A Philosophical Debate On The Problem Of Abortion

[Betterave]

I mean that the statement can only be said to be ethical if I also said that the progress of nature is morally significant in itself. Christians sometimes do this by referring to their not-so-natural “Natural Law,” but I do no such thing. As I said, throughout history, ethics has always involved humans picking and choosing what we like and don’t like about nature (life over death, pleasure over pain, etc.). There’s nothing objective about it. It’s merely a species expressing their desire for their environment to be a certain way, and it often isn’t that way.

That being said, I’m an emotivist. The way I see it, ethics arise from emotions and are not objective. Also, I’m a utilitarian. You will notice that utilitarianism does not derive its values from metaphysics but from psychology (the tendency of sentient beings to seek pleasure and avoid pain).

The fact that “throughout history, ethics has always involved humans picking and choosing what we like and don’t like about nature” is an objective claim, is it not? Why would you say “there’s nothing objective about it”? What do you take the word objective to mean? Maybe you think that subjectivism/emotivism, for example, is a subjective claim about ethics? It’s not; it’s a claim about the objective basis of moral judgments. Your emotivism entails that your approval of utilitarianism is the subjective expression of your positive feelings towards utilitarian principles. If your feelings changed, or if others have feelings different from yours, no matter how different, the resulting ethical judgments are all objectively valid ethical views from the standpoint of each subjective assessment. To be a subjectivist in ethics just means that the objectivity of ethical judgments is located at the level of the individual subject, not that “there is nothing objective about it.” Capisci?

(In case you still don’t get it, let me clarify: my reductio ad absurdum attacks your meta-ethical viewpoint and its underlying (correct?) metaphysical viewpoint.)

 

[Betterave]

(It spells out the absurd consequences in terms of the kind of ethical claims that one can be justified in making given your meta-ethical viewpoint.)

 

[Oreoracle]

No problem, thanks for getting to it now. I think that you think a lot of groundless things (such as that not a lot was put into my criticism or that you have answered it). I suggest you read the thread Prodigal Son started on fishy argumentation. Where are you getting the claim that I assumed your meta-ethical views were the same as a Christian’s (whatever you suppose that to be - as if their were one meta-ethical view held by all Christians!)?

You even said near the end of your post that most people agree that factors such as the existence of God, free will, etc., play an important part in ethics. I’m telling you that I’m not one of those people. In your reductio ad absurdum, you assumed that I meant actions such as beating our wives must be acceptable because they’ve occured naturally. That was rather presumptuous of you. I don’t feel that all aspects of nature have inherent value, and I don’t know how you possibly got the idea that I did.

As I understand, your meta-ethical view is emotivist, your ethical view is utilitarian (you haven’t specified which kind - I’ll guess Bentham-style (naive hedonism) utilitarianism?),

I’d say that I’m closer to preference utilitarianism, but that’s almost identical (and can be identical, depending on your views) to the classical version.

and your metaphysical view is naturalism.

Where have I even hinted at being a naturalist? I wouldn’t say that I have a metaphysical “view.” I make assumptions, of course, since I believe the external world exists and that other consciousnesses exist, but I don’t follow any particular metaphysical doctrine. Indeed, I think it’s a bit foolish to do so, but that’s just me.

 

[Oreoracle]

The fact that “throughout history, ethics has always involved humans picking and choosing what we like and don’t like about nature” is an objective claim, is it not?

Yes. There is quite a difference between the ethic, “I should not kill.” and the factual statement, “Rob believes that he should not kill.” The former is prescriptive, subjective, and conveys no meaning in itself (We have no idea what “should” is supposed to reference in reality. Part of the statement is disconnected from reality, so we can’t possibly determine its truth value.). The latter is objective and descriptive because every one of its terms describe something in reality (in this case, we don’t need to know what “should” actually refers to as long as we know the person believes that they should).

What do you take the word objective to mean? Maybe you think that subjectivism/emotivism, for example, is a subjective claim about ethics? It’s not; it’s a claim about the objective basis of moral judgments.

