Atheism, Burden of Proof, and Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument

[JDaniel]

An unsound argument contains a false or unproven premise. And this one begins with the logical possibility of maximal (infinite) greatness being instantiated in a possible world. In fact, such a thing is not possible, the argument is unsound.

While it may not be logically possible to instantiate infinite greatness on the purely material level, it is certainly possible to instantiate all of the attributes of infinite greatness on some other level, such as an immaterial level, or, a spiritual level. The material level has limitation(s) immaterial levels do not.

So only a certain finite amount of greatness will have been achieved.

(See above.)

I think we’re agreed maximal greatness must mean infinite greatness for the argument to make sense.

At least on some level above the material level.

These things might lead us to conceive of an infinitely great being. It doesn’t show that being is logically possible, however.

Again, I would refrain from limiting such a being to the mundane since we already know that matter is not actually infinite, but only, potentially infinite.

Not really. If P1 is that there is a logically possible world in which infinite greatness is instantiated, then, given the necessary argumentation to connect infinite greatness with necessary existence, that God (infinite greatness) exists follows from modal logic.

I agree.

If P1 states merely that there is an epistemically possible world (true for all we know) in which infinite greatness is instantiated the argument goes nowhere.

This seems contradictory. It a thing is “true for all we know” then it is possibly true. I should think that affirming that would carry the argument, not drop it.

jd

 

[gearhead]

While it may not be logically possible to instantiate infinite greatness on the purely material level, it is certainly possible to instantiate all of the attributes of infinite greatness on some other level, such as an immaterial level, or, a spiritual level. The material level has limitation(s) immaterial levels do not.

If the “infinite greatness” is not on the material level, then the argument does not demonstrate that the “maximally great” being materially exists.

 

[MindOverMatter]

Wait one minute. I think we have to define our terms here. How are we defining “maximal” for this argument? I see two possibilities:

• “maximal” just means “more than anything else”, not necessarily “as much as could possibly be”.

Well it should be obvious to you by now that this is not how your opponents have been using the term maximal. It is been expressed on more then one ocassion that a finite being cannot ever be by definition a maximal “being” since you can always think of a being that is greater; and thus you will never reach maximal greatness accept in a very subjective and relative sense. (Notice that we include the word being). A being that which nothing greater can be thought off cannot be added to or subtracted from, and thus cannot be a material entity; cannot have any limitations, cannot be added to or subtracted from. You can always add to an entity that is limited in its being, and thus it is always finite no matter what. A circle or a sphere can alway be bigger; but it could never be infinitely big for it would cease to be a circle in any meaningful sense of the term since it would lose its definitive dimensions to its infinite size. In fact when speaking of infinites, size or shape is meaningless. Any term such as “big” would become meaningless. Big and Small are relative terms and are only meaningful when used in the sense of finite comparisons. A thing cannot be infinitely small; for such a thing would be nothing at all. Its a meaningless concept in respect of the predicate and subject involved. Thus a maximal being, by definition, is completely immaterial; transcendent of space/time and all physics. A perfect being is also a necessary being, since there is no greater being, logically speaking, then a necessary being.

We might not be able to distinguish between them, but the two beings certainly could distinguish between themselves… after all, we’ve defined them as omniscient.

You fail to understand that a being that is infinite in every way cannot be compared or stand out side of another infinite entity. What you are saying is meaningless

And? You imply a numeration as well (or rather, the argument does): one.

Well, I don’t mean that God is one if it is to imply that Gods nature can be added to. I use the word one only in the sense that there is only one God. I use it in the sense of Gods divine nature, which, as i have explained, cannot be added to; nothing is greater then God. There is only one nature that is God. There is only one maximal being.

Not quite. There are different types of infinity. Look at it this way: imagine a graph with “greatness of a being” along the x-axis and “number of beings” along the y. The total greatness of the system would be the area of the graph.

For a single “maximally great” being, the area of the graph would be infinitely long, but only one unit high. For an infinite number of “maximally great” beings, the graph would be infinitely high as well as infinitely long.

What is an infinite number?

