Why is freedom a necessary attribute of a personal being?

[blase6]

God created human beings in his own image and likeness and since God has a free will so do human beings and this is why human beings have a free will, because God has one.

This does not answer my question: Why does any person necessarily have freedom? What is it about freedom that makes it a requisite for a personal being?

 

[davidv]

I have attempted to show you how I am correct way too many times. You simply cannot or will not see it. I give up on you.

That is because you have failed to provide a reasonable (logically valid) argument.

 

[davidv]

This does not answer my question: Why does any person necessarily have freedom?

Because that is the way God created us. In His image and likeness.

What is it about freedom that makes it a requisite for a personal being?

This is backwards. Freedom is appropriate as a gift from the creator. You have freedom because you are person made in God image and likeness.

 

[blase6]

Because that is the way God created us. In His image and likeness.

This is backwards. Freedom is appropriate as a gift from the creator. You have freedom because you are person made in God image and likeness.

My question applies to God as well as created persons. Why does a person have to have freedom?

 

[blase6]

That is because you have failed to provide a reasonable (logically valid) argument.

No, I have attempted to show you the predictable means by which the will chooses. You will not see it, because you still hold to the idea that your choice is ultimately your own without external (name removed by moderator)ut.

 

[davidv]

No, I have attempted to show you the predictable means by which the will chooses. You will not see it, because you still hold to the idea that your choice is ultimately your own without external (name removed by moderator)ut.

The bolded is not my position. Why do you think it is?

 

[blase6]

The bolded is not my position. Why do you think it is?

You think that after motives present themselves to the will, then the will just so happens to choose one without predetermined bias. I simply don’t see that, in observation of my own and other people’s actions.

 

[ChainBreaker]

You think that after motives present themselves to the will, then the will just so happens to choose one without predetermined bias. I simply don’t see that, in observation of my own and other people’s actions.

We choose either what we **reason **to be morally good, or we choose what we reason to be good for our pleasure in the context of our existential predicament.

Will begins in the intellect. We have the knowledge of possibilities. Of course we are never really free to go against that which we reason to be good for us, for every act is an act for the good no matter how irrational that act turns out to be. Even a person contemplating suicide is deciding whether or not that is good for him or her. In that context it would seem that we do not have freewill. But we are free to choose between personal pleasure and God. This is where our freewill is most evident. Secondly our will is not determined in respect to possibilities in the sense that we are no forced to choose between some particular thing without reason but rather we have the freedom to reason and analyze what is good or better.

Perhaps one should say that we have “free-reason” rather than “freewill”, since we have no choice but to act.

 

[blase6]

We choose either what we **reason **to be morally good, or we choose what we reason to be good for our pleasure in the context of our existential predicament.

Will begins in the intellect. We have the knowledge of possibilities. Of course we are never really free to go against that which we reason to be good for us, for every act is an act for the good no matter how irrational that act turns out to be. Even a person contemplating suicide is deciding whether or not that is good for him or her. In that context it would seem that we do not have freewill. But we are free to choose between personal pleasure and God. This is where our freewill is most evident. Secondly our will is not determined in respect to possibilities in the sense that we are no forced to choose between some particular thing without reason but rather we have the freedom to reason and analyze what is good or better.

Perhaps one should say that we have “free-reason” rather than “freewill”, since we have no choice but to act.

Again, “freedom to reason” is meaningless. Every person’s reason is determined by the intellect and how the brain actualizes thoughts. I don’t think that this is what the Church means by “freedom”.

And still everyone wants to argue with me on whether free will exists, instead of addressing the original point of this thread: Why do persons have to be free?

 

[ChainBreaker]

Again, “freedom to reason” is meaningless. Every person’s reason is determined by the intellect and how the brain actualizes thoughts. I don’t think that this is what the Church means by “freedom”.

And still everyone wants to argue with me on whether free will exists, instead of addressing the original point of this thread: Why do persons have to be free?

Love does not force itself on man’s destiny. Secondly you are saying that the intellect and our act of reason is reducible to brain activity alone in which case of course free-reason is meaningless.