Right. I only said that the morals/ethics themselves are subjective.

Your emotivism entails that your approval of utilitarianism is the subjective expression of your positive feelings towards utilitarian principles.

Bingo! We have a winner!

(In case you still don’t get it, let me clarify: my reductio ad absurdum attacks your meta-ethical viewpoint and its underlying (correct?) metaphysical viewpoint.)

And here your assumption stands out like a sore thumb. How does emotivism entail naturalism? How did you make this inference?

 

[Oreoracle]

(It spells out the absurd consequences in terms of the kind of ethical claims that one can be justified in making given your meta-ethical viewpoint.)

So because I believe that all ethics are subjective, I have to believe that all ethics are justified in being established? Now your sputtering nonsense. How did you make this inference?

 

[Oreoracle]

How about “conducive to happiness”?

That’s good enough. Yes, I think the value of the fetus is entirely dependent on its utility.

Then why did you write:"The more the unborn child and others value its life, the more utility it has?

I figured that if I omitted “the unborn child” (I believe I actually put “fetus,” but whatever) you would think I’m being unfair to the fetus by not considering its feelings. To make it easier to read, I made my assertion that the fetus (during the first few months) doesn’t have feelings a separate statement altogether. I wanted to prevent confusion, but I guess that made it more confusing.

If the physical universe did not exist there would be no basis for life, consciousness, emotions or value. Since it provides a basis for rational and sentient existence it must be valuable.

I think it’s circular to say that consciousness has value simply because it allows for value to be produced. Value is produced by us when we perceive the world around us. It works like comedy: a joke is funny not because it is inherently funny, but merely because it stimulates your brain (or mind, whatever you wish to call it) in a way you find pleasing. Values are the offspring of the involvement of both objects and consciousnesses, not just objects. So it’s pure nonsense to say that something is objectively or intrinsically valuable.

So if you can evade punishment there is no reason not to commit a crime? Laws are just based on expediency?

All conscious actions are based on expediency, but that’s another thread.

Anyway, you seem to be confused. Laws aren’t ethics–they are based on ethics. There isn’t a law saying, “You should not murder.” Rather, the law would say that a person found guilty of murder will be sentenced to X. Laws are descriptive, not prescriptive. We make laws against murder because we find it offensive or in some way detrimental to us, but the laws aren’t ethics in themselves (they don’t suggest what we should or should not do).

So in this case morality is based entirely on **one **person’s feelings? The father and the child itself should not be taken into account?

Of course the father’s feelings and those of other relatives should be taken into account. I was saying that the woman’s feelings tend to outweigh the others in most cases. In fact, the woman is usually met with support in these circumstances.

What feelings does the child have? Or does it not matter that the child can’t feel?

So if you have a preference for agnosticism it is because you are compelled to have that preference?

I would rather say that I prefer rationality and that rationality has led me to agnosticism. Preferences usually aren’t very specific. For instance, the preference for sex can be satisfied no matter who the partner is*. The same goes for the preferences for food and drink.

*Don’t even think about changing the subject to sexual ethics.

Please give a precise reference to substantiate this statement.

I will make a separate post for this tomorrow.

So her happiness was more important than your life. Even if her pregnancy had been perfectly normal she would have been justified in preventing you from having an opportunity to develop into a mature person and enjoy life? Doesn’t it occur to you that it would have been rather selfish of her?

Sure she would have been justified. Would you have blamed her?

And I’m curious: If your mother had decided to remain abstinent for her entire life, knowing that she could have had children at any time, but refused to do so all the same, would she have been justified in preventing you from having the opportunity to develop into a mature person and enjoy life?

 

[Betterave]

You even said near the end of your post that most people agree that factors such as the existence of God, free will, etc., play an important part in ethics. I’m telling you that I’m not one of those people. In your reductio ad absurdum, you assumed that I meant actions such as beating our wives must be acceptable because they’ve occured naturally. That was rather presumptuous of you. I don’t feel that all aspects of nature have inherent value, and I don’t know how you possibly got the idea that I did.

