A question that has been bugging me about Aquinas's 5 Proofs

[Anthony_V]

Wait… I’m fairly certain have again made a muddleheaded error…

Although the above post was a bit closer.

 

[Partinobodycula]

In other words, in a per se series of A, B, C, for every effect generated of B onto C, there is an intrinsically corresponding effect of A. The reason is that B (and even C, if we were to posit another variable upon which it acts) acts as an efficient cause only in a derivative manner of A; for which reason, we would conversely call B an instrumental cause of A. The effect that B has on C is principally A’s effect, passing through B, such that it is only B’s effect instrumentally.

Does it necessarily mean that the causal process is instantaneous? Certainly not. If you write using a pencil, which you are then using instrumentally, it doesn’t matter whether or not the pencil is instantaneously leaving graphite upon the paper. What does matter is that the pencil is not the kind of thing which has a built-in power to write on paper without a proportionate cause of some stripe or another to use it as an instrument.

We might object, “But isn’t that a per accidens series? Isn’t it the case that in the series A, B, C, that B (the pencil) affects C (the paper) even when the force of A (the hand) is gone? Don’t you remember – it’s the difference between A acting as a cause and B acting as a cause when the series is not instantaneous. There’s a small gap in time! The pencil moves just a little bit on its own, like when the son begets his own son (the grandson) without the father being around.”

The answer is (1) no and (2) it doesn’t matter. In the case of a per accidens series, there is not the kind of proportion there is in the per se series. In the prior, there need not be a 1:1 proportion (all things being equal) between the primary cause and the secondary cause(s). The father does not have to beget the son for every time that the son begets a grandchild. Or, to use the abstract variables example, B can affect C more (or less) times than A affects B. This is what we mean by “built-in” power, as opposed to “derived” or “instrumental” power. B is not just an instrument of A acting upon C. Rather, B can act as an independent agent.

On the other hand, there *is * (all things being equal) a 1:1 proportion in the per se series of causality. All things being equal, for every inch that you move your hand, the pencil will also move an inch. The pencil’s movement doesn’t need to be instantaneous; it only needs to be “instrumental” or “derived” of the hand. The pencil cannot affect the paper more than your hand (or other interfering but proportionate causes, when all things are not equal) affects the pencil. Sons can beget children more times than they themselves are begotten, but, all things being equal, pencils cannot draw more lines than the hand draws.

To use the abstract variables example, for every effect of B upon C, there is an intrinsically corresponding effect of A upon B. Notice that this is not “extrinsically corresponding,” but intrinsically corresponding. To illustrate “extrinsically corresponding”: If the father begets the son, and the son begets exactly one grandchild, then we have a correspondence of effects such that the father begot the son as many times as the son happened to beget a son. That would still be extrinsically corresponding, because there was nothing about the father’s begetting of the son which necessitated that the son beget exactly one other son. It just happened to be the case, and there is no pertinent causal connection. Hence, it is still a per accidens series.

First off, dang that’s good for one so young. Second, what are you doing posting at such an hour?

I realize that I’m really going to distill your answer down to the bare essentials this time. But in effect what you’re saying is that as far as Aquinas’ First Way is concerned, there are no per accidens causal chains. To clarify this statement just a little bit, ultimately the father is just an intermediate cause of the son (if that’s the proper term), because the father can try to have as many sons as he likes, but that doesn’t mean that he’ll have ten or none. The ultimate cause therefore, isn’t the father. There would still need to be a per se causal chain between the first cause and the son.

If this is getting confusing to you, or anyone else, sorry.

If I’m following the reasoning correctly, we can therefore treat all causal chains as finite, although in theory, per accidens causal chains can be infinite. Hopefully I haven’t mutilated this argument beyond recognition.

Which brings us back to the First Way. When Aquinas speaks of movers, and changing potency to act, is he talking about a real physical process, or simply drawing an analogy between the physical and the metaphysical? And what could possibly be the causal relationship between the two? In either case it doesn’t seem to pass Augustine’s footprint test. Because we should be able to understand the cause, by looking at the effect. And in this case, the effect is always twofold, one thing changes from potency to act, while another thing changes from act to potency. Never one without the other. The cause it would seem, can’t be pure act?

You should know that as a solipsist I’m faced with the exact same dilemma. What’s the nature of the first cause? Because there must be one. Therefore I can appreciate anyone who diligently tries to answer that question. Unfortunately, I’ve yet to find one. But perhaps the search for the answer is just as important as the answer itself.

 

[Partinobodycula]

If we have the domino example, it’s not just you pushing the first domino over, but the inertia of the first domino after it’s pushed over, and gravity, and other things which science talks at us about. That’s fine; the dominoes derive their “falling over” from the confluence of causes that bears upon the first domino when you push it over. The essential piece is simply that they don’t have the built-in power to push themselves over when there isn’t that series or some equivalent.

Ok, after about eight hours of reading, contemplating, and searching the web, my brain is fried. Plus it’s Monday, and I fast on Mondays, which means my brains a little slow. So you’re going to have to explain to me whether you believe that the falling dominoes are an example of a per se series, or a per accidens series. Because from what I’ve been able to find online, (Which is a questionable source, I know) it’s defined differently be different people.

So is it per se or per accidens?

 

[Anthony_V]

First off, dang that’s good for one so young.

I’m glad that my pig-headed attempt to demonstrate the principle of non-contradiction does not altogether preclude saying something intelligent.

But how do you know that I am young, anyway?

Second, what are you doing posting at such an hour?

It was the hour at which I finished typing my reply and hit “Submit Reply,” and there is not a pertinent time lag between the moment I submit and the moment which the post is effectively posted. But that time lapse nothing to do with the fact that it was a per se series of efficient causality; for posts are not the kind of things that write themselves, you know. I tease.

I realize that I’m really going to distill your answer down to the bare essentials this time.

Before I’ve put them back into the first way? Alright… but I feel like I’m still going to have to provide a follow-up post.

But in effect what you’re saying is that as far as Aquinas’ First Way is concerned, there are no per accidens causal chains. To clarify this statement just a little bit, ultimately the father is just an intermediate cause of the son (if that’s the proper term), because the father can try to have as many sons as he likes, but that doesn’t mean that he’ll have ten or none. The ultimate cause therefore, isn’t the father.

That’s basically correct, as I see it at first glance.

There would still need to be a per se causal chain between the first cause and the son.

I think that’s basically right in the end… but we can’t deduce that from the information we have so far. We still need to figure in act and potency and what follows from it: the principle of proportionate causality as it applies to things which change. St. Thomas isn’t just talking about locomotion (motion from here to there), but more broadly the movement from potentially being something to actually being something.

If I’m following the reasoning correctly, we can therefore treat all causal chains as finite, although in theory, per accidens causal chains can be infinite. Hopefully I haven’t mutilated this argument beyond recognition.

I don’t think if it matters whether or not a given chain is finite or infinite. All that matters is that there be a first in the chain that does not derive its power from elsewhere. Can there be a per se series (in which there is always a first) that is also infinite in terms of its membership (B, C, D, … ∞)? I suppose there could, if the causation was instantaneous; but whether there is or isn’t or can or can’t doesn’t matter for our purposes. All that matters for the argument is that the chain have a first. (Whether or not it has A is irrelevant to whether it has B, C, D, or whether it has B, C, D, ∞). Let me illustrate this with a thought experiment which the early 20th-century Thomist A.D. Sertillanges used: Imagine a paintbrush with an infinitely long handle. If the paintbrush is moving, what matters is that the paintbrush is not the kind of thing that will move itself; the unusual feature about the handle – and whether the handle be short, or long, or finite or infinite – is evidently *unrelated *to the question at hand; for it doesn’t have any pertinent connection to whether or not the paintbrush is the kind of thing which moves itself. If you were somehow able to add up instrumental causes to infinity, they remain instrumental. And even if you weren’t, they remain instrumental. What matters is that the motion of the paintbrush is instrumental; and this instrumentality, even if it be an infinitely long chain of instrumentality, does not make it non-instrumental or “non-derived.” So let me reword your sentence accordingly: we can treat all causal chains as deriving their power from a first, which itself does not derive (because it is pure act). That’s essentially St. Thomas’ conclusion. But we’ve still not dealt with why it is the case. Hence it’s odd that I just tag on “because it’s pure act,” even though we haven’t mentioned it in the premises.

 

[Anthony_V]

Ok, after about eight hours of reading, contemplating, and searching the web, my brain is fried. Plus it’s Monday, and I fast on Mondays, which means my brains a little slow. So you’re going to have to explain to me whether you believe that the falling dominoes are an example of a per se series, or a per accidens series. Because from what I’ve been able to find online, (Which is a questionable source, I know) it’s defined differently be different people.

So is it per se or per accidens?

It’s per se series. Do the dominoes have their “pushing over” instrumentally? Yes. There is not a “pushing over” which any of the dominoes receive that it does not receive through the falling of the first domino; even if we also say that various physical forces like inertia and gravity are necessary conditions for the series to happen as it does, and even if we say those causal forces apply to the dominoes even before the first it tipped over. What’s key is that they do not take away the fact that the dominoes will not tip themselves over. The dominoes don’t beget “pushing over” in the same way that sons beget sons of their own. The dominoes are at the mercy of the causes that they derive their power from. The sons can however, in a certain sense, beget other sons whenever they please; and this certain sense is that they don’t need to derive their causal power to do so from dear ol’ Dad. I’m not saying their causal power is uncaused whatsoever, I’m just saying that, in the hypothetical series, they don’t need to derive their power from the cause preceding. The dominoes, on the other hand, cannot tip over whenever they please. They need to derive their power from the prior member in the series. The dominoes falling over is in principle the same as the paintbrush moving. Neither the dominoes nor the paintbrush are the kind of things that move themselves; hence they require a first. It’s in principle the same kind of causal series as when you write with a pencil, albeit things are stretched out temporally. The pencil derives its “writing” from the hand, such that it does not write whenever it pleases; the dominoes derive their “falling over” from whatever pushed over the first, and from gravity, and, again, all the other stuff science talks at us about. They are simply instruments of that confluence of causes. But let’s not get hung up on examples. We’re just trying to derive a concept of instrumentality.

You can vaguely see where St. Thomas wants to go: Nothing which changes or has the potential to change is the kind of thing that can change itself – for otherwise it would already possess the change; but there can’t be an infinite regress in determining where the change comes from, for it must come from somewhere inasmuch as everything is deriving it; hence, there must be something that does not itself change or have the potential to change, but is itself the changer. But we have to prove that first premise is necessarily the case on the basis of act and potency, which we haven’t gotten to yet. It’s the second premise we’ve been elucidating, and to a certain extent the conclusion.

 

[Anthony_V]

Even if the examples turn out to be faulty, this does not demolish the argument. The examples merely serve a pedagogical purpose, and can be dispensed with. The argument rests or falls on the concepts, not the examples which are themselves dispensable.

The argument with respect to per se series of efficient causality is that:

(1) If cause Y acts upon Z in such a manner that Y does not have of itself the power to act upon Z, then Y must derive its power from a logically preceding cause.
(2) If Y derives it’s power from a logically preceding cause, X, which does not of itself have the power to act upon Y, then X must derive it’s power from a logically preceding cause.
(3) Given that there is power in the chain, such a chain in which all variables derive their power from another cannot regress such that there is not a first which does not derive; for they would be collectively deriving their power without anything from which they actually derive their power, which is absurd.
(4) There is power in the chain, ex hypothesi.
(5) Therefore, there is a first in the chain which does not derive its power.

 

[Partinobodycula]

It’s per se series.

In case it takes me awhile to formulate a complete response. I thought that I would post this from Trent Horn.

To this objection Aquinas makes a distinction between causes that are sequential and causes that are simultaneous. Sequential causation is like a chain of dominoes. After you knock over the first domino you start a chain reaction of dominoes hitting other dominoes. In fact, you could destroy the first domino after you’ve pushed it since it is no longer needed to keep the whole set of dominoes falling. Aquinas believed that sequential causes in the past, like a set of dominoes, could have occurred for all eternity.

Aquinas argues that God explains the existence of simultaneous causation. An example of this kind of causation would be a golfer hitting a golf ball. The act of the golfer hitting the ball is not as simple as we might think. The golf ball is moved by the golf clubhead, but the clubhead is simultaneously moved by the swing of the shaft, which is moved from the handle, and the handle is simultaneously moved by the flexing of the golfer’s muscles, which cannot flex without nerve signals from the golfer’s brain stimulating them, and so on and so on.

Trent Horn holds a Master’s degree in Theology from the Franciscan University of Steubenville and is currently an apologist and speaker for Catholic Answers.

Obviously Mr. Horn believes that the series of falling dominoes is per accidens. So quite understandably, I’m confused.

The argument could also be made that if God is like the hand which set the dominoes in motion, then like the hand, He’s no longer necessary.

 

[Anthony_V]

In case it takes me awhile to formulate a complete response. I thought that I would post this from Trent Horn.

Look, we can sort that out later. Mr. Horn seems to be interpreting the argument in a manner that assumes from the beginning that God conserves the universe in every instant. I find that problematic at least pedagogically, because people ask questions like “What if science tells us a per se series isn’t always instantaneous?” The other option belongs to waiting until the end to say that the kind of thing which such a series entails, when used in conjunction with that premise concerning act and potency, is also, as a necessary corollary, a sustaining force. If the way that I understand the order of the argument turns out that it produces a correct demonstration, then we have a demonstration of God’s existence. And given that fact, the most damage you could sustain from a discrepancy between the argument I’m presenting and an argument that Mr. Horn is presenting is that you have one valid demonstration rather than two. Test the per se series, not by whether every Thomist says it, but by whether it works in the argument.

What is key is the distinction between instrumental and principal causality (or second and first causality), a distinction which the language of per accidens versus per se (which I use in The Last Superstition and Aquinas) better conveys. An instrumental cause is one that derives whatever causal power it has from something else. To use Aquinas’s famous example, the stick that the hand uses to push the stone has no power to push the stone on its own, but derives its stone-moving power from the hand, which uses it as an “instrument.” (Of course, the stick might have some other causal powers apart from the hand; the point is that relative to the specific series hand-stick-stone it has no independent causal power.) A principal cause is one that does have its causal power inherently. The hand in our example can be thought of for purposes of illustration as such a cause… In any event, it is because all the causes in such a series other than the first are instrumental in this way that they are said to be ordered per se or “essentially,” for their being causes at all depends essentially on the activity of that which uses them as instruments. By contrast, causes ordered per accidens or “accidentally” do not essentially depend for their efficacy on the activity of earlier causes in the series. To use Aquinas’s example, a father possesses the power to generate sons independently of the activity of his own father, so that a series of fathers and sons is in that sense ordered per accidens rather than per se (though each member of such a series is also dependent in various other respects on causal series ordered per se). Dr. Edward Feser, who is a Thomist professor of philosophy.

Although I can’t at present find the citation, I would also add that Dr. Feser at some point cites Msgr. John Wippel, perhaps among the foremost Thomist scholar in the English speaking world, as saying the same. Simultaneity in the sense of instantaneous is not key to accepting per se causality.

 

[Partinobodycula]

But how do you know that I am young, anyway?

Your profile.

It was the hour at which I finished typing my reply and hit “Submit Reply,”

I was actually on the site when you posted it. For me it was 5 am. I figured that you were either in England, in Hawaii, or in college.

I don’t think if it matters whether or not a given chain is finite or infinite. All that matters is that there be a first in the chain that does not derive its power from elsewhere.

Let’s take the example of a man who fathers three sons as being a per accidens event. Each of the sons then having three sons would also be a per accidens event. As would be all previous fathers and sons. And all future fathers and sons. According to Aquinas we could then form an infinite series of fathers and sons.

Is such an infinite series possible?

If this isn’t an example of a series of per accidens events, then can you even conceive of a series of such per accidens events? Aquinas not only imagined that such a series was possible, but that it could be infinite.

Can you describe such a series?

Of course if falling dominoes is a per accidens series, then it’s quite easy to imagine.

 

[Partinobodycula]

Although I can’t at present find the citation, I would also add that Dr. Feser at some point cites Msgr. John Wippel, perhaps among the foremost Thomist scholar in the English speaking world, as saying the same. Simultaneity in the sense of instantaneous is not key to accepting per se causality.

I look forward to that citation. In the meantime, let me cite your Feser quote.

By contrast, causes ordered per accidens or “accidentally” do not essentially depend for their efficacy on the activity of earlier causes in the series.

This quote seems to strongly imply that the falling dominoes are indeed a per accidens series. The series doesn’t rely upon earlier causes for it’s continued efficacy. The earlier causes can disappear and the series would continue. Surely you’re not implying that God could disappear and the world would go on without Him.

You know I actually looked for a Feser quote that would specifically say that the dominoes is a per se series, but I couldn’t find one.

 

[Anthony_V]

Your profile.

Ah, yes.

I was actually on the site when you posted it. For me it was 5 am. I figured that you were either in England, in Hawaii, or in college.

Well, I’m not in England or Hawaii.

Let’s take the example of a man who fathers three sons as being a per accidens event.

Sure, because that’s the only conceivable way to take it.

Each of the sons then having three sons would also be a per accidens event. As would be all previous fathers and sons. And all future fathers and sons. According to Aquinas we could then form an infinite series of fathers and sons. Is such an infinite series possible?

All things being equal, yes. A begets B1, B2, and B3 such that B1-3 do not then derive their causal power from A. They are not instrumental of A. Therefore, they are not reliant upon A to beget their own. Therefore, the series is per accidens.

If this isn’t an example of a series of per accidens events, then can you even conceive of a series of such per accidens events? Aquinas not only imagined that such a series was possible, but that it could be infinite. Can you describe such a series?

Of course the series can be infinitely long. I see no problem. But see my next post. It’s about time to bring in the first premise.

Of course if falling dominoes is a per accidens series, then it’s quite easy to imagine.

But a chain of dominoes isn’t a per accidens series. Isn’t that what I just finished explaining? The falling of any of the dominoes needs to be explained by something that’s not a domino. But when a father (B) has two sons (C1, C2), we do not need twice as much recourse to Grandpa (A). If another father (Y) has only one son (Z), he needs exactly as much recourse to Grandpa (X) as the other father (B) needed to the other Grandpa (A). A and X function exactly the same in both series.

 

[Anthony_V]

"What Aquinas is saying, then, is that it is in the very nature of causal series ordered per se to have a first member, precisely because everything else in the series only counts as a member in the first place relative to the actions of a first cause. To suggest that such a series might regress infinitely, without a first member, is therefore simply unintelligible. … Given their essentially instrumental character, all causes in such a series other than the first cause are referred to by Aquinas as “second causes” (“second” not in the sense of coming after the first but before the third member of the series, but rather in the sense having their causal power only in a secondary or derivative way). It is worth emphasizing that it is precisely this instrumental nature of second causes, the dependence of whatever causal power they have on the causal activity of the first cause, that is the key to the notion of a causal series per se. That the members of such a series exist simultaneously, and that the series does not regress to infinity, are of secondary importance. As Patterson Brown and John Wippel point out, even if a series of causes ordered per se could somehow be said to regress to infinity, it would remain the case, given that they are merely instrumental causes, that there must then be something outside the entire infinite series that imparts to them their causal power.

Feser, Edward. Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide (Beginner’s Guides) (Kindle Locations 1222-1225; 1229-1236). Oneworld Publications. Kindle Edition.

At this point, I think I’ll just put out the argument and see whether you think it works, rather than whether you think it’s precisely, exactly, and historically how every Thomist ever has interpreted the situation. That, like simultaneity in the sense of being instantaneous, is of secondary importance.

I’ll write up that argument now.

 

[Partinobodycula]

At this point, I think I’ll just put out the argument and see whether you think it works, rather than whether you think it’s precisely, exactly, and historically how every Thomist ever has interpreted the situation. That, like simultaneity in the sense of being instantaneous, is of secondary importance.

I’ll write up that argument now.

We do indeed appear to be at an impasse. So the floor is yours.

 

[Partinobodycula]

Did St. Thomas actually believe that?

Aquinas believed that there are two types of causal series, per se, and per accidens. He believed that a per accidens series can indeed be infinite. As you may have noticed if you’ve been following this thread, Anthony V and I are trying to ascertain just what constitutes a per accidens series.

It’s my position that any series that isn’t simultaneous in nature, is a per accidens series. Meaning that the previous causes need not exist for the series to continue.

Anthony V of course disagrees. He’s definitely more educated than I am, but I’ve got age and cunning on my side, so we’ll see.

 

[Partinobodycula]

As an aside, I’m still astonished by something Ghosty posted:

Blueprints (and design drawings in general) don’t cause anything to exist, except perhaps confusion. Or perhaps this is a metaphysical use of the word ‘cause’ with which I’m not familiar.

It is indeed a metaphysical concept. It’s based upon the idea that things move toward a specific end. And that this movement toward an end can’t simply be random, or there would only be chaos. Neither can the knowledge of the end exist within the things themselves. But if the knowledge of the end doesn’t exist somewhere, then how are things guided to the end toward which they move?

The metaphysical answer to that question is, that the knowledge of the end must exist in God. Just as the knowledge of the building exists in the blueprint. Without the blueprint, the carpenter doesn’t know what to build, and without God, the seed doesn’t know to become a tree.

Yes, it’s a metaphysical concept which you can either accept or reject, but for its time, it was the best and most logical answer to why the world is the way it is. And some would say that it’s still the only answer, as to why there’s something, rather than nothing.

 

[Tomdstone]

…without God, the seed doesn’t know to become a tree.

I think that a biologist would give you a purely natural explanation as to how a seed becomes a tree. The biologist would not invoke divine intervention.

 

[Partinobodycula]

I think that a biologist would give you a purely natural explanation as to how a seed becomes a tree. The biologist would not invoke divine intervention.

I don’t actually believe the metaphysical argument, but Nixbits didn’t seem to be interested in my opinion of the argument, but simply what it was. I’ll gladly leave the commentary to others.

 

[Nixbits]

To be clear, Partinobodycula, I am interested in your opinion of the argument. I’m learning a lot from the discussion between you and Anthony V. Sorry if my post interrupted the flow.

 

[Partinobodycula]

To be clear, Partinobodycula, I am interested in your opinion of the argument. I’m learning a lot from the discussion between you and Anthony V. Sorry if my post interrupted the flow.

Nixbits, you haven’t interrupted anything. I’m patiently waiting for Anythony V to lay out his argument. In fact, your question may offer me the chance to give some much needed context to the whole idea of metaphysics. One that perhaps many people don’t appreciate, or haven’t even considered.

When one considers metaphysics in its historical context you begin to get an appreciation for it’s place in the story of humanity, even if you don’t get an acceptance of it. For a thousand years metaphysics was science. It was perhaps man’s first attempt to build a coherent, logical explanation for why the world is the way it is. Men like Aristotle and Aquinas were today’s Einstein and Stephen Hawking. They envisioned the world in a way that others simply couldn’t. And they used the same tools to do it, observation and reason. They weren’t a sign of the naivete and ignorance of our forebears, they were a sign of our innate genius. Men can do what perhaps nothing else in the world can do. We can reason about our own existence.

But their tools were limited, and so their information was limited. But they did what they could with what they had. They really were no different than we are today. And it may turn out that our understanding of the world is just as misguided as theirs was. And so the question is, would we be any more accepting of a new paradigm than they were? Consider for example that we may indeed be living in the “Matrix”. That reality really is a simulation. Of course you scoff at the idea. But what if more and more, the evidence begins to show that it’s true? Observation has already begun to hint that it might be true, but what if observation continues to swing even further toward that conclusion? How willing will men be to abandon their concept of a world in which everything is solid, and permanent, and predictable, for one that’s virtual? Especially if they can’t “prove” that it’s true. Consider this idea for a moment and you get perhaps a better understanding of what it was like to go from a worldview that was based upon solid, substantial, observable things, to one that was based upon atoms, and genes, and inexplicable forces. If history is any guide, then we would have a very difficult time making that transition. But we may have to.

So what do I think of metaphysics? It was a start, a beginning on the road to understanding who we are, and where we came from. It says solipsist in the upper right hand corner of my posts, because I’m not certain of metaphysics, or physics. Despite the seeming certainty of observation, I can’t be sure that the world is what men believe that it is. One thing that I can be sure of though, is that for now, this is the only world that I have. And that makes it a very precious thing.

 

[Anthony_V]

I’ve not abandoned the thread; I’m just taking a while to formulate an entire response. I’m using the old scholastic manuals from the 19th century and early 20th century.