 

[davidv]

You think that after motives present themselves to the will, then the will just so happens to choose one without predetermined bias. I simply don’t see that, in observation of my own and other people’s actions.

That is not my position either. The choice is not happenstance. It is reasoned.

 

[blase6]

That is not my position either. The choice is not happenstance. It is reasoned.

Reasoning doesn’t seem to be a choice, it seems to just happen.

 

[John_Martin]

Reasoning doesn’t seem to be a choice, it seems to just happen.

What does happen, and how?
I am walking along the road on the sidewalk. I know this setting, walking it every day.
Then I sense (eyes) a small rectangular dark object ahead on the sidewalk.
The object now in my thoughts (delivered by my brain from my eyes) is new.
Being new, not known, my will is prompted by my intellect to desire with the understanding that “It would be good to know what it is”
My will then moves my appetite for sensitive cognizance to move my feet to walk toward it, my back to stoop over, my eyes to focus to the correct aperture, etc. When at the point where I can make out its detail, my appetite for cognizance is satisfied and I stop,
My eyes read “SNICKERS” on the rectangular object, and now the object in my thoughts is a Snickers bar.

I know “what it is” in my intellect. I know it is good to be united to it (in my mouth) in my rational thought. and my appetite for food, attentive to my reason, desires what is good to eat. It does not choose to desire. It simply and mindlessly desires what the reason knows is good to eat. The understanding knows “What it is”, the reason declares “It is Good (or not)” automatically. And the appetite desires (moves the hand to reach for it). The understanding of What is a separate activity, as is the reasoning of goodness, as is the appetitive desire (therefore bodily movement) of union with goodness.

Then, my intellective reason, desires to know the whole reality. This is the beginning of “moral decision”. Why is a candy bar lying on the sidewalk. Speculative reason begins reasoning through possibilities that will make sense, so that the intellect will be satisfied with the big picture of the truth of a candy bar on the sidewalk. “Phantasms” of possible reasons are formed in the brain - someone walking along dropped it; someone poisoned it and left it there to hurt another person, etc.

With each image, various sensitive appetites are triggered to look around with the eyes and bodily turning, etc. They are triggered by the reasoned understanding of the relative goodness or badness of the phantasms’ contents. They also are moved by the will to hesitate reaching for the candy bar. Desirability is now tempered by a new uncertainty in the reason concerning goodness to eat.

At some point, the reason, not the will, comes to a conclusion - “Yes, this would be good to eat and safety concerns are minimal and no one is coming back to look for a lost Snickers bar so it is not stealing” (that last one is a questionable assumption - I would go back to find one that I dropped).

With this decision of goodness, the will desires and removes the caution flags from the sensitive appetites, such that they move the body to satisfaction.

 

[Vico]

In my reading of the CCC, Aquinas, this forum, etc. I constantly come across arguments which assume that a person is necessarily free.

I cannot understand how a contingent being can ultimately determine its own actions from itself. It contradicts my understanding of causality in the spiritual and physical world. Since I have grown tired of repeating incessantly my position on this matter, I will redirect those reading this to look up the “dilemma of determinism”. This is the most significant problem with the idea of free will.

My understanding of what personhood entails, for a creature, is that it has an awareness of spiritual matters, including its own identity as a spiritual creature, having a spirit as part or all of its being, and an awareness of God.

The Church claims that a person has the capacity to act ultimately of its own accord, without the necessitation of its actions from external factors. (At least in some instances; you can’t will or will not for your heart to beat.)

How this can coexist with the dilemma of determinism, and why this is a necessary attribute of all persons, is beyond me.

God gives each man a limited elective power (will or rational appetite). Man can freely choose between different forms of good. None of the choices exhausts our limited conception of the good so none of them totally satiates or entices the rational appetite irresistibly.

 

[blase6]

God gives each man a limited elective power (will or rational appetite). Man can freely choose between different forms of good. None of the choices exhausts our limited conception of the good so none of them totally satiates or entices the rational appetite irresistibly.

