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Anthony_V
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I apologize for the delay. I’ve been busy. I’ll try and have something tomorrow.
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Tomdstone
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First you say there was no change in the mind or ideas from the act of communicating them.
Now you say something different
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Ghosty
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I haven’t said anything different. The act of communicating ideas does not change the mind of the communicator. The idea is communicated without loss, and without any “reciprocal force”.
I never claimed that minds can’t change at all, that was your misunderstanding.
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Partinobodycula
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Perhaps you could assist me in clearing a few things up then.
There are supposedly two distinct types of causal chains, sequential, and simultaneous. Can you describe my existence at this precise moment in time, in terms of each of these two causal chains? I assume that there must be one of each. Can you describe them?
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Tomdstone
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I don’t see these metaphysical concepts of act and potency discussed in Sacred Scripture. Further, I don;t see where St. Paul discusses them. If these metaphysical concepts are so important to understanding God, why didn’t Jesus talk about them? Is it better to focus in on the metaphysical philosophy of some pagan Greek philosophers, or is it better to focus in on what Jesus, the Son of God, had to tell us?
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Ghosty
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I don’t know precisely what Anthony means by sequential and simultaneous causes as those aren’t terms I tend to use in describing the order of things, but I think I understand how he’s using them.
I will use physical causes not because I don’t believe that there are metaphysical examples, but because I think it’s easier to grasp the idea from physical things first.
The sequential causes that have led to you would be the sequence of births leading to your parents coming together, the choices you have made in life that have led you to sit in front of your computer, ect. These occur one after the other, so we can say this before that, and we can line them up as events stretching into the past like dominos that fall into each other, the final domino being this moment.
An example of simultaneous causes would be the the chemical and nuclear forces of nature that are holding your body together; the bonds between atoms, gravity, electrical pulses, ect. Leaving aside the notion that these forces have existed since perhaps the beginning of time, at this moment they are causing you to exist and we can say you are here because of the forces of nature. They are causing you just as surely as the choices of your parents caused you. In this moment they are not a prior thing that leads to you, but an integral part of your current existence. You are an effect and they are a cause because if you are removed they remain, but if they are removed you cease to be, yet there is no “before and after” in the sense of sequence. Even if time began at this moment, and the forces did not exist “before” you, you would still be an effect of these forces.
The classic Augustinian example is the timeless footprint in the sand made by the timeless foot. There is no sequence, as the foot has always been in precisely this spot in the sand, but there is cause and effect because the footprint is in the shape of the foot, and is the impression of the foot, and is therefore caused by the foot even if there was never a time when it wasn’t there in the sand, under the foot. In this example the foot and the footprint are utterly simultaneous, and yet we can see that the cause is the foot and the effect is the footprint.
Moving beyond the physical we get to notions like form and intent and such, but for now I hope these examples suffice, and that they match the ideas Anthony was trying to express.
Peace and God bless!
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Anthony_V
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There’s no need to have mentioned these concepts in Sacred Scripture, because they weren’t integral to communicating the Gospel to a people who already believed in God, or at least gods (in the case of the classical pagans).
As I discussed earlier, truths do not contradict themselves; you cannot even begin to argue without assuming the fact. Supernatural truths and natural truths are both truths. Therefore, they do not contradict.
Obviously in this thread it is contested as to whether metaphysics is a body of truths, but that is irrelevant to the present point, which is to say that if they were a body of truths, they would be relevant to matters concerning the supernatural truths found in the Gospels. A focus on metaphysics does not logically preclude a focus on supernatural truths; and, in fact, if someone claims certain supernatural truths which contradict with those natural truths, we must conclude that they have misunderstood the data from which they were supposedly deriving their “supernatural truths,” under pain of stating that there is contradiction in truth, and therefore under pain of the discourse’s cessation.
Now, a focus on metaphysics does *temporally *preclude a focus on supernatural truths. You can’t read St. Paul and Aristotle simultaneously. Perhaps this is what you meant more precisely. But as long as there is the necessity of evangelization, it is necessary to articulate the faith in a manner such that (a) the points of faith which can also be understood by natural reason alone, e.g. existence of God, are demonstrated to those who say it can’t; (b) the points of faith which cannot be demonstrated by natural reason alone, e.g. the Incarnation or the Trinity, are demonstrated to not contradict natural reason. Both demand the ability to articulate the truths of natural reason, especially as they are found in the branches of philosophy, among which is metaphysics.