I’d say that I’m closer to preference utilitarianism, but that’s almost identical (and can be identical, depending on your views) to the classical version.

Where have I even hinted at being a naturalist? I wouldn’t say that I have a metaphysical “view.” I make assumptions, of course, since I believe the external world exists and that other consciousnesses exist, but I don’t follow any particular metaphysical doctrine. Indeed, I think it’s a bit foolish to do so, but that’s just me.

Whoa pardner! Slow down, take your ritalin, and let’s try this again.

Please consider the possibility that the fact that you aren’t aware of following any metaphysical doctrine may be indicative of your ignorance/lack of education, not evidence that you don’t “follow” particular metaphysical doctrines. What do you think a metaphysical doctrine is? (If you like I’ll point some out in what you’ve written.) Or do you think that if you call them assumptions then they’re not doctrines? Isn’t that an entirely otiose distinction?

Preference utilitarian, huh? Way to be mainstream! Why don’t you talk about preferences then instead of pleasure and pain? As for being identical (depending on your views) to classical utilitarianism, yes, of course; but hopefully you’re aware that it can be “identical” (equivalent is probably a better word) to any ethical system, depending on your views. (If you don’t understand how this works, I suggest reading Peter Railton’s “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984) - not that it’s a good article on the whole, but it explains this point well.)

You wrote: “In your reductio ad absurdum, you assumed that I meant actions such as beating our wives must be acceptable because they’ve occured naturally.” Please don’t just make stupid stuff up because it makes you feel good! Read what I wrote and make an open-minded effort to understand it! Thanks! Now you understand your own position enough to recognize that this is true: “Your emotivism entails that your approval of utilitarianism is the subjective expression of your positive feelings towards utilitarian principles.” (Congratulations!) Now generalize: your emotivism also entails that a wife-beaters approval of his moral principles (maybe he’s a utilitarian too, with different views from yours) and the actions that follow from them is also the subjective expression of his positive feelings towards his principles and related moral judgments. Emotivism entails that both views are equally and objectively justified.

 

[Betterave]

Yes. There is quite a difference between the ethic, “I should not kill.” and the factual statement, “Rob believes that he should not kill.” The former is prescriptive, subjective, and conveys no meaning in itself (We have no idea what “should” is supposed to reference in reality. Part of the statement is disconnected from reality, so we can’t possibly determine its truth value.). The latter is objective and descriptive because every one of its terms describe something in reality (in this case, we don’t need to know what “should” actually refers to as long as we know the person believes that they should).

We don’t need to know what “should” refers to? But emotivism claims that it does know, even if we don’t need to. It refers to the subjective tendency to approve of something. Do you have a point to make here?

Right. I only said that the morals/ethics themselves are subjective.

Wrong, go back, read again.

And here your assumption stands out like a sore thumb. How does emotivism entail naturalism? How did you make this inference?

I never claimed that it does:
“(In case you still don’t get it, let me clarify: my reductio ad absurdum attacks your meta-ethical viewpoint and its underlying (correct?) metaphysical viewpoint.)”
…although as a matter of fact the two usually do go together. But of course, you don’t have any metaphysical views! (Of course!)
However, if there really are no underlying metaphysical views (a claim which is beyond absurd), just leave it as an attack on your meta-ethics.

 

[Betterave]

Oreo, let me just add, because I’m worried you’re missing this important point: The fact that a judgment (or ‘ethic’ as you like to call it) is subjective does not mean that it is not objective - the terms are not (necessarily) mutually exclusive. This is basic to emotivism.

So because I believe that all ethics are subjective, I have to believe that all ethics are justified in being established? Now your sputtering nonsense. How did you make this inference?

As for this…??? Who’s sputtering nonsense?

 

[tonyrey]

I think the value of the fetus is entirely dependent on its utility.

