A Philosophical Debate On The Problem Of Abortion

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I’m not playing your semantical games. You know perfectly well what I mean.
1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.
1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity.
A case study:

The object chosen is the words you choose to write. These have to be good in themselves. (What you wrote was objectively not correct, although you don’t seem to care.)

Your intention in writing the words must also be good. Intention is different from the object. (Thus you could accuse me, rightly or wrongly, of playing semantic games and ignoring your intention, although what I wrote was objectively correct.)

See the distinction?
 
1750 The morality of human acts depends on:
  • the object chosen;
  • the end in view or the intention;
  • the circumstances of the action.
    The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.
1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.
In the first quote, they say that the end in view and the intention are synonymous. Here, they say that the object is what the will deliberately directs itself toward. How is this any different than an intention?
The objective end is different from the end in view or intention (or subjective end).
E.g.: what you write is different from what you mean.
Capisci?
1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity.
With all due respect, I think this is a petty way to distinguish the two.
But hopefully now you see the importance of not playing fast and loose with semantic distinctions. Distinctions in meaning matter, Oreo, especially if you’re trying to have a reasonable discussion with someone, rather than just venting how you feel.🙂
 
Quote:
1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation.
I think this demonstrates my point rather well. Here, they state that the intention, or end, (and thus, the object, I suppose) is entirely subordinate to the means.
I must confess that I don’t know what the Church means by “intrinsically disordered.”
HUH? The intention or subjective end (not the object) is entirely subordinate to the object (or objective end).

Intrinsically disordered just means wrong in itself. Attacking you as a stupid liar when you’ve displayed nothing but intelligence and honesty, for example, would be intrinsically disordered (calumny).
 
Well, we obviously can’t call a compilation of assumptions a doctrine in every case (the axioms of mathematics, for example, provide structure and consistency while one’s metaphysical assumptions may not be as ordered). A metaphysical doctrine would explain the lay of reality without leaving anything open-ended. For example, naturalism states that all that exists is physical. It doesn’t allow one to believe that anything non-physical could possibly exist. I’m rather open-minded to the possibility of non-physicality, but I do question whether non-physical entities can be reliably experimented with if they exist.
Is this your way of trying to say you don’t want to be held accountable for your metaphysical views? Your metaphysical views don’t have to be dogmatic to be metaphysical views. Regardless, your view that moral evaluations are subjectively grounded, and have no other meaning in reality, is a (dogmatic) metaphysical view - the fact that it is haphazardly believed in relation to your other views of reality does not tell in favor of the coherence or rationality of your beliefs. Right???
Yes, and being one of the Catholics, who make up one-sixth of the world’s population, isn’t being mainstream at all! 😛
You’re unique, just like everybody else. 😉
Whatever dude, I’m way uniquer than you and we both know it.
Preferences are already alluded to when one uses the utilitarian definitions of “pleasure” and “pain.” Pain is the feeling associated with the dissatisfaction of preferences. Pleasure is the opposite.
So apparently a guy like Hare didn’t really need to bother talking about preferences? Did you know he thought Kant could have been a utilitarian?
I’m afraid I don’t understand, and so I might want to take a look at the article. As far as I know, utilitarianism is the only ethical philosophy based on anything remotely similar to the greatest happiness principle. It might demand that we do what other philosophies also tell us to do, but for different reasons.
Edit: Oh, I see now. You mean that utilitarians have different beliefs regarding what makes people happy. Yes, that’s a difficulty inherent in the system.
Did you know Hare thought Kant could have been a utilitarian? (Wait, I just asked that question.)😉
I’m sorry, but I can’t force myself to interpret it any other way. What did you mean?
I meant that emotivism claims that the only meaning of moral claims (i.e., the objective content of moral claims) is the subject’s expression of approval of some act or ethical belief. That applies to all subjects, everywhere, in every culture. It’s a very strong claim, with some very uncomfortable implications.
I wouldn’t say “objectively justified.” I think emotivism rather says that ethical systems hold no objective plausibility whatsoever–attempting to justify them is merely an act of persuasion.
Don’t you mean they hold no (cognitively-based) intersubjective plausibility whatsoever? Persuasion is irrelevant. Objectivity does not mean intersubjectivity. (Didn’t I make this point already?) The subject’s moral evaluations are non-cognitively but objectively justified by his own subjective feelings of approval or disapproval. This doesn’t mean his view is binding on anyone else; it means that no one else’s view is binding on him. I.e., the buck stops here, at the individual.
 
