A serious logical problem

[warpspeedpetey]

Good, focus on that. What is “accidental necessity”? What establishes it, and what relationship does it entail between a “knower”-subject and the objects corresponding to that subject’s knowledge?

im not arguing from accidental necessity, im pointing out tha it eventually winds up at my postion of atemporality

This pushes too far, you’ll lose R Daneel’s interest again.

why is that a problem? im intrerested in veritas, not popularity.

The “existent event” we want to focus on is an individual free choice made by an entity other than God. Naturally (according to Catholic teaching) all things & events, including free choices, emanate directly from the Creator and are logically contingent thereupon. But R Daneel is not there, so we must focus on a single immediate instance and the relationship between it and God’s knowledge of it. Get what I mean?

i understand your purpose, but you presuppose that minds can be changed by argumentation. R Daneel has many times said that he is not interested in the metaphysics and does not consider it a logical system.

so even were you to do all that it wouldnt matter. we are still trying to get him to admit to the logical contracdiction inherent in empiricism. thats the first step necessary before any non-empirical argumentation of evidence is going to matter.

:blush:What I am trying to do is “come to terms” with the OP and focus on specific points of argument, then discuss/flesh-out those points with the original poster and, preferably, your assistance.

i have different tact than you on the matter.

Your focus on time demonstrates a… confusion or disconnect in understanding between you and the poster. One must first “come to terms” in order to carry on a meaningful and potentially helpful discussion or debate. If you wish people to come to an appreciative understanding of your position, you must guide them there along lines of discussion that keep their interest, and don’t jump steps, take short-cuts, or run off on tangents which engender greater confusion.

i attacking it from the scientific angle which i can provide evicence for that the poster already accepts.

we should come to terms, but that doesnt have anything to do with your angle, we are not arguing as a team.

i was an atheist, and ive been doing this for a long time. i might have an insight or two on the topic.

So please, warpspeedpetey, tell Sulu to put the Enterprise under “impulse power” and work on helping the poster rather than driving him away. Get me?

No offense intended.

how is it possible not to take offense at that kind of statement?

that aside.

this isnt a team effort. you argue your angle and i will argue mine. the entire problem i have is that you seem to think that your goals are of greater value than mine, and that somehow that gives you the right to restrict conversation to what best serves your goals.

please respect my right to argue in any manner i wish. whether that attains to your goals or not.

 

[R_Daneel]

EXACTLY!!! In the OP, #1 dealt with free will but is clearly out. This is #2! Does a person’s action, namely choice, “cause” something in God which is identical to His essence and therefore “cause” God? If so, Catholic teaching implodes.

Sheesh. 'You realize it’s been 8 pages and you’re just hitting the question now? sigh Sorry, guys, I didn’t mean to derail a discussion of the illusory nature of time, but it didn’t seem to pertain to the OP.

Now, I’ll leave it to R Daneel to shut me down, taking liberties with claiming to know what *he *meant in the OP.

Why on Earth would I try to shut you down? You are the only one who understands my reasoning. Every piece of knowledge is “contingent”, inasmuch it is contingent upon the “object” to be known. I send you my /cheers

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Why on Earth would I try to shut you down? You are the only one who understands my reasoning. Every piece of knowledge is “contingent”, inasmuch it is contingent upon the “object” to be known. I send you my /cheers

we all understand youre reasoning, and we are all attacking it from different angles because we disagree with it.

 

[Syntax]

Stop putting words into my mouth, please. You are still incorrect on so many points.

Hmm, a distinction between “contingent” and “dependent”. I don’t know where you get this specificity with regard to terminology, but if that’s what you’ve been struggling over, I’m fine with it if the poster is. Needless to say, “could have been otherwise” gets away from the intended meaning.

You are wrong. This is common knowledge in all philosophy circles, Chiral. Google it anywhere. For instance, you can find it here,

“A necessary truth is one that could not have been otherwise. It would have been true under all circumstances. A contingent truth is one that is true, but could have been false. A necessary truth is one that must be true; a contingent truth is one that is true as it happens, or as things are, but that did not have to be true.”

answers.com/topic/necessary-contingent-truths

You seem to think of “contingency” only in temporal terms of “cause-effect”, which I think R Daneel made clear that was not what he meant.