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Tomdstone
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But you are looking at the metaphysics employed by the ancient pagan Greeks. Why is this particular pagan metaphysics more enlightening than the metaphysics and philosophy of India which is used in Hinduism?.
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Partinobodycula
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These examples will do nicely. These are the two types of causal chains that people generally think of.
Every temporal causal chain, is a sequential causal chain. (Yes, I know that there’s a “proper” terminology, but I prefer my own. Sorry) Any causal chain that entails the transfer of information, i.e. photons, gluons, mesons, bosons, involves the passage of time, and is therefore a sequential causal chain. Such sequential causal chains involve the changing of potency to act. This includes falling dominoes, moving trains, and anything hanging from a hook.
We agree I think, that this isn’t the type of causal chain that Aquinas was referring to in the First Way. (Because he said so)
This is the second kind of causal chain that people usually think of. I refer to it as a structural causal chain. I’m made of molecules, which are made of atoms, which are made of particles, and so on, and so on. This type of causal chain isn’t time dependent. It’s fixed at each and every moment in time. But there’s something unique about this type of causal chain…at nowhere along this causal chain does it involve changing potency to act. Which seems to be the crux of the argument in Aquinas’ First Way. It could be said that the chain itself contains a combination of potency and act. But at no point is there any changing from one to the other. Without the presence of change, where’s the need of a cause?
It would appear therefore, that the terminology that Aquinas uses in the First Way doesn’t make any sense. Because it’s not referring to the first type of causal chain, and neither is it referring to the second type of causal chain.
But as you point out, we have Augustine to offer a broader perspective. Now if we consider Augustine’s footprint, we know that the footprint had a cause, which was a foot. There’s a mover/moved relationship implicit within the existence of the footprint. In other words, there’s an implied sequential causal chain.
Now according to Aquinas, this sequential causal chain can be infinite. We could have an infinite number of footprints.
The metaphysicist points to Augustine’s footprint, and says this implies that the world must have a cause outside of itself. The skeptic, then asks why. The metaphysicist then points to Aquinas’ First Way as an argument for why.
Augustine gives a wonderful illustration of the argument, but Aquinas’ First Way fails, in my opinion, to demonstrate the veracity of that argument. It’s convoluted and confusing, even in it’s simplicity, because it’s difficult to ascertain exactly which type of causal chain Aquinas is talking about.
Would you like to try again, or clarify your reasoning in some manner?
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Anthony_V
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Where the metaphysics is from is accidental to the fact that it is a body of truths. Christianity has found in Greek philosophy the possibility for a non-contradictory synthesis between Greek thought and Christian doctrine. We use Greek philosophy in the synthesis because it because it is useful, not because it is Greek.
If Indian philosophy actually ends up saying the same thing as Greek philosophy, then that’s fantastic; it is the same body of natural truths under two different names. If, however, we find a contradiction between facets of Indian philosophy and Greek philosophy, we must cede to the facet which does not bear a contradiction. I am no expert in Indian philosophy, but I assume it comes to different conclusions than Greek philosophy – differences which mandate we cannot logically hold both systems in their entirety without contradiction. Where they contradict, one or the other position is right, but not both.
Now, the aforementioned synthesis has worked just fine for Christian purposes of evangelization, as mentioned in (a) and (b) above. Hence, there is no need to turn to Indian philosophy. If someone wishes to use it for Christian purposes, by all means they can be my guest; I have nothing against Indian philosophy qua Indian. All that is necessary is that it, like the core of the Greek system, does not harbor contradictions and can be used to defend the rationality of natural truths and supernatural truths found in the body of Christian doctrine. It would be interesting to see something like “Indian Christian Scholasticism.” I am certainly not the one equipped to do that, however.
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Lion_IRC
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You can’t. They are inexplicable. They simultaneously ‘make sense’ and yet also make no sense. Which means you can explain them by not explaining them.
Thus I can be an atheist and a theist at the same time - right?
