A question that has been bugging me about Aquinas's 5 Proofs

  • Thread starter Thread starter Ben_Sinner
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
Well put, Anthony!

One difficulty that always seems to come up in these discussions is that we tend to think almost exclusively in terms of efficient causes. It is very difficult to make the leap from thinking of causes like a series of dominos to thinking of causes like links in a chain suspended on a hook, or of the boards and nails causing a house.

I believe it is a more accurate and holisistic way to look at the world, but it takes some adjustment.

Peace and God bless!
 
Anthony_V said:
The accidentally ordered series of efficient causes is the kind of series that St. Thomas thinks can logically extend backwards into the past. There is nothing which limits the causal series, since each cause has its power “built-in.” We don’t have to come to a “first,” since each, so to speak, has it’s own “first-ness built-in.” Their power of causation is not immediately derived from the mover that moved them to have that power of causation. As a first example, let’s say A causes B. Then A ceases to exist. Now, B causes C. That would be an accidentally ordered series. The reason is that B’s causal power to produce C is not immediately derived from A; since, when A stopped existing, B still had the power to cause C. To use a more concrete example, a father begets a son. The father (barring biological technicality here) is the efficient cause of the son; the father causes the son to exist. But is the son’s own power to be an efficient cause of his own son (the grandchild) immediately dependent upon the father? Certainly not; Grandpa could be dead, but this does not prevent the son from bearing his own son (the grandchild). The power of the son to cause his own son is “built-in” to the son; it is not immediately borrowed from the father, even if, at one point it time, it was in fact gotten from him.

Any time we are dealing with an essentially ordered series of efficient causes, there must be a “first,” in the sense that there must be an efficient cause that does not derive it’s causal power from something anterior. Otherwise, every cause in the series derives from something else, and there’s nothing to derive from. Hence, they derive nothing, and they actually would not be causing anything. But they *are *causing, which is what incites the question to being with, and so they must derive their causal power from somewhere, since it does not come form them. This means that, in the series, there must actually be an efficient cause which does not derive its causal power.

Imagine I balance Aristotle’s Metaphysics on top of Wheelock’s Latin, on top of Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment. Wheelock’s Latin does not have the “built-in” power to hold up Aristotle’s Metaphysics in the same way a son has the “built-in” power to beget his own son. If we take out Crime and Punishment (without replacing it with an equivalent), then both Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Wheelock’s Latin will fall. It’s not like taking Grandpa out of the picture (sorry Grandpa); causally speaking, there is a certain sense in which we can do without Grandpa, whereas we cannot do without Crime and Punishment. That “certain sense” has to do with whether the causal power is derived or “built-in.” Those are the two options. Does the efficient cause derive its power from an immediately anterior efficient cause in the series? If no, then we’re dealing with an accidentally ordered series of efficient causality, and the power is “built-in” to the efficient cause such we can do without Grandpa. If yes, then we’re dealing with an essentially ordered series of efficient causality, such that the power is not “built-in” to the cause but derived from an immediately anterior one, such that we cannot do without Crime and Punishment.

And in fact, that still begs the question, because Crime and Punishment would still be held up by my hands, which is held up by the rest of my body, the floor, and finally the earth. When we start dealing with the earth, we start dealing with things like inertia and other forces, so we have an accidentally ordered series of efficient causes. But the point is that, when there is an essentially ordered series of efficient causes, there must be a first cause that has its power “built-in.” St. Thomas argues that creation is itself an essentially ordered series. Therefore, there must be a first in the sense of “underived,” which of course applies even if the universe is infinitely old. No matter hold old the universe is, that does not make it the kind of thing that has underived actuality. Otherwise it would be pure act, and it would be God. But that is clearly not the case, because there would be no observable, change, contingency, or distinction whatsoever.
Click to expand...
Anthony V, thanks for taking the time to explain that in such length. Forgive me if I distill it down a bit in giving a response.

So Aquinas differentiates between a series of causes that are sequential in nature, like a line of dominoes falling one after another. And a series of causes that are simultaneous in nature, like the same dominoes stacked one on top of another. According to Aquinas a sequential series of causes can be infinitely long, while a simultaneous series of causes can’t be.

So in the First Way, Aquinas must be referring to a simultaneous series of causes, because he himself believed that an infinitely long sequential series of causes was indeed possible.

Of course, now we have a problem, because science, through simple observation, tells us that there’s no such thing as simultaneous causation. Cause always precedes effect. It always proceeds sequentially, one effect after another, like our line of dominoes. Even for a chain suspended on a hook. 😉

Now we can attempt to reason our way out of this predicament, and I’m not averse to such an endeavor, because solipsism offers its own version of this problem. But one thing is abundantly clear, an argument that at first seemed simple, self-apparent, and logical, suddenly isn’t.

