Against final causality

[Linux]

Can you tell me what is information in the brain if it is not electromagnetic wave and chemical state of neurons?

Tell me, what is the meaning of a word if not the ink its written with.

 

[DanAl]

Is what? Meaning of a “word” gets assigned in a communication channel, and it is mutually agreed upon between the sender and the receiver. The meaning is a connection between an arbitrary sequence of “letters” (or sounds) with a referent. The referent can be a physical object (table), an abstraction (number), or a fully imaginary “entity” (angels, demons, leprechauns).

so meaning is contingently attached to words, so far so good. How does that square with your previous statement that *meaning itself *changes?

And there is a very good reason for that - they are obsolete. There are hundreds of words which are meaningless today, since they refer to nonexistent “objects” or occupations.

Why do you equate existence with meaning and non-existence with lack of meaning? Fictional characters do not exist, space ether does not exist, are these concepts meaningless? I can make sense and follow a fictional tale, can’t you?

IOnly to some philosophers.

since you’re so adamant that there’s broad agreement as to what causality is, share the good news, what is causality? How does causality alone explain the order of the universe?

Oh, brother. What a logical error. “Telos” needs no “God”, only a mind. To try to smuggle in God (the alleged end point of the “teleological proof”) is called the fallacy of “question begging”.

I said God and I meant God since I believe he is the cause for the order of the universe. If you seriously the universe has a mind, argue for it.

I am willing to bet that you don’t believe the universe has a mind or a demiurge exists, you’re merely throwing that possibility to derail the conversation.

Nothing “mysterious” about it. The causes and their effects depend on the underlying physical reality, which is uniform. And the concept of “necessary” vs. “contingent” dichotomy is just as useless as many of the other medieval terms. There is no “entity” which would be present in all the “possible worlds” - therefore there is no “necessary” existence. In relative terms, these concepts are meaningful, of course. When a father-child relationship is contemplated, the existence of the father is logically necessary, while the existence of the child is contingent upon the father.

why is the universe uniform? a triangle has three sides, is that contingent? napoleon lost waterlooo, is that necessary?

(By the way, every time I see the term “efficient causation”, I need to grin. What about the opposite… the INefficient causation? Something that does not succeed as intended? One example would be “teleological argument” for God’s existence, along with all the other arguments.) You can read them here.

Just because God does not conform to your psychological projection as to how you would run things, it does not follow that God is obligated to, necessitated to or inclined to do things your way. to affirm the opposite without argument is anthropomorphism.

 

[1AugustSon7]

Then you can “ponder” about the “aim” of a natural phenomenon, for example an avalanche. It has no “telos” or aim. The final result is simply a new natural equilibrium of the snow. If it happens to destroy a village, it simply “happened”, but it was not the “aim”. One cannot rationally speak of a rock falling down (or an Earthquake) to “aim” itself toward some “potential”. The whole teleological argument is meaningless, it attempts to impose some anthropomorphic feature onto the unthinking reality.

Okay I agree that final causes have to do with a terminus; this was granted because without some terminus to an act nothing could ever change or happen: you could never finish building your house because the activity of building a house could never be completed or finished; and a child could never become a fully grown man, etc. - that is, at least, if I am understanding Saint Thomas correctly on this point. Edward Feser recently came out with an article on his blog about final causality and gave a convenient link to Saint Thomas Aquinas’ explanation and defense of final causality. I give what I suspect is the most relevant part of that defense here:

[4] Besides, if the actions of an agent are supposed to proceed to infinity, then there must be as a consequence to these actions either something that is produced, or nothing. Supposing that there is something that results, then the existence of this thing would come about after an infinite number of actions. But that which presupposes an infinite number of things cannot come into existence, since it is impossible to proceed to infinity. Now, that which is impossible in regard to being is impossible in regard to coming into being. And it is impossible to produce that which cannot come into being. Therefore, it is impossible for an agent to begin to produce something that presupposes an infinite number of actions.
In your example, I suppose we might say that the efficient cause or agent that was the moving force responsible for the avalanche was seeking and acting to restore that equilibrium you mentioned and, once this was accomplished, ceased acting. I suppose an Aristotelian natural philosopher might say something like it is in the nature of specifically the snow qua mass to be so moved or drawn by gravity- I’m not sure and I’m really not all that curious about how exactly avalanches are caused. Regardless, if I were, it would remain illuminating to try to apply the classical method of determining as precisely as possible all the causes of the phenomenon/effect of this avalanche or perhaps just avalanches more generally; and, at the very least, I can’t see why or how any harm could possibly come from doing so or what is illegitimate in applying the doctrine of the four causes to an effect or a phenomenon. Personally, I find applying the doctrine of the four causes really helps you to think about and focus on a phenomenon or effect and so helps you to grasp its nature and try to discover what exactly (or specifically) is going on and -as the Greek word for cause implies - what exaclty and precisely is “to blame” for the phenomenon.