Do you think the value of a person is entirely dependent on his/her utility?

I think it’s circular to say that consciousness has value simply because it allows for value to be produced.

So you don’t think consciousness has value?

Value is produced by us when we perceive the world around us.

So if no one considers the life of a particular person to be valuable it is valueless?

Values are the offspring of the involvement of both objects and consciousnesses, not just objects. So it’s pure nonsense to say that something is objectively or intrinsically valuable.

So animals are valueless if human beings do not exist?

So if you can evade punishment there is no reason not to commit a crime?
All conscious actions are based on expediency, but that’s another thread.

Expediency is directly related to the topic of abortion because it is how you justify it.
So if you can evade punishment there is no reason not to commit a crime?

Of course the father’s feelings and those of other relatives should be taken into account. I was saying that the woman’s feelings tend to outweigh the others in most cases. In fact, the woman is usually met with support in these circumstances.

You said almost 100%! Suppose the father is prepared to bring up the child but the mother refuses out of malice. Do you still think she is justified?

What feelings does the child have? Or does it not matter that the child can’t feel?

How do you know the unborn child cannot feel?

So if you have a preference for agnosticism it is because you are compelled to have that preference?
I would rather say that I prefer rationality and that rationality has led me to agnosticism.

So if you have a preference for rationality it is because you are compelled to have that preference?

Preferences usually aren’t very specific. For instance, the preference for sex can be satisfied no matter who the partner is*. The same goes for the preferences for food and drink.

Nevertheless you believe all preferences are compulsions?

Even if her pregnancy had been perfectly normal she would have been justified in preventing you from having an opportunity to develop into a mature person and enjoy life? Doesn’t it occur to you that it would have been rather selfish of her?
Sure she would have been justified.

Why? Don’t you consider an unborn child to be a person with a right to life?
Come to think of it, do you consider anyone to have a right to life?

Would you have blamed her?

It is not for me to blame anyone.

And I’m curious: If your mother had decided to remain abstinent for her entire life, knowing that she could have had children at any time, but refused to do so all the same, would she have been justified in preventing you from having the opportunity to develop into a mature person and enjoy life?

It depends on her motive and on her conscience.

 

[catharina]

Do you think the value of a person is entirely dependent on his/her utility?
So you don’t think consciousness has value?
So if no one considers the life of a particular person to be valuable it is valueless?
So animals are valueless if human beings do not exist?
Expediency is directly related to the topic of abortion because it is how you justify it.
So if you can evade punishment there is no reason not to commit a crime?
You said almost 100%! Suppose the father is prepared to bring up the child but the mother refuses out of malice. Do you still think she is justified?
How do you know the unborn child cannot feel?
So if you have a preference for rationality it is because you are compelled to have that preference?
Nevertheless you believe all preferences are compulsions?
Why? Don’t you consider an unborn child to be a person with a right to life?
Come to think of it, do you consider anyone to have a right to life?
It is not for me to blame anyone.
It depends on her motive and on her conscience.

Excellent, tonyrey. I applaud you.
Even the use of “feeling” is bizarre since prenatal neurological growth is present early.
Or is the poster speaking of emotions? Either way, so bizarre.

Yes, by his standards, no one has a right to life.

 

[tonyrey]

Excellent, tonyrey. I applaud you.
Even the use of “feeling” is bizarre since prenatal neurological growth is present early.
Or is the poster speaking of emotions? Either way, so bizarre.
Yes, by his standards, no one has a right to life.

Thank you for your applause, Catharina. Unborn children cannot speak for themselves and need some one to defend them from infanticide. I’ve heard accounts of children writhing on tables in abortion clinics which sicken me. Is this a humane society or have we gone back to the Dark Ages?

 

[Betterave]

Oreo, the coincidence of the subjectivity and objectivity of ethical viewpoints in the human subject is a metaphysical view which is entailed by emotivism. Emotivism, then, does depend on your metaphysical views, for example about God. If you believed in God it probably wouldn’t be tempting for you to locate the objectivity of moral judgments in the subjectivity of finite human persons, since you’d have the option to locate this objectivity in the subjectivity of God (and this needn’t be the God of any particular revealed religion). (And I’m not saying that there are no other options on the table.)