That’s not what “should” means, it’s just why it’s used. I don’t think emotivism attempts to determine the meaning of ethical statements, but rather opts to explain why they are used. Again, when we say, “Humans should not kill humans.” we are expressing our desire for the world to be a certain way (to be without human killings), because we detest a world in which human killings take place. We are not describing how the world is, as facts/objective statements do, but rather expressing how we feel it should be.
So what does ‘meaning’ mean? Ever heard the phrase “meaning is use”?
 
I am very impressed that you have gone to so much trouble to examine the principles of the moral teaching of the Church. It does you credit! 🙂
Thanks. Some people don’t believe me, but I do try to understand what the Church says even though I disagree.
It would take us right away from the topic if we discuss all the points you have made. So I shall deal with the most relevant one:
It is certainly evil to allow the unborn child to die but it can be justified. How? On the ground that it is the lesser of two evils, i.e. it is a greater evil to allow the mother to die or allow both of them to die. Fortunately such difficult moral decisions do not have to be made very often…
I think we’re on the same page here (or at least close to the same page). But do you think it would be fair for a doctor who is forced to make this decision to be considered blameworthy for causing the lesser of two evils? Would he be required to repent? I suppose the main question is: Can someone be forced to sin by the circumstances?
The object is a good, toward which the act is directed. But it is a metaphysical good; it is to act in accordance with one’s own God-given nature. It has nothing to do with the results of the moral action. One is obliged to do morally good things, whatever the consequences.
I’m still confused. I don’t know what you mean by “good.” Do you mean “good” as in an item, or “good” as in an ethical good? What if someone deliberately acts against this metaphysical structure? What is the object then?
As far as “the lesser of two evils” goes, technically this is not the case. If you have to choose between two options, both of which seem evil, then either a) they are both morally neutral, or b) one of them is in fact good. The entire concept of morality relies on the possibility of goodness; your circumstances can never force you to sin.
I agree entirely. Any ethical system that requires a person to do evil and does not consider the act better than the other options contradicts its own purpose. Goodness and badness have to be incorporated into the system so that they are expressed in degrees. Otherwise, these “lose-lose” situations will occur.
There are cases in which the “principle of double effect” may be drawn on: this means that a bad outcome is the unintended consequence of a good action. In marginal cases, Catholic teaching tends to let people discern their way through, without commanding one particular path. You do not encounter the method and tone of Catholic pastoral teaching on this bulletin board, however.
Indeed. This principle does sound very different from the principles the Church normally suggests.
Intrinsically disordered, in my understanding, means arising from original sin. A man’s desire to save his wife’s life is not, by any means, intrinsically disordered: therefore, an action aimed at saving his wife which has the unintended consequence of allowing a baby to die (who would not survive anyway) is permissible.
I see. Does the Church ever enumerate the impulses that have arisen from original sin, or is there any method one can use to determine whether an impulse was caused by original sin?
 
It is certainly evil to allow the unborn child to die but it can be justified. How? On the ground that it is the lesser of two evils, i.e. it is a greater evil to allow the mother to die or allow both of them to die. Fortunately such difficult moral decisions do not have to be made very often…
I think we’re on the same page here (or at least close to the same page). But do you think it would be fair for a doctor who is forced to make this decision to be considered blameworthy for causing the lesser of two evils? Would he be required to repent? I suppose the main question is: Can someone be forced to sin by the circumstances?
 
There are doctors (not only Catholic) who have opted out of performing abortions. I don’t believe anyone can be forced to sin by circumstances. If you had a choice between losing your job and killing an unborn child - and you believed it is a grave violation of its right to life - what would you do? I wouldn’t hesitate. I could find another job but the child could not find another life…
But that’s not what we’re talking about. In this scenario, the mother will die if the fetus is not aborted, so the options are 1) relieve yourself of the responsibility to protect her and her child as your clients, thus leaving the obligation to another doctor who will have to make the same decision, or 2) kill the fetus so that the mother can live. Any way you look at it, the decision to allow both to die (or pass the responsibility onto another) or kill one to save the other is forced on you. What do you choose? How is either course of action not sinful?
 