I think it should be remembered that Aristotle saw nature’s activities as being akin to the patient who cures himself because he is also a physician (or the patient cures himself qua physician): nature is both the patient being operated on and the one operating. Hence it can be easy to confuse causes because frequently it is just nature producing more nature (I believe Aristotle’s example is “man begets man”) and, of course, always acting according to nature. Still, Aristotle taught that “Nature qua genesis proclaims Nature qua goal”: that generation presupposes some determinate end or goal to be reached.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

A basic philosophical position in the Aristetolian-Thomist tradition is the notion of immanent teleology. Things “aim to” or “point to” the fulfilling of their potentialities. It is not mere efficient or formal causes at work here; telos is something “in-built” in the nature of things. Of course, just because Aquinas, Aristotle or other important thinkers defended final causes does not necessarily mean they were correct. And in fact this notion has been challenged by people like Duns Scotus (who spoke of final causes as “a flight towards fantasy”), Cardinal Cajetan, Francisco Suarez and William of Ockham.

There are at least three reasons to doubt immanent telos:

1-Parsimony. Final causes do not add anything over and above what efficient causes can do. Efficient causes are enough to do the work of immanent telos. The latter is an extra assumption we can do without.

2-Only rational self-movers can have a purpose. What is necessary for rational beings to act for the sake of an end? Rationality, we can act for the sake of an end and order the means to achieve it. That we’re self-movers runs counter to another Thomist/Aristetolian belief, but I will not address this particular issue here. I’ll merely point out that nature lacks rationality and cannot will an end. Does lack of rationality disprove immanent teleology? Maybe not, but it suggests something else, namely, It suggests that assigning ends to non-rational nature is a category mistake: projecting our ability to conciously seeks some ends to non-concnious nature.

3- Sometimes it is said that final causes are needed explain the apparent purpossiveness of nature, but this is no true: God can will some ends and order the means to achieve it without need to appeal to immanent teleology.

Is teleology useless, then? No, teleological talk can be useful as explanations of how efficient causes operate, but not as an extra category that is intrinsic to nature.

Thoughts?

And here is one reason to believe in it. If you don’t know where you are going, you will never get there, you probably won’t even get started because all ends seem equal to you.
The same in nature. If there were no end for the activities of nature, how could the universe ever have gotten started. It is obvious the universe is moving to some end, therefore God must have programed the natures he created with his instructions. It is more obvious with humans.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Big misunderstanding. They don’t apply.

The laws of nature apply to the electro-chemical activity of the brain, but they have nothing to do with the information itself which is processed by the brain. The neurons transmit the information in the shape of electricity and the exchange of molecules. What we do with it, is not limited by the laws of nature. In our thoughts we can travel faster than light, we can perform incredible actions which are impossible in the physical reality. The laws of nature have nothing to do with the laws of information processing. And the “free will” is all about information and its processing.

Well put.

Linus2nd

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Linusthe2nd:

If there were no end for the activities of nature, how could the universe ever have gotten started.

If I roll ten dice, and I happen to get all sixes, there was no “end” or “purpose” to me getting all sixes, but somehow it still happened.

 

[Bahman]

Tell me, what is the meaning of a word if not the ink its written with.

What do exist in our brains is information (signal, etc which are dead) ready to be comprehended by self. The main question is how information which is dead could be translated to something meaningful, express some emotion, state of being etc.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Bahman:

What do exist in our brains is information (signal, etc which are dead) ready to be comprehended by self. The main question is how information which is dead could be translated to something meaningful, express some emotion, state of being etc.

You’re talking about the brain like it contains emotions. That’s not the case. But either way, this thread is about final causality, not philosophy of mind.

Bagheera:

And the “free will” is all about information and its processing.

Um, no, it’s not. Free will is a power that the (substantive) immaterial soul has over itself. It has nothing to do with information represented by signals in the brain.

 

[Bahman]

You’re talking about the brain like it contains emotions. That’s not the case. But either way, this thread is about final causality, not philosophy of mind.

They are related as the final causality is refutable if it cannot explain only one example, namely mind. I don’t believe that brain contains emotions.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Bahman:

They are related as the final causality is refutable if it cannot explain only one example, namely mind. I don’t believe that brain contains emotions.

You’re a dualist? In another thread I debated the existence of free will with you, and so I figured you would be a materialist.