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Partinobodycula
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The problem with metaphysics is that it long ago replaced logic with dogma. The idea of metaphysics is simple enough…look at the way the world is, and then deduce from the way it is, the reason why it is. But unlike science, which evolved from metaphysics, metaphysics doesn’t change to reflect new evidence. A prime example of this is Aquinas’ First Way. When Aquinas set out the First Way it was based simply upon observation and reason. Things are in motion. We know that things in motion must have been put in motion by something which is itself in motion. Simple observation. Aquinas didn’t just make up the First Way out of whole cloth. He looked at what’s true about the world around him, and then tried to reason out why it’s true. But what Aquinas didn’t realize, is that the inverse is also true. For every change from potency to act there MUST be a change from act to potency. Simple observation says that one change in state, is always accompanied by the other change in state.
Aquinas’ First Way was based upon observation and reason, but his observations were flawed, therefore his deductions are also flawed. Science would recognize this fact, and change to reflect it, but metaphysics doesn’t. This is what makes science superior to metaphysics. And what makes metaphysics simply dogma.
Aquinas’ First Way was based upon observation and reason, but his observations were flawed, therefore his deductions are also flawed. Science would recognize this fact, and change to reflect it, but metaphysics doesn’t. This is what makes science superior to metaphysics. And what makes metaphysics simply dogma.
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Tomdstone
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Whatever causes something to become something must be actual in some respect. But a resting dog is actually warm. So a resting dog should cause itself to become warm, i.e., to move. But nothing is supposed to move itself. So I don’t see the first argument.
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Anthony_V
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Partinobodycula,
I am still a bit set back in my reply. I’ve been working on some other things. Until I have the time to formulate a competent answer, I’ll do something I would not otherwise do and simply provide you with a few links to relevant material.
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/oerter-on-universals-and-causality.html (Scroll down to halfway, when you hit “principle of causality.”)
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/oerter-contra-principle-of-causality.html (A follow-up post.)
EDIT: And I’d like to add the following:
philosophy.ucr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Does-Efficient-Causation-Presuppose-Final-Causation.pdf (A sympathetic interpretation of final causality in relation to efficient causality.)
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-return-of-final-causality.html (The necessary relationship between final causality and efficient causality in scholastic metaphysics.)
I am still a bit set back in my reply. I’ve been working on some other things. Until I have the time to formulate a competent answer, I’ll do something I would not otherwise do and simply provide you with a few links to relevant material.
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/oerter-on-universals-and-causality.html (Scroll down to halfway, when you hit “principle of causality.”)
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/oerter-contra-principle-of-causality.html (A follow-up post.)
EDIT: And I’d like to add the following:
philosophy.ucr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Does-Efficient-Causation-Presuppose-Final-Causation.pdf (A sympathetic interpretation of final causality in relation to efficient causality.)
edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-return-of-final-causality.html (The necessary relationship between final causality and efficient causality in scholastic metaphysics.)
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Ben_Sinner
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Did St. Thomas actually believe that?
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Nixbits
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Partinobodycula, thank you for setting out my own misgivings about Aquinas’ Five Ways far more succintly and eloquently than I’ve been able to do myself.
As an aside, I’m still astonished by something Ghosty posted:
Ghosty:
As an aside, I’m still astonished by something Ghosty posted:
Blueprints (and design drawings in general) don’t cause anything to exist, except perhaps confusion. Or perhaps this is a metaphysical use of the word ‘cause’ with which I’m not familiar.
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Tomdstone
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Could a blueprint of a house be a tool to move from potency to act?
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Nixbits
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A tool? Perhaps. By this measure, so is the T-shirt worn by the JCB driver and the bacon sandwich eaten by the site surveyor on the first morning. The blueprint could also be rejected at the design review, sit in a drawer unused for 12 years and then be archived. How does it help to demonstrate causation? It’s a poor example.
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Anthony_V
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Only if you forgive me for taking so long to respond. Great, done. We’ll call it even. :tiphat:
Sort of. I would caution that “simultaneous” does not necessarily mean instantaneous. To be fair, what I said certainly implied it, although I principally used “immediate” to refer to the sort of causal proximity which A bears to B, and B bears to C; if A goes away, we have no relevant causal power in B or C since they derive it of A. But that phrasing was a bad call on my part, because it made things sound more temporally determined than they are. However, I would agree that simultaneous efficient causality certainly is a specific kind of series of per se efficient causality. I’m not sure when and if you would find that kind of instantaneous per se series.