Intrinsically disordered just means wrong in itself. Attacking you as a stupid liar when you’ve displayed nothing but intelligence and honesty, for example, would be intrinsically disordered (calumny).
How do we determine that an act is “wrong in itself?” Wouldn’t accusing me of being a stupid liar be wrong because of the consequences of hurting my feelings, vilifying me, and causing us to digress from an important topic? I would say that the moral value of actions lies in their consequences. I don’t think actions are evil because they defy some metaphysical mumbo-jumbo (which would still be a consequence of the action, and not a quality of the action itself). Sorry buddy, but I think consequentialism is the only way to go.
 
Is this your way of trying to say you don’t want to be held accountable for your metaphysical views? Your metaphysical views don’t have to be dogmatic to be metaphysical views. Regardless, your view that moral evaluations are subjectively grounded, and have no other meaning in reality, is a (dogmatic) metaphysical view - the fact that it is haphazardly believed in relation to your other views of reality does not tell in favor of the coherence or rationality of your beliefs. Right???
Well, I guess my contention that morals are not some abstract laws that somehow shape our universe is a dogmatic metaphysical belief in the same way that the belief that my mind isn’t being controlled by some demonic deity is a dogmatic metaphysical belief. I think and possess my own consciousness, and so it seems logically impossible that someone else could be experiencing this same sensation of control over what I call “my mind.” Similarly, I speak my mind regarding ethics, and I can tell where those opinions come from: my emotions. Something dissatisfies me, and so I say it’s wrong. It’s one of the simplest psychological truths there is.
Whatever dude, I’m way uniquer than you and we both know it.
You’re more eccentric than most, it seems, but other than that, I haven’t heard any unique reasoning demonstrated by you. As far as the other aspects of your character go, well, I really don’t know you and you don’t know me. There’s no sense in bickering like teenage girls over whose more unique (and doing so through the internet, no less!).
So apparently a guy like Hare didn’t really need to bother talking about preferences? Did you know he thought Kant could have been a utilitarian?
Who is Hare, and why did he think Kant could have passed as a utilitarian?
I meant that emotivism claims that the only meaning of moral claims (i.e., the objective content of moral claims) is the subject’s expression of approval of some act or ethical belief. That applies to all subjects, everywhere, in every culture. It’s a very strong claim, with some very uncomfortable implications.
If that’s what you meant, I agree. Yes, it does seem a bit disconcerting, but once you realize that it would be impossible for a “should” claim to refer to an objective force in the universe, then it’s the only option. If ethics were objective, we couldn’t violate them any more than we could violate other laws, such as the gravitational laws.
Don’t you mean they hold no (cognitively-based) intersubjective plausibility whatsoever?
Not at all. In fact, ethics are usually regarded as objective precisely because of their intersubjectivity. For instance, people may think it is factual that murder (the legal definition) is wrong because this sentiment is almost unanimous amongst humans and is rarely questioned (because of the emotive power of murder).
 
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hatsoff:
Human life does not have “intrinsic” value. Nothing does.
If nothing has intrinsic value, then truth does not have intrinsic value.

If truth does not have intrinsic value, then it is by no means to be preferred to untruth.

If the statement “nothing has intrinsic value” is true, then the statement “something has intrinsic value” is false.

If the statement “nothing has intrinsic value” is true, then it is by no means to be preferred to the statement “something has intrinsic value”.

In other words, apart from value, the idea that we should believe truth instead of untruth is incoherent. But perhaps you’re willing to live with that consequence?
For the existential nihilist like hatsoff does truth even have value?
 