 

[Bahman]

You’re a dualist? In another thread I debated the existence of free will with you, and so I figured you would be a materialist.

I believe on selves (us), Self (God) and substance (illusion). Self and selves experience each other through substance (example matter). I am not materialist.

 

[polytropos]

Sorry for the rather late response. Busy with classes.

My most abject apologies. Yes, I meant “material objects”, and it was my fault to create this confusion.

Don’t worry about it.

Where is the “intent” there? The DNA and its chemical actions/interactions perform the copy of information from the original to its “offspring”, but I cannot see any “intent” there. Could you amplify? I cannot see any “intent” without a conscious entity who “intends” it. The DNA simply does what it does, exactly as two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen combine into a water molecule (under the proper circumstances). I cannot understand the proposition that hydrogen and oxygen “intend” to form a water molecule.

I understand that you cannot see intent without consciousness, but that is not the definition of intent/directionality/final causality that I am committed to. Intentionality just refers to intrinsic directedness, not to what is consciously intended. You define it as conscious and rightly note that there is nothing conscious going on with a strand of DNA. But that is not what I’m arguing anyway.

What is important to my position is that DNA is still directed towards its ends. Saying that it “simply does what it does” does not refute this claim. The claim is not that DNA does something. It is that it does something which is intrinsic to its nature. What DNA is determines what it does, which is why it has final ends. It doesn’t have to be conscious, and its action does not need to be proximately encouraged by anything conscious.

We could maybe discuss what an “explanation” is. As far as I am concerned it means that we gain information about the “ways and means” how something happens. If you mean that it should “explain” why (#1) there is order, then all I can say that the particles and the interaction of particles are brute facts, which do not need “external” explanation.

This is exactly the point. Naturalistic explanations reduce only to brute facts, which they do not explain. You claim they do not need to be explained. But why? If the project of science were to stop at brute facts, then how could we determine where to stop, or what a brute fact is? Now, I would agree that in principle emprical physics cannot explain the brute facts; it does not follow that the brute facts and the phenomena they “govern” and “explain” have no further explanation.

I referred to this article:

philosophy.lander.edu/intro/aquinas.shtml

F.Part V. The Argument from Design. (Also named “The Teleological Argument”— The intricate design and order of existent things and natural processes imply that a Great Designer exists.)

I would not use this as a resource. Each article on Aquinas’s Five Ways begins by saying that, because the arguments are based on observations of the world, they are not claimed to follow with absolute certainty, which is I think roundly false when it comes to Aquinas’s thinking. Empiricists might maintain that no absolute certainty could come from an argument based on observations, but St. Thomas certainly did not hold that. He regarded final causality as a necessary property of the world, without which efficient causality could not make sense.

The argument makes reference to design and a Designer, but is not a “design argument” in the sense that, say, William Paley’s design argument is. The fact is that biological complexity is explained by evolution, but final causality (in simple, inorganic entities as well as life) is not reducible in principle.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

I understand that you cannot see intent without consciousness, but that is not the definition of intent/directionality/final causality that I am committed to. Intentionality just refers to intrinsic directedness, not to what is consciously intended. You define it as conscious and rightly note that there is nothing conscious going on with a strand of DNA. But that is not what I’m arguing anyway.
What is important to my position is that DNA is still directed towards its ends. Saying that it “simply does what it does” does not refute this claim.

If so then final causality is hardly “intrinsic” to the nature of physical reality, it’s just what nature happens to be doing right now, which isn’t necessary to explain why it is doing it.

polytropos:

What DNA is determines what it does,

Not necessarily. If DNA were to be used in different chemical context, it might do something entirely different. This leads us to an important point: the intentionality of physical things is never intrinsic. IMO this is related to that they don’t exist inherently, as shown in one of my earlier posts.

polytropos:

If the project of science were to stop at brute facts, then how could we determine where to stop, or what a brute fact is?

Science isn’t supposed to be teleological, it just tells us what happens and why. Philosophy tells us “where to stop”, or “what a brute fact is”.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Bahman:

I believe on selves (us), Self (God) and substance (illusion). Self and selves experience each other through substance (example matter). I am not materialist.

Wow. Not sure I’ve ever seen anyone agree with me on this.

 

[tonyrey]

Science isn’t supposed to be teleological, it just tells us what happens and why…

“why” refers to purpose! Science tells us “how”, i.e. physical causality.

 

[tonyrey]

I believe on selves (us), Self (God) and substance (illusion). Self and selves experience each other through substance (example matter). I am not materialist.

How can selves experience each other though illusion, i.e. imaginary things?

 

[tonyrey]

What do exist in our brains is information (signal, etc which are dead) ready to be comprehended by self. The main question is how information which is dead could be translated to something meaningful, express some emotion, state of being etc.

