Blachernae, Florence, Filioque, Causality

[mardukm]

Linus reminds me of something Thomas a Kempis says near the end of his Imitation of Christ, that it is foolish to try to dive too deeply into the mysteries of God. St. Francis of Assisi had similar disdain for a strong desire for book learning; likewise, St. Augustine regarding curiosity, that simplicity is good …

Not to undermine your efforts for unity, though: We must find a way to unite more fully the East and West, that we may be one as Jesus wishes in John 17.

We are only discussing what has already been discussed by the Fathers of the Church.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

Sorry I was not clear. I only meant that the late medieval Eastern Fathers interpret causality to refer to origination in the context of the filioque issue. I did not mean to imply anything else. As for proof, it is evident in the Tomos itself as well as Mark of Ephesus’ Letter against the Union. It is evident in the fact that the term “cause” is more often than not associated with the term “source” (i.e., “cause and source”) when criticism of the Latin filioque occurs; it is evident in the criticism of the idea that the Son is cause of “subsistence”; and it is most evident in the criticism that the Son contributes to the Father’s property as Source. The notion of causality in the context of the filioque debate from the Eastern perspective has always been about the Son being a separate Source in addition to the Father or about the Son as contributing or adding to the Father’s hypostatic property of being Source. Think about it - the basis of the whole Eastern criticism of filioque was the danger to the monarchy of the Father as sole Source. It wouldn’t make any sense for Easterns to be so concerned unless they perceived that the filioque somehow made the Son a Source equal to the Father.

That is not what I asked for. I asked for some scholarly sources to back up your interpretation. I find it curious that in the Vatican’s clarification on the filioque, this interpretation of the late Greek fathers is nowhere to be found. Likewise, I have never seen any Orthodox sources, even from ecumenism friendly bishops, advocating this idea. I want to see some scholarly resources (peer reviewed articles, theses, books, etc.) which support your idea.

Are you sure it is in ALL senses? I sense you are restricting “causality” to the issue of the Procession, but I seriously doubt that is what St. Gregory meant. I believe he rather intended “causality” to mean the causality of the Father within the Godhead, which is denoted by Him being “First Cause.” Besides, I rather think that Eastern apologists treat this phrase from St. Gregory out of context. Here is the entire context of the phrase:

It is inconsistent to assert that St. Gregory the Theologian was aware of the distinction between different kinds of causation, and then to make a special exception for this one phrase without justification. If he knew of this distinction when he wrote this phrase without qualification, then it is likely that he meant all causality.

“all that the Father has belongs likewise to the Son, except Causality; and all that is the Son’s belongs also to the Spirit, except His Sonship”

It’s obvious from the full context that “Causality” is a reference to the Father’s unique monarchy within the Trinity as Source, and nothing else (just as the Sonship is unique to the Son). Further, who here can deny, given the full context, that the Essence of the Spirit from the Father comes through the Son? Or do you suppose that by the term “all,” St. Gregory did not really mean “all?” Do you suppose that what St. Gregory really meant was “all except Essence?”

This is reading too much into the text. He simply says that what the Son has, the Spirit also has. He makes no comment on in virtue of what the Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son.

Actually, the anathematism is directed specifically at the analogy being made with Creation. The argument went (as explicitly stated in the anathematism): “As the Son is Creator just as much as the Father is Creator even though Creation is made ‘through the Son,’ then the Son must be Source just as much as the Father is Source even though the Procession is said to be ‘through the Son.’” So the anathematism is directed specifically at the confutation of “through” and “from” as being equivalent, thereby making the Son equal with the Father in the Procession as Source. Yes, it is plainly obvious that “through” does not equate to “from,” but Blachernae was anathemizing Beccus’ pretention that “through” is indeed equivalent to “from,” thereby making the Son not merely a Second Cause (as the Latins teach), but actually equal to the Father as Source.

No, the fourth anathematism is dedicated to refuting that from and through are equivalent. This anathematism is dedicated to saying exactly what it says: even if the Father is called initial cause, the Son cannot be accounted as cause because of His role in the Spirit’s manifestation.

Read the analogy again. What is criticized is the equivalence of causality in the Father and Son.

The analogy should make it clear that what is being condemned is that something being accomplished through something always means that the thing through which it is accomplished has agency. In the case of the Son creating the world, he can be called creator precisely because the creation of the world through him implies agency in the creation of the World. In theology (as opposed to economy), by contrast, this is not always true. In this case, because the Spirit neither receives existence from or through the Son (something which Gregory II distinguishes from existing through the Son), but only receives existence from the Father alone, the Son cannot properly be called cause of the Spirit in any sense.

 

[hazcompat]

Is the use of “it” in reference to the person of The Holy Spirit or the hypostasis?.