I’m not sure how your implication makes any sense, and I’m not sure why you think “infinite” means “infinite in every way”

Because there is nothing greater then a being that transcends all numbers in every way shape or form.

… especially since there’s been quite a bit of discussion about ways in which a “maximally excellent” being would not be infinite in every way, such as size, fluffiness and jolliness.

Again you are showing your lack of understanding. In any case even if you said that something was as happy as possibly can be, that doesn’t mean that it would exist as a result of being happy. Since happiness does not include the predicate of existence. But an infinitely necessary being does.

Also, just above you in your own post, you argued that such a being is not infinite in number.

Numbers imply limits, therefore no amount of numbers can embody maximal greatness. You can always add one more.

Only if you assume *a priori *that only a single god exists.

I don’t have to assume anything, i have shown you that a being, which is infinite in every way, is one being logically speaking, since you cannot transcend a real infinite.

 

[MindOverMatter]

If the “infinite greatness” is not on the material level, then the argument does not demonstrate that the “maximally great” being materially exists.

Your point being?

 

[gearhead]

Well it should be obvious to you by now that this is not how your opponents have been using the term maximal.

I realize that. However, I think that’s the definition we would have to use for your point to make sense.

It is been expressed on more then one ocassion that a finite being cannot ever be by definition a maximal “being” since you can always think of a being that is greater; and thus you will never reach maximal greatness accept in a very subjective and relative sense. (Notice that we include the word being).

A singular being is, in a sense, finite. Are you agreeing with me?

A being that which nothing greater can be thought off cannot be added to or subtracted from, and thus cannot be a material entity; cannot have any limitations, cannot be added to or subtracted from.

Sure it can. It works like this:

• imagine the greatest being you can possibly imagine.
• now imagine that there are two of them.

See how easy it is?

You can always add to an entity that is limited in its being, and thus it is always finite no matter what. A circle or a sphere can alway be bigger; but it could never be infinitely big for it would cease to be a circle in any meaningful sense of the term since it would lose its definitive dimensions to its infinite size. In fact when speaking of infinites, size or shape is meaningless. Any term such as “big” would become meaningless.

I disagree. You might want to have a look at this: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleph_number

There are different orders of “infinte” numbers. A one-dimensional infinite (e.g. a line that stretches forever in one direction) is of a lower order than a two-dimensional infinite (e.g. a surface that stretches forever in two orthogonal directions).

Big and Small are relative terms in the sense of finite comparison. Also, a thing cannot be infinitely small; for such a thing would be nothing at all. Its a meaningless concept in respect of the predicate and subject involved. Thus a maximal being, by definition, is completely immaterial; transcendent of space/time and all physics.

And therefore could not be omnipotent, since omnipotence refers to a material aspect of the being’s nature.

A perfect being is also a necessary being, since there is no greater being, logically speaking, then a necessary being.

Why? Why is it greater that a thing to exist necessarily than it is for a thing to exist conditionally? How does this fit into the definition of “greatness”?

You fail to understand that a being that is infinite in every way cannot be compared or stand out side of another infinite entity.

Why not?

If the logic of the modal ontological argument is right, if multiple “maximally great” beings are instantiated in just one possible world, then they’re instantiated in all worlds.

Well, I don’t mean that God is one if it is to imply that Gods nature can be added to. I use the word one in a sense that there is only one God. I use it in the sense of Gods nature. There is only one nature that is God. There is only one maximal being.

Why? If one God is great, then two Gods are greater. Where’s the problem?

What is an infinite number?

Maybe you can re-phrase - are you actually looking for me to explain the concept of infinity to you?

Because there is nothing greater then a being that transcends all numbers in every way shape or form.

You’re contradicting yourself. “A” being implies one being. If this being transcends all numbers, then we can no longer describe it as a singular being.

Again you are showing your lack of understanding. In any case even if you said that something was as happy as possibly can be, that doesn’t mean that it would exist as a result of being happy. Since happiness does not include the predicate of existence. But an infinitely necessary being does.

What attributes do you think include the predicate of existence? The argument specifically mentioned omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness. Do you think that these attributes necessarily imply existence?

Numbers imply limits, therefore no amount of numbers can embody maximal greatness. You can always add one more.