“inanimate” is more accurate than “dead”.

 

[polytropos]

If so then final causality is hardly “intrinsic” to the nature of physical reality, it’s just what nature happens to be doing right now, which isn’t necessary to explain why it is doing it.

This does not follow. I did not say that final causality is just what nature happens to be doing right now; it has to do with nature doing what its form determines it to do.

Not necessarily. If DNA were to be used in different chemical context, it might do something entirely different. This leads us to an important point: the intentionality of physical things is never intrinsic. IMO this is related to that they don’t exist inherently, as shown in one of my earlier posts.

We might consider the example of a retrovirus, which writes its RNA to a host cell. Viral RNA is sometimes redirected by organisms toward their own ends, since it provides the cell with other “material” to adapt. Certainly, the final cause of the retrovirus (to infect and use a host to reproduce) is not being fulfilled any longer, but the new DNA in the host may take on its own purpose, which it will be directed toward. That does not mean that neither the retrovirus nor the host cell’s DNA has intentionality. What is true is that each is directed toward something according to what it is.

Science isn’t supposed to be teleological, it just tells us what happens and why. Philosophy tells us “where to stop”, or “what a brute fact is”.

I did not say science is teleological. I am actually saying that science only gives us proximate explanations. The fact that science necessarily terminates in brute facts does not imply that the world is a brute fact or that we must regard it as a brute fact.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

Certainly, the final cause of the retrovirus (to infect and use a host to reproduce) is not being fulfilled any longer, but the new DNA in the host may take on its own purpose, which it will be directed toward.

But then the RNA has a new final cause, and yet its form is exactly the same. ???.

“why” refers to purpose! Science tells us “how”, i.e. physical causality.

“Why” does not necessarily refer to purpose. It can be used in a causal sense. If you insist on using the word “how” instead, you subtract nothing from the post you quoted.

tonrey:

How can selves experience each other though illusion, i.e. imaginary things?

The idea of the physical world is to allow for interaction between human souls. Just because the physical world doesn’t exist on its own doesn’t mean that everything our perception tells us is a lie.

tonrey:

“inanimate” is more accurate than “dead”.

Only because dead implies having once been alive.

In my first post I gave an argument for that the physical world only exists dependently, ie. not inherently. My point was that if physical things don’t even exist inherently, then how can anything about them be inherent. No one seems to have really answered me on that point.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Sorry for the rather late response. Busy with classes.

Don’t worry about it.

I understand that you cannot see intent without consciousness, but that is not the definition of intent/directionality/final causality that I am committed to. Intentionality just refers to intrinsic directedness, not to what is consciously intended. You define it as conscious and rightly note that there is nothing conscious going on with a strand of DNA. But that is not what I’m arguing anyway.

What is important to my position is that DNA is still directed towards its ends. Saying that it “simply does what it does” does not refute this claim. The claim is not that DNA does something. It is that it does something which is intrinsic to its nature. What DNA is determines what it does, which is why it has final ends. It doesn’t have to be conscious, and its action does not need to be proximately encouraged by anything conscious.

This is exactly the point. Naturalistic explanations reduce only to brute facts, which they do not explain. You claim they do not need to be explained. But why? If the project of science were to stop at brute facts, then how could we determine where to stop, or what a brute fact is? Now, I would agree that in principle emprical physics cannot explain the brute facts; it does not follow that the brute facts and the phenomena they “govern” and “explain” have no further explanation.

I would not use this as a resource. Each article on Aquinas’s Five Ways begins by saying that, because the arguments are based on observations of the world, they are not claimed to follow with absolute certainty, which is I think roundly false when it comes to Aquinas’s thinking. Empiricists might maintain that no absolute certainty could come from an argument based on observations, but St. Thomas certainly did not hold that. He regarded final causality as a necessary property of the world, without which efficient causality could not make sense.

You know, I didn’t see anything wrong with the article except with its use of " Designer " for " some one with intelligence. " Still, I think it is permissible.

Where are you getting this, " Each article on Aquinas’s Five Ways begins by saying that, because the arguments are based on observations of the world, they are not claimed to follow with absolute certainty… " ?

The argument makes reference to design and a Designer, but is not a “design argument” in the sense that, say, William Paley’s design argument is. The fact is that biological complexity is explained by evolution, but final causality (in simple, inorganic entities as well as life) is not reducible in principle.

I don’t see why it couldn’t be used as a " design " argument.

That " biological complexity is explained by evolution, " us an unproven assumption.
What do you mean by, " final causality (in simple, inorganic entities as well as life) is not reducible in principle. " ?

Linus2nd