Why there is no such thing as objective morality

[dbg]

because one is objectively obliged to do those things that one is earnestly snd sincerely convinced she is objectively obliged to to do.

look, if you’ve done your level best to inform yourself as to your moral duty in some circumstance, and you have come to the conclusion that X is the right action to perform, then how could you not be obliged to perform X?

but this is still an objective moral duty: it is the instance where what you’re calling one’s “objective” and one’s “subjective” moral duties coincide.

so. far from being a counterexample to “objective” morality, this is in fact a proof of it.

You seem to have mispoken or committed yourself to a contradiction. If there is an objective obligation “to do those things that one is earnestly snd sincerely convinced she is objectively obliged to to do” and in a particular case she is “earnestly snd sincerely convinced” that “she is objectively obliged to to do” something which is not only objectively permissible but objectively forbidden, then she would be with reference to the same act both objectively obliged to do it and objectively forbidden from doing it. Do you see the problem here? I’ll leave it to you to resolve it.

 

[dbg]

You just gave a perfect example why we cannot deny objective morality without affirming its existence. Just look at this statement an ask yourself this question - is this an objective statement about morality or a subjective statement about morality.

If if merely subjective, then why believe it. If it is objective, then you have just disproved your argument.

It is an objective statement about morality but statements about morality are not themselves necessarily moral claims. Meta-moral claims are not necessarily moral claims just as meta-mathematical claims are not necessarily mathematical claims (some may be for example, philosophical claims). Within the realm of mathematics, a meta-first-order-logic statement is not itself a first-order-logic statement. In the case of morality, if for some weird reason, all left-handed persons believed cloning was moral and all right-handed persons believed cloning was not so moral, then it would not be a moral claim – objective or otherwise – to simply observe that such was the case. Likewise, it is not a moral claim to say that there is no objective morality – that is to say it is not a claim as to whether or not something is moral; it is rather a claim as to the nature of morality itself. So, when I say there is no objective morality, I mean only that there are no objective moral values – not to say that there are no universal moral values, just that there are no object-based, subject-independent ones. That there are no objective moral values is not itself a moral value (it is a question of fact, not a question of value – the value-fact distinction) and so no self-contradiction like the one you suppose arises.

What is this “We”? And what is this “ought”. Both words implies a unversal, objective morality

“We” is all human persons. “Ought” refers to what is desirable given that we all desire to be true to reality (the reality that there is no objective morality). As I said above, I do not disbelieve in a universal morality (if by universal you mean uniform, the same for every person, I do disbelieve that – if by universal you mean to include situations where people have in certain ways similar but as a whole still unique sets of moral values then that may well be true). Subjective morality has the potential to be universal.

Morality mean, in a nutshell, what a person OUGHT to do.

The way I see it, morality is just simply what we desire, those things we value and the judgments we make as to what most desirably achieves those things we value. Think about it and u’ll see that it is impossible to conceive of a personal morality separate from what you desire. Aquinas wrote that to be human is to desire to be happy. We cannot conceive of an “ought” separate from our desires. We cannot for example sincerely and genuinely commit to self-damnation because we think we ought to do it even at the expense of happiness, contrary to Paul’s assertion in the NT.

So by telling everyone that they should apply only a subjective morality, you yourself must apply an objective morality on everyone. This is a self-contradiction.

It’s not. People should apply only a subjective morality not because that is preferable to an objective one, but rather because – as a matter of fact as opposed to a matter of value – the former actually exists whereas the latter does not actually exist. That people “should” do this only means that given the fact that they desire to be true to reality (who doesn’t?) they should to further that end, drop the notion of objective morality.

If there were to exist someone who truly desired to have false beliefs rather than true beliefs, then that person should NOT (relative to his morality) drop his notion of objective morality - he should keep it since he desires false beliefs. No one like that exists today but someone like that did exist in the Matrix movies … whether it’s possible for someone like that to exist, I don’t know for sure, but I doubt it.

 

[dbg]

You know, since the belief that there are no moral absolutes is immediately self-refuting, it’s automatically guaranteed that there’s a flaw in your argument somewhere.

I explained to another person above why it is not self-refuting.

Yes, it’s true that one is always obliged to follow his conscience.

Good we’ve established that point (yet you seem to muddy it when you seem to make some kind of exception for human rights violations – I assume you are talking there not of subjective obligation but of what society should do to prevent people from following their erroneous consciences, in which case the matter is still clear and I only didn’t understand)

But your statement makes no sense, because you say that a man sincerely convinced of atheism “ought not believe God exists.”

