A question that has been bugging me about Aquinas's 5 Proofs

[Ben_Sinner]

There is a question that has been bothering me lately and it seems to turn the 5 proofs from 'Proof" to only “Possibility”

Now logically these make sense and it would be illogical to disagree with them.

BUT…there is a doubt in my mind that keeps saying this:

"Just because we can’t logically fathom something, doesn’t mean it’s false.

So basically just because some of the arguments made against the 5 proofs are logically impossible for US logically, doesn’t mean the arguments aren’t true outside of human logic.

Is there a way to get rid of this doubt?

Remember, these are supposed to be Proofs, as in it is verified and can’t be proven false, not just strong logical possibilities.

How can we Prove the 5 proofs even against the above doubt?

 

[Tomdstone]

There is a question that has been bothering me lately and it seems to turn the 5 proofs from 'Proof" to only “Possibility”

Now logically these make sense and it would be illogical to disagree with them.

BUT…there is a doubt in my mind that keeps saying this:

"Just because we can’t logically fathom something, doesn’t mean it’s false.

So basically just because some of the arguments made against the 5 proofs are logically impossible for US logically, doesn’t mean the arguments aren’t true outside of human logic.

Is there a way to get rid of this doubt?

Remember, these are supposed to be Proofs, as in it is verified and can’t be proven false, not just strong logical possibilities.

How can we Prove the 5 proofs even against the above doubt?

A lot of people have criticized the 5 proofs.

 

[Ghosty]

There is a question that has been bothering me lately and it seems to turn the 5 proofs from 'Proof" to only “Possibility”

Now logically these make sense and it would be illogical to disagree with them.

BUT…there is a doubt in my mind that keeps saying this:

"Just because we can’t logically fathom something, doesn’t mean it’s false.

So basically just because some of the arguments made against the 5 proofs are logically impossible for US logically, doesn’t mean the arguments aren’t true outside of human logic.

Is there a way to get rid of this doubt?

Remember, these are supposed to be Proofs, as in it is verified and can’t be proven false, not just strong logical possibilities.

How can we Prove the 5 proofs even against the above doubt?

If you say that our human logic might not encompass all limits of truth then you must doubt truth itself since you can never be certain that reality beyond your comprehension doesn’t contradict truth as you know it.

Aquinas’ arguments are just that, arguments and not proofs in the logical sense. They are strong ( I would argue irrefutable) arguments that appeal to our common experience of reality and human understanding, but that is all they can be.

If you are willing to accept that there can only be reasonable arguments for God’s existence based on common human experience and understanding, then I think you’ll be hard pressed to find many better than those Aquinas puts forth.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Two_of_Clubs]

There is a question that has been bothering me lately and it seems to turn the 5 proofs from 'Proof" to only “Possibility”

Now logically these make sense and it would be illogical to disagree with them.

BUT…there is a doubt in my mind that keeps saying this:

"Just because we can’t logically fathom something, doesn’t mean it’s false.

So basically just because some of the arguments made against the 5 proofs are logically impossible for US logically, doesn’t mean the arguments aren’t true outside of human logic.

I don’t understand the nature of your objection. What exactly are you saying? Explain it to me like a six-year old. Could you maybe rephrase what you’re asking or give an example?

 

[Partinobodycula]

There is a question that has been bothering me lately and it seems to turn the 5 proofs from 'Proof" to only “Possibility”

Now logically these make sense and it would be illogical to disagree with them.

BUT…there is a doubt in my mind that keeps saying this:

"Just because we can’t logically fathom something, doesn’t mean it’s false.

So basically just because some of the arguments made against the 5 proofs are logically impossible for US logically, doesn’t mean the arguments aren’t true outside of human logic.

Is there a way to get rid of this doubt?

Remember, these are supposed to be Proofs, as in it is verified and can’t be proven false, not just strong logical possibilities.

How can we Prove the 5 proofs even against the above doubt?

This is a very good question, but if you’re anything like me, then you’re going to find it almost impossible to answer.

For me personally, the most compelling of Aquinas’ Five Ways is the Third one. But even that one leaves me with just a twinge of doubt. Is it actually possible that I’ve always existed? This may seem like an absurd idea, but it isn’t categorically impossible. And so there’s always going to be some doubt, although I don’t think of it as doubt, I think of it as just another of life’s many mysteries. And it’s the mysteries I think, that make life so compelling.