No, I don’t think this. Contingency is strictly an logically modal notion about truth–it has nothing to do with time.

sigh What am I trying to do is get inside R Daneel’s head to see how he thinks and work from there… “Sloppy” would be missing the posters point entirely and running off on tangents more to your liking…

If you guys can’t get your terms straight, you will never resolve anything but continue to talk passed eachother.

Here we are! THIS is the focus - “causal sufficiency”, a “conditional relationship between events”.

That’s right, but the condtional relationship is a **causal **relationship not a **logical **relationship. We just use material-conditional statements “If A, then B” to express the notion of condtional dependency between two events. For instance, we don’t say “Bill’s driving his car too fast logically **entails **that he got in an accident.” This would be saying,

(1) Bill drove his car too fast
(2) Therefore, Bill got in an accident.

But this is logically invalid!!

Instead, we say “Bill’s driving his car to fast caused him to get into an accident.”

If A, then B. A, therefore B. A = a human free choice, B = God’s knowledge thereof. A and B can be switched in the premise, but the point of focus is A “causing” B, (but do not use “occur” for that implies time). And yes, “causal sufficiency” does include logical entailment. The difference is 1 step or 2…

No, causal sufficiency does not include logical entailment, because the argument comes out **invalid. ** I strongly suggest you read more on the differences here:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entailment

(B) John freely does X.
(C) Therefore, God knows that John does X.

This is invalid because (C) does not logically follow from (B). If causal sufficiency were a logical notion, then this inference would be valid. But it is not. Therefore, causal sufficiency is not a logical notion. The two come apart. In order to make the above inference valid, you need an additional premise that will warrant the inference. It will look like this:

(A) If John freely does X, then God knows that John does X.
(B) John freely does X.
(C) Therefore, God knows that John does X.

But (A) is merely a *tool *to express causal sufficiency, but the events designated by the antecedent and *consequent * stand only in causal relationships, not logical relationships. Conclusion (C) follow from (A) and (B) because (C) is a logical consequence of (A) and (B) as premises, not becuase (A) and (B) together cause (C). This is your big confusion, and you need to separate the differences.

The following are very different notions:

**A I= B ** --this means A **entails **B.
**A => B ** --this means A implies B.
**A → B ** --this means **If **A then B.
**A therefore B ** --this means B is a **logical consequence **of A
**A causes B ** --this means that, given A happens B will happen.

Sheesh. 'You realize it’s been 8 pages and you’re just hitting the question now? sigh Sorry, guys, I didn’t mean to derail a discussion of the illusory nature of time, but it didn’t seem to pertain to the OP.

It’s not my fault you guys messed up a long time ago at the beginning of this thread. I am simply now pointing out your mistakes.

 

[Syntax]

Why on Earth would I try to shut you down? You are the only one who understands my reasoning. Every piece of knowledge is “contingent”, inasmuch it is contingent upon the “object” to be known. I send you my /cheers

Sure, but how does this undermine free will? Because God’s knowledge “causes” John to do X? But this is plainly false because God’s knowledge (or any sort of knowledge for that matter) does not have causal powers at all simply because knowledge is completely **inert **just as desires are. Only actions have causal power. And actions come from decisions made by the will, not from knowledge. Knowledge can’t make decisions, only the person by his will can make decisions. So your claim that knowledge has causal power by itself is just an unfounded assumption for which you offer no explanation how this is even possible.

 

[R_Daneel]

(B) John freely does X.
(C) Therefore, God knows that John does X.

This is NOT what the Catholic/Chrsitian reasoning says, and therefore NOT what I was saying all along.The correct syllogism is:

(A) God is omniscient (knows everything).
(B) John (freely or not freely - it does not matter) does X.
(C) Therefore, God knows that John does X. (from A and B)

You said that God’s knowledge cannot be the causative factor, since knowledge is inert. I agree with you.

Then there are 3 other possibilities:

1. God knows what John does because John does it. (God’s knowledge is contingent upon John’s action)
2. Both God’s knowledge and John’s action are somehow caused by some factor.
3. God’s knowledge and John’s action are both uncaused, they just happen to coincide (a cosmic sized improbability).

Most Christians and Catholics would choose 1). They do not know or do not realize that this solution makes God’s knowledge contingent. Of course, as I said above, ALL knowledge is contingent, since it is dependent upon the object or event (neither of which is “necessary” - they all could have been otherwise). Therefore God’s knowledge is contingent. Since God’s knowledge is indistingushable from God’s essence (Catholic teaching) therefore God’s essence is contingent. What is your problem?