The reason that makes no sense is because this isn’t a matter of “ought” or “should”: such a man cannot (is not able to) believe in God.

But you are correct that there is a subjective obligation regarding what to believe that rises out of such a man’s disbelief in God.

A person genuinely convinced that there is no God should not lie to himself and try to pretend he DOES believe.

OK, let’s set aside the issue you raised above, and consider the case of someone who believed in God yet considered him to be evil and was convinced it was his duty to curse God (similar to how some Gnostics believed God or the creator of this world was evil). It would seem that such a man – if earnestly and sincerely convinced – would be subjectively obliged to curse God! How do you reconcile that with objective morality (namely the notion that God is so great that objectively we ought never curse him and applying the reasoning I gave in my initial post to this situation that doesn’t involve impossibilities (since it is possible now for the man to curse God)

The bottom line is this - and please respond to this point specifically, to both of them:

If moral relativists practiced what they preach, they would have no objection to someone’s raping a child, using nuclear weapons, or engaging in heinous acts of torture.

No one desires evil – that is no one desires what he takes to be evil or bad … no one says, “this is so evil! Yes! I’m just loving this; this is so bad!” – that would be an oxymoronic statement, a self-contradictory statement.

And I do not see how it is possible for a person to have a set of values inclusive of this basic desire for the good, that would be consistent with a belief that rape or wanton heinous torture is good. So those who believe in such things would simply have inconsistent belief systems and my response would be to show how theirs is consistent – to make their second-order, that is derivative values, consistent with their first-order or fundamental values. So my response would not be one of condemnation, but of showing how to make their own value system consistent with itself.

And I don’t see the problem in the first place. Any objection I have would be an objection relative to my values, not one relative to some objective standard. So yes I object to wanton torture, but I object inasmuch as it contradicts what I value most – that is I simply say that I do not desire wanton torture to occur. For me to go further and to say that others should not torture wantonly would be to say that if they are to be true to their own core values then they would realize that wanton torture contradicts their own core values, as explained above.

I object to the smell of garlic (suppose) – but that does not commit me to a belief in an objective standard of smell! Likewise, my objectiving to wanton torture, does not commit me to a belief in an objective standard of morality.

If moral relativists preached what they practice, they would start preaching a belief in moral absolutes.

You’ll have to elaborate. Perhaps this is the self-refutation someone else brought up, in which I case I already refuted it.

(If it’s not too much to burden you with one more question which might distract from your original points - and it may be too much to ask, so don’t feel obligated to let me switch the focus of this thread - I would like to know how you apply your belief that there is no such thing as objective morality in your life. Perhaps by my understanding of moral absolutes you actually do believe in them. Would you characterize the actions of extermination, genocide, forced labor, and brutal experimentation on humans during the Nazi Holocaust, for example, as objectively evil? The acts, I mean?

The acts cannot be separated from the persons inasmuch as they are acts OF persons as opposed to mere physical random events of nature. The acts were SUBJECTIVELY not as good as could be (privatory with respect to goodness) inasmuch as they were not true expressions of what the guilty parties truly desired – and since everyone desires the good – the good is after all that which is desirable – inasmuch as those acts were incompatible with their desire for the good, they were not true expressions of their true desires. It is like when someone in a heated argument says something that he immediately or perhaps after some time regrets and apologizes by saying, “I didn’t really mean that” – that’s true, he didn’t really mean it since it wasn’t a true expression of what is his utmost desire.

All he could say about the Holocaust was, “I certainly wouldn’t have done that, but I can’t honestly say with absolute certainty that such acts are objectively evil.” Would you agree with that sentiment? If not, how would you reconcile that with your relativism?)

No I would go further and say that those acts are not objectively evil, but only subjectively evil relative to each subject since objective good and evil doesn’t exist in the first place.

What is the good? it is by definition that which is desirable – how is this concept of the good able to be formulated in a non-subjective way then? Impossible!

 

[Sailor_Kenshin]

This is the kind of muddled thinking that only years of a public education can bring.

The Ten Commandments. They are real. Any such obfusticating is not only Protestantism, but in fact, choosing evil over good.