1. 3rd Proposition: To the same, who say that the Father is, through the Son, the cause of the Spirit, and who cannot conceive the Father as the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit — giving it existence and being — except through the Son

peace

 

[Cavaradossi]

I think you might misnderstand what an argument from silence is. An argument from silence is an attempt to draw a conclusion when there is absolutely no evidence available. But It is not an argument from silence when an alternative conclusion is positively present - to wit, the Fathers only use the language of Essence/Energy in relation to the Economy. They never use it to attempt to describe the internal reality of the Godhead as you do. So we should follow the Fathers in what they positively do. That’s not an argument from silence.

This is still an argument from silence. The Greek Fathers never made it clear that essence and energies were only able to be distinguished in economy. Similarly, they never make it clear that there are no distinctions in the Godhead except for the Trinitarian persons. It is not sound reasoning to read this rather uniquely Thomistic understanding of divine simplicity back onto the Greek Fathers.

Using language to express ideas is not a scholastic gloss. It is just human.

That is not what I wrote. I wrote that reading a distinction back on the Greek Fathers which is not made by them is a gloss.

I can see this rationale working only if one does not distinguish the Essence from the Energy within the Godhead, but only economically. If one distinguishes Essence and Energy within the Godhead, then “two sources” is the natural outcome of such a paradigm.

That is untrue, because the energies are actualized from the Father, through the Son, and in the Holy Spirit. The Father is still the source of the energies, but as a result of the unique Trinitarian taxis according to energy (to quote Gregory of Nyssa: “since there is no delay, existent or conceived, in the motion of the Divine will from the Father, through the Son, to the Spirit,” and, “but every operation which extends from God to the Creation… has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit”), the Spirit can be said both to be manifested from and through the Son, although one would admit that through is probably the more proper preposition.

Sorry, St. Cyril specifically wrote that it is the substance of the Spirit that progresses (proienia/procedit) through the Son. No amount of Eastern redefinition or doctrinal development is going to change the obvious meaning of what St. Cyril wrote.

I am sorry, but I do not recall St. Cyril ever writing that “the substance of the Spirit progresses through the Son.” I recall him saying on several occasions that The Holy Spirit “progresses essentially from the Son.” Is this the kind of quotation you are referencing?

Here’s where we disagree. Hypostasis is denoted by both hypostatic characteristics (otherwise called Energy from the economic perspective) and the Essence together, as you admit.

This is incorrect. Hypostatic characteristics are not energies. Energies are related to and proceed from essence, not hypostasis, as the fathers of the sixth ecumenical council rightly taught in asserting that since Christ is known in two natures, he is also known in two energies. And also St. John of Damascus who wrote in the second book of his Exposition on the Orthodox Faith: For energy is the natural force and activity of each essence: or again, natural energy is the activity innate in every essence: and so, clearly, things that have the same essence have also the same energy, and things that have different natures have also different energies. For no essence can be devoid of natural energy.

Yet this did not stop St. Palamas from distinguishing between an energetic procession from the Son and an essential procession in which the Son apparently does not participate.

Yes, that is because energy, hypostasis and essence are not the same, according to Gregory Palamas, who wrote: “Three realities pertain to God: essence, energy, and the triad of divine hypostaseis.”

So you have no problem distinguishing the Energy from the Hypostasis, yet distinguishing between the Essence and the Hypostasis is impossible? Please explain.

Essence and hypostasis are distinct but cannot be separated. There is no hypostasis without essence (as such an hypostasis would not be anything), and there is no essence without hypostasis (as such an essence would have no beings in which it could be considered, and as such, it would be an abstraction). On the other hand, the teachings of the fathers indicate manifestly that energies (in the sense of actuality) can belong to hypostaseis which are not of the essence from which those energies naturally proceed. Man is deified by God’s energies, which are enhypostatized in man, even though man is not of the divine nature. The teaching of the eternal manifestation relates to the Gregory of Nyssa quote above, that the natural activity of the divine nature (will, intellect, light, etc.) is actualized in the particular order of from the Father, through the Son, and in the Holy Spirit, so that the Son is in a medial position between the Spirit and the Father with respect to energy, but not with respect to the Spirit having existence, which involves

Of course, there is also the fact that many Fathers both East and West taught that the essence is from the Father to the Spirit through the Son.

Which Eastern Fathers? St. Maximus the Confessor? St. Cyril? The most common prooftexts only work because they are bad translations from the Greek. When they are rendered properly with the difference between certain verbs like proceed, progress, and pour out, as well as with the adverbs rendered correctly, they are not as easy to interpret in support of this idea.

 

[Cavaradossi]

Is the use of “it” in reference to the person of The Holy Spirit or the hypostasis?.

1. 3rd Proposition: To the same, who say that the Father is, through the Son, the cause of the Spirit, and who cannot conceive the Father as the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit — giving it existence and being — except through the Son

peace

Hypostasis is the Greek term which normally is translated as person (and sometimes subsistence). The Trinity in Greek is said to be one ousia (essence) and three hypostases (persons). So in a sense, the answer is that ‘it’ refers to both.