Indeed. Hence why a single being can not be “maximally great”, even if it has acheived perfection as a being.

I don’t have to assume anything, i have shown you that a being, which is infinite in every way, is one being logically speaking, since you cannot transcend a real infinite.

You’ve done no such thing. You haven’t demonstrated that the “maximally great” being of the argument is “infinite in every way”, and you haven’t demonstrated that a being that’s “infinite in every way” cannot be transcended.

I argue that infinites can be transcended: a first-order infinite is transcended by a second-order infinite. A second-order infinite is transcended by a third-ordered one and so on.

I get the impression that you think that simply labelling something as “infinite” implies that it’s an infinite-order infinite; but so far, you haven’t shown why this would be.

 

[Matthias123]

Omnipotence is defined in terms of interaction with the material; if a being can interact with the material, then in some sense, that being is material itself.

This is news to me, care to explain why?

What exactly do you think the answer “I don’t know” holds on faith.

I might be taking this in a different context.

Well, as we’ve established in this thread, the terms used in the first premise are defined later on in the argument, so I would think that anyone who accepts the first premise without reading the argument all the way through had already decided that God exists before reading it.

It is proposed that a being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and

I don’t understand your objection; he is just defining what a maximally excellent being would be. Accepting the premise would just be accepting a concept of God – this premise does not depend on God’ existence therefore is not begging the question.

And what exactly is wrong with disputing whether the existence of God is possible?

Nothing, that is the point of the argument. Plantinga is being clever and attempting to wedge you guys into a more radical position, or accept theism.

Are you sure? By the logic of the argument, if there’s a possibility that Santa Claus is “necessary”, then he exists.

…no, I believe it is imposible for Santa Clause to be necessary – I think this is fairly self-evident.

 

[gearhead]

This is news to me, care to explain why?

By defintion, IMO. If a thing has no material existence whatsoever, then in material terms, its existence would be indistinguishable from its non-existence. However, if a thing can interact with the material, then in a material sense, its existence can be established… implying that its existence has a material aspect.

I don’t understand your objection; he is just defining what a maximally excellent being would be. Accepting the premise would just be accepting a concept of God – this premise does not depend on God’ existence therefore is not begging the question.

I just thought it was strange that you would suggest that reading the argument all the way through before objecting would be a strike against the objection somehow.

Nothing, that is the point of the argument. Plantinga is being clever and attempting to wedge you guys into a more radical position, or accept theism.

And in that it fails, because the option is always open to accept neither position; the “I don’t know” option.

…no, I believe it is imposible for Santa Clause to be necessary – I think this is fairly self-evident.

Why? What about Santa Claus leads you to assume that he cannot exist in all possible worlds?

 

[MindOverMatter]

I realize that. However, I think that’s the definition we would have to use for your point to make sense.

I don’t know what definition you are talking about. I and many others have given the definition, you can either take that in to account or you can continue to ignore what other people are saying.

A singular being is, in a sense, finite. Are you agreeing with me?

Sure it can. It works like this:

• imagine the greatest being you can possibly imagine.
• now imagine that there are two of them.

See how easy it is?

Now apply logic to the same process, instead of just thinking it. You do know what logic is don’t you?

There are different orders of “infinte” numbers. A one-dimensional infinite (e.g. a line that stretches forever in one direction) is of a lower order than a two-dimensional infinite (e.g. a surface that stretches forever in two orthogonal directions).

That is not a real infinite. A real infinite cannot be added to. You cannot make an infinite out of adding one number after another, and therefore you cannot have an actual infinity of numbers. What you are talking about is conceptual infinities. But they cannot exist in the real world. A line can stretch on for ever and ever, but it will never reach an infinite; you can always add more length to the line, and thus it will always be finite.

And therefore could not be omnipotent, since omnipotence refers to a material aspect of the being’s nature.

What? Explain why you think this. Who has ever said that on this thread or in the history of the ontological arguement?

Why? Why is it greater that a thing to exist necessarily than it is for a thing to exist conditionally? How does this fit into the definition of “greatness”?

If you can’t figure that out for your self i can’t help you.