Tonyrey, I can answer most of these:

Do you think the value of a person is entirely dependent on his/her utility? Yes.
So you don’t think consciousness has value? It has value if and only if it has utility.
So if no one considers the life of a particular person to be valuable it is valueless? Yes.
So animals are valueless if human beings do not exist? No, they are sentient beings who prefer pleasure to pain.
…
So if you can evade punishment there is no reason not to commit a crime? This depends on how my commission of a crime contributes to the overall fulfillment of the preferences of sentient beings.
You said almost 100%! Suppose the father is prepared to bring up the child but the mother refuses out of malice. Do you still think she is justified? This will depend on Oreo’s personal views.
How do you know the unborn child cannot feel? Don’t know.
So if you have a preference for rationality it is because you are compelled to have that preference? We often have no choice about immediate preferences, but there is probably no reason to rule out first and second order accounts of desire(?).
Why? Don’t you consider an unborn child to be a person with a right to life? There is no such right.
Come to think of it, do you consider anyone to have a right to life? I’m pretty sure Oreo has been clear about this: the answer is no.
…

 

[tonyrey]

Tonyrey, I can answer most of these:

It will be interesting to see how many of your answers coincide with Oreo’s. I’m not going to speculate…

 

[Oreoracle]

Whoa pardner! Slow down, take your ritalin, and let’s try this again.

:ehh:

What do you think a metaphysical doctrine is? (If you like I’ll point some out in what you’ve written.) Or do you think that if you call them assumptions then they’re not doctrines? Isn’t that an entirely otiose distinction?

Well, we obviously can’t call a compilation of assumptions a doctrine in every case (the axioms of mathematics, for example, provide structure and consistency while one’s metaphysical assumptions may not be as ordered). A metaphysical doctrine would explain the lay of reality without leaving anything open-ended. For example, naturalism states that all that exists is physical. It doesn’t allow one to believe that anything non-physical could possibly exist. I’m rather open-minded to the possibility of non-physicality, but I do question whether non-physical entities can be reliably experimented with if they exist.

Preference utilitarian, huh? Way to be mainstream!

Yes, and being one of the Catholics, who make up one-sixth of the world’s population, isn’t being mainstream at all!

You’re unique, just like everybody else.

Why don’t you talk about preferences then instead of pleasure and pain?

Preferences are already alluded to when one uses the utilitarian definitions of “pleasure” and “pain.” Pain is the feeling associated with the dissatisfaction of preferences. Pleasure is the opposite.

As for being identical (depending on your views) to classical utilitarianism, yes, of course; but hopefully you’re aware that it can be “identical” (equivalent is probably a better word) to any ethical system, depending on your views. (If you don’t understand how this works, I suggest reading Peter Railton’s “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984) - not that it’s a good article on the whole, but it explains this point well.)

I’m afraid I don’t understand, and so I might want to take a look at the article. As far as I know, utilitarianism is the only ethical philosophy based on anything remotely similar to the greatest happiness principle. It might demand that we do what other philosophies also tell us to do, but for different reasons.

Edit: Oh, I see now. You mean that utilitarians have different beliefs regarding what makes people happy. Yes, that’s a difficulty inherent in the system.

Please don’t just make stupid stuff up because it makes you feel good! Read what I wrote and make an open-minded effort to understand it! Thanks!

I’m sorry, but I can’t force myself to interpret it any other way. What did you mean?

Now you understand your own position enough to recognize that this is true: “Your emotivism entails that your approval of utilitarianism is the subjective expression of your positive feelings towards utilitarian principles.” (Congratulations!) Now generalize: your emotivism also entails that a wife-beaters approval of his moral principles (maybe he’s a utilitarian too, with different views from yours) and the actions that follow from them is also the subjective expression of his positive feelings towards his principles and related moral judgments. Emotivism entails that both views are equally and objectively justified.