 

[mardukm]

That is not what I asked for.

I think I’ve mentioned to you before that I normally don’t read theological works, but only source documents. I don’t know what good these sources would be since you are addressing my rhetoric.

Let me repeat the Seventh proposition which should settle the matter:
According to the distinction and strength of these prepositions, they introduce a distinction in the Spirit’s cause, with the result that sometimes they believe and say that the Father is cause, and sometimes the Son.
As you can see, the Tomos does not make or recognize any distinction between the Father as cause and the Son as cause.

In any case, please address what I stated about the Eastern concern for the monarchy of the Father. A second cause does not threaten the Monarchia. The only reason the Eastern Fathers would even feel that the Father’s Monarchia is threatened is if they perceived the Latin teaching to be encroaching on the Father’s sole prerogative or property as First Cause/Source.

It is inconsistent to assert that St. Gregory the Theologian was aware of the distinction between different kinds of causation, and then to make a special exception for this one phrase without justification. If he knew of this distinction when he wrote this phrase without qualification, then it is likely that he meant all causality.

But he did not write the phrase without qualification (perhaps EO are so used to seeing the phrase out of its proper context that they/you forget this); there is a definite context (which I provided) denoting that the “causality” spoken of was a reference to the Father as Source of the Trinity. St. Gregory’s statement is perfectly equivalent to the teaching of other Fathers, normally in the form “the Son has all that the Father has, except to be the Father; the Spirit has all that the Son has, except to be the Son.” Clearly, St. Gregory is not speaking of the whole genus of “causality,” but specifically that causality that is unique to the Father as Source of the Trinity.

This is reading too much into the text. He simply says that what the Son has, the Spirit also has. He makes no comment on in virtue of what the Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son.

So you seriously believe that the statement excludes the Essence? Please answer that. There is an alternative phrasing from other Fathers of the same teaching - namely, “The Son receives of the Father and the Spirit receives of the Son.” The Spirit has all that the Son has because he receives it from the Son, just as the Son has all that the Father has because he receives it from the Father. This includes the Essence.

Here’s another issue, but one we need not discuss: We know that the Father actively gives the Essence, but whether the Son is also active as a giver in his relationship to the Spirit as receiver from the Son, or is simply a passive intermediary of the Father’s action of giving the Essence, the CC does not say, but rightly leaves that a Mystery (which is why we don’t need to discuss it). All I will propose is that I assume that the Son as a passive intermediary would be more acceptable to Easterns. I would also agree with that interpretation.

No, the fourth anathematism is dedicated to refuting that from and through are equivalent. This anathematism is dedicated to saying exactly what it says: even if the Father is called initial cause, the Son cannot be accounted as cause because of His role in the Spirit’s manifestation.

Don’t you mean the fifth? In any case, both anathematisms are condemning the same ultimate idea. The difference between the two anathematisms are the distinctive premises (one, the equivalence of “through” and “from”; the other, the analogy with Creation) that lead to the same ultimate idea - namely, that the Son contributes in some way to the hypostatic property of the Father as Source, thus making them equivalent in the causation of the Spirit. Again this goes back to the underlying concern of the Eastern Fathers -that filioque somehow challenges or encroaches upon the Monarchia of the Father.

The analogy should make it clear that what is being condemned is that something being accomplished through something always means that the thing through which it is accomplished has agency. In the case of the Son creating the world, he can be called creator precisely because the creation of the world through him implies agency in the creation of the World. In theology (as opposed to economy), by contrast, this is not always true. In this case, because the Spirit neither receives existence from or through the Son (something which Gregory II distinguishes from existing through the Son), but only receives existence from the Father alone, the Son cannot properly be called cause of the Spirit in any sense.

That doesn’t make sense. The notion of “agency” does not challenge or weaken in any way the ontological reality of “source.” The only possible reason that the Eastern Fathers would have a problem with “agency” is if they thought the “agency” actually encroached upon that ontological reality, and the only way an agency can encroach on the unique identity of the “source” is if it some way accomodates to itself the role of “source.” This is what Beccus did. He made the Source dependent on the Agency in order for the Source to retain its property as Source - hence, his confession that the Father and Son together make up one “cause and source.” But this is not what the CC has ever taught or teaches today.

Blessings

 

[mardukm]

This is still an argument from silence. The Greek Fathers never made it clear that essence and energies were only able to be distinguished in economy.

Show me a discussion of Essence/Energy from the early medieval Fathers that is not in the context of the Economy.

Similarly, they never make it clear that there are no distinctions in the Godhead except for the Trinitarian persons.