If the logic of the modal ontological argument is right, if multiple “maximally great” beings are instantiated in just one possible world, then they’re instantiated in all worlds.

Do you even know what that means?

Why? If one God is great, then two Gods are greater. Where’s the problem?

I have showed you what the problem is. The ontological arguement uses logic, not magic. You might be able to think about two gods in your mind, but its a logical contradiction in the real world. I am not going to explain it again. I wasted enough time already.

Maybe you can re-phrase - are you actually looking for me to explain the concept of infinity to you?

What is an infinite number?

You’re contradicting yourself. “A” being implies one being. If this being transcends all numbers, then we can no longer describe it as a singular being.

That depends on the context in which you are using the term “A”. I am not using the term in a singular context if what you mean is that God is a number that can be added to. If God transcends physical beings then he transcends all numbers as you have admitted. God is one nature/ not one number in the finite sense of the term. This has been explained to you.

What attributes do you think include the predicate of existence? The argument specifically mentioned omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness. Do you think that these attributes necessarily imply existence?

A being that which nothing greater can be conceived, implies all of the attributes commonly understood of God, since they all imply the “maximal.” You cannot think of anything greater then them.

Indeed. Hence why a single being can not be “maximally great”, even if it has acheived perfection as a being.

Explain why exactly?

You’ve done no such thing. You haven’t demonstrated that the “maximally great” being of the argument is “infinite in every way”, and you haven’t demonstrated that a being that’s “infinite in every way” cannot be transcended.

Yes i have. You simply refuse to see it, or cannot see it.

I argue that infinites can be transcended: a first-order infinite is transcended by a second-order infinite. A second-order infinite is transcended by a third-ordered one and so on.

They are not real infinites since they can be added to. A being then which nothing greater can be conceived cannot be added to.

I get the impression that you think that simply labelling something as “infinite” implies that it’s an infinite-order infinite; but so far, you haven’t shown why this would be.

You are the one that keeps defining self contradictory beings in to existence. You are either not reading my posts properly, or you don’t care to understand. Hopefully others will see that. But this is my last post to you.

 

[gearhead]

I don’t know what definition you are talking about. I and many others have given the definition, you can either take that in to account or you can continue to ignore what other people are saying.

Then your point just doesn’t work. If “maximally great” means just “great to the highest degree” or “perfect”, then there’s no reason to say that only one being can be “maximally great”.

That is not a real infinite. A real infinite cannot be added to. You cannot make an infinite out of adding one number after another, and therefore you cannot have an actual infinity of numbers. What you are talking about is conceptual infinities. But they cannot exist in the real world. A line can stretch on for ever and ever, but it will never reach an infinite; you can always add more length to the line, and thus it will always be finite.

It seems to me like you’re declaring premise (1) to be false. Is that your intent?

What? Explain why you think this. Who has ever said that on this thread or in the history of the ontological arguement?

As I just explained to Matthias123,

If a thing has no material existence whatsoever, then in material terms, its existence would be indistinguishable from its non-existence. However, if a thing can interact with the material, then in a material sense, its existence can be established… implying that its existence has a material aspect.

If you can’t figure that out for your self i can’t help you.

If you can’t demonstrate it, then the argument fails.

Do you even know what that means?

Yes, I do. It means that either the modal ontological argument is incorrect, or all the monotheists got it wrong.

I have showed you what the problem is. The ontological arguement uses logic, not magic. You might be able to think about two gods in your mind, but its a logical contradiction in the real world. I am not going to explain it again. I wasted enough time already.

That’s a shame, since I and I’m sure the many members of polytheistic religious would be interested to hear how you objectively disproved their faith.

What is an infinite number?

Okay… I’ll take that as a “no, I won’t re-phrase”.

That depends on the context in which you are using the term “A”. I am not using the term in a singular context if what you mean is that God is a number that can be added to.

The use of the term “a” implies a singular context.

If God transcends physical beings then he transcends all numbers as you have admitted. God is one nature/ not one number in the finite sense of the term.

So… we’re again at an idea that contradicts monotheism: if God “transcends numbers”, then monotheistic or Trinitarian ideas are incorrect, since they imply a specific number of beings. Are you arguing for some sort of pantheism or panentheism?