 

[john_doran]

I explained to another person above why it is not self-refuting.

i agree, it’s not self-refuting.

dbg:

OK, let’s set aside the issue you raised above, and consider the case of someone who believed in God yet considered him to be evil and was convinced it was his duty to curse God (similar to how some Gnostics believed God or the creator of this world was evil). It would seem that such a man – if earnestly and sincerely convinced – would be subjectively obliged to curse God! How do you reconcile that with objective morality (namely the notion that God is so great that objectively we ought never curse him and applying the reasoning I gave in my initial post to this situation that doesn’t involve impossibilities (since it is possible now for the man to curse God)

cursing god for that man would be objectively wrong, but a wrong for which he would be subjectively blameless.

dbg:

No one desires evil – that is no one desires what he takes to be evil or bad … no one says, “this is so evil! Yes! I’m just loving this; this is so bad!” – that would be an oxymoronic statement, a self-contradictory statement.

sure, but so what? what if someone understands rape and torture as good? then they’ll be raping and torturing and thinking how awesome it is.

dbg:

And I do not see how it is possible for a person to have a set of values inclusive of this basic desire for the good, that would be consistent with a belief that rape or wanton heinous torture is good.

easy: if that person understands the good to be “anything i feel like doing”, and he feels like torturing and raping.

dbg:

So those who believe in such things would simply have inconsistent belief systems

not if “the good” for that person is defined as “anything i feel like doing”, and he feels like raping and torturing.

dbg:

and my response would be to show how theirs is consistent – to make their second-order, that is derivative values, consistent with their first-order or fundamental values.

what if their fundamental value is to do whatever they feel like doing whenever they feel like doing it?

dbg:

And I don’t see the problem in the first place. Any objection I have would be an objection relative to my values, not one relative to some objective standard. So yes I object to wanton torture, but I object inasmuch as it contradicts what I value most – that is I simply say that I do not desire wanton torture to occur.

precisely. but what do you say to someone else who does desire (wanton) torture to occur?

how do you tell them that they are mistakenly valuing torture and rape if their is no system of values that is objective?

dbg:

For me to go further and to say that others should not torture wantonly would be to say that if they are to be true to their own core values then they would realize that wanton torture contradicts their own core values, as explained above.

only if it contradicts their core values. what if it doesn’t?

dbg:

I object to the smell of garlic (suppose) – but that does not commit me to a belief in an objective standard of smell! Likewise, my objectiving to wanton torture, does not commit me to a belief in an objective standard of morality.

what has this got to do with anything? no one argues for an objective morality based on the fact that they don’t like doing certain things…

there isn’t an argument for an objective morality in that sense: that there is such an objective morality isn’t capable of deductive demostration any more than is the existence of an objective reality, or the past, or other minds, or…

i’m not sure i understand the rest of your post, so i’ll stop there.

 

[dbg]

i agree, it’s not self-refuting.

Cool.

cursing god for that man would be objectively wrong, but a wrong for which he would be subjectively blameless.

OK.

easy: if that person understands the good to be “anything i feel like doing”, and he feels like torturing and raping.

Not so easy. Every man desires happiness such that he does not desire anything more than he desires to be happy. (There is no one would could genuninely for example desire that he suffer eternally and excruciatingly if that be ordained by the god he desires to serve – what Paul says in scripture notwithstanding)

So any understanding of the good as “anything I feel like doing” would have to be consistent with the good of happiness which he desires, unsurpassed by any other desire. Well, I think then that you and I both agree that raping and wantonly torturing do not further the goal of happiness and in fact tend to subtract from it. Then to the above person you mentioned, one could simply show that the person’s own desire to be happy would have him refrain from those things. You could I suppose point to studies that showed it (should any exist) or reason about it from the armchair.

what if their fundamental value is to do whatever they feel like doing whenever they feel like doing it?

It’s not possible that that fundamental value is more fundamental than the value that they place on their own happiness. I think even Aquinas said as much.

only if it contradicts their core values. what if it doesn’t?

If it doesn’t – and I don’t think such is possible but let’s suppose – then I could not call their acts morally defective (their acts may still be undesirable from a pragmatic point of view but one could make any negative moral evaluation of them)

there isn’t an argument for an objective morality in that sense: that there is such an objective morality isn’t capable of deductive demostration any more than is the existence of an objective reality, or the past, or other minds, or…

What do you mean by “objective reality” – do you mean merely the existence of concrete things other than subjects? I may agree with you there inasmuch as some form of Idealism ala Berkeley or Leibniz cannot be excluded. In terms of the existence of other minds, I think the existence of at least one mind other than one’s own can be deduced, but deducing the existence of any particular mind – I agree cannot be deductively demonstrated … this would be especially evident should technology advance to the point that robots indistinguishable from humans roam about. But there are non-demonstrative arguments for the existence of other minds and such but I don’t see any for the existence of objective morality.

Thank you for your post.