All the Fathers say that the Essence is simple. All the Fathers say that the Energy is simple. St. Basil immediately comes to mind. He stated that there is not multiplicity or compoundness in God, which is why we say “God is Good” or “God is Holy.” We do not say that God is composed of goodness and holiness, and other attributes. We do not refer to the Energies of God, but rather the Energy of God. The Energy appears as a multiplicity only from our limited human perspective, but within God Himself, there is no such distinction in attirbutes. Further, there is no distinction within the Godhead of Essence and Energy, which is why in one place, St. Basil taught “goodness is essence in the Holy Spirit.” “Essence” and “Energy” are merely names we give as creatures with a limited understanding of God - we give the name of “Essence” to that of the Godhead which we cannot experience, and we give the name of “Energy” to that of the Godhead which we can experience, and from our limited human perspective this Energy appears to us as a multiplicity. But these names do not have the power to make distinctions within the Godhead itself. To claim that these mere names that we use to accomodate our frail understanding of God are real distinctions within God himself is surely beyond the patristic evidence. Despite this simplicity, nevertheless, the Fathers all say that in the Godhead, there is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. There is no other distinction within the Godhead except that of the Persons. I think that is rather clear. Btw, the reason that the Names of the Persons can indicate distinction, while the names of all other things we use to refer to the Godhead cannot, is because the latter refers to impersonal objects, while the former refers to personal beings with will.

That is not what I wrote. I wrote that reading a distinction back on the Greek Fathers which is not made by them is a gloss.

The Fathers make a distinction between the Father, Son and HS. Surely you are not saying that the early Fathers failed to make this distinction? What is your point? If you are saying the early Fathers were scholastic, that is perfectly fine. The Oriental Tradition has never had an aversion to scholasticism in the same way that is evident in certain prominent quarters of EO’xy today.

That is untrue, because the energies are actualized from the Father, through the Son, and in the Holy Spirit. The Father is still the source of the energies,

The rationale you use here for Energy is the exact same rationale the CC uses with respect to Essence. So the issue here is your justification for splitting the Energy from the Essence within the Godhead. You have not given any patristic justification for that. In fact, I think this is the real root of the problem. You obviously are able to make a distinction between souce and agency, without the agency encroaching on the source’s prerogative or quality as source. So the real issue here is:
If there is no distinction between Essence and Energy within the Godhead, then the Catholic position is justified.
If a distinction can be made between Essence and Energy within the Godhead, then the Eastern Orthodox position is justified.

Perhaps we should limit our discussion to that particular issue, which I feel would settle it once and for all. I have a theory forming in my mind that could possibly bring an accord, but I’ll wait to see if you can agree that this is in fact the underlying matter in the debate.

but as a result of the unique Trinitarian taxis according to energy (to quote Gregory of Nyssa: “since there is no delay, existent or conceived, in the motion of the Divine will from the Father, through the Son, to the Spirit,” and, “but every operation which extends from God to the Creation… has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit”), the Spirit can be said both to be manifested from and through the Son, although one would admit that through is probably the more proper preposition.

You can’t use St. Gregory of Nyssa to support your idea that this procession only refers to Energy, because he did not recognize that distinction within the Godhead: “For if (according to the idea of those who have been led astray) the nature of the Holy Trinity were diverse, the number would by consequence be extended to a plurality of Gods, being divided according to the diversity of essence in the subjects. But since the Divine, single, and unchanging nature, that it may be one, rejects all diversity in essence, it does not admit in its own case the signification of multitude; but as it is called one nature, so it is called in the singular by all its other names, God, Good, Holy, Saviour, Just, Judge, and every other Divine name conceivable: whether one says that the names refer to nature or to operation, we shall not dispute the point.”
This is the identical to St. Basil’s position, btw, who wrote that “goodness is essence in the Holy Spirit.”

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

Further, he expresses the Catholic teaching quite succinctly: “while we confess the invariable character of the nature, we do not deny the difference in respect of cause, and that which is caused, by which alone we apprehend that one Person is distinguished from another—by our belief, that is, that one is the Cause, and another is of the Cause; and again in that which is of the Cause we recognize another distinction. For one is directly from the first Cause, and another by that which is directly from the first Cause; so that the attribute of being Only-begotten abides without doubt in the Son, and the interposition of the Son, while it guards His attribute of being Only-begotten, does not shut out the Spirit from His relation by way of nature to the Father.”

I am sorry, but I do not recall St. Cyril ever writing that “the substance of the Spirit progresses through the Son.” I recall him saying on several occasions that The Holy Spirit “progresses essentially from the Son.” Is this the kind of quotation you are referencing?

I had that in mind (“the Spirit is from God the Father and, for that matter, from the Son, being poured forth essentially from both, that is to say, from the Father through the Son”), but I was simultaneously thinking of a larger context. E.g., in his Commentary on Joel: “For, in that the Son is God, and from God according to essence (for He has had His birth from God the Father), the Spirit is both proper to Him and in Him and from Him, just as, to be sure, the same thing is understood to hold true in the case of God the Father Himself.”