I wouldn’t say “objectively justified.” I think emotivism rather says that ethical systems hold no objective plausibility whatsoever–attempting to justify them is merely an act of persuasion.

 

[Oreoracle]

We don’t need to know what “should” refers to? But emotivism claims that it does know, even if we don’t need to. It refers to the subjective tendency to approve of something. Do you have a point to make here?

That’s not what “should” means, it’s just why it’s used. I don’t think emotivism attempts to determine the meaning of ethical statements, but rather opts to explain why they are used. Again, when we say, “Humans should not kill humans.” we are expressing our desire for the world to be a certain way (to be without human killings), because we detest a world in which human killings take place. We are not describing how the world is, as facts/objective statements do, but rather expressing how we feel it should be.

Wrong, go back, read again.

I’m not playing your semantical games. You know perfectly well what I mean.

I never claimed that it does:
“(In case you still don’t get it, let me clarify: my reductio ad absurdum attacks your meta-ethical viewpoint and its underlying (correct?) metaphysical viewpoint.)”
…although as a matter of fact the two usually do go together. But of course, you don’t have any metaphysical views! (Of course!)
However, if there really are no underlying metaphysical views (a claim which is beyond absurd), just leave it as an attack on your meta-ethics.

I mean that I don’t adhere to any definitive metaphysical system. Many questions remain open-ended in my view.

Here, you are just twisting my words so that they deviate from my obvious intentions and then taunting me as if you were a child. When you’re done playing games, let me know.

 

[Oreoracle]

Betterave did a pretty good job of answering for me (), but I offer my answers nonetheless.

Do you think the value of a person is entirely dependent on his/her utility?

The ethical value, yes. Obviously the sentimental values that people hold for one another are not to be conflated with what I mean by utility value.

So you don’t think consciousness has value?

I, and many others, feel that it does, but that value doesn’t exist outside of our feelings.

So if no one considers the life of a particular person to be valuable it is valueless?

As with the above, the life is valuable, but only in the eyes of the beholder(s). The value doesn’t exist outside of their feelings.

So animals are valueless if human beings do not exist?

I think it’s naive to believe that all animals are incapable of valuing themselves, each other, or aspects of their environment. Humans are not the only animals with emotions.

So if you can evade punishment there is no reason not to commit a crime?

I’ve already answered this question.

You said almost 100%! Suppose the father is prepared to bring up the child but the mother refuses out of malice. Do you still think she is justified?

Can you give me a likely scenario wherein the father’s happiness would be dependent on the birth of the child more so than the mother’s? If so, then she may not be justified, but we’d still have to address other issues, such as their financial status. Can the father afford to raise the child properly? Does he have the time to raise the child properly? I ask because it doesn’t seem that the mother would be very accomodating in this scenario.

How do you know the unborn child cannot feel?

We have good reason to believe that a lack of brain activity implies a lack of consciousness. After someone awakes from sleep after being “put under” before a surgery, do they ever speak of what they were thinking during the surgery? Of course not, because the part of the brain responsible for consciousness was made inactive. This simple observation is convincing whether you believe that consciousness is produced by the brain or if you only believe they are correlated.

So if you have a preference for rationality it is because you are compelled to have that preference?

Yes.

Nevertheless you believe all preferences are compulsions?

Yes.

Why? Don’t you consider an unborn child to be a person with a right to life?
Come to think of it, do you consider anyone to have a right to life?

Rights are silly notions because a) they imply that morality is objective and b) any system that contains a multitude of absolute rules will inevitably run into contradictions. For instance, the right to one’s body and the right to life seem to conflict in the pro-life vs. pro-choice debate. When pro-lifers are forced to address this contradiction they say that the right to life is more important than other rights. How can one absolute be more important than another? Indeed, how can one object be more important than another? It seems that the pro-lifers are creating a hierarchy of supposed absolutes, thus making their absolutes relative to one another.

