A colossal accident?

[warpspeedpetey]

Warpspeedpetey, what is the definition of knowledge you’re relying upon if not a restatement of empiricism in general terms?

I assume this is rhetorical. If you want to claim it is then you will need to demonstrate it.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

lol actually, I think we have just seen that you do not know what you’re talking about, whereas I just admitted my lack of experience with these matters. I already said that I don’t know what a logical or a non-logical axiom is and that I found these terms on wikipedia. I’m not implying anything irrational! Your rather free interpretation of this point leads you to think that I am asserting that maths is irrational, simply by pointing you towards a fuller understanding of the term ‘axiom’. Given that neither of us understands these terms, we cannot discuss them meaningfully. (Well, I suppose if we can gain knowledge by pure reason, we won’t have to turn to an online encyclopedia, but I doubt that as you know…)

I really don’t think your attempt to discredit my understanding with mere derision holds much merit and isn’t an argument unto itself. Your inability to articulate with clarity or consistency has contributed to the protracted and contorted nature of this thread. Address the issues and defend your assertions. If by your own admission you have no expertise in mathematics, then do not claim mathematics is tautological or is incapable to expand knowledge without recourse to empirical measure. You certainly aren’t in a position to assess my expertise on the matter.

And if you are saying that a concern with authorities is irrelevant to the truth of empiricism, then why are you implying that I should not be arguing my general point because I am not an expert?

Your penchant to use vague appeals to authority (e.g. many people say this…) without citations to bolster claims is what I object to. Then to solicit the fallacy of false compromise and say ‘we’re not both qualified to discuss’ when it suits you purpose shows how shallow your defense has now become. You still haven’t addressed my question to you regarding sense experience either.

 

[James1215]

I really don’t think your attempt to discredit my understanding with mere derision holds much merit and isn’t an argument unto itself. Your inability to articulate with clarity or consistency has contributed to the protracted and contorted nature of this thread. Address the issues and defend your assertions. If by your own admission you have no expertise in mathematics, then do not claim mathematics is tautological or is incapable to expand knowledge without recourse to empirical measure. You certainly aren’t in a position to assess my expertise on the matter.

Your penchant to use vague appeals to authority (e.g. many people say this…) without citations to bolster claims is what I object to. Then to solicit the fallacy of false compromise and say ‘we’re not both qualified to discuss’ when it suits you purpose shows how shallow your defense has now become. You still haven’t addressed my question to you regarding sense experience either.

Then I apologise, because it was not meant to be derisive what I said. If you are familiar with the philosophy of maths, please contribute your understanding. As yet I don’t think either of us has the competence to deal with much more than the philosophy of arithmetic, which is tautological.

When I have referred to ‘authorities’ I have either p(name removed by moderator)ointed the view and the person (eg Wittgenstein above) or I have been vague in proportion to the generality of the statement and the vast number of people who say it. In addition, I have referred to other philosophy on Descartes (regarding cogito ergo sum) because it relates to countering warpspeedpetey’s assertion but was tangential to my claims. Nothing I am saying actually relies upon an authority.

As for the sense experience question about our thoughts, it seems like a non-problem.

1. We do sense when we are thinking
2. We don’t need to know how we do so in order to have that experience
3. The origins of thoughts or their nature may or may not be physical, but what matters is whether they are true. It is the evaluation of thoughts which requires experience; that is the assertion of empiricism.
4. If thoughts are taken to be evidence of the existence of something outside sense experience, they might be considered a counter to empiricism. However, it has to be demonstrated that they are indeed evidence of something non-empirical, which is rather difficult. I leave that problem to you.

 

[James1215]

I assume this is rhetorical. If you want to claim it is then you will need to demonstrate it.

I say: Knowledge can be dependent upon experience without contradiction. Knowledge is reason to believe, experience gives us reason to believe in empiricism.

You say: that is demonstrably incorrect.

You then quote:

knowl·edge Noun/ˈnälij/

1. Information and skills acquired through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject.
2. What is known in a particular field or in total; facts and information.

And say: If you cannot make an argument using standard terminology, you really just can’t make the argument.

Well if your main counter to the idea that empiricism can be non-contradictory is this, it is interesting that your definition of knowledge is so close to that of empiricism. I have highlighted above the terms which are directly related to experience.