And in his Thesaurus: “Thus, Paul knows no difference of essence between the Son and the Holy Spirit, but because the Spirit exists from Him and in Him by essence, He calls Him by the name of Lordship.”

Of course, that Pope St. Cyril uses "from " in terms of subsistence should not be taken to mean that the Son is Source of the Holy Spirit, but merely as intermediary, with the Father being the sole Source (a concept you acknoweldge), as the Council of Florence exhorted.

Btw, how is saying “the essence of the Spirit progresses from the Son” different in intent from saying “the Spirit essentially progresses from the Son?” especially given the context of everything else St. Cyril taught as stated above.

This is incorrect.

I actually realized that a few minutes after I posted it, but I figured I’d just let you make the explanation since I was too tired at the time.

Yes, that is because energy, hypostasis and essence are not the same, according to Gregory Palamas, who wrote: “Three realities pertain to God: essence, energy, and the triad of divine hypostaseis.”

This is at first glance altogether strange to me as an Oriental. It is obviously a development of doctrine within the Eastern Tradition. I do not understand it nor accept it. But, as a Catholic and Oriental, I adhere to the paradigm that as long as these distinctions between Traditions do not become “rigid” (i.e., “dogmatic”), then peace and unity will ensue.

But for the sake of discussion, I am wondering if St. Palamas is here distinguishing the three realities in the same way that the three Persons are able to be distinguished. It doesn’t seem that way since he includes the reality of the Trinity as a distinct “reality.” Though I do not know what the difference is, that apparent difference is the only thing that prevents me from accusing St. Palamas of heresy for proposing five Gods within the Godhead (which is the perception some Orientals have of the Eastern theology).

Essence and hypostasis are distinct but cannot be separated. There is no hypostasis without essence (as such an hypostasis would not be anything), and there is no essence without hypostasis (as such an essence would have no beings in which it could be considered, and as such, it would be an abstraction). On the other hand, the teachings of the fathers indicate manifestly that energies (in the sense of actuality) can belong to hypostaseis which are not of the essence from which those energies naturally proceed.

The underlined portion is confusing. Are you saying the energy is not of the essence, yet naturally proceeds from the essence?

It seems you are saying “Energy flows from the Hypostasis which has Essence.” My position is “Energy flows from the Essence which has Hypostasis.” From my pov, my position explains why the Energy of each hypostasis is one - because of the one Essence. The unity of their Energy is a natural result of their oneness of Essence. But your position, ISTM, makes the unity of Energy of the Hypostases unnatural, but rather the result of separated, individual wills.

Which Eastern Fathers? St. Maximus the Confessor? St. Cyril? The most common prooftexts only work because they are bad translations from the Greek. When they are rendered properly with the difference between certain verbs like proceed, progress, and pour out, as well as with the adverbs rendered correctly, they are not as easy to interpret in support of this idea.

What I’ve read from EO apologetics indicates it is not just in the translation, but something is added to the texts to support the EO position - namely, the distinction of Essence from Energy within the Godhead. This distinction displays itself in the rhetoric “that refers to the energetic manifestation only.” Anywhere the Fathers refer to the progression or even procession of essence from the Father through the Son to the HS, EO have to make this “clarification.” But why? To me the “clarification” is given only because the natural and most obvious meaning of these statements taken on their own without benefit of “clarification” tends to support the Catholic position.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Cavaradossi]

I think I’ve mentioned to you before that I normally don’t read theological works, but only source documents. I don’t know what good these sources would be since you are addressing my rhetoric.

If this is all original research, then there exists a burden of proof to show that the provided interpretation of causality in the late Greek fathers to refer only to ‘source’, to the exclusion of other interpretations. To make a convincing case for this would easily require at least two hundred pages worth of well-cited peer-reviewed material, would it not? Surely I cannot be blamed for my skepticism.

Let me repeat the Seventh proposition which should settle the matter:
According to the distinction and strength of these prepositions, they introduce a distinction in the Spirit’s cause, with the result that sometimes they believe and say that the Father is cause, and sometimes the Son.
As you can see, the Tomos does not make or recognize any distinction between the Father as cause and the Son as cause.

That settles nothing. No justification has been given as to why ‘cause’ here cannot be read as ‘cause’, but must be read as ‘source’. In fact, the argument of the anathematism, taken in context indicates just the opposite. The anathematism reads: To the same, who teach that the Father and the Son—not as two principles and two causes—share in the causality of the Spirit, and that the Son is as much a participant with the Father as is implied in the preposition “through.” According to the distinction and strength of these prepositions, they introduce a distinction in the Spirit’s cause, with the result that sometimes they believe and say that the Father is cause, and sometimes the Son. This being so, they introduce a plurality and a multitude of causes in the procession of the Spirit…The entire argument here hinges upon the distinction between differing types of cause. What they say is that those who justify that the Son shares in the causality of the Spirit as one principle with the Father by using the preposition “through”, necessarily introduce a division of cause and posit two principles, because of the difference in strength between prepositions. This argument would fall apart if they did not recognize that distinctions between different types of causality are possible.