 

[Oreoracle]

How does it contradict everything else the Church has said about morality?

Alright, I’m going to finally address this. I’ll be fair and quote the Catechism even though it is understood that few Catholics agree fully with the Church’s ethical system, which is very particular, I might add. Because of this, I don’t think you can blame me for forming the opinions I have about the Church. When most of the adherents and even the apologists speak contrarily to Church doctrine, spectators can’t be blamed for thinking ill of the Church, can they?

From the Catechism:

1750 The morality of human acts depends on:

• the object chosen;

• the end in view or the intention;

• the circumstances of the action.

The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.

This seems to coincide with what you’ve said so far, assuming that “object” means “means.” (But it doesn’t. )

1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.

In the first quote, they say that the end in view and the intention are synonymous. Here, they say that the object is what the will deliberately directs itself toward. How is this any different than an intention?

1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity.

With all due respect, I think this is a petty way to distinguish the two.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but is this saying that the intention is the means by which one attains the end? If so, the intention and the end are certainly not synonymous as the first quote contends.

1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation.

I think this demonstrates my point rather well. Here, they state that the intention, or end, (and thus, the object, I suppose) is entirely subordinate to the means.

I must confess that I don’t know what the Church means by “intrinsically disordered.”

1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.

Here, they state very clearly that the circumstance and consequences are subordinate to the means. The only element left that can be said to be primary is the means.

Also, we see that the circumstances and the consequences do not determine whether an act is good or evil, but rather how good or evil it is.

From what I understand of these quotes, every element seems to be considered secondary in one case or another. And the terminology is rather confusing–how can the intention be the end in view and the means by which the end is attained at the same time?

Despite this, the Church stated very clearly that the end and the consequences don’t justify the means, but rather contribute to its inherent goodness or badness (they make it more or less good or more or less bad, but they cannot reverse the inherent value). Thus, if killing is “intrinsically disordered,” whatever that means, then it can’t be justified given any end, even if the object/intention/end is to save the mother. The action will be considered evil no matter what.

 

[tonyrey]

I am very impressed that you have gone to so much trouble to examine the principles of the moral teaching of the Church. It does you credit!
It would take us right away from the topic if we discuss all the points you have made. So I shall deal with the most relevant one:

Thus, if killing is “intrinsically disordered,” whatever that means, then it can’t be justified given any end, even if the object/intention/end is to save the mother. The action will be considered evil no matter what.

It is certainly evil to allow the unborn child to die but it can be justified. How? On the ground that it is the lesser of two evils, i.e. it is a greater evil to allow the mother to die or allow both of them to die. Fortunately such difficult moral decisions do not have to be made very often…

 

[Prodigal_Son]

In the first quote, they say that the end in view and the intention are synonymous. Here, they say that the object is what the will deliberately directs itself toward. How is this any different than an intention?

The object is a good, toward which the act is directed. But it is a metaphysical good; it is to act in accordance with one’s own God-given nature. It has nothing to do with the results of the moral action. One is obliged to do morally good things, whatever the consequences.

As far as “the lesser of two evils” goes, technically this is not the case. If you have to choose between two options, both of which seem evil, then either a) they are both morally neutral, or b) one of them is in fact good. The entire concept of morality relies on the possibility of goodness; your circumstances can never force you to sin.

There are cases in which the “principle of double effect” may be drawn on: this means that a bad outcome is the unintended consequence of a good action. In marginal cases, Catholic teaching tends to let people discern their way through, without commanding one particular path. You do not encounter the method and tone of Catholic pastoral teaching on this bulletin board, however.

I must confess that I don’t know what the Church means by “intrinsically disordered.”

Intrinsically disordered, in my understanding, means arising from original sin. A man’s desire to save his wife’s life is not, by any means, intrinsically disordered: therefore, an action aimed at saving his wife which has the unintended consequence of allowing a baby to die (who would not survive anyway) is permissible.