A being that which nothing greater can be conceived, implies all of the attributes commonly understood of God, since they all imply the “maximal.” You cannot think of anything greater then them.

Sure, you can. For example, omnipotence implies a need to affect things in the universe. It would conceivably be greater to not need to affect them at all. It’s like the difference between a highly-skilled watch-calibrator and an expert watchmaker. The expert watchmaker, if good enough, could make a watch that needs no calibration.

Explain why exactly?

Because a single being does not “transcend numbers”. You can still add one more.

They are not real infinites since they can be added to. A being then which nothing greater can be conceived cannot be added to.

No, they’re real infinites. They go on forever, therefore they’re infinite.

You are the one that keeps defining self contradictory beings in to existence. You are either not reading my posts properly, or you don’t care to understand. Hopefully others will see that. But this is my last post to you.

I’m not reading your posts in a way that lets me agree with you, but I put that on you, not me.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Could you dumb that down a bit?

What I’m saying is that, strictly speaking, we have no way of knowing that things could have played out differently than they have. Sure, we can speculate and say, “If factor X was changed then Z would have resulted instead of Y.” But we have no way of knowing if factor X could have been changed.

thats what the physicists say. though im an adherent of the deterministic universe, myself. that still doesnt make it necessary though, if thats what youre hoping. there is nothing saying that this particualr universe must be actualized.

Let me put it this way (forgive me if you’ve already answered this before): if we knew the location, energy, and all other significant factors of all the atoms in the universe, would we be able to predict the exact conditions of the universe 5 seconds from now?

assuming a closed system, yes. if you know the starting state perfectly, you can predict the state of a closed system at any point along its trajectory.

And before you say that free will throws a wrench in that possibility, consider: If we knew the cognitive, emotional, and intellectual tendencies of human minds, the genetics, etc., of all humans, could we predict the next actions of all humans? These are interesting to consider, and I wouldn’t be willing to toss determinism without reason.

i wouldnt say that free will throws a wrench in it. thats my “warpspeedpeteys’ proof”, considering a deterministic universe, if free will is an illusion, then the starting state of the system (the universe) would need to be such as to fake free will trillions of times per day, for the entire history of humanity. that would absolutely smack of design. after all what odds are there that every particle in the universe came into being in just the right way as to fake free will, quadrillions of times? on the other side of the coin, if the universe is deterministic and we really do have free will that is again evidence of G-d. so either way, free will is evidence towards the existence of G-d.

the only defense is that the universe is not deterministic. only that goes against what we know of the universe.

I’m not afraid of being wrong. I’m afraid of being right and being ignored.

what in the world would make you fear being right and being ignored?

Well, Aquinas’ first three ways are more or less identical, with slightly different wording (all of which mention or allude to possible worlds).

um…they are similar, but they dont allude to modal logic.

Arguments from design abuse subjective notions such as “order” and “beauty” (just ask an artist what counts as being orderly or beautiful!).

from my opinion they are variations on the ontological argument when they use such phraases, they generally mean some variety of “perfection” but the language gets in the way.

And “contingency” includes possible worlds in its very definition.

no it doesnt, you may be confusing plantingas modalized contingency argument, with other contingency arguments. most are not modal.

No, I haven’t seen a decent argument for God that doesn’t use “possible worlds.”

now youre moving the goal posts to what you consider decent. that aside. modal logic wasnt formalized until the early 20th century. a little late to ascribe all arguments for G-d to that position. yet, even were they, what would be the problem?

 

[punkforchrist]

BTW - I brought up a point earlier, but it kinda got lost in the discussion. Anyone want to deal with it now?

Multiple “maximally great” entities would together be greater than a single “maximally great” entity. Therefore, if all the premises of the argument hold true and “maximal greatness” is necessary in all possible worlds, then an infinite number of “maximally great” beings exist, since for any finite number of “maximally great” beings, a higher degree of “greatness” could be acheived with one more of these beings, which would imply that any finite number of “maximally great” beings is not itself “maximally great” in the sense that it’s less great than another conceivable possibility.