The key, rather, is instrumentality. The main point was this:
In other words, in a per se series of A, B, C, for every effect generated of B onto C, there is an intrinsically corresponding effect of A. The reason is that B (and even C, if we were to posit another variable upon which it acts) acts as an efficient cause only in a derivative manner of A; for which reason, we would conversely call B an instrumental cause of A. The effect that B has on C is principally A’s effect, passing through B, such that it is only B’s effect instrumentally.
Does it necessarily mean that the causal process is instantaneous? Certainly not. If you write using a pencil, which you are then using instrumentally, it doesn’t matter whether or not the pencil is instantaneously leaving graphite upon the paper. What does matter is that the pencil is not the kind of thing which has a built-in power to write on paper without a proportionate cause of some stripe or another to use it as an instrument.
We might object, “But isn’t that a per accidens series? Isn’t it the case that in the series A, B, C, that B (the pencil) affects C (the paper) even when the force of A (the hand) is gone? Don’t you remember – it’s the difference between A acting as a cause and B acting as a cause when the series is not instantaneous. There’s a small gap in time! The pencil moves just a little bit on its own, like when the son begets his own son (the grandson) without the father being around.”
The answer is (1) no and (2) it doesn’t matter. In the case of a per accidens series, there is not the kind of proportion there is in the per se series. In the prior, there need not be a 1:1 proportion (all things being equal) between the primary cause and the secondary cause(s). The father does not have to beget the son for every time that the son begets a grandchild. Or, to use the abstract variables example, B can affect C more (or less) times than A affects B. This is what we mean by “built-in” power, as opposed to “derived” or “instrumental” power. B is not just an instrument of A acting upon C. Rather, B can act as an independent agent.
On the other hand, there *is * (all things being equal) a 1:1 proportion in the per se series of causality. All things being equal, for every inch that you move your hand, the pencil will also move an inch. The pencil’s movement doesn’t need to be instantaneous; it only needs to be “instrumental” or “derived” of the hand. The pencil cannot affect the paper more than your hand (or other interfering but proportionate causes, when all things are not equal) affects the pencil. Sons can beget children more times than they themselves are begotten, but, all things being equal, pencils cannot draw more lines than the hand draws.
To use the abstract variables example, for every effect of B upon C, there is an intrinsically corresponding effect of A upon B. Notice that this is not “extrinsically corresponding,” but intrinsically corresponding. To illustrate “extrinsically corresponding”: If the father begets the son, and the son begets exactly one grandchild, then we have a correspondence of effects such that the father begot the son as many times as the son happened to beget a son. That would still be extrinsically corresponding, because there was nothing about the father’s begetting of the son which necessitated that the son beget exactly one other son. It just happened to be the case, and there is no pertinent causal connection. Hence, it is still a per accidens series.
We might also ask whether it is pertinent to the topic as to whether or not there can only be one non-instrumental cause in the series. What if it’s not 1:1 because it’s not “all things being equal?” The point is simply that whatever power is found in the effect(s) is derived of some other causes. If we have the domino example, it’s not just you pushing the first domino over, but the inertia of the first domino after it’s pushed over, and gravity, and other things which science talks at us about. That’s fine; the dominoes derive their “falling over” from the confluence of causes that bears upon the first domino when you push it over. The essential piece is simply that they don’t have the built-in power to push themselves over when there isn’t that series or some equivalent.
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Anthony_V
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I should add that, as a result of my correction, St. Thomas thinks that both per se and per accidens series could both logically extend backwards into infinity regarding temporal duration. In a per se series, however, there must be a first at least, from which the rest of the causes in the series derive their power.
Some Thomist authors have used this example, which, though it doesn’t directly illustrate the point about temporal duration, does illustrate the point about what we mean by a per se series: Even if a moving paintbrush has an infinitely long handle, that doesn’t make the brush the kind of thing which doesn’t need an explanation of why it is moving; for it isn’t the kind of thing, despite its unusual handle, that moves itself.
Some Thomist authors have used this example, which, though it doesn’t directly illustrate the point about temporal duration, does illustrate the point about what we mean by a per se series: Even if a moving paintbrush has an infinitely long handle, that doesn’t make the brush the kind of thing which doesn’t need an explanation of why it is moving; for it isn’t the kind of thing, despite its unusual handle, that moves itself.
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