A colossal accident?

[warpspeedpetey]

And I am not trying to argue from naive to strong, or naive via weak to strong - they are different.

The adjective “naive” refers strong empiricism.

Naive is basic but a hypothesis

A long disproven hypothesis.

Strong is basic but a dogma asking for certainty

Your proposition is a dogma. You can treat a dogma like a catma, but you still have a dogma until you change the proposition that you are asserting. Like I pointed out the intent of the speaker doesn’t change the content of the statement.

Weak is nuanced in ways I’m not familiar with - saying that certain knowledge comes from experience. What do you think of that position? What are the knowledge boundaries it supposes?

In the general history it failed because they couldn’t find a way to eliminate metaphysical statements, then they moved to verificationism, then falsificationism, and then the entire idea died. Saul Kripke. David Lewis, et al stuck a fork in it with frame semantics. Metaphysics rules.

And the difference between naive and weak is that naive (as far as I’m aware) does not make these distinctions. Weak could also be hypothetical, but differs on the above point from naive.

Do you think that the article you read has proposed a new kind of empiricism called “Naive”? It doesn’t it is referring to the strong empiricists of the logical positivist school, and making an attempt to defend it with the weak empirical argument as I have pointed out.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I agree that rationalism is not the antonym for irrational,

What else could you do?

but I would argue that if something is irrational, it cannot be a legitimate part of rationalism.

That goes without saying

As doubting everything is irrational,

It’s not. It’s done in philosophy programs around the world. First year, first class philo 101 stuff.

I say it is not a valid rationalist technique.

That will be news to the rationailst who invented it and all the rationalists hence.

You don’t like it because its true and kills your claim and you know it. You might as well tell me you don’t think it’s fair to be proven wrong.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

1=1 is indeed a tautology. But are you then saying that 1=1 is different from 1=2-1? They are the same therefore they are both tautologies.

You’ve merely solved the 2-1 problem and found the answer to be 1. How? Using the axioms employed in the arithemic theroms. Knowing the answer to which you find to be obvious does not make is tautological. Further, just because the solution equals a tautological statement doesn’t make it tautological either.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

In other words, we have reduced our ability to perceive the thoughts that would otherwise be perceptible even afterwards.

Nothing of the sort has occurred. You example only demonstrates alchohol impairs neurological processes. You are presuming sense disruption is what causes memory impairment as opposed to neurological disruption. Thoughts are not perceived through senses because no senses are identified with the perception of thought.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

This is the logical formulation, but I cannot pretend that it is a syllogism because it is evidence and a provisional conclusion: a hypothesis.

All theories of knowledge (epistemologies) are hypotheses. To claim such is merely superfluous.

Experience gives us knowledge
Knowledge has not been shown to come from any other source
Therefore we have reason to believe that knowledge requires evidence.

I can agree experience gives us knowledge but there is a claim that it does not come from any other source, which has been rejected by rationalists and other epistemological theories. The conclusion you have is self-evident. Of course knowledge requires evidence.

This is conditional upon the understanding that certainty is not possible by inductive reasoning, and that truth is a statement’s correspondence with reality and knowledge the reason to believe in the statement.

Then you have belief which may or may not be true and, therefore, no actual knowledge. In order to have knowledge, it requires justification (evidence), it must be true and you must believe it to be true. Truth is a central component of knowledge, in the epsitemological sense.

So some of the above things that you’ve said do not apply. For example, ‘if knowledge is simply reason to believe, how do you know what you believe is true’. This is like asking: why do you have reason to believe what you have reason to believe is true? Because you have reason to believe.

Again, then you have belief which may or may not be true and no actual knowledge.

Given that knowledge is reason to believe, I am quite happy to accept that:

‘Experience give us knowledge [of] empiricsim’

There is no circularity in saying that sense perception gives us reason to believe sense perception is the only way to have reason to believe, because what is perceived is evidence.

You position appears circular because what you are in essence saying is: I believe the perceived evidence that all evidence is perceived. So what’s not circular?

What about the fact that all we have is perception?

Please provide us with a citation for this fact. Until then, the remainder of your argument is rejected due to lack of substantiation.

 

[James1215]

Knowledge requires experience was the conclusion, not merely knowledge requires evidence as I put. However, a long time ago I believe the requirement of evidence to state a position was my position!