This is really a minor point, but if your apparent misunderstanding of empiricism rests on this foundation, it ought to be easily adjusted.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I say: Knowledge can be dependent upon experience without contradiction. Knowledge is reason to believe, experience gives us reason to believe in empiricism.

You say: that is demonstrably incorrect.

You then quote:

knowl·edge Noun/ˈnälij/

1. Information and skills acquired through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject.
2. What is known in a particular field or in total; facts and information.

And say: If you cannot make an argument using standard terminology, you really just can’t make the argument.

It is so much easier just to use the quote button.

Well if your main counter to the idea that empiricism can be non-contradictory is this,

Not just your misuse of terminology but the accepted historical facts that we have repeatedly demonstrated and the great many refutations you still fail to address are all counter to the idea that the proposition you assert is self contradictory as are all such propositions wherein physical experience is required for knowledge.

it is interesting that your definition of knowledge is so close to that of empiricism. I have highlighted above the terms which are directly related to experience.

It isn’t and the highlighted terms don’t say a thing about empiricism, or empirical experience.

This is really a minor point, but if your apparent misunderstanding of empiricism rests on this foundation, it ought to be easily adjusted.

I have read a bit more than 11 unpublished pages on the subject. If you understood what empiricism is or the history you wouldn’t be making such easily refuted arguments. You wouldn’t even be bothering to advance it as you would be aware of the historical course arguments. We still haven’t left the early 20th century, We still have decades to discuss the aftermath of strong empiricism’s implosion.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

Then I apologise, because it was not meant to be derisive what I said. If you are familiar with the philosophy of maths, please contribute your understanding. As yet I don’t think either of us has the competence to deal with much more than the philosophy of arithmetic, which is tautological.

By similar reasoning, neither of us should be discussing epistemology since none of us are apparently accredited in the field. Yet you persist to back dated epistemological theory, when you should admit your lack of competence many pages ago and end the discussion. Why the dichotomy in thinking? As for mathematics (e.g. arithmetic) being tautological, present your evidence. To date, you presented nothing other than pronouncements that they are tautological. Although, you’ve agreed in prior messages that mathematics is axiomatic, so you are now contradicting yourself.

When I have referred to ‘authorities’ I have either p(name removed by moderator)ointed the view and the person (eg Wittgenstein above) or I have been vague in proportion to the generality of the statement and the vast number of people who say it. In addition, I have referred to other philosophy on Descartes (regarding cogito ergo sum) because it relates to countering warpspeedpetey’s assertion but was tangential to my claims. Nothing I am saying actually relies upon an authority.

In your messages, when you state ‘many people say X’ in the context these people are qualified experts, you are using an appeal authority. When you point out and individual without a citation, you are engaging in an argument by authority. If you believe your arguments stand without such authorities, then don’t mention them. If you feel your argument is backed by authorities, it’s good form to provide a citation so that other can verify the claim being made. Otherwise, it’s just a claim to authority to gain merit to a point without substantiation.

As for the sense experience question about our thoughts, it seems like a non-problem.

1. We do sense when we are thinking
2. We don’t need to know how we do so in order to have that experience
3. The origins of thoughts or their nature may or may not be physical, but what matters is whether they are true. It is the evaluation of thoughts which requires experience; that is the assertion of empiricism.
4. If thoughts are taken to be evidence of the existence of something outside sense experience, they might be considered a counter to empiricism. However, it has to be demonstrated that they are indeed evidence of something non-empirical, which is rather difficult. I leave that problem to you.

If we sense that we are thinking, then what senses are being used? Also, why don’t we need how we do so? If you don’t know how thoughts are perceived, how can you be sure that senses are being used to perceive thought? Doesn’t empiricism state that all knowledge is sense experience, and if you are sensing your thoughts then logically you can identify the senses used. Since you’ve made the claim that thoughts are sensed, the burden of proof is on you.

 

[James1215]

By similar reasoning, neither of us should be discussing epistemology since none of us are apparently accredited in the field.

It is not accreditation I am talking about, but familiarity with the subject matter. Since we are discussing the claims of an 11-page article, all the accreditation I need I have got.