 

[ncgolf]

According to your own philosophical tradition, a man is always bound to follow his conscience. So, hypothetically, if a man were sincerely convinced that there is no God, he ought not believe God exists and in fact ought believe that it doesn’t exist.

What does this have to do with morality? Whether you believe in God or not does not the effect the existence of God. God can exist whether I believe it or not. Look at gravity … you don’t have to believe in gravity … you are free to do so … at your own peril. I think your argument hinges too much on a personal belief … personal beliefs don’t change the existance of objective truths.

 

[john_doran]

Not so easy. Every man desires happiness such that he does not desire anything more than he desires to be happy. (There is no one would could genuninely for example desire that he suffer eternally and excruciatingly if that be ordained by the god he desires to serve – what Paul says in scripture notwithstanding)

So any understanding of the good as “anything I feel like doing” would have to be consistent with the good of happiness which he desires, unsurpassed by any other desire.

you assume that there is something like “happiness” that is a state of affairs independent of pursuing what one believes to be good. but why should anyone believe that? I mean, how is being happy not to be understood simply as consistently pursuing what one understands to be good?

And if the good is just doing what one wants when one wants to do it, and if what one wants to do is rape and torture, then consistently pursuing a life of raping and torturing (when that’s what one feels like doing), is just to be happy.

dbg:

Well, I think then that you and I both agree that raping and wantonly torturing do not further the goal of happiness and in fact tend to subtract from it. Then to the above person you mentioned, one could simply show that the person’s own desire to be happy would have him refrain from those things. You could I suppose point to studies that showed it (should any exist) or reason about it from the armchair.

i agree because i believe that there is an objective standard for what counts as being happy (as well as for what counts as “good”, and for what counts as moral and immoral).

failing that objectivity, you only agree because you happen to have been wired that way. but others happen not to have been so wired. what do you say to them? certainly you couldn’t point to what makes other people happy and say “see: you can’t be happy doing this because they’re not happy doing it” - by your lights, that simply makes no sense.

dbg:

It’s not possible that that fundamental value is more fundamental than the value that they place on their own happiness. I think even Aquinas said as much.

sure. but aquinas didn’t think of happiness as anything distinct from living a life of (successful) pursuit of the good (which he also thought was objective).

dbg:

If it doesn’t – and I don’t think such is possible but let’s suppose – then I could not call their acts morally defective (their acts may still be undesirable from a pragmatic point of view but one could make any negative moral evaluation of them)

exactly.

dbg:

What do you mean by “objective reality” – do you mean merely the existence of concrete things other than subjects? I may agree with you there inasmuch as some form of Idealism ala Berkeley or Leibniz cannot be excluded. In terms of the existence of other minds, I think the existence of at least one mind other than one’s own can be deduced

i’d love to see that proof.

dbg:

, but deducing the existence of any particular mind – I agree cannot be deductively demonstrated … this would be especially evident should technology advance to the point that robots indistinguishable from humans roam about. But there are non-demonstrative arguments for the existence of other minds

you mean inductive proofs? show me one that works.

 

[dbg]

you mean inductive proofs? show me one that works.

I have to go, but before I do, I just want to clarify that I mean evidential arguments like some evidential arguments against the existence of God based on the problem of evil. I wouldn’t call these “proofs” as I would reserve the term “proof” for something demonstrative, not for something that merely makes something probable or highly probable. Let me know if you’re still interested then. (and I’ll respond to other things you raised later as well)

 

[Jesus_N_Cherie]

Mark’s right. One’s conscience must be “well formed” in order to be “follow-able”.

Add to that. One’s conscience must also be in union with the true teachings of Christ through His Church. That would ensure that one’s conscience is well formed. Otherwise, we could fall into terrible sin. It may be true that the terrible sin might not fall into the catagory of Mortal Sin (for the three things which make a sin a Mortal Sin must be present) but it could, in fact, be a terrible sin.

 

[Jesus_N_Cherie]

I don’t know as you are going to be happy. Oddily enough, there is a group here who don’t believe in following one’s own conscience. They believe, contrary to many statements of both popes and theolgians that the Magisterium is conscious and they have only to align themselves with it to be correctly formed in conscious. They totally reject that anyone must in the end live by their own conscience. It does not good to quote directly from the CCC or the popes or anything for that matter. They simply won’t agree.

That is easily true. A Protestant would not be happy in the forum which is CATHOLIC, because the protestant denies the truths of the Holy Catholic Church…who can trace their traditions and knowledge right to Christ Himself. No protestant can do that. The person or persons who protestants follow are admittedly going against the Church. They left the Church that Christ started. They rebelled.