This is not what I meant. I meant that the option presented to us in a given situation, which attracts our desire more than any other option, appears to always be the option chosen.

 

[blase6]

What does happen, and how?
I am walking along the road on the sidewalk. I know this setting, walking it every day.
Then I sense (eyes) a small rectangular dark object ahead on the sidewalk.
The object now in my thoughts (delivered by my brain from my eyes) is new.
Being new, not known, my will is prompted by my intellect to desire with the understanding that “It would be good to know what it is”
My will then moves my appetite for sensitive cognizance to move my feet to walk toward it, my back to stoop over, my eyes to focus to the correct aperture, etc. When at the point where I can make out its detail, my appetite for cognizance is satisfied and I stop,
My eyes read “SNICKERS” on the rectangular object, and now the object in my thoughts is a Snickers bar.

I know “what it is” in my intellect. I know it is good to be united to it (in my mouth) in my rational thought. and my appetite for food, attentive to my reason, desires what is good to eat. It does not choose to desire. It simply and mindlessly desires what the reason knows is good to eat. The understanding knows “What it is”, the reason declares “It is Good (or not)” automatically. And the appetite desires (moves the hand to reach for it). The understanding of What is a separate activity, as is the reasoning of goodness, as is the appetitive desire (therefore bodily movement) of union with goodness.

Then, my intellective reason, desires to know the whole reality. This is the beginning of “moral decision”. Why is a candy bar lying on the sidewalk. Speculative reason begins reasoning through possibilities that will make sense, so that the intellect will be satisfied with the big picture of the truth of a candy bar on the sidewalk. “Phantasms” of possible reasons are formed in the brain - someone walking along dropped it; someone poisoned it and left it there to hurt another person, etc.

With each image, various sensitive appetites are triggered to look around with the eyes and bodily turning, etc. They are triggered by the reasoned understanding of the relative goodness or badness of the phantasms’ contents. They also are moved by the will to hesitate reaching for the candy bar. Desirability is now tempered by a new uncertainty in the reason concerning goodness to eat.

At some point, the reason, not the will, comes to a conclusion - “Yes, this would be good to eat and safety concerns are minimal and no one is coming back to look for a lost Snickers bar so it is not stealing” (that last one is a questionable assumption - I would go back to find one that I dropped).

With this decision of goodness, the will desires and removes the caution flags from the sensitive appetites, such that they move the body to satisfaction.

Nothing in this shows me how freedom exists.

 

[Vico]

This is not what I meant. I meant that the option presented to us in a given situation, which attracts our desire more than any other option, appears to always be the option chosen.

The will follows the judgment made by the intellect between options. There are two kinds of appetites based consequentially upon the two kinds of knowledge: sense and intellectual. The sense appetite tends to particular goods, and the rational will to universal goodness. The sources of sin reveal the type of judgment: ignorance, passion, and malice.

 

[John_Martin]

Nothing in this shows me how freedom exists.

Oh, I know that, Blase ,
I was just showing how it “just happens” to your post where you said, “Reasoning doesn’t seem to be a choice, it seems to just happen.”

This was the mechanics of it. It is possible to decompose to its events rather than a thing that just seems to happen. My description was somewhat at a high level also, that could be dissected further.

 

[blase6]

The will follows the judgment made by the intellect between options. There are two kinds of appetites based consequentially upon the two kinds of knowledge: sense and intellectual. The sense appetite tends to particular goods, and the rational will to universal goodness. The sources of sin reveal the type of judgment: ignorance, passion, and malice.

This does not support freedom in the presence of a deterministic will.

 

[blase6]

Oh, I know that, Blase ,
I was just showing how it “just happens” to your post where you said, “Reasoning doesn’t seem to be a choice, it seems to just happen.”

This was the mechanics of it. It is possible to decompose to its events rather than a thing that just seems to happen. My description was somewhat at a high level also, that could be dissected further.

Nowhere in the entire chain of reasoning seems to involve an undetermined choice.