However, this doesn’t mean that one should abandon all hope. There are still truths to be found in Aquinas’ Five Ways. Or am I just fooling myself?

Actually, I think that it could be argued that an infinitely long series of causes would support the notion of God, rather than disprove it. But then again, I could take the opposite position as well. Ignorance has its benefits.
 
Partinobodycula said:
Conclusion: Since there cannot be an infinite series of movers, there must be a first mover, unmoved by anything else. And this everyone understands to be God…
Click to expand...
I don’t think that God is unmoved. First of all, the fact that God came down from heaven and became man indicates that He moved from heaven. Secondly, He was walking around in a garden on earth thousands of years before Christ. Thirdly, He is moved by the prayers at Holy Mass to which He responds by performing the miracle of Transubstantiation.
Further, I don;t believe that there is a logical contradiction in assuming an infinite series of movers. Mathematics deals with infinitely long lines extending in both directions and with infinite series and there is no contradiction.
 
Tomdstone said:
There are some effects which do not have well defined causes but are brought about as a result of quantum fluctuations.
Click to expand...
I have indeed given some thought to quantum phenomena as it relates to Aquinas’ First Way, and the question of cause and effect. But it’s difficult enough incorporating classical physics into the discussion, without trying to introduce quantum mechanics as well. So I’m purposely trying to avoid it. I do find QM to be fascinating in it’s implications. But maybe in the end De Broglie and Bohm will win the day and we can all go back to living in a deterministic world again.

I wonder what Aquinas would’ve thought, if he’d known about QM?
 
Of course, now we have a problem, because science, through simple observation, tells us that there’s no such thing as simultaneous causation. Cause always precedes effect. It always proceeds sequentially, one effect after another, like our line of dominoes. Even for a chain suspended on a hook.
Click to expand...
Science is the observation of material efficient causes, so it has nothing to say one way or another about these other kinds of causes. Science doesn’t tell us that there are now such things as simultaneous causes, it simply isn’t designed to observe and measure them.

This is precisely the kind of limitation in thinking I was speaking about in my post above.

Peace and God bless!
 
Ghosty said:
Science is the observation of material efficient causes, so it has nothing to say one way or another about these other kinds of causes. Science doesn’t tell us that there are now such things as simultaneous causes, it simply isn’t designed to observe and measure them.

This is precisely the kind of limitation in thinking I was speaking about in my post above.

Peace and God bless!
Click to expand...
But this is exactly what Aquinas is attempting to do in the Five Ways, take that which is observable and extrapolate from it, the unobservable. I can definitely see your point, that just because science doesn’t observe simultaneous causation, doesn’t mean that there can’t be simultaneous causation. My point is simply that in Aquinas’ attempt to extrapolate the nature of God from that which is observable, he uses an attribute of the observable world that doesn’t exist. There is no simultaneous causation.

This doesn’t disprove the claim that God is the simultaneous cause of the world, but it does mean that Aquinas’ First Way is based upon a theoretical phenomenon, and not an observable one.

But this is by no means the only weakness in Aquinas’ First Way, there are others.
 
Partinobodycula said:
But this is exactly what Aquinas is attempting to do in the Five Ways, take that which is observable and extrapolate from it, the unobservable. I can definitely see your point, that just because science doesn’t observe simultaneous causation, doesn’t mean that there can’t be simultaneous causation. My point is simply that in Aquinas’ attempt to extrapolate the nature of God from that which is observable, he uses an attribute of the observable world that doesn’t exist. There is no simultaneous causation.

This doesn’t disprove the claim that God is the simultaneous cause of the world, but it does mean that Aquinas’ First Way is based upon a theoretical phenomenon, and not an observable one.

But this is by no means the only weakness in Aquinas’ First Way, there are others.
Click to expand...
These causes and principles do exist in reality, but you are focusing only on empirical observation which is limited in scope. You can’t close your eyes and then claim that color does not exist, or say that salts don’t exist because you can’t smell them.

That a blueprint is causing my house to exist is observable and deducible, but not to empirical observation, and not as an efficient cause.

Peace and God bless!
 
Ghosty said:
These causes and principles do exist in reality, but you are focusing only on empirical observation which is limited in scope. You can’t close your eyes and then claim that color does not exist, or say that salts don’t exist because you can’t smell them.

That a blueprint is causing my house to exist is observable and deducible, but not to empirical observation, and not as an efficient cause.