In any case, please address what I stated about the Eastern concern for the monarchy of the Father. A second cause does not threaten the Monarchia. The only reason the Eastern Fathers would even feel that the Father’s Monarchia is threatened is if they perceived the Latin teaching to be encroaching on the Father’s sole prerogative or property as First Cause/Source.

The Greek fathers did not call the Father first cause, they called him the cause.

But he did not write the phrase without qualification (perhaps EO are so used to seeing the phrase out of its proper context that they/you forget this); there is a definite context (which I provided) denoting that the “causality” spoken of was a reference to the Father as Source of the Trinity. St. Gregory’s statement is perfectly equivalent to the teaching of other Fathers, normally in the form “the Son has all that the Father has, except to be the Father; the Spirit has all that the Son has, except to be the Son.” Clearly, St. Gregory is not speaking of the whole genus of “causality,” but specifically that causality that is unique to the Father as Source of the Trinity.

Firstly, I very much dislike statements where I am lumped in with some vague caricature of ‘EO apologists’ and treated as if I were so unenlightened so as not to actually analyze the texts which I quote. Questions like, “how do you intepret passage X,” are a good way to foster good discourse, whereas writing statements like, “perhaps EO are so used to seeing the phrase out of its proper context that they/you forget this,” are not.

I must reiterate that this interpretation is again, reading too much into such statements. It could also be said that the Son has all that the Spirit has except proceeding, since there is no implication with the phrasing of having what another has that he who has must receive what is shared in common from the other. Such statements, however, are not made, for the reason that one never sees in the context of the economy the Spirit being contemplated and known in virtue of the Son, but the other way around. It is therefore more fitting to stress the divinity of the Spirit by relating it to the Son, Whom it illuminates in our minds, and to do the same with the Son in relation to the Father, Who is made known to us by the Son. But statements about the economy cannot be mapped back onto theology. This is why, despite the trinitarian ordering, the Cappadocians always asserted that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and has its being from Him, instead of mapping the implications of the trinitarian taxis in economy back onto theology, as the Eunomians did (the Eunomians, of course, interpreted the verse that all things were made through the Son literally, asserting that the Spirit was created by the Son in the manner of all creatures).

 

[Cavaradossi]

So you seriously believe that the statement excludes the Essence? Please answer that. There is an alternative phrasing from other Fathers of the same teaching - namely, “The Son receives of the Father and the Spirit receives of the Son.” The Spirit has all that the Son has because he receives it from the Son, just as the Son has all that the Father has because he receives it from the Father. This includes the Essence.

I do not see the statement saying anything about the essence of God, nor do I see anything in St. Gregory the Theologian’s statement about the Spirit receiving the divine nature through the Son.

Don’t you mean the fifth? In any case, both anathematisms are condemning the same ultimate idea. The difference between the two anathematisms are the distinctive premises (one, the equivalence of “through” and “from”; the other, the analogy with Creation) that lead to the same ultimate idea - namely, that the Son contributes in some way to the hypostatic property of the Father as Source, thus making them equivalent in the causation of the Spirit. Again this goes back to the underlying concern of the Eastern Fathers -that filioque somehow challenges or encroaches upon the Monarchia of the Father.

Yes, the fifth. I did not have my book at the time and was citing from memory. That being said, I cannot agree with this interpretation. It has nothing to do with the Son contributing to the hypostatic characteristic of the Father. It has everything to do with the Son not sharing in the unique hypostatic characteristic of the Father.

That doesn’t make sense. The notion of “agency” does not challenge or weaken in any way the ontological reality of “source.” The only possible reason that the Eastern Fathers would have a problem with “agency” is if they thought the “agency” actually encroached upon that ontological reality, and the only way an agency can encroach on the unique identity of the “source” is if it some way accomodates to itself the role of “source.” This is what Beccus did. He made the Source dependent on the Agency in order for the Source to retain its property as Source - hence, his confession that the Father and Son together make up one “cause and source.” But this is not what the CC has ever taught or teaches today.

But that is not the objection. The objection is that the Son having agency confuses the unique hypostatic property of the Father, causality, with the Son. Either one has a distinction between the causality of the Father and the Son, in which case the seventh anathematism condemns this as proposing two causes, or one posits that they are the same cause, which is condemned by the fourth anathematism.