As for a person living according to his own conscience and nothing else, I am quite sure that Hitler, Stalin and many others who have done atrocious things throughout the timeline of humanity have followed their own consciences. Had they followed the Catholic Church and her teachings, they would not have committed such atrocities.
And don’t go starting in on the Crusades and the Spanish Inquisition and such. There weren’t infallible doctrines or dogmas for those actions. Those actions were performed by people in the Church…even popes(who are mortal men and not perfect). They were not ‘the’ Church, or her teachings. The very same way that the horrible molestations committed by and covered up by priests and bishops of the Catholic Church were not acts of the Church. There is nothing in doctrine or dogma which accepts these acts or promotes them. They are condemnable acts. But one cannot say that it was the Church that committed them. It was individuals in the Church that committed them.

 

[Jesus_N_Cherie]

Let’s examine this quote.

First, it states that we must always obey the certain judgement of our conscience. The fact that this distinction is made means that an uncertain judgement must be possible. This sentence does not clarify what “certainty” means.

Thus, we move on to the third sentence. Here it is stated that the conscience can “make erroneous judgements”. This means that the conscience can be decieved or misled into falsehood.

The third sentence clarifies the first. We are bound to obey the “certain” judgements of our concience, but if and only if they are in fact certain. Since the concience can be misled, certainity in this case seems to refer to an accurate judgement.



Now, the only way we can determine if our judgement is in fact certain (accurate) is to hold it up to the standard of the infallible Church and the natural law. These two things provide a way to double-check and reform our consicence to the truth.

 

[Jesus_N_Cherie]

You show a shallow understanding of the Catholic faith. True, the Church does teach that we should follow our conscience. But the Church goes on to say that this is a conscience* well-formed by the teachings of the Catholic Church*.

You are building a straw man. The only types of Christians that would believe that sincerity is enough are liberal Protestants and Catholics, and New Agers. And these types of “Christians” would agree with you - that there is no such thing as absolute truth.

Those that believe in absolute truth on the Protestant side are Protestant evangelicals and fundementalists. Fundementalists totally opposes to the idea of “letting your conscience be your guide”. If you are not a Christian you will fry. Evangelicals would see God showing some kind of mercy to the heathen in Africa. But once a person hears the gospel and he rejects it, there is no hope for him no matter how sincere he is.

Those that believe in absolute truth on the Catholic side are traditional and conservative Catholics, which is what I am. We try to follow closely the teachings of the Catholic Church. The Church promises that those Christians who die in a state of grace will go heaven. Now, the Church acknowledges that God’s mercy far extends to what He has explicitly promised. The Church will not box God in. We must allow God to be God. So, in view of God’s abundant mercies, God COULD have compassion on Jew, a Muslim, or even an atheist who, even though they had not believed in Christ, sincerely loved God and man. Again, I want to emphasize that God COULD, not that God necessarily WILL. Since there is no explicit promise from God that he will do this, it is still very possible that this person would go to hell. Only God can judge.

So, as I just show, no one who believes in absolute truth believes that sincerity is enough or that it is enough to let your conscience be your guide. You are building a straw man.

Again, I say AMEN!!!

 

[bogeydogg]

“We” is all human persons. “Ought” refers to what is desirable given that we all desire to be true to reality (the reality that there is no objective morality). As I said above, I do not disbelieve in a universal morality (if by universal you mean uniform, the same for every person, I do disbelieve that – if by universal you mean to include situations where people have in certain ways similar but as a whole still unique sets of moral values then that may well be true). Subjective morality has the potential to be universal.

You just said that universal objective morality exists but we only experience it subjectively.

Ought-ness is not that which we feel to be desirable but rather which we ought to do independent of ourselves. The fact that you admit it is universal, although only in our experiential subjectivity, proves its objective existence. And if it exists objectively in any sense, then that morality which flows from it is also universal and objective.

 

[Jesus_N_Cherie]

No one desires evil – that is no one desires what he takes to be evil or bad … no one says, “this is so evil! Yes! I’m just loving this; this is so bad!” – that would be an oxymoronic statement, a self-contradictory statement.

You are very wrong. I have known at least one person who believed and loved evil for evil’s sake. He knew his actions and beliefs to be evil, and he enjoyed practicing evil for the sake of evil itself. He believed that satan was stronger than God, and made satan his god.
That is the religion of satan. It is the religion of many. Fortunatly, God is Almighty and All Powerful. And Divine Mercy in Itself.