If you told me that I could know it all…would I want to?

 

[Anthony_V]

There is a question that has been bothering me lately and it seems to turn the 5 proofs from 'Proof" to only “Possibility”

Now logically these make sense and it would be illogical to disagree with them.

BUT…there is a doubt in my mind that keeps saying this:

"Just because we can’t logically fathom something, doesn’t mean it’s false.

So basically just because some of the arguments made against the 5 proofs are logically impossible for US logically, doesn’t mean the arguments aren’t true outside of human logic.

Is there a way to get rid of this doubt?

Remember, these are supposed to be Proofs, as in it is verified and can’t be proven false, not just strong logical possibilities.

How can we Prove the 5 proofs even against the above doubt?

All St. Thomas does in his five ways is take various metaphysical structures that constitute reality (such as act and potency) and drive them to their logical conclusion. It is not as if one could take those metaphysical structures, as he presents them, and drive them to some other conclusion tomorrow, because logic today is the same as logic tomorrow. Coming to another conclusion would be contradictory. He doesn’t present things on the basis of some sort of empirical method dealing with evidence. Evidence can afford a variety of interpretations at times, and it is this variety that additionally affords one interpretation today and another one tomorrow. Evidence produces a range of plausible explanation, and so tomorrow there could simply be a better, more comprehensive explanation of things that we’ve overlooked.

For example, say I find an ancient Egyptian urn on my back porch tomorrow. We could sit around for days and exchange interpretations of the evidence. I might say: “It must have been the same aliens that built the pyramids.” You might reply: “Are you sure your archaeologist friend didn’t just leave it here on accident?” And so forth. Often times there is not just a single interpretation of the evidence, but those interpretations are very often mutually exclusive. In our case, it cannot be the case that the aliens themselves did it and some archaeologist friend that I don’t have did it. One or the other, but not both.

St. Thomas’ method here (really, characteristic of most scholastics) is far more deductive than that, and deduction does not deal in a variety of interpretations (which can be mutually exclusive). Given his premises, you *must *come to his conclusions, or otherwise you will contradict yourself. Sure, you could draw other corollaries from his premises too, but those corollaries are not mutually exclusive of the conclusions he does present. If you take his premises, you take his conclusion, today until eternity.

For example, we might say the following: “(A) God is uncomposed of parts. (B) All perfections found in creatures are found in God. (C) Perfections are parts. (D) Therefore, all perfections found in creatures are found in God uncomposedly.” If you’re creative and really quite brilliant, you might be able to use those premises (A, B, C) in other ways to draw conclusions other than (D); but whatever conclusions you draw, they cannot be mutually exclusive of (D), viz., they cannot contradict it. This is in contrast to us talking about that Egyptian urn. We could draw several interpretations of the evidence, but we could only choose one interpretation, even though they were logical interpretations (none contradicted itself internally). When we’re working with deduction and syllogisms however, we must choose all the logical conclusions, otherwise we’re conceding a conclusion that isn’t logical, and that means we’ve made a contradiction.

That, again, is how St. Thomas’ five ways works. You could use his premises to draw other conclusions other than God’s existence (indeed you must accept them if they are logical), but none of those logical conclusions, by definition, can contradict his main conclusion that God exists, since it is a logical one.

So, you might be wondering, how do people go about criticizing these five ways anyhow? In order to criticize a conclusion that follows logically from its premises, you must criticize the premises. So, critics try and dismantle those metaphysical structures which he holds as premises, viz., act and potency, efficient causality, final causality, etc. (which I think is a very silly thing to do). Act and potency, for instance, is such a basic structure of reality, that you literally cannot reject it without eventually regressing to the silly pre-Aristotelian extremes characterized by Heraclitus (everything is changing and never the same thing) and Parmenides (everything is the same, unchanged thing).

Dr. Edward Feser, a renowned Thomist, wrote a very interesting article some time ago concerning the impact on contemporary philosophy that this theme of act and potency bears – and he mentions its relationship to the first way.

 

[Bradski]

You could use his premises to draw other conclusions other than God’s existence…

I hink that you’ve summd it up quite succintly there.

 

[Anthony_V]

I hink that you’ve summd it up quite succintly there.

You forgot the rest of the sentence, and in doing so misunderstood the distinction I was trying to make between logical conclusions (all of which one must accept) and logical interpretations (often times only one of which we can accept). Perhaps I just didn’t make the distinction very well.