 

[R_Daneel]

Sure, but how does this undermine free will?

It does not.

Because God’s knowledge “causes” John to do X? But this is plainly false because God’s knowledge (or any sort of knowledge for that matter) does not have causal powers at all simply because knowledge is completely **inert **just as desires are.

Yes.

Only actions have causal power. And actions come from decisions made by the will, not from knowledge. Knowledge can’t make decisions, only the person by his will can make decisions. So your claim that knowledge has causal power by itself is just an unfounded assumption for which you offer no explanation how this is even possible.

Except I did not say that the OP’s 1) is the only solution. It was one of the 4 possible solutions. We are waaaaay past what you are arguing about.

 

[Syntax]

It does not.

Except I did not say that the OP’s 1) is the only solution.

“Solution” to what? What are you even arguing against? I have your quote right here saying that **God’s knowledge is incompatible with free will **and that they are logically inconsistent. You say,

Either the knowledge of God causes our actions, or our actions cause God’s knowledge, or some unknown factor causes both of them, or we have a coincidence. That is all. Whichever you pick, it will be at odds with the Catholic belief. Result: the Catholic belief is proven to be logically false. Which one do you want to discard, God’s omniscience or our free will? It’s up to you.

But why is Catholic doctrine “logically” false? Where’s the alleged logical inconsistency. “Logical Inconsistency” means there is a contradition. So where is the contradition? Can we get a logical demonstration please? **Your job **is to construct an argument with a set of premises and a conclusion that is a contradiction. The conclusion will have this form:

P and ~P

It was one of the 4 possible solutions. We are waaaaay past what you are arguing about.

“4 possible” solutions to what? And what are these 4 solutions? You’re not even defining the problem!

 

[Betterave]

You said that God’s knowledge cannot be the causative factor, since knowledge is inert. I agree with you.

Then there are 3 other possibilities:

1. God knows what John does because John does it. (God’s -]knowledge/-] knowing is necessary and part of what he knows -]is contingent upon/-] is John’s contingent action)
2. Both God’s knowledge and John’s action are somehow caused by some factor.
3. God’s knowledge and John’s action are both uncaused, they just happen to coincide (a cosmic sized improbability).

Most Christians and Catholics would choose 1). They do not know or do not realize that this solution makes God’s knowledge -]contingent/-] of contingent things necessary.

Cute argument! I even fixed it up for you. (You failed to note an ambiguity in the word ‘knowledge’ between ‘knowing’ and ‘thing known’.)

 

[Syntax]

Cute argument! I even fixed it up for you. (You failed to note an ambiguity in the word ‘knowledge’ between ‘knowing’ and ‘thing known’.)

It’s always an editing enterprise for us.:banghead: They can’t even get an argument off the ground to make it work…sheesh.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

This is NOT what the Catholic/Chrsitian reasoning says, and therefore NOT what I was saying all along.The correct syllogism is:

(A) God is omniscient (knows everything).
(B) John (freely or not freely - it does not matter) does X.
(C) Therefore, God knows that John does X. (from A and B)

where is this in “Catholic Reasoning”

You said that God’s knowledge cannot be the causative factor, since knowledge is inert. I agree with you.

Then there are 3 other possibilities:

1. God knows what John does because John does it. (God’s knowledge is contingent upon John’s action)
2. Both God’s knowledge and John’s action are somehow caused by some factor.
3. God’s knowledge and John’s action are both uncaused, they just happen to coincide (a cosmic sized improbability).

or…there is no causitive factor needed because when free will decisions are actualized they are part of G-d, not something separate. as i said before without time there is no barrier between G-d and our decisions that would necessitate a causal relationship. without the idea of time. there is no “time” at which they arent part of G-d.

Of course, as I said above, ALL knowledge is contingent, since it is dependent upon the object or event (neither of which is “necessary” - they all could have been otherwise).

thats not true, G-ds self knowledge is as necessary as He is.

Therefore God’s knowledge is contingent.

as your premise is demonstrably false, so is youre conclusion here.

Since God’s knowledge is indistingushable from God’s essence (Catholic teaching) therefore God’s essence is contingent. What is your problem?

this conclusion would also be false because of the false premise.

that said though, G-d by definition is the Necessary Being, we derive this from the universes contingency.

ergo, any being that is contingent, cannot be G-d.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Cute argument! I even fixed it up for you. (You failed to note an ambiguity in the word ‘knowledge’ between ‘knowing’ and ‘thing known’.)