 

[Jesus_N_Cherie]

Think about it and u’ll see that it is impossible to conceive of a personal morality separate from what you desire. Aquinas wrote that to be human is to desire to be happy. We cannot conceive of an “ought” separate from our desires. We cannot for example sincerely and genuinely commit to self-damnation because we think we ought to do it even at the expense of happiness, contrary to Paul’s assertion in the NT.

I desire to be involved in the act of fornication. My personal morality says that this is a evil because I have been down this road before and it led to much personal destruction. Morality based on Christianity (that which I follow with all of my heart and soul), tells me that it is evil. My personal morality, along with the morality I have learned from the Catholic Church is one in the same. Yet, my personal desire is to be involved in the act of fornication.

 

[john_doran]

I have to go, but before I do, I just want to clarify that I mean evidential arguments like some evidential arguments against the existence of God based on the problem of evil. I wouldn’t call these “proofs” as I would reserve the term “proof” for something demonstrative, not for something that merely makes something probable or highly probable.

right. the logical term for what you’re calling “demonstrative”, is “deductive”; and the term for a bit of reasoning that makes its conclusion more or less probable is “inductive”.

you’re saying you have one or more inductive arguments for the existence of other minds (or at least one other mind).

dbg:

Let me know if you’re still interested then. (and I’ll respond to other things you raised later as well)

absolutely. fire away…

 

[Henning]

of course there’s objective morality
for example code from Exodus 20

13 Thou shalt not murder
14 Thou shalt not commit adultery
15 Thou shalt not steal

not Moses’ subjective directives

 

[Transformer]

I explained to another person above why it is not self-refuting.

Regarding the post you are alluding to:

It is an objective statement about morality but statements about morality are not themselves necessarily moral claims.

Some statements about morality may not be moral claims. The total denial of any objective moral values, however, is a moral claim. More below.

Likewise, it is not a moral claim to say that there is no objective morality – that is to say it is not a claim as to whether or not something is moral; it is rather a claim as to the nature of morality itself.

But it is a moral claim. The objectivity or subjectivity of morality is a moral value, not just a factual one. To presuppose some kind of contrast between the nature of “values” and that of “facts” is to presuppose relativism; I do not grant that assumption. To claim that the nature of morality does not include objective rules, independent of differing circumstances constitutes an appeal to a subject-independent, object-based moral value.

I mean … that there are no object-based, subject-independent [values].

That statement asserts that the value it expresses is objective.

That there are no objective moral values is not itself a moral value (it is a question of fact, not a question of value – the value-fact distinction) and so no self-contradiction like the one you suppose arises.

When used in moral discussions, the term “value” has become ambiguous. It often is used to refer to opinions, but also can refer to statements that are (at least said to be) objectively true.

The contrast you draw between “questions of fact” and “questions of value” presupposes moral relativism; only if moral relativism is true can “values” be incapable of being facts.

Anyway, back to your reply to me:

Good we’ve established that point (yet you seem to muddy it when you seem to make some kind of exception for human rights violations – I assume you are talking there not of subjective obligation but of what society should do to prevent people from following their erroneous consciences, in which case the matter is still clear and I only didn’t understand)

Let me clarify that point, then. I stand by my statement that even on a personal, subjective level, the conscience of a man who finds torturing children acceptable has no moral authority.

This only contradicts the supreme authority of conscience if one says conscience is unimpeachable in every situation, absolutely - no exceptions.

I do not claim this. It is usually true - and can generally be assumed - that you should not violate your conscience. There are, however, exceptions.

In fact, this discussion has made me realize something that needs to be clarified/pointed out, something that I believe constitutes a better, more complete and more relevant answer to your original argument from conscience:

One’s conscience doesn’t necessarily exist to tell us what is right and what is wrong. Rather, conscience exists to tell us when we’ve done something wrong. There is a fine but significant difference between the two.

The reason one “should” never violate his conscience is because one “should” never knowingly commit evil. That is the reason one should generally always obey his conscience, and it presupposes that a person already knows right from wrong.

But in the case of a man who feels morally compelled to commit an act which is actually objectively immoral, following his conscience no longer will accomplish that goal. That is when one cannot be said to be obligated to follow his conscience.

I think that keeping in mind the whole reason behind the authority of conscience will make the solution to any further disputes about conscience absolutely clear.