“…but none of those logical conclusions [those other ones], by definition, can contradict his main conclusion that God exists, since it is a logical one.”

I am only suggesting that there might be other conclusions, for the sake of the argument, because it relates to the OP’s question: Even if some genius comes along tomorrow, looks at the premises in one of the five ways and says, “Hey, I can do something else with these.” I’m not sure if that’s possible, but even if it were possible, that “something else” he figures out could not contradict the main conclusion (“that God exists”).

Again, as I stated above, our genius would need to criticize the premises so as not to come to St. Thomas’ conclusion, rather than accept the very premises which logically derive St. Thomas conclusion. And that’s precisely what happens in academia. Some people throw out very fundamental metaphysical structures of the world and then create artificial problems for themselves.

 

[Ben_Sinner]

I don’t understand the nature of your objection. What exactly are you saying? Explain it to me like a six-year old. Could you maybe rephrase what you’re asking or give an example?

Basically the objection was Just because something is illogical and can’t be fathomed logically by our human logic, doesn’t mean it is false. It could be true, but our human logic is too faulty to realize it

My question was if that objection could be proven wrong.

 

[Ghosty]

Basically the objection was Just because something is illogical and can’t be fathomed logically by our human logic, doesn’t mean it is false. It could be true, but our human logic is too faulty to realize it

My question was if that objection could be proven wrong.

How can it be proven wrong when we are only capable of human logic? It can’t be proven nor disproven, it can only be accepted or rejected on a guess. There is no way for us to know the likelihood of this proposition.

My question is why you would entertain such a doubt given that you are incapable of even supporting it with evidence. Given that it is unsupported, I would tend towards the evidence present to human reason.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Charlemagne_III]

For me personally, the most compelling of Aquinas’ Five Ways is the Third one.

I like the third and the fifth equally.

Logical proof need not be absolute to buy into the proof.

The only absolute proof is the proof in the head combined with the proof in the heart.

 

[Anthony_V]

Basically the objection was Just because something is illogical and can’t be fathomed logically by our human logic, doesn’t mean it is false. It could be true, but our human logic is too faulty to realize it

My question was if that objection could be proven wrong.

Let not talk about human logic then; let’s talk about truth, which goes beyond human capacities. I tried to draw everything out to its logical conclusion… hopefully I didn’t miss anything.
Quaestio: How do we know that truths attained by unaided human reason is not rendered false by truths that are not attainable by unaided human reason?*
Sequence I

Proposition: Truths do not contradict themselves. There are truths that can be known by unaided reason and potentially truths that cannot be known by unaided human reason. Therefore, truths that can be known by unaided reason and truths that cannot be known by unaided reason cannot contradict themselves.
**
Objection to Proposition:** That the conclusion follows from the premises; granted. But that the premise “truths do not contradict themselves” is not derived by human logic and therefore not subject to possible invalidity, denied; for we can know by unaided reason that something cannot both be and not be in the same respect.

Conclusion of the Sequence: Given the premises (A) that Truths do not contradict themselves and (B) that there are truths that can be known by unaided reason and potentially truths beyond what can be known by unaided reason, then it logically follows (C) that truths known by human reason and those beyond it cannot contradict.

Sequence II

Reply to Objection: That the principle of non-contradiction can be derived from unaided reason, granted. That the principle of non-contradiction can be invalidated, denied; for the validity of any given proposition presupposes the principle of non-contradiction.

Objection to Reply: That the validity of any given proposition presupposes the principle of non-contradiction, granted. That we should nevertheless presuppose the principle of non-contradiction, denied; for it seems that it cannot be proven apart from presupposing itself.

Conclusion of the Sequence: The principle of non-contradiction can be derived from unaided reason, and any proposition is dependent upon it.

Sequence III

Reply to Objection: That the principle of non-contradiction cannot be proven apart from presupposing itself, granted. That we should abandon the principle on account of this, denied; for the principle is abstracted from experience, which does not contradict itself.

Objection to Reply: That the principle is abstracted from experience, granted. That experience cannot contradict itself, denied; for though a person may never experience something contradictory, this does not rule out the possibility.

Conclusion of the Sequence: The principle of non-contradiction cannot be proven apart from experience, and is in fact abstracted from experience.