Peace and God bless!
Click to expand...
You’re correct, I’m focusing specifically on the First Way at this point. Which, unlike the other Ways, is based specifically on that which is “certain, and evident to our senses”.

Any proposed weaknesses in the other Ways are much easier to dismiss, precisely because they’re not based upon empirical observation. I understand if you want to broaden the discussion beyond the First Way, but it should still be able to stand on its own merits. My contention is, that it doesn’t.

My only purpose in participating in this thread is to counter Anthony V’s contention that the arguments presented in the Five Ways are essentially incontrovertible. The OP deserves to hear both sides of the discussion. Don’t you agree?
 
Aquinas does not base the First Way on empirical observation, he uses observation of motion as a foundation for demonstrating potency and act. He is demonstraiting a metaphysical, logical principle through material observation, not arguing for God based on material motion alone.

Peace and God bless!
 
Ghosty said:
Aquinas does not base the First Way on empirical observation, he uses observation of motion as a foundation for demonstrating potency and act. He is demonstraiting a metaphysical, logical principle through material observation, not arguing for God based on material motion alone.

Peace and God bless!
Click to expand...
Okay agreed. Let’s reframe the discussion in terms of potency and act. I suppose that the best place to begin, is with Aquinas’ definition of potency and act, as given in the First Way.

“Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold.”

This is an adequate definition for its time, but as those of us with even a modicum of education realize, it’s lacking in one very important detail. One famously described in Isaac Newton’s Third Law. “For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.”

In other words, for something to change from potency to act, the thing which affected that change must itself change from act to potency, and to the exact same degree. For something to accelerate, something else must decelerate. For something to get hotter, something else must get colder. Nothing ever changes without an equal and opposite change. If either party lacks the potency to change, there will be no change.

Now it would seem logical, that if Aquinas’ description of the relationship between potency and act is incomplete, then his description of the unmoved mover must be incomplete as well.
 
Partinobodycula said:
Now it would seem logical, that if Aquinas’ description of the relationship between potency and act is incomplete, then his description of the unmoved mover must be incomplete as well.
Click to expand...
In the everyday sense of the word “unmoved”, I don’t see how any Roman Catholic can say that God is unMoved.
See post #23.
 
Partinobodycula said:
Okay agreed. Let’s reframe the discussion in terms of potency and act. I suppose that the best place to begin, is with Aquinas’ definition of potency and act, as given in the First Way.

“Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold.”

This is an adequate definition for its time, but as those of us with even a modicum of education realize, it’s lacking in one very important detail. One famously described in Isaac Newton’s Third Law. “For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.”

In other words, for something to change from potency to act, the thing which affected that change must itself change from act to potency, and to the exact same degree. For something to accelerate, something else must decelerate. For something to get hotter, something else must get colder. Nothing ever changes without an equal and opposite change. If either party lacks the potency to change, there will be no change.

Now it would seem logical, that if Aquinas’ description of the relationship between potency and act is incomplete, then his description of the unmoved mover must be incomplete as well.
Click to expand...
Newton’s Third Law applies to matter and physics, not to metaphysics. Again, you are carrying too much into the analogy.

Physical motion is a kind of potency and act, but it is not exactly the same as metaphysical potency and act. The blueprint of the house acts on the material wood and nails and makes it a house rather than a pile of boards, but there is no reciprocal motion from the boards to the blue print; the design of the house does not get termites, and doesn’t suffer from dry rot. Likewise, my ideas can be communicated to you, but there is no necessary change in my mind or ideas from the act of communicating them.

The properties of matter as matter do not apply to the immaterial, though we can draw analogies from physical things to better illustrate metaphysical concepts. These metaphysical concepts do not, however, follow from the physical but rather it goes the other direction. We understand the metaphysical by removing the purely physical aspects of our observations, and we must do this carefully and consistently. To apply the traits of baser things to higher things is an error in reasoning.

Peace and God bless!
 
Ghosty said:
Likewise, my ideas can be communicated to you, but there is no necessary change in my mind or ideas from the act of communicating them.
Click to expand...
That is simply not true. People’s minds change all the time as they get new information. At one point in time, their mind may be set against buying an electric car. But as they find out that gasoline will not be readily available next month, they change their mind and they decide to buy the electric car. So there is a change in mind resulting from the act of communicating and absorbing new information.
 
Ghosty said:
Newton’s Third Law applies to matter and physics, not to metaphysics. Again, you are carrying too much into the analogy.

Physical motion is a kind of potency and act, but it is not exactly the same as metaphysical potency and act. The blueprint of the house acts on the material wood and nails and makes it a house rather than a pile of boards, but there is no reciprocal motion from the boards to the blue print; the design of the house does not get termites, and doesn’t suffer from dry rot. Likewise, my ideas can be communicated to you, but there is no necessary change in my mind or ideas from the act of communicating them.

The properties of matter as matter do not apply to the immaterial, though we can draw analogies from physical things to better illustrate metaphysical concepts. These metaphysical concepts do not, however, follow from the physical but rather it goes the other direction. We understand the metaphysical by removing the purely physical aspects of our observations, and we must do this carefully and consistently. To apply the traits of baser things to higher things is an error in reasoning.

Peace and God bless!
Click to expand...
I hope that you’ll understand, but I have some real problems with dogmatically sticking to a metaphysical argument for God that was developed more than a thousand years ago, and steadfastly refuses to change as our understanding of the world changes. If you want to give me an argument for God, then give me an argument that I can relate to, and which relates to the world as I know it to be, not as Aquinas knew it to be. I find it disingenuous to point to the world for evidence of God, and then disavow that relationship when it brings your argument into question.

I can forgive Aristotle and Aquinas for any inconsistencies in their arguments, what I have a harder time with, is those who are aware of those inconsistencies, and yet brush them aside as if they’re insignificant. I don’t find them to be insignificant. If I discuss God with a Muslim or a Buddhist, and I find inconsistencies in their arguments, I will question them as well.

All that being said, I can’t really challenge you on a metaphysical basis. I can follow the reasoning, but I can’t justify the reasoning. So in the end I suppose, you’re left with a metaphysical argument for God, that relates less and less to the physical world over time, and in Aquinas’ Five Ways, I’m left with an argument for God that I find thoroughly unconvincing.

But this discussion has been enlightening, at least for me. My opinion hasn’t changed, but my understanding has, and that has made it well worth the effort.

Thanks
 
Tomdstone said:
That is simply not true. People’s minds change all the time as they get new information. At one point in time, their mind may be set against buying an electric car. But as they find out that gasoline will not be readily available next month, they change their mind and they decide to buy the electric car. So there is a change in mind resulting from the act of communicating and absorbing new information.
Click to expand...
Please read what I’ve written. I never said that minds don’t change.
 
Read the part you quoted again. 🙂

I said that there was no change to the mind or ideas from communicating them, not that there was never any change of ideas or mind. Of course new information can make me change my mind. but sharing my ideas doesn’t change them, so there is no “equal and opposite reaction” from me communicating my ideas to you.
 
Partinobodycula said:
I hope that you’ll understand, but I have some real problems with dogmatically sticking to a metaphysical argument for God that was developed more than a thousand years ago, and steadfastly refuses to change as our understanding of the world changes. If you want to give me an argument for God, then give me an argument that I can relate to, and which relates to the world as I know it to be, not as Aquinas knew it to be. I find it disingenuous to point to the world for evidence of God, and then disavow that relationship when it brings your argument into question.

I can forgive Aristotle and Aquinas for any inconsistencies in their arguments, what I have a harder time with, is those who are aware of those inconsistencies, and yet brush them aside as if they’re insignificant. I don’t find them to be insignificant. If I discuss God with a Muslim or a Buddhist, and I find inconsistencies in their arguments, I will question them as well.

All that being said, I can’t really challenge you on a metaphysical basis. I can follow the reasoning, but I can’t justify the reasoning. So in the end I suppose, you’re left with a metaphysical argument for God, that relates less and less to the physical world over time, and in Aquinas’ Five Ways, I’m left with an argument for God that I find thoroughly unconvincing.

But this discussion has been enlightening, at least for me. My opinion hasn’t changed, but my understanding has, and that has made it well worth the effort.

Thanks
Click to expand...
You’re lack of willingness to understand these metaphysical principles doesn’t make them unsound. The arguments of Aquinas haven’t lost power as we’ve learned more about the world, as our expanding knowledge has been in the realm of the physical rather than the metaphysical.

In fact, I would argue that Aquinas’ points have better foundation now then they did is his day, but that is really beside the point. You must encounter Aquinas on his terms before you can dismiss his arguments; to say that they don’t speak to the world as you understand it is like saying scripture has no meaning in modern times because it was written for Jews two thousand and more years ago. In order to understand we must go out from our comfort zone, and in the case of Aquinas this means truly making an effort to understand the philosophical principles he’s working from rather than dismissing them out of hand.

If you want to understand his actual points, I recommend beginning with a study of the four different kinds of causes put forth by Aristotle. They are not at all obsolete, even if they aren’t spoken of often in modern times.

Peace and God bless!
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top