How do we determine that an act is “wrong in itself?” Wouldn’t accusing me of being a stupid liar be wrong because of the consequences of hurting my feelings, vilifying me, and causing us to digress from an important topic? I would say that the moral value of actions lies in their consequences. I don’t think actions are evil because they defy some metaphysical mumbo-jumbo (which would still be a consequence of the action, and not a quality of the action itself). Sorry buddy, but I think consequentialism is the only way to go.
Yes, it would be wrong because of the consequences, but it would still be wrong if there were no consequences, say if I only was harboring such thoughts in my heart, then died. Do you not see that? It would be an act of injustice, an offense against truth and love. Do you really not have these concepts? It may be that you simply have a corrupt mind. If you have missed out on some basic formation of moral character, you will be unable to see what others see. This is called blindness. If a blind person insists to a person who can see that their is no such thing as light or color, there’s not much the seeing person can do. Some people just don’t have consciences. Neuroscientists have identified certain neurons as mirror neurons which are necessary for normal emotional and moral development. Some people have moral defects arising from neural defects. Others for other reasons. I don’t know how to explain your case, but if you don’t see that injustice is wrong apart from consequences, I’m afraid there is simply something wrong with you.
 
Well, I guess my contention that morals are not some abstract laws that somehow shape our universe is a dogmatic metaphysical belief in the same way that the belief that my mind isn’t being controlled by some demonic deity is a dogmatic metaphysical belief.
You guess, huh? What makes them the same?
You’re more eccentric than most, it seems, but other than that, I haven’t heard any unique reasoning demonstrated by you. As far as the other aspects of your character go, well, I really don’t know you and you don’t know me. There’s no sense in bickering like teenage girls over whose more unique (and doing so through the internet, no less!).
No sense at all in bickering - I WAS JOKING!
Who is Hare, and why did he think Kant could have passed as a utilitarian?
I thought he was a leading proponent of preference utilitarianism. You’ve never heard of him? Kant could have been a utilitarian because his first formulation of the categorical imperative can be interpreted as coinciding with what preference utilitarianism recommends. “Act only according to that maxim which you can will to be universal law.” Anyway, my point is just that calling yourself utilitarian doesn’t entail anything about your particular moral judgments. This being the case, boasting of the coherence of your views is an entirely trivial boast (not that I believe it anyway).
If that’s what you meant, I agree. Yes, it does seem a bit disconcerting, but once you realize that it would be impossible for a “should” claim to refer to an objective force in the universe, then it’s the only option. If ethics were objective, we couldn’t violate them any more than we could violate other laws, such as the gravitational laws.
Well thank you for your immense graciousness. My reductio was valid after all. You even admit it seems a bit disconcerting. (I dare say!)
Not at all. In fact, ethics are usually regarded as objective precisely because of their intersubjectivity. For instance, people may think it is factual that murder (the legal definition) is wrong because this sentiment is almost unanimous amongst humans and is rarely questioned (because of the emotive power of murder).
Not at all?? Did you read what I wrote?:confused:
Betterave wrote:
Don’t you mean they hold no (cognitively-based) intersubjective plausibility whatsoever?
Did you notice the words “cognitively-based”?
Anyhoo! We were talking about emotivism, remember? So yes, according to emotivism, “ethics are usually regarded as objective precisely because of their intersubjectivity” - however, this usual way of regarding ethics is wrong according to emotivism. According to cognitivism, let me repeat, “they hold no (cognitively-based) intersubjective plausibility whatsoever.” According to emotivism, let me repeat:
Betterave wrote:
Objectivity does not mean intersubjectivity. (Didn’t I make this point already?) The subject’s moral evaluations are non-cognitively but objectively justified by his own subjective feelings of approval or disapproval. This doesn’t mean his view is binding on anyone else; it means that no one else’s view is binding on him. I.e., the buck stops here, at the individual.
 
Yes, it would be wrong because of the consequences, but it would still be wrong if there were no consequences, say if I only was harboring such thoughts in my heart, then died. Do you not see that?
See what? Yes, a person is thinking (or feeling) in a way that I don’t appreciate. So what? Realistically, what can I do about it? Is it any of my business?

Do you really want ethics to function as a group of thought police? To me, the whole purpose of ethics is to improve the world by finding ways to please everyone (creating win-win situations). What you’re advocating is what I’d call “mental fascism” (my own term). People can rarely control how they feel, and to distribute rewards and punishments based on how they feel is ludicrous. Do you not see that? Yes, we want everyone to feel a certain way, but it doesn’t make much sense to punish people for not conforming to such standards (indeed, we would have no way of knowing how they felt unless they spoke of it).