Sequence IV

Reply to Objection: That a person may never experience something contradictory, granted. That this does not rule out the possibility, denied; for in order for anything whatsoever to be experienced, it must be experienced and not not experienced; yet this presupposes the existence of the principle in reality, and is from where we abstract it.

Objection to Reply: That for anything whatsoever to be experienced, it must be experienced and not not experienced, granted. But that this applies to all experiences as a principle to be abstracted, denied; for one thing can be contradictory and another not.

Conclusion of the Sequence: It is possible that a person may never experience something contradictory, and if a person does experience something that isn’t contradictory, he cannot both experience and not experience it.

Sequence V

Reply to Objection: That one thing – such as a proposition – can be contradictory and another not, granted. But that this does not apply to all experiences as a principle to be abstracted, denied; for the very existence of an experience which does not contradict itself – such that, whatsoever, it is *and *is not – demonstrates the very nature of experience as precisely non-contradictory. That is, an experience cannot both be an experience an not be an experience, and yet remain an experience. Thus, there can be no contradictory experience, because if it were contradictory, then it would not be an experience.

Objection to Reply: That an experience cannot both be an experience and not be an experience, granted. And that the principle of non-contradiction can be abstracted from experience, conceded. But that the principle as abstracted from experience demonstrates that the principle applies to all of reality, denied; for experience is only a part of reality.

Conclusion of the Sequence: Some things – such as propositions – can be contradictory (though we have not defined how). However, there are some things, such as experiences, that cannot be contradictory. Additionally, that there are any non-contradictory experiences demonstrates that the principle of non-contradiction can be abstracted as a principle (albeit pertaining at this point only to experience).

(I’m running out of characters… starting a new post in which I continue this.)

 

[Tomdstone]

Anthony_V:
Truths do not contradict themselves. There are truths that can be known by unaided reason and potentially truths that cannot be known by unaided human reason. Therefore, truths that can be known by unaided reason and truths that cannot be known by unaided reason cannot contradict themselves.

---

How do you explain the thesis of Dialetheism and other contradiction-tolerant systems such as paraconsistent logics ?

 

[Anthony_V]

… Continued from previous post …

Sequence VI

Reply to Objection: That experience is only a part of reality, granted. But that the principle as abstracted from experience does not apply to all of reality, denied; for just as the demonstration of one non-contradictory experience demonstrates that no experience is contradictory, viz., not itself, so also the demonstration that one part of reality is non-contradictory demonstrates that all parts of reality are non-contradictory; what is real cannot also be not real and yet still be real.

Objection to Reply: That the reply’s usage of “real” demonstrates that it cannot be both itself and not itself, inasmuch as it is instantiated in experience, which is not both itself and not itself, granted. But that the kind of reality instantiated in experience is also demonstrative of every kind of reality, denied; for, it is a fallacy to apply the character of one part to the character of every part, and indeed the whole.

Conclusion of the Sequence: Experience is only a part of reality and, given the usage of reality of which experience is an instance, none of that kind of reality is contradictory, or otherwise experience could not be an instance of it.

Sequence VII

Reply to Objection: That it is a fallacy to apply the entire character of one part to the entire character of every part, and indeed the whole, granted. But that it is a fallacy whatsoever to necessarily apply the character of one part to the character of every part, denied; for it is necessary that the quality of a part being a part of the whole is applied to every part. Thus, what constitutes experience as a part of reality constitutes every part as a part of reality. Now, what constitutes experience as a part of reality is that it exists. We also know that this is the kind of existing that can be done by non-contradictory experience. Non-contradictory experience, of course, exists in a non-contradictory way, for it is the kind of thing that, just as we know by experience, is not a contradiction. Thus, all kinds of reality, which are parts of reality for the same reason that non-contradictory experience is a part of reality, exist in a non-contradictory way.

Objection to Reply: That it is necessary for all parts of a whole to be predicated as such, granted. But that the manner of this predication is the same for each part, denied; for the manner in which a root is part of a tree is very different from the manner in which a leaf is part of the same tree.

Conclusion of the Sequence: It is a fallacy to apply the entire character of one part to the entire character of every part, but it is also necessary that the conditions by which a part is predicated of a whole whatsoever apply to all parts of the whole.