 

[Syntax]

This is NOT what the Catholic/Chrsitian reasoning says, and therefore NOT what I was saying all along.The correct syllogism is:

(A) God is omniscient (knows everything).
(B) John (freely or not freely - it does not matter) does X.
(C) Therefore, God knows that John does X. (from A and B)

You said that God’s knowledge cannot be the causative factor, since knowledge is inert. I agree with you.

What is so wrong with (A), (B), and (C)? You are not even defining what the problem is! What are you even arguing against? I have your quote right here saying that **God’s knowledge is incompatible with free will **and that they are logically inconsistent. You say,

Either the knowledge of God causes our actions, or our actions cause God’s knowledge, or some unknown factor causes both of them, or we have a coincidence. That is all. Whichever you pick, it will be at odds with the Catholic belief. Result: the Catholic belief is proven to be logically false. Which one do you want to discard, God’s omniscience or our free will? It’s up to you.

But where’s the logical inconsistency that needs so desperately to be resolved? I don’t see it. “Logical Inconsistency” means there is a contradiction. So where is the contradiction? Can we get a logical demonstration please? Your job is to construct an argument with a set of premises and showing that the conclusion which follows is a contradiction. In case you haven’t noticed, logical inconsistencies have the following form:

P and ~P

Without showing us what the problem actually is, there’s no point in constructing solutions below (1, 2, 3) to a problem that doesn’t even exist in the first place.

Then there are 3 other possibilities:

1. God knows what John does because John does it. (God’s knowledge is -]contingent upon /-]John’s action)
2. Both God’s knowledge and John’s action are somehow caused by some factor.
3. God’s knowledge and John’s action are both uncaused, they just happen to coincide (a cosmic sized improbability).

Except I did not say that the OP’s 1) is the only solution

.

“Solution” to what? What’s the problem?

R Daneel;6334749:

Most Christians and Catholics would choose 1). They do not know or do not realize that this solution makes God’s knowledge contingent.

Cute argument! I even fixed it up for you. (You failed to note an ambiguity in the word ‘knowledge’ between ‘knowing’ and ‘thing known’.)

Betterave is right, your proposed solutions to what** I see **as an undefined problem, themselves fail to make distinctions between “knowledge,” “thing known,” and “knowing.”

 

[Chiral]

…You are wrong. This is common knowledge in all philosophy circles, Chiral…

Apparently we hang out in different “circles”

“A necessary truth is one that could not have been otherwise. It would have been true under all circumstances. A contingent truth is one that is true, but could have been false. A necessary truth is one that must be true; a contingent truth is one that is true as it happens, or as things are, but that did not have to be true.”

That is a really bad definition! A “necessary truth” must be true, either because it is “self-caused” (i.e. it’s “truth” is contingent upon only itself) or because the laws of logic demand it. “Could” or “could not have been otherwise” simply point to the logical “cause” of a “truth”, but do so in an implicitly temporal manner, as if there was a time before a “truth” was true, which is ridiculous. This is why it seems to me that you are thinking of “contingent” as temporal, which is not how it is meant in this discussion, that’s all.

If you guys can’t get your terms straight, you will never resolve anything but continue to talk passed eachother.

Actually, it’s you and petey we’re having trouble with…

…but the condtional relationship is a **causal **relationship not a **logical **relationship…

“Causal” relationships are a kind of logical relationship. Every “effect” has a logical “cause”, whether or not you’re steeped in time. But I’ll get to that in a second.

No, causal sufficiency does not include logical entailment, because the argument comes out invalid…

(B) John freely does X.
(C) Therefore, God knows that John does X.

This is invalid because (C) does not logically follow from (B)…
Oops. You missed a very important premise: “God” is “omniscient”. Is B knowable? Then C. Valid! But the key is, what “causes” God’s knowledge? Are we there yet?
Syntax;6334599:

…Conclusion (C) follow from (A) and (B) because (C) is a logical consequence

of (A) and (B) as premises, not because (A) and (B) together cause (C).
Good, good, you recognize logical consequence. Now, WHY is it a consequence? Upon what is God’s knowledge contingent?