 

[Vico]

This from Vladimir Lossky, Chapter 4 of In the Image and Likeness of God (SVS Press: Crestwood, NY, 1976), pp. 71-96, shows the eastern expression: the sense of source of nature and the monarchy of the Father.If the Father is the personal cause of the hypostases, He is also, for that very reason, the principle of their common possession of one and the same nature; and in that sense, He is the “source” of the common divinity of the Three. The revelation of this nature, the externalization of the unknowable essence of the Three, is not a reality foreign to the Three hypostases. Every energy, every manifestation, comes from the Father, is expressed in the Son, and goes forth in the Holy Spirit. {35} This procession– natural, “energetic,” manifesting– must be clearly distinguished from hypostatic procession, which is personal, internal, from the Father alone. The same monarchy of the Father conditions both the hypostatic procession of the Holy Spirit– His personal existence ek monou tou Patros– and the manifesting, [92] natural procession of the common Godhead ad extra in the Holy Spirit, through the Son– dia Huiou.​

1. Thus all the divine names, denoting as they do the common nature, can be applied to each of the Persons, but only in the energetic order– the order of the manifestation of the Divinity. See, for example, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Adversus Macedonianos 13; P.G. 45, col. 1317: “The source of power is the Father; the power is the Son; the spirit of power is the Holy Spirit.” St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 23, 11; P.G. 35, col. 1164A: “The True, the Truth, the Spirit of Truth.”

 

[mardukm]

This from Vladimir Lossky, Chapter 4 of In the Image and Likeness of God (SVS Press: Crestwood, NY, 1976), pp. 71-96, shows the eastern expression: the sense of source of nature and the monarchy of the Father.

If the Father is the personal cause of the hypostases, He is also, for that very reason, the principle of their common possession of one and the same nature; and in that sense, He is the “source” of the common divinity of the Three.
​

Thank you, brother Vico.

Blessings,
Marduk​

 

[mardukm]

If this is all original research, then there exists a burden of proof to show that the provided interpretation of causality in the late Greek fathers to refer only to ‘source’, to the exclusion of other interpretations. To make a convincing case for this would easily require at least two hundred pages worth of well-cited peer-reviewed material, would it not? Surely I cannot be blamed for my skepticism.

Understood. I would point you to the concerns of Sts. Maximos, Photius, Mark of Ephesus about the monarchy of the Father to get an understanding of my pov about Cause as Source from the Eastern perspective. The Official Clarification on Filioque also mentions that this was the overweening concern of the Easterns. Most of all, I would direct you to the proem of the Tomos which sets the tone of the entire work: "And someone [Beccus] dares to declare in our midst that the Spirit also proceeds ekporeusai] from the Son, just as it does, indeed, from the Father. The use of the term ekporeusai demonstrates that the main concern here is the property of the Father as Source or Origin.

That settles nothing. No justification has been given as to why ‘cause’ here cannot be read as ‘cause’, but must be read as ‘source’.

I am reading it in the context of other Eastern sources about their concern for the Monarchy of the Father as Source of the Trinity. This is the only way to read “Cause” in the context of the filioque issue.

Here is another excerpt from the Tomos: “the all-Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father; and we confess that it has its existence from the Father, and that it prides itself — exactly as the Son Himself does — in the fact that the same [Father] is essentially the cause of its being. And we know and believe that the Son is from the Father, being enriched in having the Father as His cause and natural principle, and in being consubstantial and of one nature with the Spirit, which is from the Father. Even so, He is not, either separately or with the Father, the cause of the Spirit.”
If, as you propose, the Synod understood the distinction between first cause and second cause, surely they would have made that evident in the Tomos. But here we see that the term “cause” is only understood in one sense - in the sense that the Father is cause. And the only way the Father is “cause” is as “source.”

In fact, the argument of the anathematism, taken in context indicates just the opposite: To the same, who teach that the Father and the Son—not as two principles and two causes—share in the causality of the Spirit, and that the Son is as much a participant with the Father as is implied in the preposition “through.” According to the distinction and strength of these prepositions, they introduce a distinction in the Spirit’s cause, with the result that sometimes they believe and say that the Father is cause, and sometimes the Son. This being so, they introduce a plurality and a multitude of causes in the procession of the Spirit…
The entire argument here hinges upon the distinction between differing types of cause. What they say is that those who justify that the Son shares in the causality of the Spirit as one principle with the Father by using the preposition “through”, necessarily introduce a division of cause and posit two principles, because of the difference in strength between prepositions. This argument would fall apart if they did not recognize that distinctions between different types of causality are possible.