Sequence VIII

Reply to Objection: That the exact same same manner by which parts are parts of a whole – as in the analogy – does not apply to every part of the whole, granted. That there are not fundamental necessary conditions by which a part is a part of a whole, or that these conditions may be absolutely disparate, denied; for a whole is determined, so to speak, by being contiguous with itself, and so any parts of it are also, at least by participation, contiguous as well. In the case of the tree, the manner of their being parts is demonstrated by conditions such as being attached to the tree, or having grown from it (or onto it). And so, while some manner of existing may differ, it is impossible that all manners may differ. Hence, with respect to experience’s non-contradictory act of existing, we may assume, say, that not all existing things are experience, but we must assume that they exist, and that this existence is the same kind as that of experience.

Objection to Reply: That there are necessary conditions by which a part is a part of a whole, conceded. And less remotely to the issue, that not all existing things are experience, granted. However, that this proves there is only one kind of existing done by all real things – which is a non-contradictory kind of existing – denied; for not all existing things are experience, and so do not necessarily exist as experience does (which is in a non-contradictory manner).

Conclusion of the Sequence: Parts are not all parts of a whole in the exact same manner – as in the case of the leaf and the roots, which are parts in different ways. The remote corollary of this is that it is not necessary that all existing things are experience. However, there are necessary conditions by which a part is a part of a whole. So, whatever most fundamentally makes experience a part of reality is also the same thing which makes every real thing a part of reality.

… to be continued … still …

 

[Anthony_V]

How do you explain the thesis of Dialetheism and other contradiction-tolerant systems such as paraconsistent logics ?

I’m experimenting with something like that now. It might be a while…

 

[Ghosty]

Anthony V: You are still using human logic to determine truth and formulate your argument. There’s no way around it; it’s like trying to see ultraviolet light with your God-given eyes.

I applaud your efforts and agree with you, of course, just pointing out that I think Ben is dealing with a fundamental skepticism towards reality as we know it.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Anthony_V]

… the hunt for the principle of non-contradiction continues … episode 3 …

Sequence IX

Reply to Objection: That not all existing things are experience, again, granted. But that the manner of non-contradictory existing by which experience is a part of reality is not the necessary condition by which every part of reality is, in fact, a part – denied; for the kind of thing that reality is can allow for experience only inasmuch as it can exist in a non-contradictory manner. Yet this must extend to all parts of reality, for otherwise there is not a common, necessary condition by which all parts of reality are parts of the same whole.

Objection to Reply: That existing is a necessary condition for being part of reality, granted. That non-contradictory existing is the only kind of existing, denied; for contradictory existing is also a manner of existing,

Sequence X

Final Reply: That non-contradictory existing is the only kind of existing, insisted; for contradictory existing is not another kind of existing, but precisely the only kind of existing posited alongside what is not a kind of existing at all: for which is it, by definition “not existing.” Thus, anything that is a part of reality must adhere to the same kind of non-contradictory existing as experience.

---

It seems odd that I spelled this all out (certainly because it was odd, and I didn’t want to stop midway). Basically, all it amounts to is the fact that experience is not the kind of thing that can both be and not be. Experience is a facet of reality. Reality cannot accommodate any kinds of things except for the kind experience is: a non-contradictory kind of thing – which, as it turns out, is the only kind of thing.

Then again, you have to presuppose the principle of non-contradiction to agree with the argument.

 

[Anthony_V]

Anthony V: You are still using human logic to determine truth and formulate your argument. There’s no way around it; it’s like trying to see ultraviolet light with your God-given eyes.

I applaud your efforts and agree with you, of course, just pointing out that I think Ben is dealing with a fundamental skepticism towards reality as we know it.

Peace and God bless!

I just forgot to take my knuckle-head pills today. I was just so excited to set up a scholastic argument.

As to the fairly long argument… Maybe it will be of some use, yet. (I’m not sure how.)

 

[Partinobodycula]

Given his premises, you *must *come to his conclusions, or otherwise you will contradict yourself. Sure, you could draw other corollaries from his premises too, but those corollaries are not mutually exclusive of the conclusions he does present. If you take his premises, you take his conclusion, today until eternity.

You make it sound as if Aquinas’ premises and conclusions are self-apparent and inescapable, which they definitely aren’t.

For example, let’s take the First Way, the argument from motion. Which is as follows:

A. Things are in motion
B. Whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another
C. This cannot go on to infinity

Conclusion: Since there cannot be an infinite series of movers, there must be a first mover, unmoved by anything else. And this everyone understands to be God.

This seems simple enough, although premise “C” would seem to directly contradict premise “B”, but Aquinas doesn’t seem to think that this is a problem. Why?