The following are very different notions:
**A I= B **

–this means A **entails **B.
**A => B ** --this means A implies B.
**A → B ** --this means **If **A then B.
**A therefore B ** --this means B is a **logical consequence **of A
**A causes B ** --this means that, given A happens B will happen.
Good, you’ve taken a class in logic. Let me help:

**A I= B ** – A **entails **B. “If A, then B, where B is necessary for A. If not-B, then not-A.” Mutual contingency.
**A => B ** – A implies B. “If A, then B, though not necessarily.” A is not contingent upon B and may be its “cause”.
**A → B ** – **If **A then B. “If A, then B.” The logical relationship is obscure, and either of the above could be true.

Those are all premises. The next two are arguments based upon premises.

**A therefore B ** – B is a **logical consequence **of A, but it is not specified what type of logical relationship they share, so either of the first 2 premises may apply.

**A causes B ** –given A happens B MAY happen. This sentence-meaning uses “cause” in a purely temporal sense, which is restrictive. “A causes B” can also be used to mean “B is logically contingent upon A. A is not logically contingent upon B.”

Things are not always as clear cut as they may have tried to teach you in your class. To be so, one must be very specific. But there do exist equations that will help you specify.

 

[Chiral]

Cute argument! I even fixed it up for you. (You failed to note an ambiguity in the word ‘knowledge’ between ‘knowing’ and ‘thing known’.)

:whacky: LOL - Step back a few pages to where R Daneel and I were discussing this precise line of inquiry. I’ve repeated my last post on the subject twice now in reposts.
phew I am sooo thankful someone has finally caught on!

R Daneel, read that post of mine yet? You thoughts? Should i repost again?

 

[Syntax]

PART I

Apparently we hang out in different “circles”

That’s right. You’re still stuck in medieval circles that use an outdated terminology of old.

This is a really bad definition!

LOL! What universe are you from??

Check out:
plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/

Modal logicians use this definition as fundamental to all modal logic and possible worlds talk. Are you now deciding to go against the grain in the developments of modal logic?? Good luck.

A “necessary truth” must be true, either because it is “self-caused” (i.e. it’s “truth” is contingent upon only itself) or because the laws of logic demand it.

Defining “Necessary truth” in terms of being “self-caused,” is a backwards construal that comes from philosophers of old because it doesn’t make any sense. In fact, I would ask you to define “self-caused.” How would you do this? By saying that something necessarily exists? But that’s a circular definition. Modal Logic defines it thus:

A proposition P is necessarily true if and only if it is true in all possible worlds.

Notice the “only if.”

“Could” or “could not have been otherwise” simply point to the logical “cause” of a “truth”, but do so in an implicitly temporal manner, as if there was a time before a “truth” was true, which is ridiculous This is why it seems to me that you are thinking of “contingent” as temporal, which is not how it is meant in this discussion, that’s all.

“Could” does not “point to” “a cause of the truth.” The “ridiculous” consequences come from *your own *ridiculous defintion. So that’s your problem, not mine. I don’t even know what “could points to a cause” is supposed to mean. If the cause of an event occurs, then the effect necessarily follows. So the effect could not have occured otherwise given the cause. So it doesn’t even make any sense to say “could” points to “a cause” in the first place! It is a logical contradiction!

“Could be true” merely means “possibly true.” There are different kinds of possibility, such as logical, metaphysical, and physical possibilities. Possibility and necessity are interdefinable, with contingency expressing a third notion.

Necessarily true means not possibly false.
Possibly true means not necessarily false.
Contingently true means possibly true and not necessarily true.

I refer you to the metaphysics of causation here:
plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/

“Causal” relationships are a kind of logical relationship. Every “effect” has a logical “cause”, whether or not you’re steeped in time. But I’ll get to that in a second.

No! Events are not premises. And causal relations are *not *logical inferences. If you think otherwise, then I need proof for who the heck thinks this! I don’t even understand it. Again, you are confusing material implication “if, then” with causal power. No, material implication is merely a logical device for expressing causal power. The logical implication is not the causal power itself! Show me in the wealth of philosophical literature where someone else, other than you, says the following identity is true.

Material implication=causal power

Oops. You missed a very important premise: “God” is “omniscient”. Is B knowable? Then C. Valid! But the key is, what “causes” God’s knowledge? Are we there yet?.Good, good, you recognize logical consequence. Now, WHY is it a consequence? Upon what is God’s knowledge -]contingent/-]?