But this, of course, is where Catholicism steps in. Ah yes, Catholicism…the undisputed champion of the “I deserve, you deserve” philosophies. Catholicism: the ideology wherein it is acceptable for someone to be eternally tortured, without hope of redemption, all for thinking in a certain way, regardless of what they’ve actually done*. Justice indeed! :rolleyes:
  • And could God not send everyone to Heaven, regardless of their actions? Why make people suffer, or allow them to suffer, at all? Just for the hell of it? (LOL I made a pun!)
I’m afraid there is simply something wrong with you.
I feel the very same way about you. 🤷
 
You guess, huh? What makes them the same?
They’re both negative metaphysical assertions that appear to be self-explanatory. Some people are too lazy to do the introspection to come to those conclusions, I guess.
I thought he was a leading proponent of preference utilitarianism.
If he is, then it seems that Singer is far more famous. Singer’s pretty much regarded as the go-to guy for preference utilitarianism (though I don’t agree with all of his conclusions).
You’ve never heard of him? Kant could have been a utilitarian because his first formulation of the categorical imperative can be interpreted as coinciding with what preference utilitarianism recommends. “Act only according to that maxim which you can will to be universal law.”
How in the world does that formulation align itself with preference utilitarianism? This world is full of fools who, despite their observations, insist that everyone should feel a certain way (have you read your last post?) because they don’t care about the preferences of others. These apathetic persons would abuse the first formulation so much that Kant would roll over in his grave! His belief in some sort of immutable, abstract structure that could justify any action if you would only feel that you could “will something to be universal” is laughable. People prefer different things, and we are natural, so trying to compare our desires to something uniform and supernatural is insane.

Anyway, utilitarianism, in any form, is not in the business of setting universal standards (except the greatest happiness principle itself) based on one person’s desires. No, we wish to please everyone, and allow for the possibility that people prefer different things, so Kant’s conclusions seem very obscure to us (and, as I said, insane).
Anyway, my point is just that calling yourself utilitarian doesn’t entail anything about your particular moral judgments. This being the case, boasting of the coherence of your views is an entirely trivial boast (not that I believe it anyway).
Calling yourself utilitarian, if you are being honest, means that your moral judgments are (except in times when you have abandoned your code) contingent on the greatest happiness principle, and that that is the sole absolute standard you’ve set for yourself. That’s the only rule we follow, unless you count those hypocritical rule utilitarians.
 
Just a general comment Oreo: you’ve already made a major bad assumption about an argument that I made that you’ve recognized you were wrong about. An honest, reasonable person would tone down the arrogance level after such an experience. Could you try to be an honest reasonable person, please?
 
See what? Yes, a person is thinking (or feeling) in a way that I don’t appreciate. So what? Realistically, what can I do about it? Is it any of my business?

Do you really want ethics to function as a group of thought police? To me, the whole purpose of ethics is to improve the world by finding ways to please everyone (creating win-win situations). What you’re advocating is what I’d call “mental fascism” (my own term). People can rarely control how they feel, and to distribute rewards and punishments based on how they feel is ludicrous. Do you not see that? Yes, we want everyone to feel a certain way, but it doesn’t make much sense to punish people for not conforming to such standards (indeed, we would have no way of knowing how they felt unless they spoke of it).
What can you do about it?? You can recognize that its wrong (as you apparently do, although you missed this little point, which was the only point I was making)! Wrong regardless of consequences! And of course it’s none of your business, and you can’t do anything about it - I’m dead!!!

It’s a conceptual point (do you know what that is?), not a call to start monitoring the thoughts of dying people!!! Mental fascism?? - I’m sorry, but that is SO stupid!!! My point had nothing to do with punishment!!! Wow!
But this, of course, is where Catholicism steps in. Ah yes, Catholicism…the undisputed champion of the “I deserve, you deserve” philosophies. Catholicism: the ideology wherein it is acceptable for someone to be eternally tortured, without hope of redemption, all for thinking in a certain way, regardless of what they’ve actually done*. Justice indeed! :rolleyes:
  • And could God not send everyone to Heaven, regardless of their actions? Why make people suffer, or allow them to suffer, at all? Just for the hell of it? (LOL I made a pun!)
I feel the very same way about you. 🤷
My statement was an “if…then” statement. It wasn’t a stupid blank assertion of how I feel about you. As for your ignorant rant about Catholicism, if you want to discuss a different topic, I think it would be better if you started a new thread. Before you do though, stop, breathe deeply, and resolve to be way more rational and open-minded.
 