Personally, I’m satisfied that I know how Aquinas resolves this seeming contradiction, but it’s not readily apparent within the argument itself. One has to go outside of the Five Ways, or have an intellect far keener than mine, to find the answer.

Hint: Aquinas actually believed that an infinite series of causes was indeed possible, but that it would have no bearing upon the validity of this argument.

Still, I cannot resolve this contradiction without raising further questions. Questions which thus far, I’ve been unable to answer. The designation “Christian Solipsist” in the upper right hand corner of my posts still holds true, because there are questions such as these, to which I cannot find the answers.

Too often though, people focus on the Solipsist part, and forget about the Christian part, as if one negates the other, but it doesn’t. The designation “Solipsist” is there, because it’s true.

 

[Anthony_V]

You make it sound as if Aquinas’ premises and conclusions are self-apparent and inescapable, which they definitely aren’t.

While I would agree that a bit of background is necessary to understanding what St. Thomas is saying, I would also hold that you cannot *but *conclude there is a first mover from his definition of motion and an essentially ordered series of efficient causes. Are you trying to uphold existential inertia or something?

The accidentally ordered series of efficient causes is the kind of series that St. Thomas thinks can logically extend backwards into the past. There is nothing which limits the causal series, since each cause has its power “built-in.” We don’t have to come to a “first,” since each, so to speak, has it’s own “first-ness built-in.” Their power of causation is not immediately derived from the mover that moved them to have that power of causation. As a first example, let’s say A causes B. Then A ceases to exist. Now, B causes C. That would be an accidentally ordered series. The reason is that B’s causal power to produce C is not immediately derived from A; since, when A stopped existing, B still had the power to cause C. To use a more concrete example, a father begets a son. The father (barring biological technicality here) is the efficient cause of the son; the father causes the son to exist. But is the son’s own power to be an efficient cause of his own son (the grandchild) immediately dependent upon the father? Certainly not; Grandpa could be dead, but this does not prevent the son from bearing his own son (the grandchild). The power of the son to cause his own son is “built-in” to the son; it is not immediately borrowed from the father, even if, at one point it time, it was in fact gotten from him.

Any time we are dealing with an essentially ordered series of efficient causes, there must be a “first,” in the sense that there must be an efficient cause that does not derive it’s causal power from something anterior. Otherwise, every cause in the series derives from something else, and there’s nothing to derive from. Hence, they derive nothing, and they actually would not be causing anything. But they *are *causing, which is what incites the question to being with, and so they must derive their causal power from somewhere, since it does not come form them. This means that, in the series, there must actually be an efficient cause which does not derive its causal power.

Imagine I balance Aristotle’s Metaphysics on top of Wheelock’s Latin, on top of Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment. Wheelock’s Latin does not have the “built-in” power to hold up Aristotle’s Metaphysics in the same way a son has the “built-in” power to beget his own son. If we take out Crime and Punishment (without replacing it with an equivalent), then both Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Wheelock’s Latin will fall. It’s not like taking Grandpa out of the picture (sorry Grandpa); causally speaking, there is a certain sense in which we can do without Grandpa, whereas we cannot do without Crime and Punishment. That “certain sense” has to do with whether the causal power is derived or “built-in.” Those are the two options. Does the efficient cause derive its power from an immediately anterior efficient cause in the series? If no, then we’re dealing with an accidentally ordered series of efficient causality, and the power is “built-in” to the efficient cause such we can do without Grandpa. If yes, then we’re dealing with an essentially ordered series of efficient causality, such that the power is not “built-in” to the cause but derived from an immediately anterior one, such that we cannot do without Crime and Punishment.

And in fact, that still begs the question, because Crime and Punishment would still be held up by my hands, which is held up by the rest of my body, the floor, and finally the earth. When we start dealing with the earth, we start dealing with things like inertia and other forces, so we have an accidentally ordered series of efficient causes. But the point is that, when there is an essentially ordered series of efficient causes, there must be a first cause that has its power “built-in.” St. Thomas argues that creation is itself an essentially ordered series. Therefore, there must be a first in the sense of “underived,” which of course applies even if the universe is infinitely old. No matter hold old the universe is, that does not make it the kind of thing that has underived actuality. Otherwise it would be pure act, and it would be God. But that is clearly not the case, because there would be no observable, change, contingency, or distinction whatsoever.