You fool. I wasn’t talking about the argument in this thread. I was showing the difference between logical consequence, material implication, and causal relations.

I correct this for you too. God’s knowledge is not “contingent.” You fail to make a distinction between “knowledge,” the “object of knowledge,” and “knowing.”

Good, you’ve taken a class in logic. Let me help:

I have taken three logic classes, including Symbolic Logic, Modal logic, with a background in the metaphysics of causation.

 

[Syntax]

PART II

**A I= B ** – A **entails **B. “If A, then B, where B is necessary for A. If not-B, then not-A.” -]Mutual contingency/-].

Wrong! “I=” does not express material implication (if, then or, “–>”). They are completely different logical relations. “I=” means “necessarily, if A then B,” so “I=” indicates strict entailment.

Further, show me ONE logic text book or quote ONE philosopher that says **Material Implication **and its Converse expresses contingency. You don’t even know what you’re talking about.

“If not-B, then not-A” is the merely the converse of “If A then B,” and they are logically equivalent, meaning, they have identical truth conditions.

**A => B ** – A implies B. “If A, then B, -]though not necessarily/-].” A is not -]contingent/-] upon B and may be its “cause”

Oh, so now you’re making “cause” up, eh? “A may be B’s ‘cause’”? lol…

You continue to perform categorical errors. Premises don’t “cause” other premises, premises *imply * the truths of other premises. Only events can cause other events.

**A → B ** – **If **A then B. “If A, then B.” -]The logical relationship is obscure/-], and either of the above could be true."Those are all premises.

That’s right. You are just spelling out the possible truth conditions of the truth-function “–>”. Didn’t you learn the semantics of truth-functions in Logic 101? But no, the logical relationship is* not *obscure. It is explicitly defined by the semantics of the truth-table that lists all the different possible truth-values of A and B. But certainly A or B could fail to hold. And if A holds, but B does not, then “A–>B” is false.

**A therefore B ** – B is a **logical consequence **of A, but it is -]not specified what type of logical relationship /-]they share, so either of the first 2 premises may apply.

No, this is false. The logical relation of “–>” is **clearly specified **by the truth-table that shows the different possible combinations of A and B’s truth values. So the truth-value of the entire conditional is **a function **of the truth-value of its parts, namely, A and B. You should have learned this in any introductory logical course.

A causes B ** –-]given** A happens B MAY happen./-] This sentence-meaning uses “cause” in a purely temporal sense, which is restrictive. “A causes B” can also be used to mean “B -]is logically contingent upon A/-]. A is not -]logically contingent /-]upon B.”.

All this is incorrect with respect to logical notation and meaning. But with respect to causation, there is one small caveat: Most philosophers no longer believe causation is a notion expressing *causal necessity *,such that given A, B must follow, but rather only probabilistic dependency such that, given A, B will follow with some high degree of probability. And I refer you to the following source:

plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/

Things are not always as clear cut as they may have tried to teach you in your class. To be so, one must be very specific. But there do exist equations that will help you specify.

Unfortunately, you don’t know you’re talking about at all. I recommend being VERY careful when using these logical notions. **Not once **in the three logic courses I had, Introductory Logic, Symbolic Logic, and Modal Logic did I ever encounter all the nonsense you just fed me. You need to apologize for your mistakes to other people who are reading this thread.

 

[surritter]

Yes, it is getting boring by now, but the problem of omniscience and free will needs to be addressed again. The basic problem is this:

Suppose that God knows all our future decisions, and yet we still have freedom to act on our own volition, that is: “we have free will”. This is what Catholics assert in a unanimous fashion. If this is the case, there are 3 different ways of addressing the interrelationship between these two entities.

1. God’s knowledge is the causative factor in determining our actions. In other words, we do whatever we do, because God knows what we shall do. Obviously this negates our freedom totally and completely. Catholics - naturally - deny this.
2. Our actions are the causative factors in determining God’s knowledge. In other words, God knows what we shall do, because we do those acts. The problem here is that God’s knowledge is logically contingent upon our actions. If we would act differently it would “retroactively” (retroactively is not meant in the temporal sense, rather in the causative one!) change God’s knowledge. However, it is an ironclad Catholic dogma (or doctrine) that God is “simple”, God has no “parts”, God is “indivisible”. God’s knowledge is an integral part of his essence. That being the case, God’s essence would be contingent upon our actions. Clearly, that would be contradictory to God’s essence - which is supposed to be uncaused. (It is true, that some Catholics advocate this solution. Of course they fail to think it over, and do not realize the ramification of their stance.)
3. There is a third possibility (for the sake of completeness), which is never discussed or even mentioned. This possibility is that God’s knowledge and our free actions are totally independent, there is no causative relationship either way. In other words, God’s knowledge just “happens” to coincide with our actions, it is mere chance that the two “happen” to be identical. No one advocates this solution. Natually so, since it reduces God’s knowledge (and therefore God’s essence) to something that depends on lucky chances.