Yet you persist to back dated epistemological theory, when you should admit your lack of competence many pages ago and end the discussion. Why the dichotomy in thinking?

Let’s put it this way. Given our collective limited knowledge on the issue (to use a controverted word…), we have to have limited aims in the discussion. I believe all that I need achieve here is the demonstration that empiricism can be self-consistent and is well evidenced, which means we have reason to believe in it. This requires only a limited understanding of epistemology, and where I cannot go due to ignorance, I won’t. The philosophy of maths outside arithmetic is one such area, but I think that ignorance is shared.

As for mathematics (e.g. arithmetic) being tautological, present your evidence. To date, you presented nothing other than pronouncements that they are tautological. Although, you’ve agreed in prior messages that mathematics is axiomatic, so you are now contradicting yourself.

Not quite. The fact that I need to clarify again is not good evidence of thinking here. You asserted that maths was axiomatic, I thought it was not - in the common sense of the word. So I looked it up on wikipedia and conveyed that maths makes use of logical and non-logical axioms, which I also said I am not familiar with. Hence I have not agreed to your use of axiomatic, because I thought I disagreed, and if you meant the sort of axioms wikipedia describes, then you and the page agree. I am not convinced that this could make the whole of maths un-tautological, but as to arithmetic, we can still say that it is.

The evidence: 1+1=2 because 2 and 1 are inter-referential concepts. Therefore arithmetic is tautological. There is no way that 1 could possibly equal more or less than 2 when 1 is added to it. If it did, we’d be operating under different definitions, that’s all.

In your messages, when you state ‘many people say X’ in the context these people are qualified experts, you are using an appeal authority. When you point out and individual without a citation, you are engaging in an argument by authority. If you believe your arguments stand without such authorities, then don’t mention them. If you feel your argument is backed by authorities, it’s good form to provide a citation so that other can verify the claim being made. Otherwise, it’s just a claim to authority to gain merit to a point without substantiation.

I have argued no substantial point by reference to authority, and if you think I have feel free to quote it with a line through or something. The same for anyone else in the discussion.

If we sense that we are thinking, then what senses are being used? Also, why don’t we need how we do so? If you don’t know how thoughts are perceived, how can you be sure that senses are being used to perceive thought? Doesn’t empiricism state that all knowledge is sense experience, and if you are sensing your thoughts then logically you can identify the senses used. Since you’ve made the claim that thoughts are sensed, the burden of proof is on you.

All knowledge is perception-based
Thoughts are perceptible
Therefore the source of the perception of thoughts is knowable

Is not a sound argument. All it means is that we can have knowledge of our thoughts within empiricism, not that we are able or obliged to know the sense-mechanism by which thoughts are perceptible.

Further, it seems you might be wanting to reverse it like so:

The source of the sense is not known (or cannot be known), therefore the proposition that all knowledge is perception-based is false.

That would of course be denying the antecedent and also not sound.

To clarify, we do not need to know how the human eye works to realise that we have the sense of sight. Similarly, we do not need to know how we sense that we are thinking to realise that we can tell when are.

 

[James1215]

If you understood what empiricism is or the history you wouldn’t be making such easily refuted arguments. You wouldn’t even be bothering to advance it as you would be aware of the historical course arguments. We still haven’t left the early 20th century, We still have decades to discuss the aftermath of strong empiricism’s implosion.

The thing is that naive [or ‘weak’] empiricism has not been refuted by your arguments because it is self-consistent and evidenced. It is self-consistent because it requires of itself that perceptible evidence gives us reason to believe in it. It is evidenced by the ability to come up with vast amounts of knowledge through experience, and it is not undermined by any ‘evidence’ to the contrary.

This is so provided that neither maths nor dubito is an example of non-empirical knowledge. Referring at least to arithmetic, we can see that it tells us nothing about the world - is true independent of anything outside its own definitions. Its truth tells us nothing outside the maths. As to dubito, we can argue that a) it is irrational to doubt all perception, therefore it is not an example of rationalism; b) doubts can be experienced empirically, so it could support empiricism; c) engaging in a hypothetical project of doubt circularly provides no form of certainty, so it provides no knowledge whatsoever - rationally or empirically.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

I say: Knowledge can be dependent upon experience without contradiction. Knowledge is reason to believe, experience gives us reason to believe in empiricism.