They’re both negative metaphysical assertions that appear to be self-explanatory. Some people are too lazy to do the introspection to come to those conclusions, I guess.
Or too lazy to do the introspection to see the truth of the categorical imperative, right? You call this an argument? Have you heard of Wittgenstein? Do you know what “beetle in a box” refers to?
If he is, then it seems that Singer is far more famous. Singer’s pretty much regarded as the go-to guy for preference utilitarianism (though I don’t agree with all of his conclusions).
Hare was Singer’s teacher and most important mentor.
How in the world does that formulation align itself with preference utilitarianism? This world is full of fools who, despite their observations, insist that everyone should feel a certain way (have you read your last post?) because they don’t care about the preferences of others. These apathetic persons would abuse the first formulation so much that Kant would roll over in his grave! His belief in some sort of immutable, abstract structure that could justify any action if you would only feel that you could “will something to be universal” is laughable. People prefer different things, and we are natural, so trying to compare our desires to something uniform and supernatural is insane.
Anyway, utilitarianism, in any form, is not in the business of setting universal standards (except the greatest happiness principle itself) based on one person’s desires. No, we wish to please everyone, and allow for the possibility that people prefer different things, so Kant’s conclusions seem very obscure to us (and, as I said, insane).
Your “we” is ridiculously naive. As if “you” utilitarians agree about everything. What a joke! You don’t even know who R.M. Hare is! He was a leading moral philosopher of the 20th century who sits squarely in “your” camp. If you have any interest in understanding ethics rather than spouting naive rhetoric about what you and “yours” believe, maybe you should do a little more reading.
Calling yourself utilitarian, if you are being honest, means that your moral judgments are (except in times when you have abandoned your code) contingent on the greatest happiness principle, and that that is the sole absolute standard you’ve set for yourself. That’s the only rule we follow, unless you count those hypocritical rule utilitarians.
The only rule you follow. Yeah, like the only rule I follow is “do the right thing.” Good rule. Very easy to follow. No need for anything more specific than that. One rule does the job. And also, Kant was insane.:o
 
Or too lazy to do the introspection to see the truth of the categorical imperative, right? You call this an argument? Have you heard of Wittgenstein? Do you know what “beetle in a box” refers to?
So now the categorical imperative is not only preferable to other moral principles, it’s true? Do tell. What does it take for an ethical principle to be true?
Hare was Singer’s teacher and most important mentor.
I thought I read the name somewhere, but that’s beside the point. I don’t need to know what utilitarians think in order to understand utilitarianism as it is defined. An ideology is not defined by those who claim to adhere to it (unless we count the relevant dictums of its creator, of course).
Your “we” is ridiculously naive. As if “you” utilitarians agree about everything. What a joke! You don’t even know who R.M. Hare is! He was a leading moral philosopher of the 20th century who sits squarely in “your” camp. If you have any interest in understanding ethics rather than spouting naive rhetoric about what you and “yours” believe, maybe you should do a little more reading.
Utilitarianism, being a very practical commonsense philosophy, has many adherents. More adherents, I would say, than the number of people who’ve actually heard the term “utilitarian.” As such, if I wanted to observe the behaviors of my fellows, I need not look very far, and I certainly wouldn’t have to pick up a philosophy book to read the works of utilitarians. In fact, most consequentialists are either utilitarian or are egoists with utilitarian tendencies. All you really have to do is avoid the works of the deontologists, and you’re there (that, of course, is easier said than done).
The only rule you follow. Yeah, like the only rule I follow is “do the right thing.” Good rule. Very easy to follow. No need for anything more specific than that. One rule does the job. And also, Kant was insane.:o
Aren’t all of Kant’s rules derived from one principle (the Categorical Imperative), like those of utilitarians?
 
Utilitarianism, being a very practical commonsense philosophy, has many adherents.
I question whether this is true. Consider: how many people encourage their spouse to cheat on them? (An action which seems to be implied by utilitarianism…)
 
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