Therefore, the conclusion is this:

1. God’s knowledge cannot cause our actions - because that would negate our free will.
2. Our actions cannot cause God’s knowledge - because that would negate God’s uncaused essence.
3. God’s knowledge cannot be based upon lucky chances - because that would render God’s essence to be the result of random chance.

There are no other solutions. Therefore, omniscience and free will cannot be reconciled. Q.E.D.

Forgive me for not having read each post. But to answer the OP (above) I think the flaw in logic is his conclusion #2:

“Our actions cannot cause God’s knowledge - because that would negate God’s uncaused essence.”

The problem is that you are using the word “cause” in two different senses. It’s true that God Himself has no cause. He is the uncreated being. Yet the first part of the statement is completely false – our free-willed actions do indeed “cause” something about God’s knowledge, since we choose it yet He knows it.

So it’s a false premise, and the remainder of the progression is now meaningless.

 

[Syntax]

Chiral,

Here’s a source from WIKI that will shoot down your silly claims that *causal relations *are logical conditionals: I highlighted all the bold-faced pieces you need to pay attention to:

Conditional statements are not statements of causality. An important distinction is that statements of causality require the antecedent to precede the consequent in time, whereas conditional statements do not require this temporal order. Confusion commonly arises since many different statements in English may be presented using “If …, then …” form (and, arguably, because this form is far more commonly used to make a statement of causality). The two types of statements are distinct, however**…

A full grasp of the concept of conditionals is important to understanding the literature on causality. **A **crucial stumbling block **is that conditionals in everyday English are usually loosely used to describe a general situation. For example, “If I drop my coffee, then my shoe gets wet” relates an infinite number of possible events. It is shorthand for “For any fact that would count as ‘dropping my coffee’, some fact that counts as ‘my shoe gets wet’ will be true”.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality

And…

For example, all of the following statements are true when interpreting “If …, then …” as the material conditional:

If George Bush is president of the United States in 2004, then Germany is in Europe.
If George Washington is president of the United States in 2004, then Germany is in Europe.
If George Washington is president of the United States in 2004, then Germany is not in Europe.

The first is true since both the antecedent and the consequent are true. The second is true because the antecedent is false and the consequent is true. The third is true because both the antecedent and the consequent are false. These statements are trivial examples. Of course, although **none of these statements expresses a causal connection **between the antecedent and consequent, they are nonetheless all true because no statement has the combination of a true antecedent and false consequent. Logic requires only that truth not be deceptive.

The ordinary** indicative conditional **has somewhat more structure than the material conditional. For instance, although the first is the closest, none of the preceding three statements seems true as an ordinary indicative reading. But the sentence

“If Shakespeare of Stratford-on-Avon did not write Macbeth, then someone else did”
.
intuitively seems to be true, even though there is **no straightforward causal relation **in this **hypothetical situation **between Shakespeare’s not writing Macbeth and someone else’s actually writing it.

Another sort of conditional, the counterfactual conditional, has a stronger connection with causality, yet even counterfactual statements are not all examples of causality. Consider the following two statements:

If A were a triangle, then A would have three sides.
If switch S were thrown, then bulb B would light.

In the first case, it would not be correct to say that A’s being a triangle caused it to have three sides, since the relationship between triangularity and three-sidedness is that of definition. The property of having three sides actually determines A’s state as a triangle. Nonetheless, even when interpreted counterfactually, the first statement is true.

And…

Necessary causes:

If x is a necessary cause of y, then the presence of y necessarily implies the presence of x. The presence of x, however, does not imply that y will occur.

Sufficient causes:

If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the presence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the presence of x.

How do you like them apples??

 

[warpspeedpetey]

How do you like them apples??

mmmmmmm…apples.