D
dbg
Guest
I’m consolidating something from another thread into this one to avoid sidetracking the other thread started by another member. Response to john from that other thread:
I am not anti-realist when it comes to whether or not there are propositions which correspond with the way the world in fact is. But some propositions may correspond to the way the world in fact is, not in an absolute non-relative way, but in a relative yet still real way. For example the proposition: “The door is to the left” can only be “true” relative to something else – it can be true relative to a window, to a person etc. Likewise for the proposition “Compassion is more beautiful than patience” – it may be really true relative to one person but not true – really – relative to another. So while I am a moral relativist in that sense, I am NOT a moral anti-realist. Moral values are real – they do exist – but they are GROUNDED ultimately within each individual subject and are grounded only in what is found desirable – since a “value” is by definition something which is found desirable.
I am not anti-realist when it comes to whether or not there are propositions which correspond with the way the world in fact is. But some propositions may correspond to the way the world in fact is, not in an absolute non-relative way, but in a relative yet still real way. For example the proposition: “The door is to the left” can only be “true” relative to something else – it can be true relative to a window, to a person etc. Likewise for the proposition “Compassion is more beautiful than patience” – it may be really true relative to one person but not true – really – relative to another. So while I am a moral relativist in that sense, I am NOT a moral anti-realist. Moral values are real – they do exist – but they are GROUNDED ultimately within each individual subject and are grounded only in what is found desirable – since a “value” is by definition something which is found desirable.