I’ve been away for awhile and haven’t had time to respond. Multiple maximally great beings would be identical in their essence. If one were distinct from the other, it would lack something the other has, in which case the former would not be maximally great, which is a contradiction.

 

[gearhead]

I’ve been away for awhile and haven’t had time to respond. Multiple maximally great beings would be identical in their essence. If one were distinct from the other, it would lack something the other has, in which case the former would not be maximally great, which is a contradiction.

I’m trying to follow your argument - are you saying that a “maximally great” being cannot have any attributes that do not contribute to its “maximal greatness”?

And in any case, I’m not sure why you say that distinction implies a lack of something. Two things can be identical, yet distinct from each other. However, you don’t have me convinced yet that two “maximally great” beings are necessarily identical.

 

[punkforchrist]

I’m trying to follow your argument - are you saying that a “maximally great” being cannot have any attributes that do not contribute to its “maximal greatness”?

Yes.

And in any case, I’m not sure why you say that distinction implies a lack of something. Two things can be identical, yet distinct from each other. However, you don’t have me convinced yet that two “maximally great” beings are necessarily identical.

I don’t know what you mean by what’s in bold. How can two things be identical, yet distinct?

 

[gearhead]

Yes.

Why?

And, as a bonus question, why is there necessarily only one standard for “maximal greatness”? Why would it not be possible for two things to both be “maximally great”, but in different ways?

I don’t know what you mean by what’s in bold. How can two things be identical, yet distinct?

Well, for example, take two countable objects, both the same in every way, yet when you count them, you see you have two.

I don’t see the difficulty you have with this. Maybe if you re-phrase, I’ll understand your objection better.

 

[punkforchrist]

Why?

For anyone who is following, I’ll rephrase the question in context: why can a maximally great being not possess attributes that contribute to its maximal greatness?

The reason for this is that any attribute that is not maximally excellent (and by extension, does not add to a thing’s maximal greatness) need not exist in every possible world. Given that a maximally great being must exist in every possible world, any attribute that is not maximally great would not be predicated of this being.

And, as a bonus question, why is there necessarily only one standard for “maximal greatness”? Why would it not be possible for two things to both be “maximally great”, but in different ways?

Well, if a being’s maximal greatness is subordinated to another’s standard, it wouldn’t actually be maximally great. I’m also inclined to think that a “different standard” would result in the kind of contradictions we explored earlier. A “maximally great island” is an incoherent concept, meaning its existence is impossible. Maybe you could give me an example of what you have in mind?

Well, for example, take two countable objects, both the same in every way, yet when you count them, you see you have two.

Let’s make this more concrete. If we have a set of apples and a set of oranges, we could count the members of each set. If both sets contain ten, then the number of apples and oranges is identical. However, that’s where the identity stops. Apples are distinct from oranges. The only instance in which they are identical is in their quantity.

I don’t see the difficulty you have with this. Maybe if you re-phrase, I’ll understand your objection better.

At this time I can’t think of another way to put it. That’s my own fault, though. As we continue, it may become more unambiguous.

 

[Matthias123]

By defintion, IMO. If a thing has no material existence whatsoever, then in material terms, its existence would be indistinguishable from its non-existence. However, if a thing can interact with the material, then in a material sense, its existence can be established… implying that its existence has a material aspect.

Thomas Aquanis:

It is impossible that matter should exist in God.

First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (I:2:3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.

Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best–viz. God–is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.

Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.

I just thought it was strange that you would suggest that reading the argument all the way through before objecting would be a strike against the objection somehow.

Plantinga:

“Once you see how the argument works, you may think that asserting or believing the premise is tantamount to asserting or believing the conclusion; the canny atheist will say that he does not believe it is possible that there be a maximally great being. But would not a similar criticism hold of any valid argument? Take any valid argument: once you see how it works, you may think that asserting or believing the premise is tantamount to asserting or believing the conclusion.”

And in that it fails, because the option is always open to accept neither position; the “I don’t know” option.

Fine, it either pushes the atheist into theism, a radical posistion, or a position of self-induced ignorance. Come on, how long is he going to say “I don’t know” for?

