yochumjy:
The same thing applies here.
Shortened in order to save space
The basic feeling portion of the brain might be there before the 20th week, but it is not functioning at that time.
The issue of fetal pain was addressed by a working group appointed by the
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists in the United Kingdom. The panel consisted of experts in fetal development, law and bioethics. Dr. Anne McLaren headed the group.
The group determined that pain can only be felt by a fetus after nerve connections became established between two parts of its brain: the cortex and the thalamus. This happens about 26 weeks from conception. Professor Maria Fitzgerald of University College London, author of the working group’s report, says that “
little sensory (name removed by moderator)ut” reaches the brain of the developing fetus before 26 weeks. “
Therefore reactions to noxious stimuli cannot be interpreted as feeling or perceiving pain.”
How do you know that the conditions given by the others are sufficent to tell whether or not the fetus can feel pain?
The undisputed discovery that the neonate and fetus launch a hormonal and neural response to invasive practice cannot be considered proof there is an
experience of pain. An
experience implies sensations have been interpreted in a conscious manner. Even when combined with the observations of behavior and improved clinical outcome when using anesthetics, there is still no proof there is an
experience of pain. Although all of these phenomena are associated with the notion of “pain,” none of them adequately describe or explain the phenomenological experience of “pain.” These phenomena may exist independently of conscious experience. The relationship between the physiological responses of nociceptors, the hormonal and other responses of the CNS, and the behavioral outcome of these changes to the psychological response are yet to be determined (Wall & McMahon, 1986).
If a proper assessment of neonatal and fetal pain is to be undertaken, we should examine the structure of the psychological experience of “pain,” as the biological structures have been examined, and then work backwards to the fetus and neonate to decide whether it is likely or possible these psychological structures are in place (Derbyshire, 1999).
Pain experience is now widely seen as a consequence of an amalgam of cognition, sensation, and affective processes, commonly described under the rubric of the biopsychosocial model of pain. Pain is no longer regarded as merely a physical sensation of noxious stimulus and disease, but is seen as a conscious experience that may be modulated by mental, emotional, and sensory mechanisms with sensory and emotional components. The biopsychosocial concept emphasizes the multidimensional nature of illness, injury, and pain, rather than emphasizing pain as a purely physical fact of illness or injury. Pain has been described as a multidimensional phenomena for some time (Melzack & Casey, 1968), and this understanding is reflected in the current IASP definition of pain as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage” (Merskey, 1991).
(continued)
disregard that I think we are done with this.