 

[James1215]

Warpspeedpetey, you seem to maintain both that empiricism as a hypothesis is a dogma and that as a dogma it is a disproven hypothesis. Nevertheless, I will address both ends and show you how that is not plausibly so.

Firstly, it is a hypothesis and not a dogma. Secondly, whatever rationalism we have come across in this discussion poses no threat to empiricism, and the well-versed philosopher who wrote the article cites even rationalists who agree. We might as well begin with Dubito.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Warpspeedpetey, you seem to maintain both that empiricism as a hypothesis is a dogma
and that as a dogma it is a disproven hypothesis. Nevertheless, I will address both ends and show you how that is not plausibly so.

The proposition that you assert is dogmatic. there is no such thing as empiricism as a real theory anymore, it’s been dead for decades. Once upon a time it was accurate to call it theory, hypothesis, etc. Now, it is the name of a dead end alley on the streets of epistemology.

Firstly, it is a hypothesis and not a dogma.

No, it’s not. It’s dogmatic, as repeatedly demonstrated. Not that it matters as **all **propositions in which knowledge relies on physical experience are well known logical contradictions.

Secondly, whatever rationalism we have come across in this discussion poses no threat to empiricism, and the well-versed philosopher who wrote the article cites even rationalists who agree. We might as well begin with Dubito.

Admitting that we can gain knowledge of any kind apart from physical experience disproves the proposition that you assert.

 

[James1215]

The adjective “naive” refers strong empiricism.
A long disproven hypothesis.

Ah ha! So let’s talk about that hypothesis of strong empiricism. What is it, if you can say? I’m asking because here you are acknowledging that a strong variety of empiricism can be asserted as a hypothesis. Also, as you are able to distinguish between this hypothesis and weak empiricism, can you say what the argument for weak empiricism is?

It would only be fair if you knew exactly what I’m thinking:

Naive hypothesis - experience evidences the hypothesis that knowledge requires experience.

Weak - some knowledge requires experience.

We can see plainly that I am not using weak to argue for naive/strong as they are actually different. Also, we can see that naive empiricism is not a dogma - and you’ve just said that it is ‘a long disproven hypothesis’. I’m asking you because this revelation in my opinion ends the discussion on whether it is a dogma to assert hypothetically that knowledge requires experience. Hence we can move onto the second part of your objections - that actually we do gain knowledge without experience, therefore the hypothesis is wrong.

In the general history [of weak empiricism] it failed because they couldn’t find a way to eliminate metaphysical statements, then they moved to verificationism, then falsificationism, and then the entire idea died. Saul Kripke. David Lewis, et al stuck a fork in it with frame semantics. Metaphysics rules.

It is not necessary to disprove metaphysics to establish an empiricism, and there are numerous different ideas of what constitutes ‘meaningful’ which even the logical positivists accepted. So even to try to claim metaphysics is meaningless is challenging. But that is not what I’m doing in saying that empiricism stands.

Do you think that the article you read has proposed a new kind of empiricism called “Naive”? It doesn’t it is referring to the strong empiricists of the logical positivist school, and making an attempt to defend it with the weak empirical argument as I have pointed out.

Yes I am aware that the author is redefining an existing sort of empiricism. The contentious part seems to be his formulation which says the fundamental principle of empiricism can be a hypothesis.

 

[James1215]

Nothing of the sort has occurred. You example only demonstrates alchohol impairs neurological processes. You are presuming sense disruption is what causes memory impairment as opposed to neurological disruption. Thoughts are not perceived through senses because no senses are identified with the perception of thought.

That seems to use a narrow definition of ‘senses’, whereas we can say that if thought is perceived, it is sensed. You seem to acknowledge that the perception of thought happens, and that is all we need to say.

 

[James1215]

I can agree experience gives us knowledge but there is a claim that it does not come from any other source, which has been rejected by rationalists and other epistemological theories. The conclusion you have is self-evident. Of course knowledge requires evidence.

That much is tautological, and was a typo on my part - I meant experience when I said evidence.

Then you have belief which may or may not be true and, therefore, no actual knowledge. In order to have knowledge, it requires justification (evidence), it must be true and you must believe it to be true. Truth is a central component of knowledge, in the epsitemological sense.

The only problem is that we cannot have certainty, so our beloved idea of knowing the absolute truth is a shaky one. Having reason to believe that something is true is the best I think we can do.

