From the beginning the
Christian moralist did not condemn slavery as
in se, or essentially, against the
natural law or natural
justice. The fact that slavery, tempered with many humane restrictions, was permitted under the Mosaic law would have sufficed to prevent the institution form being condemned by
Christian teachers as absolutely immoral. They, following the example of
St. Paul, implicitly accept slavery as not in itself incompatible with the
Christian Law. The apostle counsels slaves to obey their masters, and to bear with their condition patiently. This estimate of slavery continued to prevail till it became fixed in the systematized
ethical teaching of the
schools; and so it remained without any conspicuous modification till towards the end of the eighteenth century. We may take as representative de Lugo’s statement of the chief argument offered in
proof of the thesis that slavery, apart from all abuses, is not in itself contrary to the
natural law. Slavery consists in this, that a man is
obliged, for his whole life, to devoted his labour and services to a master. Now as anybody may justly bind himself, for the sake of some anticipated reward, to give his entire services to a master for a year, and he would in
justice be bound to fulfil this contract, why may not he bind himself in like manner for a longer period, even for his entire lifetime, an
obligation which would constitute slavery? (De Justitia et Jure, disp. VI, sec. 2. no. 14.) It must be observed that the defence of what may be termed theoretical slavery was by no means intended to be a justification of slavery as it existed historically, with all its attendant, and almost inevitably attendant, abuses, disregarding the natural
rights of the slave and entailing pernicious consequences on the character of the slave-holding class, as well as on
society in general. Concurrently with the affirmation that slavery is not against the
natural law, the
moralists specify what are the natural inviolable
rights of the slave, and the corresponding
duties of the owner. The gist of this teaching is summarized by
Cardinal Gerdil (1718-1802):
Slavery is not to be understood as conferring on one man the same power over another that men have over cattle. Wherefore they
erred who in former times refused to include slaves among
persons; and believed that however barbarously the master treated his slave he did not violate any right of the slave. For slavery does not abolish the natural equality of men: hence by slavery one man is understood to become subject to the dominion of another to the extent that the master has a perpetual right to all those services which one man may justly perform for another; and subject to the condition that the master shall take due care of his slave and treat him humanely (Comp. Instit. Civil., L, vii). The master was judged to
sin against
justice if he treated his slave cruelly, if he overloaded him with labour, deprived him of adequate food and clothing, or if he separated husband from wife, or the mother from her young children. It may be said that the approved
ethical view of slavery was that while, religiously speaking, it could not be condemned as against the
natural law, and had on its side the
jus gentium, it was looked upon with disfavour as at best merely tolerable, and when judged by its consequences, a positive
evil.