OK, let’s set aside the issue you raised above, and consider the case of someone who believed in God yet considered him to be evil and was convinced it was his duty to curse God (similar to how some Gnostics believed God or the creator of this world was evil). It would seem that such a man – if earnestly and sincerely convinced – would be subjectively obliged to curse God! How do you reconcile that with objective morality (namely the notion that God is so great that objectively we ought never curse him and applying the reasoning I gave in my initial post to this situation that doesn’t involve impossibilities (since it is possible now for the man to curse God)

Of course it is objectively immoral to curse God. But how exactly does that not allow for the possibility of someone feeling subjectively compelled to curse God? Feeling morally compelled to do something does not make you truly compelled to do so. To say that someone is truly subjectively compelled to commit an act is oxymoronic. The person in your example truly feels compelled to curse God, but is not truly obligated to do so.

No one desires evil – that is no one desires what he takes to be evil or bad … no one says, “this is so evil! Yes! I’m just loving this; this is so bad!” – that would be an oxymoronic statement, a self-contradictory statement.

Wrong. Deliberate malice is often understood by the one doing it to be immoral on at least some conscious level. Of course, I would agree that most of the time, no one actively desires what (s)he knows to be evil.

Such statements (“This is so evil; I love it!”) are philosophically and morally oxymoronic, but they are **not **psychologically impossible.

And I do not see how it is possible for a person to have a set of values inclusive of this basic desire for the good, that would be consistent with a belief that rape or wanton heinous torture is good.

Case in point: a “basic desire for the good”? That the nature of “the good” necessarily excludes rape and torture is an objective moral value.

So my response would not be one of condemnation, but of showing how to make their own value system consistent with itself.

That compels to repeat one of my first points:

If moral relativists preached what they practice, they would start preaching common-sense morality.

And I don’t see the problem in the first place. Any objection I have would be an objection relative to my values, not one relative to some objective standard.

Not true. You appealed to some “basic desire for the good” with which rape and torture are - according to you - fundamentally, objectively imcompatible. That is definitely an appeal to an objective moral standard.

So yes I object to wanton torture, but I object inasmuch as it contradicts what I value most – that is I simply say that I do not desire wanton torture to occur.

Okay; fair enough. That would be consistent with moral relativism - to simply say, “I do not want it to occur.” You, however, asserted that torture is fundamentally inconsistent with the set of values that includes a basic desire for the good.

For me to go further and to say that others should not torture wantonly would be to say that if they are to be true to their own core values then they would realize that wanton torture contradicts their own core values, as explained above.

But some people don’t share those “core values.” Some people don’t desire the common good. Selfish dictators who seek only their own advancement and power have not hesitated throughout history to use torture. What can a moral relativist say to them? “You’re not being true to your values!” would simply be false. Only an absolutist can say, “What you’re doing is wrong, whether you believe it to be so or not; and we’re going to stop you.”

What is the good? It is by definition that which is desirable – how is this concept of the good able to be formulated in a non-subjective way then? Impossible!

I concur; that concept of “the good” probably cannot be formulated to express a truly objective moral code. That, however, is not the actual definition of "the good."

After all, a person afflicted with hardcore sadism as a psychological disorder truly does find causing others pain to be desirable. That doesn’t make it good.

I will not be responding for the next week or so. I’m going on a trip. Just wanted to let you know so that you don’t think I’m ignoring you.

 

[Fone_Bone_2001]

I explained to another person above why it is not self-refuting.

Regarding the post you are alluding to:

It is an objective statement about morality but statements about morality are not themselves necessarily moral claims.

Some statements about morality may not be moral claims. The total denial of any objective moral values, however, is a moral claim. More below.

Likewise, it is not a moral claim to say that there is no objective morality – that is to say it is not a claim as to whether or not something is moral; it is rather a claim as to the nature of morality itself.

But it is a moral claim. The objectivity or subjectivity of morality is a moral value, not just a factual one. To presuppose some kind of contrast between the nature of “values” and that of “facts” is to presuppose relativism; I do not grant that assumption. To claim that the nature of morality does not include objective rules, independent of differing circumstances constitutes an appeal to a subject-independent, object-based moral value.

I mean … that there are no object-based, subject-independent [values].

That statement asserts that the value it expresses is objective.

That there are no objective moral values is not itself a moral value (it is a question of fact, not a question of value – the value-fact distinction) and so no self-contradiction like the one you suppose arises.

When used in moral discussions, the term “value” has become ambiguous. It often is used to refer to opinions, but also can refer to statements that are (at least said to be) objectively true.

The contrast you draw between “questions of fact” and “questions of value” presupposes moral relativism; only if moral relativism is true can “values” be incapable of being facts.

Anyway, back to your reply to me:

Good we’ve established that point (yet you seem to muddy it when you seem to make some kind of exception for human rights violations – I assume you are talking there not of subjective obligation but of what society should do to prevent people from following their erroneous consciences, in which case the matter is still clear and I only didn’t understand)

Let me clarify that point, then. I stand by my statement that even on a personal, subjective level, the conscience of a man who finds torturing children acceptable has no moral authority.