Again, then you have belief which may or may not be true and no actual knowledge.

You position appears circular because what you are in essence saying is: I believe the perceived evidence that all evidence is perceived. So what’s not circular?

No, I think this is another straw man. It actually goes like this: ‘I have reason to believe that all ‘reason to believe’ (knowledge) is granted via evidence all of which is perception-based’. This empiricism relies upon having reason to believe in it, rather than simply belief - that’s the subtle difference which might be missed. And it might seem circular, but it is not. This is because it is making a claim about experience that is testable by experience, not one which is automatically guaranteed by it. We might find that we have some non-empirical ways of gaining knowledge, and then the supposed ‘circular’ proposition falls, whereas real circular propositions cannot fall (nor do they stand).

Please provide us with a citation for this fact. Until then, the remainder of your argument is rejected due to lack of substantiation.

I was only supposing you would say that all we have is experience, but this is also something I think. In saying that, I’m engaging in some kind of metaphysics, which may or may not be meaningful or relevant, by talking as if perception and reality can be split. That is an interesting question, do you think we can believe that there is reality even if we never existed to perceive it? My ‘fact’ was simply that all of ‘reality’ (if it is independent) is filtered through human apprehension before we can apprehend it.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Ah ha! So let’s talk about that hypothesis of strong empiricism. What is it, if you can say? I’m asking because here you are acknowledging that a strong variety of empiricism can be asserted as a hypothesis.

I asserted that naive empiricism as the title of the argument uses the term is understood to refer to strong empiricism. Which is the proposition you are asserting. As I have had to repeatedly point out the words “hypothesis” and “theory” are synonyms. Using one or the other makes no change in meaning.

Also, as you are able to distinguish between this hypothesis and weak empiricism, can you say what the argument for weak empiricism is?

Do your own work.

It would only be fair if you knew exactly what I’m thinking:

No clue what this means.

Naive hypothesis - experience evidences the hypothesis that knowledge requires experience.

First those are the wrong terms, second, it does not evidence anything as I have repeatedly demonstrated.

Weak - some knowledge requires experience.

Something like that. It can be stated many different ways.

We can see plainly that I am not using weak to argue for naive/strong as they are actually different.

No we can’t. You used the wrong terms. Naive empricism is not the same thing as a naive hypothesis.

Also, we can see that naive empiricism is not a dogma

Strong empiricism, which is what naive empiricism is a reference to, as yo have assertes it is clearly a dogma. Not that it matters because regardless of adjective, it is still a proposition that creates a well known logical contradiction.

• and you’ve just said that it is ‘a long disproven hypothesis’.

Which means the exact same thing when we call it a “theory”. Changing synonyms doesn’t change anything.

I’m asking you because this revelation in my opinion ends the discussion on whether it is a dogma to assert hypothetically that knowledge requires experience.

What revelation? the words theory and hypothesis are still synonymous. Further, you cannot assert that black is white, or that a dog is a cat, until evidence proves otherwise. The contradiction shows the statement is false as soon as it is uttered.

Yes I am aware that the author is redefining an existing sort of empiricism.

He is not. Naive empiricism simply refers to strong empiricism. He tries to use the weak empirical argument to support it.

The contentious part seems to be his formulation which says the fundamental principle of empiricism can be a hypothesis.

No, that is what you find contentious. I don’t care what you call it because it is still a proposition that is a well known logical contradiction. You think calling it a hypothesis instead of a theory changes the meaning, no matter how many times I point out they are synonymous. Further you misuse the term hypothesis as though it entails the word empirical and so on, which you never seem to understand is assuming your case before you make it. Circular reasoning, not that there is anything wrong with that. Worse, you have no evidence, you cannot prove that you are experiencing physical senses at all, etc. You are missing the forest for the trees as they say.

 

[James1215]

You replied in post 631 this about naive empiricism:

James1215: Naive is basic but a hypothesis
Warpspeedpetey: A long disproven hypothesis.

So if you accepted that naive empiricism is a hypothesis, can we agree to talk about that instead of whatever empiricisms you thought were dogmas?

 

[James1215]

Strong empiricism, which is what naive empiricism is a reference to, as yo have assertes it is clearly a dogma. Not that it matters because regardless of adjective, it is still a proposition that creates a well known logical contradiction.