Why? What about Santa Claus leads you to assume that he cannot exist in all possible worlds?

He could exist in all possible woulds, but I do not beleive that it is possible for him to be nessecary in all possible worlds.

 

[Areopagite]

If the “Perfect Being” is not material, then the “Perfect Being” does not posess omnipotence. Omnipotence is defined in terms of interaction with the material; if a being can interact with the material, then in some sense, that being is material itself.

If a being can interact with material then it’s “in some sense” material itself? Where do you get this?

First of all, gravity is not material, yet it affects matter. If you say, “Well gravity is caused by a material thing, and thus no force is caused by an immaterial thing” (an inductive leap of logic indeed), then you have to prove that all forces are caused by material things. Good luck.

Also, “being composed of matter” is a perfection that implies an imperfection. God has all the positive being that matter has (e.g. being able to affect other matter), but not the negative being that matter necessarily has as well (e.g. being limited to specific points in space at a time, being destructible). Thus, God is not composed of matter.

Are you sure? By the logic of the argument, if there’s a possibility that Santa Claus is “necessary”, then he exists.

It is not possible that Santa Claus necessarily exists because the essence of Santa Claus does not include existence.

Multiple “maximally great” entities would together be greater than a single “maximally great” entity. Therefore, if all the premises of the argument hold true and “maximal greatness” is necessary in all possible worlds, then an infinite number of “maximally great” beings exist, since for any finite number of “maximally great” beings, a higher degree of “greatness” could be acheived with one more of these beings, which would imply that any finite number of “maximally great” beings is not itself “maximally great” in the sense that it’s less great than another conceivable possibility.

If there were two maximally great beings, that would imply that one has something the other doesn’t have. However, as previously defined, a maximally great being has all being and thus has … everything. Thus, two maximally great beings are impossible. Hence, there can only one maximally great being.

I’m not sure how your implication makes any sense, and I’m not sure why you think “infinite” means “infinite in every way”… especially since there’s been quite a bit of discussion about ways in which a “maximally excellent” being would not be infinite in every way, such as size, fluffiness and jolliness. Also, just above you in your own post, you argued that such a being is not infinite in number.

Once again, a maximally great being possesses all being (and as said before, all real being … and all real being is positive being). Thus, a being does not possess more being (and hence does not become greater) if another one like it comes into existence. And as shown before, only only maximally great being is possible.

• imagine the greatest being you can possibly imagine.
• now imagine that there are two of them.

See how easy it is?

I can also say:

Imagine 7 x 8 = 54

See how easy it is? (this is wrong by the way)

However, if I really understand the terms and what’s going on, it doesn’t make sense. Likewise, if you really understand what a maximally great being is (which has been defined several times throughout the thread), then saying that there could be two doesn’t make sense.

And therefore could not be omnipotent, since omnipotence refers to a material aspect of the being’s nature.

What? Where’d you dig this up?

Why? Why is it greater that a thing to exist necessarily than it is for a thing to exist conditionally? How does this fit into the definition of “greatness”?

Existence is a thing that a maximally great being possesses by nature (because it possesses everything). Thus, it necessarily exists.

By defintion, IMO. If a thing has no material existence whatsoever, then in material terms, its existence would be indistinguishable from its non-existence.

If a thing has no pink existence whatsoever, then in pink terms, its existence would be indistinguishable from its non-existence.

What I’m trying to say is … what exactly are you talking about?

However, if a thing can interact with the material, then in a material sense, its existence can be established… implying that its existence has a material aspect.

“Material aspect” is very vague indeed. If you mean “the power to affect matter” then yes I guess God would have a “material aspect.” If you mean “being composed of matter” then no God would not have a material aspect.

If you meant the former, then I suppose I would have a “rhinoceros aspect” if I affected a rhinoceros by poking it. No?

I’m trying to follow your argument - are you saying that a “maximally great” being cannot have any attributes that do not contribute to its “maximal greatness”?

All attributes that require a negation of some being are attributes that God does not have. However, all the positive being possessed by such attributes are possessed by God.