If I understand your declaration correctly, you are saying the following:

Premise 1: Knowledge can be dependent on experience
Premise 2: Knowledge is reason to believe
Conclusion: Experience give us reason to believe in empiricsim

How does your premise(s) lead to the conclusion? It appears to be a non-sequitur. In addition, if knowledge is simply reason to believe, how do you know what you believe is true? Further, if we substitute reason to believe with the word knowledge, in accordance to premise 2, we get the following conclusion:

Experience give us knowledge in [of] empiricsim

You are in essence saying sensory experience gives us knowledge of empiricism, presumably in the context that empiricism is true. Given that empiricism holds that knowledge is solely from sensory experience, this appears to be circular reasoning. Would you care to clarify?

 

[James1215]

Here’s something like dubito - postmodernism!

Postmodernism goes something like this: truth is relative. But hang on, we cannot know that postmodernism is universally true, so its truth is relative too! Postmodernism is true for you, but I know better, could be a standard response. We can see that the response is good; no one can claim once-and-for-all that absolutes are impossible, for that is an absolute.

The postmodernist might come back and say “Think about it again. You say that postmodernism cannot be known, and I agree. The fact that you have shown yet another thing cannot be known only shows my proposition that nothing can be known… not even postmodernism!”

This is what I think you might be trying with Dubito in saying that doubting doubt is still doubt, for certain. Either one is doubting, or one has some reason to believe, but not both. If postmodernism grants the ability to believe, we can believe in it, but if it does not, we cannot. The same with doubt - if we are doubting, we do not have reason to believe, but if doubt allows us to be certain about some things, it is not total doubt (dubito).

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

It is not accreditation I am talking about, but familiarity with the subject matter. Since we are discussing the claims of an 11-page article, all the accreditation I need I have got.

We are discussing empirisicm as a valid epistemology. You’ve merely used this article to support your argument. If you are not familiar with a topic then how can one assess the validity of an authority. Authorities are not infalliable.

Let’s put it this way. Given our collective limited knowledge on the issue (to use a controverted word…), we have to have limited aims in the discussion. I believe all that I need achieve here is the demonstration that empiricism can be self-consistent and is well evidenced, which means we have reason to believe in it. This requires only a limited understanding of epistemology, and where I cannot go due to ignorance, I won’t. The philosophy of maths outside arithmetic is one such area, but I think that ignorance is shared.

You’ll need to back up your claim that our mathematical ignorance is shared. Further, you’ll need to demonstrate your claims that arithmetic is an area that can be isolated outside the domain of philosphical knowledge of mathematics.

Not quite. The fact that I need to clarify again is not good evidence of thinking here. You asserted that maths was axiomatic, I thought it was not - in the common sense of the word. So I looked it up on wikipedia and conveyed that maths makes use of logical and non-logical axioms, which I also said I am not familiar with. Hence I have not agreed to your use of axiomatic, because I thought I disagreed, and if you meant the sort of axioms wikipedia describes, then you and the page agree. I am not convinced that this could make the whole of maths un-tautological, but as to arithmetic, we can still say that it is.

The article you cited indicates the mathematics are axiomatic. If you are saying that axiomatic has a substantially different meaning because a word (logical or non-logical) preceeds show me that you are engaging in petty semantics in order to avoid honest debate.

The evidence: 1+1=2 because 2 and 1 are inter-referential concepts. Therefore arithmetic is tautological. There is no way that 1 could possibly equal more or less than 2 when 1 is added to it. If it did, we’d be operating under different definitions, that’s all.

Inter-referentiality doesn’t equate to tautology. The numbers themselves are defined but how they are applied is axiomatic. A tautology is an unconditional truth as a result of its structure. So, 1=1 would be a tautological statement just as much as an apple is an apple. However, arithemitic operations are structured problems and because of the axioms employed, we are able to find a solution. You can substitute numbers in to the problem equation but the solutions with vary. The axioms determine the outcome.

I have argued no substantial point by reference to authority, and if you think I have feel free to quote it with a line through or something. The same for anyone else in the discussion.

I have pointed out such references in the past and asked for sources. I will be more insistent going forward then.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

To clarify, we do not need to know how the human eye works to realise that we have the sense of sight. Similarly, we do not need to know how we sense that we are thinking to realise that we can tell when are.

You still haven’t identified the senses in play a role in “perceiving” our thoughts. We don’t have to know how the eye works to see but identify that we see with our eyes.

 

[James1215]

If I understand your declaration correctly, you are saying the following:

Premise 1: Knowledge can be dependent on experience
Premise 2: Knowledge is reason to believe
Conclusion: Experience give us reason to believe in empiricsim

How does your premise(s) lead to the conclusion? It appears to be a non-sequitur. In addition, if knowledge is simply reason to believe, how do you know what you believe is true? Further, if we substitute reason to believe with the word knowledge, in accordance to premise 2, we get the following conclusion:

Experience give us knowledge in [of] empiricsim

You are in essence saying sensory experience gives us knowledge of empiricism, presumably in the context that empiricism is true. Given that empiricism holds that knowledge is solely from sensory experience, this appears to be circular reasoning. Would you care to clarify?

This is the logical formulation, but I cannot pretend that it is a syllogism because it is evidence and a provisional conclusion: a hypothesis.

Experience gives us knowledge
Knowledge has not been shown to come from any other source
Therefore we have reason to believe that knowledge requires evidence.

This is conditional upon the understanding that certainty is not possible by inductive reasoning, and that truth is a statement’s correspondence with reality and knowledge the reason to believe in the statement.

So some of the above things that you’ve said do not apply. For example, ‘if knowledge is simply reason to believe, how do you know what you believe is true’. This is like asking: why do you have reason to believe what you have reason to believe is true? Because you have reason to believe.

Given that knowledge is reason to believe, I am quite happy to accept that:

‘Experience give us knowledge [of] empiricsim’

There is no circularity in saying that sense perception gives us reason to believe sense perception is the only way to have reason to believe, because what is perceived is evidence. What about the fact that all we have is perception? Everything is perception, so how can it not be circular? The answer is not that empiricism confirms the reality of perception, but that it operates only within perception. It says that ‘future new perception is likely to continue showing that using perception is the only way to successfully describe or predict perception, as opposed to using something outside perception, such as reason alone, for this purpose’. Man is the measure of all things here.

It needs reinforcing that while empiricism does not guarantee the reliability of our perception, nothing can. In addition, nothing needs to. Nothing gives us reason to think perception is illusory. As a result, all we can do is live and work within the perceptible world, and understand it. If we get things right, we continue to perceive (stay alive). If we get things horribly wrong, we cease to perceive, and cause the perception of loss in our friends and family. This is just to say that the disavowal of perception does not make it meaningless.

 

[James1215]

1=1 is indeed a tautology. But are you then saying that 1=1 is different from 1=2-1? They are the same therefore they are both tautologies.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

The thing is that naive [or ‘weak’] empiricism

Naive empiricism and weak empiricism are not the same thing. Naive empiricism generally refers to the basic form of empiricism, the strong empirical statement which is what you are making “physical experience is required for knowledge”. Weak empiricism is what resulted from strong empiricisms contradiction. You have yet to move to a weak empirical statements like “experience is required for “some” knowledge”. Like I told you, you are trying to support the strong empirical statement with the weak empirical argument.

has not been refuted by your arguments because it is self-consistent and evidenced.

It has been refuted by all my arguments. Your proposition “physical experience is required of knowledge” is a well known logical contradiction which is not self consistent. Further, you have no evidence. As I keep pointing out, and you keep ignoring because you know it refutes your claim to evidence You literally cannot make the leap from premises like “I observe water oxidizes iron” to the conclusion “therefore physical experience is required for knowledge”. It’s non-sequitur. The conclusion does not follow from the premises. What you are calling evidence for empiricism is not.

It is self-consistent because it requires of itself that perceptible evidence gives us reason to believe in it.

That is self referential, not self consistent, being self consistent would mean that you have empirical evidence for it, which you do not as I point out in the big red letters directly above.

It is evidenced by the ability to come up with vast amounts of knowledge through experience,

You literally cannot make the leap from premises like “I observe water oxidizes iron” to the conclusion “therefore physical experience is required for knowledge”. It’s non-sequitur. The conclusion does not follow from the premises. What you are calling evidence for empiricism is not.

…and it is not undermined by any ‘evidence’ to the contrary.

Mathematics, logic and Dubito all disprove the necessity of empirical evidence for us to gain knowledge.

This is so provided that neither maths nor dubito is an example of non-empirical knowledge.

Then you were born knowing that 1+1=2? You were born knowoing that the only object that we can be certain exists is the rational object Dubito? I find that hard to believe.

Referring at least to arithmetic, we can see that it tells us nothing about the world

Except for the fact that the universe seems to obey truths that transcend it’s own existence.

• is true independent of anything outside its own definitions.

No axiomatic system strong enough to describe the real number system is self consistent. Basic stuff here.

Its truth tells us nothing outside the maths.

Are you sure that there is anything outside mathematics? Maybe all that exists is mathematical objects. The subjects you think you are speaking on are much more complicate than you know.

As to dubito, we can argue that a) it is irrational to doubt all perception, therefore it is not an example of rationalism;

Rationalism the theory of knowledge is not the antonym of “irrational”. Further It is not irrational to doubt your senses. You merely asserting so doesn’t mean anything.

b) doubts can be experienced empirically, so it could support empiricism;

No they can’t. Yet another baseless assertion.

c) engaging in a hypothetical project of doubt circularly provides no form of certainty, so it provides no knowledge whatsoever - rationally or empirically.

Sure it does. We now know that the only object certain to exist is Dubito. Which is not knowledge that we are born with.

 

[James1215]

It has been refuted by all my arguments. Your proposition “physical experience is required of knowledge” is a well known logical contradiction which is not self consistent. Further, you have no evidence. As I keep pointing out, and you keep ignoring because you know it refutes your claim to evidence You literally cannot make the leap from premises like “I observe water oxidizes iron” to the conclusion “therefore physical experience is required for knowledge”. It’s non-sequitur. The conclusion does not follow from the premises. What you are calling evidence for empiricism is not.

That seems to be your main objection, but sadly for you it is a double misunderstanding. The proposition does not contain ‘physical’, nor does it need to. The ‘leap’ is no leap, and it is not from the evidence you cite. Why don’t you let me provide the evidence, rather than developing your straw man alternative? The reason to believe is based on the fact that observation and experience do provide their own knowledge, plus the observation that there are no other means to gain knowledge.

 

[James1215]

And I am not trying to argue from naive to strong, or naive via weak to strong - they are different.

Naive is basic but a hypothesis

Strong is basic but a dogma asking for certainty

Weak is nuanced in ways I’m not familiar with - saying that certain knowledge comes from experience. What do you think of that position? What are the knowledge boundaries it supposes?

And the difference between naive and weak is that naive (as far as I’m aware) does not make these distinctions. Weak could also be hypothetical, but differs on the above point from naive.

 

[James1215]

I agree that rationalism is not the antonym for irrational, but I would argue that if something is irrational, it cannot be a legitimate part of rationalism. As doubting everything is irrational, I say it is not a valid rationalist technique.

 

[James1215]

You still haven’t identified the senses in play a role in “perceiving” our thoughts. We don’t have to know how the eye works to see but identify that we see with our eyes.

Yes, in that when we cover our eyes we realise that we cannot see. When we drink a lot of alcohol we realise later that we have impaired our ability to recall our thoughts and experiences. In other words, we have reduced our ability to perceive the thoughts that would otherwise be perceptible even afterwards.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…The proposition does not contain ‘physical’, nor does it need to.

Yes it does. Unless you are admitting that experience includes knowledge not gained from the physical senses, but that would refute empiricism.

The ‘leap’ is no leap, and it is not from the evidence you cite.

Yes, there is a leap from premise to conclusion. As there is in absolutely every argument.

Why don’t you let me provide the evidence, rather than developing your straw man alternative?

It isn’t a straw man, and I had to provide a concrete example of your claim because you refused to. It doesn’t matter what example you use from the scientific method, none of them will produce the conclusion you wish.

The reason to believe is based on the fact that observation and experience do provide their own knowledge,

You have no idea if you are experiencing an empirical reality.

plus the observation that there are no other means to gain knowledge.

Dubito, mathematics and the various logics all disprove this statement.