This is the source of the problem I think. You recognise that naive empiricism is related to the dogmatic empiricism, but you are unwilling to see there is a difference. It is to the latter that the logical conundrum applies, and not to the former, because only the former can be supported by empirical evidence. So you do see their similarity, but you cannot apply this rule to all philosophical constructions going by the noun empiricism: “Bertrand Russel pointed out the contradiction in empiricism, therefore if something is called empiricism, it must be self-contradicted”. Bertrand Russel may not have been aware of the later formulation. Indeed, I don’t think you can show that the hypothesis is a self-contradiction, which is why you have denied that it is a hypothesis.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…So if you accepted that naive empiricism is a hypothesis,

There is no such thing as “naive empiricism”. It is a reference to strong empiricism. Further the words “theory” and “hypothesis” are synonymous. There is no new meaning in calling it a “hypothesis” instead of a “theory”.

can we agree to talk about that

You don’t even know what the terms you are referring to mean. You think you are talking about an epistemological concept that doesn’t exist while actually talking about one you admit is a well known contradiction. That is what we have been talking about this entire time.

instead of whatever empiricisms you thought were dogmas?

We are talking about the proposition you assert. One that is clearly dogmatic. I don’t care what you want to call it because like all propositions of that variety it presents a logical contradiction. As the experts point out and the historical facts demonstrate.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

That seems to use a narrow definition of ‘senses’, whereas we can say that if thought is perceived, it is sensed. You seem to acknowledge that the perception of thought happens, and that is all we need to say.

It’s your assertion thoughts are perceived (via senses). I don’t acknowledge it to be the case and it’s more appropriate you are self-aware or conscious of thought. That fact that your use the word ‘sensed’ should tell you senses are involved. All I ask is evidence that senses are used (since perception is about sensory (name removed by moderator)ut), which you still cannot seem to supply so I’ll presume you’ve ceded the point at this juncture.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

The only problem is that we cannot have certainty, so our beloved idea of knowing the absolute truth is a shaky one. Having reason to believe that something is true is the best I think we can do.

Then you have no knowledge but a belief.

No, I think this is another straw man. It actually goes like this: ‘I have reason to believe that all ‘reason to believe’ (knowledge) is granted via evidence all of which is perception-based’…

You’re equivocating. Now are saying that you have a reason to believe that all reasons to believe are empirically based. Again, this is self-refuting reasoning.

I was only supposing you would say that all we have is experience, but this is also something I think. In saying that, I’m engaging in some kind of metaphysics, which may or may not be meaningful or relevant, by talking as if perception and reality can be split. That is an interesting question, do you think we can believe that there is reality even if we never existed to perceive it? My ‘fact’ was simply that all of ‘reality’ (if it is independent) is filtered through human apprehension before we can apprehend it.

I’m not sure what you are saying here. Clarification would be of help.

 

[James1215]

It’s your assertion thoughts are perceived (via senses). I don’t acknowledge it to be the case and it’s more appropriate you are self-aware or conscious of thought. That fact that your use the word ‘sensed’ should tell you senses are involved. All I ask is evidence that senses are used (since perception is about sensory (name removed by moderator)ut), which you still cannot seem to supply so I’ll presume you’ve ceded the point at this juncture.

I can take ‘self-aware of thought’, that seems fine. Self-perceptive, self-experiencing. If you wanted a materialist account, that would be another matter not necessary to empiricism.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

I can take ‘self-aware of thought’, that seems fine. Self-perceptive, self-experiencing. If you wanted a materialist account, that would be another matter not necessary to empiricism.

You’ve made the assertion that thoughts are perceived, which is an empirical statement.

 

[James1215]

Then you have no knowledge but a belief.

Well, there are beliefs and beliefs. Do I have reason to believe that an invisible Flying Spaghetti Monster is in low earth orbit, sending me pasta recipes? Do we have reason to believe that ice will melt when left out at room temperature, all other things equal?

You’re equivocating. Now are saying that you have a reason to believe that all reasons to believe are empirically based. Again, this is self-refuting reasoning.

How is that actually self-refuting? I don’t think it is.

I’m not sure what you are saying here. Clarification would be of help.

That last point was just a musing. I don’t think we can truly split perception from reality with absolute certainty. Even if we could, I still think that all reality when thought of is filtered through the capacities and senses of the human physiology, which alone makes it apprehended.