This only contradicts the supreme authority of conscience if one says conscience is unimpeachable in every situation, absolutely - no exceptions.

I do not claim this. It is usually true - and can generally be assumed - that you should not violate your conscience. There are, however, exceptions.

In fact, this discussion has made me realize something that needs to be clarified/pointed out, something that I believe constitutes a better, more complete and more relevant answer to your original argument from conscience:

One’s conscience doesn’t necessarily exist to tell us what is right and what is wrong. Rather, conscience exists to tell us when we’ve done something wrong. There is a fine but significant difference between the two.

The reason one “should” never violate his conscience is because one “should” never knowingly commit evil. That is the reason one should generally always obey his conscience, and it presupposes that a person already knows right from wrong.

But in the case of a man who feels morally compelled to commit an act which is actually objectively immoral, following his conscience no longer will accomplish that goal. That is when one cannot be said to be obligated to follow his conscience.

I think that keeping in mind the whole reason behind the authority of conscience will make the solution to any further disputes about conscience absolutely clear.

OK, let’s set aside the issue you raised above, and consider the case of someone who believed in God yet considered him to be evil and was convinced it was his duty to curse God (similar to how some Gnostics believed God or the creator of this world was evil). It would seem that such a man – if earnestly and sincerely convinced – would be subjectively obliged to curse God! How do you reconcile that with objective morality (namely the notion that God is so great that objectively we ought never curse him and applying the reasoning I gave in my initial post to this situation that doesn’t involve impossibilities (since it is possible now for the man to curse God)

Of course it is objectively immoral to curse God. But how exactly does that not allow for the possibility of someone feeling subjectively compelled to curse God? Feeling morally compelled to do something does not make you truly compelled to do so. To say that someone is truly subjectively compelled to commit an act is oxymoronic. The person in your example truly feels compelled to curse God, but is not truly obligated to do so.

No one desires evil – that is no one desires what he takes to be evil or bad … no one says, “this is so evil! Yes! I’m just loving this; this is so bad!” – that would be an oxymoronic statement, a self-contradictory statement.

Wrong. Deliberate malice is often understood by the one doing it to be immoral on at least some conscious level. Of course, I would agree that most of the time, no one actively desires what (s)he knows to be evil.

Such statements (“This is so evil; I love it!”) are philosophically and morally oxymoronic, but they are **not **psychologically impossible.

And I do not see how it is possible for a person to have a set of values inclusive of this basic desire for the good, that would be consistent with a belief that rape or wanton heinous torture is good.

Case in point: a “basic desire for the good”? That the nature of “the good” necessarily excludes rape and torture is an objective moral value.

So my response would not be one of condemnation, but of showing how to make their own value system consistent with itself.

That compels to repeat one of my first points:

If moral relativists preached what they practice, they would start preaching common-sense morality.

And I don’t see the problem in the first place. Any objection I have would be an objection relative to my values, not one relative to some objective standard.

Not true. You appealed to some “basic desire for the good” with which rape and torture are - according to you - fundamentally, objectively imcompatible. That is definitely an appeal to an objective moral standard.

So yes I object to wanton torture, but I object inasmuch as it contradicts what I value most – that is I simply say that I do not desire wanton torture to occur.

Okay; fair enough. That would be consistent with moral relativism - to simply say, “I do not want it to occur.” You, however, asserted that torture is fundamentally inconsistent with the set of values that includes a basic desire for the good.

For me to go further and to say that others should not torture wantonly would be to say that if they are to be true to their own core values then they would realize that wanton torture contradicts their own core values, as explained above.

But some people don’t share those “core values.” Some people don’t desire the common good. Selfish dictators who seek only their own advancement and power have not hesitated throughout history to use torture. What can a moral relativist say to them? “You’re not being true to your values!” would simply be false. Only an absolutist can say, “What you’re doing is wrong, whether you believe it to be so or not; and we’re going to stop you.”

What is the good? It is by definition that which is desirable – how is this concept of the good able to be formulated in a non-subjective way then? Impossible!

I concur; that concept of “the good” probably cannot be formulated to express a truly objective moral code. That, however, is not the actual definition of "the good."

After all, a person afflicted with hardcore sadism as a psychological disorder truly does find causing others pain to be desirable. That doesn’t make it good.

I will not be responding for the next week or so. I’m going on a trip. Just wanted to let you know so that you don’t think I’m ignoring you.