Hume realizes that his realm of impressions and ideas is already structured, and then he comes to think that there must be some fundamental elements behind such structures. He calls those elements “simple ideas”.
And how do we compose those structures starting from simple ideas? He says it is by “association”. Therefore, there must be some principles of association.
But what is this “association”? Is it an spontaneous activity of the “understanding” which operates upon its “simple ideas”? Or is it an effect produced by “external” agents on the “understanding”?
There is obviously at least another option concerning the structured realm of impressions and ideas: structures are elemental, and “simple ideas” are just an unnecessary postulate of the “understanding”. However, Hume did not explore this alternative. At any rate, if there is another possible option for the structured nature of the realm of impressions and ideas and it is not contradictory, Hume’s doctrine is not a “relation of ideas” and, therefore, does not possess the characteristics of necessity that “relations of ideas” have.
So, what are the principles of association, according to Hume? He writes the following:
*“It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse this is so observable that any particular thought, which breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread of discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the subject of conversation. Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: a certain proof that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind.”
“Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are connected together; I do not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a subject, however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect.”
“That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original: the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others: and if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it. But that this enumeration is complete, and that there are no other principles of association except these, may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader, or even to a man’s own satisfaction. All we can do, in such cases, is to run over several instances, and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other, never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible. The more instances we examine, and the more care we employ, the more assurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is complete and entire.”*
Indeed, it would be very difficult to prove that Resemblance, Contiguity, and Cause and Effect are the complete list of the principles of association. How could we, for instance, based only on those principles, build the complex idea of Pythagoras’ theorem? How could we build Galileo’s principle? Hume was very smart when he admitted that he could not prove the completeness of his list.
But let’s look at the details: simple ideas are continually there, at least hypothetically, in our understanding, isolated from each other. Those simple ideas are what Hume calls “impressions”, and are distinguished from those other “perceptions” that Hume calls “ideas” in that they are more “lively”. But, what does “lively” mean? Does it mean that while impressions produce strong
effects on us (sensations, feelings, emotions…), ideas produce just dull
effects? If simple ideas are, by themselves, isolated from each other, how is it that they can
affect us?
Anyway, Hume suggests that we continually make associations between the simple ideas that emerge in our conscience. So,
we produce complex ideas; we are the cause of complex ideas.… But, isn’t this an indication that “Cause and effect” is a peculiar principle of association which has to be distinguished from Resemblance and Contiguity, because it is not only an epistemological principle, but an ontological one: When our “understanding” associates ideas (either simple or complex already) by Resemblance or Contiguity, isn’t “Cause and effect” immanent there? Yes, it is there, precisely because our “understanding” is producing the complex ideas.
:coffeeread: :hypno: :jrbirdman: :takeoff:
