A serious logical problem

[R_Daneel]

Just throwing in my 2-cents. I am one of those who argued the above, and I am very much aware of Church dogma regarding God’s simplicity. Aquinas already handled all of this in the Summa Contra Gentiles. I think you may be confused with regard to what divine “simplicty” means and what constitutes an “attribute”.

Logic: “Knowledge” cannot stand alone, it requires an Object, thus knowledge is in practice “knowledge of”. Knowledge OF an object/event, etc. is therefore logically contingent on (i.e. it cannot exist independently of) that very same object/event, etc.
Thus, God’s knowledge OF our choices is logically contingent upon our making them.
(Note, time has not come in yet)

So far it is very well said. Exactly as you say, the knowledge of anything is contingent upon the existence of the object/event. This is why it makes no sense that it is possible to “know” something that does not exist. (How many pages are there in the non-existent book which does not reside on my desk? In which language was it written?). Since, according to Genesis, God uttered the famous words: “let there be light” (who was there to record this event?) it clearly creates two intervals of God’s meta-time (if you will): one when the creation has not taken place, and there was nothing except God, and the one afterwards. Therefore God could not have “known” (could not have had information) of the nonexistent world yet. So much for “omniscience”.

Here is the kicker: “Knowledge” is NOT an “attribute”. The attribute is the property of knowing which is necessarily contingent upon the existence of precisely one thing, the “knower”. God’s essence remains simple in His property of knowing, His omniscience. This property is “caused” by His own existence as the “knower”, maintaining his simple logical self-sustenance (lack of external contingency).

Here is your contradiction. You say that “God’s essence remains simple in His property of knowing”. Is now “knowing” a property? God has no properties. Furthermore, attribute and property are interchangable, they are the same thing. God’s property of “knowing” is contingent upon the existence of the “known object/event”. If God’s knowing is inherent part of God’s essence then God’s essence is also contingent. Time or timelessness play no part here. Your 2 cents are very valuable, because they underscore and support exactly what I said.

 

[Chiral]

…Therefore God could not have “known” (could not have had information) of the nonexistent world yet. So much for “omniscience”.

This concern gets into the meaning of “transcendence” with regard to time. Omniscience is not hurt here, for omniscience is simply the property (or attribute) of knowing all that is logically knowable. If one’s conciousness transcends time, then the future is also the present. I’ll go into this in a second…

Here is your contradiction… attribute and property are interchangable… God’s property of “knowing” is contingent upon the existence of the “known object/event”. If God’s knowing is inherent part of God’s essence then God’s essence is also contingent. Time or timelessness play no part here…

No no, the attribute or property of “knowing” is NOT interchangeable with specific knowledge of an object/event.
God’s “knowing” is inherent in His essence, necessary or non-contingent. But “Knowledge”, as you yourself have said, is just information, and information is NOT a property or attribute. Information can, indeed MUST be contingent on something. But “knowing” is not contingent upon possession of any specific piece of information, it is only contingent upon the existence of A (i.e. any) piece of information, any object/event to which knowledge can correspond.
My property of knowing is not contingent upon my knowing what the dollar-to-yen exchange rate is, for example. My knowledge is contingent only upon there being something, anything to know at all! Well, to possess the property of knowing, I must exist, and knowledge of my own existence is sufficient information to describe in me the property of “knowing”. So my “knowing” is contingent upon my existing. Well, if I exist simply but contingently, then my knowing is contingent on the existence of something contingent and therefore my existence is axiomatically proven to be contingent.
But what if I exist simply and necessarily? Then my property of knowing, contingent on knowledge of my necessary self, is axiomatically proven to be non-contingent, for the subject and the object are identical - I cannot be both contingent and not!
This is how God’s simplicity is maintained with regard to His knowing. Did that make sense?

Now, TIME. According to Catholic teaching, God transcends time, and so all of His attributes transcend time. What this means is that God’s “meta-time” as you put it consists of only Present. To God, He did not create light, He creates light. There is no past or future tense, there are only timepoints: T1, T2, T3…
Let’s say, At T1, our past, God created light. At T2, I am typing this post. At T3, Iran will be nuked by Israel (hypothetical future). That’s all using our perspective.
Now, is there anyway to write those sentences using only the present tense?
At T1, God creates light. At T2, Chiral types post. At T3, Israel nukes Iran. All present tense, no past or future, only time-stamps as are necessitated by logic with regard to events. The sentences transcend time, if they are true they remain true forever and have always been true. This is how God can possess knowledge of what has not happened YET because “yet” implies that it WILL, that it MUST.

Concerns? Obvious contradictions I missed?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

It all depends. if you happen to gamble on the outcome, it matters very much.

are you going to reply to the metaphysically correct answer in post #55? or just keep ignoring it, because you dont know any metaphysics?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

It all depends. if you happen to gamble on the outcome, it matters very much.

are you going to reply to the metaphysically correct answer in post #55? or just keep ignoring it, because you dont know any metaphysics?

if you do not understand the logical basis of metaphysics, or what metaphysics is. i will be happy to explain. we can start from the laws of logic and the divisions of being, which is where the difference between hard sciences, metaphysics and mathematics, originates and work all the way up through Aristotle, Aquinas to Gilson. if thats whats needed.

 

[Areopagite]

It all depends. if you happen to gamble on the outcome, it matters very much.

Well, to God, it doesn’t matter. If it is important in the divine plan that a pair of dice roll a certain way at a certain time, God could have merely designed creation from the beginning to make it go that way if those certain conditions were met. So, your example here does not show that it is important for God to know actualized contingencies.

To clarify: “knowledge is information about something”. If that book was never written, then it makes no sense “to have information about its contents”. I can say that I know all the telephone numbers in the world - but it is an “empty knowledge” - since I don’t know which phone number belongs to whom.

When you say “knowledge is information about something” … you have to define “something.” A “thing” includes both actual and potential beings. A unicorn is a thing, even though it doesn’t actually exist. A future potential action is a thing … hence the phrase, “I’m going to do something” (or at least, “I want to do something”)

Also, you obviously can know all the phone numbers in the world … but some people don’t. In fact, you might be mistaken about certain ones … all those that begin with “555” for example are not real phone numbers. And of course, foreign phone numbers have a different amount of digits and whatnot. But let’s say it was all very simple and there were only 7 digit numbers and all combinations were possible. You can then say, I suppose, that you KNOW all the phone numbers. Some people, on the other hand, might not have any idea what a phone number even is. Hence, they would NOT know what all the phone numbers are. Or, a person might know what a phone number is … but doesn’t realize the very simple mathematical concept to figure them all out. Here, one can see the distinctions of different knowledges with regarding to phone numbers themselves (and not to what people they refer). If these aren’t different kinds of knowledge … then what do you call it?

Potential existence is at best a sloppy expression. Something either exists, or does not. Something cannot both exist and not exist. Yes, we use phrases like “the contents of a book I am about to write” - but such phrases are improper.

To clarify: something cannot both exist and not exist in the same way at the same time. However, something can exist and at the same time not exist in different ways (i.e. actual vs. potential existence).

You see, “non-actual existence” is a contradiction in terms.

Well … I disagree. “Existence” often implies “actual existence” specifically, but not always.

 

[Areopagite]

Yes, and I agree with you. We do use the term “potential existence” sometimes, but it is misleading. Yes, an acorn can grow into an oak tree, given the proper circumstances, but the acorn is just an acorn - not a potential oak tree. Clarity is of utmost impotrance - when one tries a philosophical conversation. Sure, in everyday parlance we can talk about “potential existence”, but not here.

An acorn is not a potential oak tree? Wha? Of course it is. Don’t you know how acorns work? If an acorn can grow into an oak tree (which I hope you agree) then obviously it is a potential oak tree. How on earth can one deny this?

You haven’t shown why everyday parlance has the privilege of talking about “potential existence” but philosophical conversation does not.

I am not sure what you mean here. As I said, knowledge is information. If something does not exist, then there can be no information about it. Let’s put it way: the proposition: “I have a nonexistent book and a nonexistent ball on my table” is a syntactically correct but semantically meaningless proposition. This is why one cannot know the contents of a book, which does not exist. And a book which might be written in the future definitely does not exist. Once it will be wriiten then it will exist, and then its contents can be known.

I agree that you cannot know the actual contents of an actual book that does not actually exist. It obviously breaks the principle of non-contradiction. But I nonetheless would say that you can know potential contents of a potential book that potentially exists. That’s all I’m saying. For example, a person may write a book that merely has the contents “Once upon a time, lalala.” I can know that such a book is possible. Since I can know that, it follows that potential beings are objects of knowledge. Your accusation that such knowledge is “empty” doesn’t make any sense. That knowledge does refer to something … it conceives a book with certain content and says that it can exist.

Now if you simply disregard that and say such kind of knowledge is useless and hence not knowledge … let me speak of something more useful. I could think about possible arguments you could make and likewise possible arguments that I could respond with. Such knowledge of non-actualized things is legitimate and USEFUL knowledge. And, of course, it is knowledge. The words of those possible arguments may not be actualized at one time, but they can still be known, and it is useful to know them. This is different from “I know what you’re going to say” but rather it is “I know what you might say” … either way the word “know” is there. Hence, knowledge of possible things is knowledge. Plane, brutal, unadulterated common sense.

You might also be thinking that “potential existence” is a worthless idea because everything has potential existence. This is true depending on what you mean by “thing.” A square circle doesn’t have potential existence (and some thus would not consider it a “thing” either), and it is useful to recognizes impossible absurdities and distinguish them from things you know are possible.

Now, you yourself admit that in common parlance, we do use the term “potential existence.” Hence, the burden of proof is on you why we should disregard it in philosophical discussion. It is quite natural to keep it, and much of what we say will stop making sense if we throw it away.

 

[R_Daneel]

Well, to God, it doesn’t matter. If it is important in the divine plan that a pair of dice roll a certain way at a certain time, God could have merely designed creation from the beginning to make it go that way if those certain conditions were met. So, your example here does not show that it is important for God to know actualized contingencies.

I disagree. The knowledge of all the potential outcomes differs from the knowledge from the actual outcome. And that is all that matters. To know all the potential outcomes is a “lower” level of knowledge from knowing the actual outcome.

Well … I disagree. “Existence” often implies “actual existence” specifically, but not always.

We use a different nomenclature. I differentiate between “physical existence” and “conceptual existence” - which you call actual and potential existence. The problem with your terminology is that you do not differentiate between “potential that can be realized” and “potential that cannot be realized”, therefore I don’t consider your terminology accurate.

Are you familiar with the works of M. C. Escher? Just type it into Google and see the amazing pictures he created. They “look” like possible pictures of a physical reality, but they are not. They display a physically inconsistent reality. So what do they represent in your terminology? A “potential” existence?

The trouble is that we are drifting here from the topic of this thread. let’s get back to it.

 

[R_Daneel]

No no, the attribute or property of “knowing” is NOT interchangeable with specific knowledge of an object/event.
God’s “knowing” is inherent in His essence, necessary or non-contingent. But “Knowledge”, as you yourself have said, is just information, and information is NOT a property or attribute. Information can, indeed MUST be contingent on something.

In this case the concept of “knowledge” when it pertains to God is fundamentally different from “knowledge” when it pertains to humans (which is information). As such God’s “knowledge” is undefined, and I have absolutely no idea what are you talking about. And it would be fruitless to argue about an undefined category.

 

[R_Daneel]

are you going to reply to the metaphysically correct answer in post #55? or just keep ignoring it, because you dont know any metaphysics?

Taunting will not make me interested.

 

[Areopagite]

I disagree. The knowledge of all the potential outcomes differs from the knowledge from the actual outcome.

Right here you seem to say that knowledge of potential things IS legit knowledge, whereas previously you seemed to deny this.

I agree that knowledge of potential outcomes vs. knowledge of actual ones are different though.

And that is all that matters. To know all the potential outcomes is a “lower” level of knowledge from knowing the actual outcome.

Okay, here we go. This is heart of the issue. Why does it matter? Why is it important for God to have knowledge of actual things rather than knowledge of potential things?

We use a different nomenclature. I differentiate between “physical existence” and “conceptual existence” - which you call actual and potential existence. The problem with your terminology is that you do not differentiate between “potential that can be realized” and “potential that cannot be realized”, therefore I don’t consider your terminology accurate.

Depending on what you mean by “potential that can be realized” vs. “potential that cannot be realized” (I’m unclear what you mean by “realized” for that could mean a variety of things), I DO make the distinction (though I haven’t mentioned it on this thread). For example, here are some further distinctions made with regard to potency (I’m not quite sure which one addresses what you’re saying):

Intrinsic Possibility: the potential for something to exist with regard to the integrity of its nature (unicorns are intrinsically possible, but square circles are intrinsically impossible)
Extrinsic Possibility: the potential for something to exist based on the available means to bring it into existence (a space shuttle may have intrinsic possibility, but for most people, it is extrinsically impossible due to the availability of resources and tools required to bring it into existence)

Real Existence: which is subdivided into Actual and Potential existence
Ideal Existence: which is subdivided into Subjective existence (sense experience) and Objective existence (which is the realm of concepts)
Logical Existence: which is subdivided into many things (which I could mention), one of which is “purely logical existence” (which includes square circles and other intrinsically impossible beings)

I don’t know if somewhere in here your objection is answered.

Are you familiar with the works of M. C. Escher? Just type it into Google and see the amazing pictures he created. They “look” like possible pictures of a physical reality, but they are not. They display a physically inconsistent reality. So what do they represent in your terminology? A “potential” existence?

Possibility can also be divided into:

Metaphysical OR Logical Possibility: the potential for something to exist with regard to the integrity of its nature (this is the same as intrinsic possibility)
Physical OR Natural Possibility: the potential for something to exist based on the laws of physics
Moral Possibility: the potential for something (an act) to be acceptable in ethics

A square circle does not have metaphysical possibility … its very nature contradicts itself. Not even God can perform metaphysical impossible feats.

Something like … teleporting from one side of the galaxy to the other (I guess … for example) is a physically impossible feat because it breaks the laws of physics. God can choose to suspend this kind of impossibility.

Rape, for example, is not morally possible (i.e. it cannot be ethical). There are intrinsically immoral acts and ones that are not. God can change certain moral rules … except intrinsically immoral ones.

Escher seems to depict physically impossible worlds. That is, they contradict the laws of the physical universe, but they do not appear to achieve metaphysically impossibility (unless I can be shown wrong on this). I wouldn’t say they’re immoral, of course. Hence, it is possible for God to create such worlds, but it is impossible for us to create them. The worlds have intrinsic possibility but not (for us) extrinsic possibility.

I guess that would be my analysis of it.

The trouble is that we are drifting here from the topic of this thread. let’s get back to it.

Sure. The key question, once again, I ask from you is why does it matter for God to possess knowledge of actualized contingencies? Why can’t knowledge of potential contingencies be sufficient? Why does it matter?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Taunting will not make me interested.

im not trying to taunt you. i am pointing out what i believe to be the reason that you have not replied to the post. you dont have any real metaphysical experience.

what else am i to think?

surely if i avoided some scientific truth, that could be construed as detrimental to my position. it would be entirely reasonable for you to make the same assumption. that i lacked the scientific knowledge to debate the subject, but i was unwilling to admit as much.

we dont have to stand about arguing these things, when it would be much more fun to debate the actual issues that we are both interested in. lets do that instead.

 

[mmmcounts]

I have not used the libertarian definition of free will. What I said is valid for both the libertarian and the compatibilist scenarios.

The bare-bones summary of the compatibilist scenario (within a religious context) is that God has perfect foreknowledge (which nearly all Christians know to be true) and this does not negate our free will (which we also know to be true). You didn’t address this. All you did was form a selection of scenarios that negated one or the other of these two very simple propositions. Observe.

Scenario 1: Affirms Prop. A, assumes that foreknowledge implies a type of causation that automatically negates Prop. B.

Scenario 2: Denies Prop. A with an awkward description of Open Theism, affirms Prop. B.

Scenario 3: Denies Prop. A by reducing God’s foreknowledge to lucky chances, affirms Prop. B.

Now you’re saying two things that don’t reconcile to each other very well: You assert that there are no scenarios other than these (like, for example, affirming both Prop. A and Prop. B) and you’ve also said your thing was relevant for both the compatibilist and libertarian scenarios (see above). That’s a pretty neat trick when you can adequately address an issue without talking about it.

So how about it? God has perfect foreknowledge. And it does not destroy our free will. What’s the problem? And more importantly, what do you offer in its place?

Please do offer something in its place. What goes? God’s foreknowledge or our free will? Or do you have something more creative that sidesteps this and denies compatibilism?

Oh, wait a second. Is this one of those things where all you’re trying to do is prove that there is no satisfactory solution, and therefore…what? No, really, what? I don’t get it. What’s the point? QED, you’re right, there is no answer, good job? That’s it?

I see that you don’t have a religion tag. Are you an atheist? Is the whole point of this to say you’re much more comfortable believing there is no God because of this? I should probably remind you that at least half the compatibilist philosophers mentioned in the link I gave you are rather high-profile atheists or agnostics. The holy trinity of compatibilism, libertarianism, and determinism is not limited to religion. It’s a purely philosophical problem, as well.

A lot of atheists seem to think the problem is neatly and perfectly solved if you would only deny the existence of God, but that isn’t the case at all. Even in the absence of a belief in God, you still have to pick one of those broad groups of theories and defend one in particular. Atheism does not grant you exemption. Just look at B. F. Skinner- one of the most visible advocates of hard determinism ever, and he absolutely hated religion. Then look at Dan Dennett- noted atheist, secularlist, advocate of the Brights movement, and informally listed among the “Four Horsemen”- Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens are the other three. He created and now defends a specific type of compatibilism. Long story short, this is a problem that requires an answer from you just as much as it’s required of Christians.

I picked mine- in the general sense, anyway. I’m going with compatibilism. What’s yours?

You do have to pick one. Libertarian free will, hard determinism, or compatibilism. You can get more specific after you pick one of those. And you do have to pick one, so do it now please.

 

[Chiral]

In this case the concept of “knowledge” when it pertains to God is fundamentally different from “knowledge” when it pertains to humans (which is information). As such God’s “knowledge” is undefined, and I have absolutely no idea what are you talking about. And it would be fruitless to argue about an undefined category.

I know you are busy trying to deal with others arguing about theoretical vs actual existence, and whether time exists, but could you please explain this dodge?

We both agree that “knowledge” is merely information.
I pointed out that information is not an attribute or property, thus your argument lacks logical cohesion.
An actual property or attribute relating to knowledge would be “knowing”, just as that relating to existence would be “being”. There is nothing “undefined” presented. The concept does not differ between subjects. You are dodging the challenge.

Unless you can make a logical argument to negate the distinction between information and the capacity of a mind for acquiring it (so to speak), or unless you can demonstrate that “information” is a “property”, your “serious logical problem” falls flat, and the thread need extend no further along extraneous lines of argument.

(Sorry, I’m not trying to be selfish, I just think we share an understanding of logical terms, and this may be the most direct route to a solution)

 

[R_Daneel]

Right here you seem to say that knowledge of potential things IS legit knowledge, whereas previously you seemed to deny this.

I agree that knowledge of potential outcomes vs. knowledge of actual ones are different though.

A bit of a correction. I said that knowledge about (or “of”) the potential outcomes is legitimate knowledge. Yes, it is. Consider the die being cast. We examine the die, we see the six sides, we see the number of points on each side (all empirically obtained), and from this empirical knowledge we deduct that the result of a potential die-toss can be one of the set of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, none-of-the-above}. The last one is also possible if someone snatches the die in mid-air, or if the die lands in a gooey substance on its edge or corner. But this is all deducted from the empirically obtained knowledge of the physical die.

Okay, here we go. This is heart of the issue. Why does it matter? Why is it important for God to have knowledge of actual things rather than knowledge of potential things?

Because it is the full knowledge. It is the real knowledge. You would not call me “omniscient” if I claimed that I know (deduct) the set of possible outcomes of a die-toss, would you?

Depending on what you mean by “potential that can be realized” vs. “potential that cannot be realized” (I’m unclear what you mean by “realized” for that could mean a variety of things), I DO make the distinction (though I haven’t mentioned it on this thread). For example, here are some further distinctions made with regard to potency (I’m not quite sure which one addresses what you’re saying):

Intrinsic Possibility: the potential for something to exist with regard to the integrity of its nature (unicorns are intrinsically possible, but square circles are intrinsically impossible)
Extrinsic Possibility: the potential for something to exist based on the available means to bring it into existence (a space shuttle may have intrinsic possibility, but for most people, it is extrinsically impossible due to the availability of resources and tools required to bring it into existence)

Real Existence: which is subdivided into Actual and Potential existence
Ideal Existence: which is subdivided into Subjective existence (sense experience) and Objective existence (which is the realm of concepts)
Logical Existence: which is subdivided into many things (which I could mention), one of which is “purely logical existence” (which includes square circles and other intrinsically impossible beings)

Possibility can also be divided into:

Metaphysical OR Logical Possibility: the potential for something to exist with regard to the integrity of its nature (this is the same as intrinsic possibility)
Physical OR Natural Possibility: the potential for something to exist based on the laws of physics
Moral Possibility: the potential for something (an act) to be acceptable in ethics

I don’t know if somewhere in here your objection is answered.

This is all Aristotelian mumbo-jumbo. Yes, he was a great philosopher of his time, but this type of categorization is unnecessarily complicated and tells us nothing. (An analogy could be the categorization of humans based upon their skin-pigmentation. It is a possible categorization, it is even objective, and yet it is totally useless.) Here is the categorization I use:

1. Physical existence. (Composed of STEM).
2. Conceptual existence. (Ideas of all kinds).

Nothing more. As a courtesy to you, I allow for one more type of existence:

1. Supernatural existence. (Something that is not physical, but more than just conceptual. Something that is active, that can exert physical forces on the physical world.)

Now, how does one obtain information (knowledge) about the physical world? By empirical methods. No big deal there. The trouble comes when one starts to speak of the realm of concepts, because they can pertain to so many things. Concepts can refer to the physical world - this is what we call natural sciences. Concept can pertain to abstractions of the physical world (mathematics, the final abstraction). Concepts can pertain to fully imaginary “objects”, like an iron-nosed witch, or fairies, or unicorns, what have you. Concepts also pertain to entities which I consider fully imaginary, but you do not (gods, angels, demons, etc.)

How can one obtain information about the concepts pertaining to the physical world? How can one obtain information about the abstractions about the physical world (mathematics)? And how can one obtain information about the “iron-nosed witch”? We could talk about these at length, but I would prefer to do it in the existing thread of epistemology.

Escher seems to depict physically impossible worlds. That is, they contradict the laws of the physical universe, but they do not appear to achieve metaphysically impossibility (unless I can be shown wrong on this). I wouldn’t say they’re immoral, of course. Hence, it is possible for God to create such worlds, but it is impossible for us to create them.

Escher’s worlds are mathematically (geometrically) impossible, too. You cannot have three perpedicular columns which all touch each other’s ends.

 

[R_Daneel]

We both agree that “knowledge” is merely information.
I pointed out that information is not an attribute or property, thus your argument lacks logical cohesion.

Sorry, we have a misunderstanding, which is probably my fault for not being precise enough. When I was saying that knowledge is information, I meant that “knowledge is internalized information”, where the entity who “knows” something has a mental image about the entity at hand, and this mental image corresponds to the entity itself. (The truth is that I thought this is obvious. My fault.)

I also agree with you that objectively existing information (which makes knowledge possible) is not an attribute or property, but knowledge (intenalized information) definitely is. Therefore God’s knowledge is just as much of a property of God as it is for us. I am not interested in the possible difference between God’s method of obtaining the information, nor am I concerned about God’s possible way of “storing” the information. The method can be vastly different, but the concept is the same. God has a “mental” image and so do we. Do you agree with this?

 

[R_Daneel]

The bare-bones summary of the compatibilist scenario (within a religious context) is that God has perfect foreknowledge (which nearly all Christians know to be true) and this does not negate our free will (which we also know to be true). You didn’t address this. All you did was form a selection of scenarios that negated one or the other of these two very simple propositions. Observe.

Well, first a little correction. No one “knows” these. The word one sould use is “believes”. The point is that we have a 100% correlation between God’s omniscience (assumed) and our free decisions (also assumed). We know (really know) that correlation does not necessarily imply causation. Hence the different scenarios, which are mutually exclusive. One must be true, there is no other possibility.

Either the knowledge of God causes our actions, or our actions cause God’s knowledge, or some unknown factor causes both of them, or we have a coincidence. That is all. Whichever you pick, it will be at odds with the Catholic belief. Result: the Catholic belief is proven to be logically false. Which one do you want to discard, God’s omniscience or our free will? It’s up to you.

 

[Chiral]

…When I was saying that knowledge is information, I meant that “knowledge is internalized information”, where the entity who “knows” something has a mental image about the entity at hand, and this mental image corresponds to the entity itself. (The truth is that I thought this is obvious. My fault.)

I understood you, and I share the notion. Knowledge - information - factual data in a mind (to differentiate between information in a book or computer, etc.). I knew what you meant.

…objectively existing information… is not an attribute or property, but knowledge (intenalized information) definitely is. Therefore God’s knowledge is just as much of a property of God as it is for us… God has a “mental” image and so do we. Do you agree with this?

The part I underlined above is what I don’t see - How is a specific piece of internalized information any more a “property” than non-internalized information? I am still a “knowing” being even if I possess no knowledge beyond that of my own existence, and possibly even without that. It seems to me that “knowledge” is never a “property” - it is the faculty for acquiring/storing knowledge (i.e. the “mind”) that is. Can you explain, logically, why you think specific pieces of knowledge are themselves properties?

 

[R_Daneel]

I understood you, and I share the notion. Knowledge - information - factual data in a mind (to differentiate between information in a book or computer, etc.). I knew what you meant.

I am glad we are in synch.

The part I underlined above is what I don’t see - How is a specific piece of internalized information any more a “property” than non-internalized information? I am still a “knowing” being even if I possess no knowledge beyond that of my own existence, and possibly even without that. It seems to me that “knowledge” is never a “property” - it is the faculty for acquiring/storing knowledge (i.e. the “mind”) that is. Can you explain, logically, why you think specific pieces of knowledge are themselves properties?

Because the internalized information (knowledge) is part of the entity that possess it. When we talk about humans, we even know that the information obtained physically changes the structure of the brain, neurons will develop new connections. The physical change is not applicable God, of course. Whatever ways and means God uses to store the information, it is (or becomes) God’s part. That is why it is (or becomes) a property of God, just like our modified brain structure is a property of us.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Well, first a little correction. No one “knows” these. The word one sould use is “believes”.

actually we do “know”, not simply “believe”.

because we “know” G-d is the maximal state of being. what Aquinas call the being whose essence is existence.

we can show this most simply by following the chain of contingent beings. you come to
the only necessary being, which is pure existence itself. What we call G-d.

The point is that we have a 100% correlation between God’s omniscience (assumed) and our free decisions (also assumed). We know (really know) that correlation does not necessarily imply causation. Hence the different scenarios, which are mutually exclusive. One must be true, there is no other possibility.

except the one that you are not adressing, that is.

“there is no screen between our free will and Him that would necessitate His knowledge to be caused if there is no time. G-d is simple, we are not. if you ignore the idea of time and count the intervals of change out by a cause:effect, cause:effect, cause:effect, scheme. G-d as the Maximal State of Being, or as Aquinas might say the Being whose Essence is Existence, lies along every point in that schema. this doesnt mean that G-ds Essence, is the same as our essence, as you seem to imply.”

Either the knowledge of God causes our actions, or our actions cause God’s knowledge, or some unknown factor causes both of them, or we have a coincidence. That is all.

or its none of the above. they are completely concurrent, coexistent. different beings, same domain. as above.

Whichever you pick, it will be at odds with the Catholic belief. Result: the Catholic belief is proven to be logically false. Which one do you want to discard, God’s omniscience or our free will? It’s up to you.

none of this is at odds with Catholic belief. your premises are wrong. as i have demonstrated.

for those who are just hearing the claim that time doesnt exist. here is a physicist demonstrating the idea. they finally caught up with the metaphysics funny enough. it only took a few centuries.

youtube.com/watch_popup?v=WKsNraFxPwk#t=19

 

[Areopagite]

A bit of a correction. I said that knowledge about (or “of”) the potential outcomes is legitimate knowledge.

I’m glad you think so.

Because it is the full knowledge. It is the real knowledge. You would not call me “omniscient” if I claimed that I know (deduct) the set of possible outcomes of a die-toss, would you?

If you only knew the possible outcomes of a die-toss, then obviously it would be inappropriate to call you omniscient.

But you still haven’t answered my question. Why does it matter if God doesn’t know actual contingencies? You have merely said, rather ambiguously and unhelpfully, that He wouldn’t have “full knowledge.” Elaborate on what you mean by that in a way that shows that it has any importance at all.

This is all Aristotelian mumbo-jumbo.

Well, that’s a convenient way to dismiss it. Obviously, if you’re not going to go into specifics on why you think it’s mumbo-jumbo, then it doesn’t convince me that you really looked at it. Can you go into specifics and tell me where it makes a bad or “unnecessarily complicated” distinction?

(An analogy could be the categorization of humans based upon their skin-pigmentation. It is a possible categorization, it is even objective, and yet it is totally useless.)

What? How is that necessarily useless? I think people who work with cosmetics would find that very helpful (to match skin tones and whatnot). In fact they probably already have a system of categorization for that.

In any case, the categorization of being/existence I gave is probably the most fundamentally useful thing of all time. Answered a lot of questions I had been struggling with for a long time. Other people have said the same thing. If you’ve ever studied detailed formal logic, you see those same distinctions constantly coming up.

If you want a tidier presentation of the outline, here is one:
forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=6013684&postcount=38

Here is the categorization I use:

1. Physical existence. (Composed of STEM).
2. Conceptual existence. (Ideas of all kinds).

Nothing more. As a courtesy to you, I allow for one more type of existence:

1. Supernatural existence. (Something that is not physical, but more than just conceptual. Something that is active, that can exert physical forces on the physical world.)

Now if you thought Aristotle’s categorization of being was useless, I don’t see why yours wouldn’t be either.

In any case, your division of being has merit … and existence can, of course, be co-divided many different ways.

However, I’m curious about the following things (regarding your system):

• Where does “Nothing” fit in?
• Where does “Square Circle” fit in? (under Conceptual Existence? Because square circles cannot really be conceived of … you can’t have a concept of a “square circle”)
• Where does “physical possibility” fit in? (because isn’t what is physically possible rooted in physical existence and reality somehow? Not just conceptual?)
• What about imagination? (imagination pertains to mere mental imaging and not their meaning … that is, not their concepts, because that’s the intellect’s job … so imagination wouldn’t fall under conceptual existence)
• Does the “law of gravity” fall under the conceptual world too? (because our understanding of the gravity … as well as all things in science … are concepts)

Escher’s worlds are mathematically (geometrically) impossible, too. You cannot have three perpedicular columns which all touch each other’s ends.

I didn’t notice that one. Well if that’s the case, it would not only be physically impossible but metaphysically impossible as well (in Aristotle’s terminology).