And, as a bonus question, why is there necessarily only one standard for “maximal greatness”? Why would it not be possible for two things to both be “maximally great”, but in different ways?

Because if they were different then SOMETHING would be possessed by one that the other didn’t have (and vice versa). However, if they had all being in them, then they would have everything, and not have something the other didn’t have … and thus they would be the same thing.

Well, for example, take two countable objects, both the same in every way, yet when you count them, you see you have two.

Wha? Could you give a concrete example of what you’re talking about?

I few things, Gearhead, which you have brought up have been addressed in my previous post:
forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5815729&postcount=66

…but perhaps it was not to your satisfaction. Hope this helps … in some way.

 

[Matthias123]

Here is the golden question gearhead, say there is an argument does prove the existence of God without a doubt, would you accept it, or would you dance around the premises? I am betting on the latter rather then the former.

Let’s see, we have already seen the “stick an obviously absurd object into the argument and attempt to show that it is ridiculous” tactic. We have seen the “dispute every single word in the argument” tactic. We have seen the “I am just going to claim ignorance and ignore the argument” tactic. Please do continue, I want to see what comes next!

I all honesty there is nothing wrong with the argument, there are just problems with the understanding of the atheists.

 

[Areopagite]

Here is the golden question gearhead, say there is an argument does prove the existence of God without a doubt, would you accept it, or would you dance around the premises? I am betting on the latter rather then the former.

You should not assume this. This is a judgment on Gearhead’s intention, which you cannot possibly know with certainty.

Personally, I had a friend who was an Anti-Theist, and one day my friends and I got into a discussion with him where he gave us all his objections against Christianity. We answered everyone to his satisfaction (which he admitted) and shortly after that he came back to the Church.

It is true that some people will rationalize the truth away when it is clear to them (in which case, they are guilty of sin), but oftentimes, a person could be impeded for honest intellectual reasons. It’s not for us to judge.

Let’s see, we have already seen the “stick an obviously absurd object into the argument and attempt to show that it is ridiculous” tactic. We have seen the “dispute every single word in the argument” tactic.

Sometimes it’s necessary to dispute every single word in an argument if you’re not sure what the words mean. I honestly used to be like this (and still am sometimes) because words are very ambiguously used nowadays in different ways. Besides, forcing us to re-analyze our terms will help us increase our own understanding with greater detail.

I all honesty there is nothing wrong with the argument, there are just problems with the understanding of the atheists.

Probably. So the solution is to correct their understanding … not to accuse them of being willfully obstinate (because I think many of them are being quite honest). Their questions aren’t that unreasonable. That’s my opinion anyway.

 

[Oreoracle]

I have often heard atheistic scientists talk about possible worlds. It’s not just “nonsense” unique to Christian philosophers.

I didn’t say it was unique to Christians. There’s certainly enough nonsense to go around.

Would I be correct then that if one were to believe in free will, that the question of “possible worlds” would be okay?

Define “free will.” If you mean “the ability to act based on one’s decisions or desires” then the question is still “Was it determined from the very beginning that we would act based on X decisions or Y desires?” I don’t dispute that we have willpower, I just dispute that it’s “free” in the sense of the word Christians seem to prefer.

It’s just a leap of very reasonable, intuitive faith that we accept the reliability of the mind, as it is in accepting the existence of free will. Those are my thoughts. I may be wrong.

Technically, this is all beside the point, because any “possible worlds” argument for God speaks of a time before free will could exist; that is, before any beings other than God existed.

I’ve thought about this and then wondered … what if someone was looking at the big super-computer that calculated the deterministic outcome of the universe in the next 5 seconds … but what if that person was intending to be a contrarian and plans to contradict the computer’s prediction? Hmm. Seems like there might be a huge cosmic contradiction on our hands … possibly leading to the universe’s annihilation.

I’m sure you just wanted to take a jab at Spock, but I’ll answer: the computer would have possessed data revealing your intention of being a contrarian and would have factored that into its calculation (remember that knowledge of the mental conditions of people was part of the hypothetical). This paradox Spock has had the misfortune of stumbling into lately is a non-issue for me because I don’t posit free will in the sense it is often used. I’m a fence-sitter on the issue.