I disagree. The argument is maintained if Cause is understood as “source,” or at least the idea that there is only one type of “cause” (i.e., in the way that the Father is “cause”). The first part criticizes the idea that the Son is a “participant” in the Father’s causality of the Holy Spirit. But we know that the Father’s causality can only mean one thing - i.e., as Source. The entire argument hinges not upon different types of cause, but rather the equivalence of the causality of the Father and the Son in the existence of the HS. You cannot excise the Tomos from the context of the Eastern Fathers’ general concern for the Monarchy of the Father. A second cause (or agency) dependent on the First Cause does not threaten the Monarchia; only an equivalent cause has the capacity to do this. I think you know this full well, given your rhetoric about the agency of the Son as pertains the Energy. So I am at a loss to understand your resistence to recognize that “cause” means “source” in the context of the filioque debate.

CONTINUED

 

[mardukm]

CONTINUED

The Greek fathers did not call the Father first cause, they called him the cause.

Cause as Source, which is identical to First Cause.

Firstly, I very much dislike…

It was just a gentle reminder. Sorry if you took it wrongly.

I must reiterate that this interpretation is again, reading too much into such statements. It could also be said that the Son has all that the Spirit has except proceeding, since there is no implication with the phrasing of having what another has that he who has must receive what is shared in common from the other.

The Cappadocians have taught us that your proposal cannot be entertained. There is no justification for you to even propose that “the Son has all that the Spirit has except proceeding,” because that would violate the order of the Trinity according to the doxologies. St. Basil wrote, “For us is sufficient the order prescribed by the Lord. He who confuses this order will be no less guilty of transgressing the law than are the impious heathen.” I know you admitted this, but the fact that you propose it just for the sake of argument, as if such a proposition was even likely from the Catholic perspective, makes this exhortation proper.

Such statements, however, are not made, for the reason that one never sees in the context of the economy the Spirit being contemplated and known in virtue of the Son, but the other way around. It is therefore more fitting to stress the divinity of the Spirit by relating it to the Son, Whom it illuminates in our minds, and to do the same with the Son in relation to the Father, Who is made known to us by the Son. But statements about the economy cannot be mapped back onto theology.

Here we see the EO addition to the writings of the Fathers that I criticized in the last part of my previous post. I don’t know why you mention the economy here. The statements at issue (“the Son has all the Father has/receiving of the Father”; “the Spirit has all the Son has/receiving of the Son”) can indeed be interpreted as referring to the economy. However, the additional clauses “except to be the Father” and “except to be the Son” dictates that these are statements about theology proper - i.e., the eternal and internal hypostatic reality of the Godhead. The statements thus must include Essence.

I do not see the statement saying anything about the essence of God, nor do I see anything in St. Gregory the Theologian’s statement about the Spirit receiving the divine nature through the Son.

See previous reply.

Yes, the fifth. I did not have my book at the time and was citing from memory. That being said, I cannot agree with this interpretation. It has nothing to do with the Son contributing to the hypostatic characteristic of the Father. It has everything to do with the Son not sharing in the unique hypostatic characteristic of the Father.

Huh? You just affirmed what I have been saying all along - that the point of criticism was the equalization of the Son with the Father’s hypostatic characteristic of causality (i.e., not as “Second Cause,” but as THE Cause or “First Cause”/Source).

the Son having agency confuses the unique hypostatic property of the Father, causality, with the Son.

No it doesn’t, and you already admitted as much. If you admit that the agency of the Son in the Energetic procession does not interfere with the Father’s monarchia as the Cause/Source of Energy, how can you now claim that the agency of the Son in the Essential procession interferes with the Father’s monarchia as the Cause/Source of Essence?

BLessings

 

[mardukm]

Dear brothers and sisters in Christ,

No it doesn’t, and you already admitted as much. If you admit that the agency of the Son in the Energetic procession does not interfere with the Father’s monarchia as the Cause/Source of Energy, how can you now claim that the agency of the Son in the Essential procession interferes with the Father’s monarchia as the Cause/Source of Essence?

This is part of the reason that I proposed earlier in the thread that the EOC splits the hypostatic procession into two Sources - one for the Essence (the Father) and one for the Energy (the Son). I mean, if agency (“second cause”) necessarily denotes participation in or contribution to the Father’s monarchia as THE Cause/Source, or, alternatively, equivalence to the Father’s monarchia as THE Cause/Source, then attribution of agency to the Son in the Energetic Procession affords the same danger to the Monarchia that attribution of agency to the Son in the Essential Procession does.

But since it has been admitted that the notion of agency does not actually pose that danger to the Father’s Monarchia, then I believe this particular issue has been settled.

The only issue left is whether Energy is actually distinguished from Essence within the Godhead. But I am willing to let this lie in abeyance. It really is, for me as an Oriental, a non-issue. We need not debate the internal reality of the Godhead to such an extent that it causes disunity. For me, anyway (as an Oriental), St. Palamas’ statement that the Godhead has three realities (Essence, Energy, and Trinity) implies that whatever distinction is made between these three is different in some way that I cannot understand from the distinction between Persons in the Trinity. That I do not understand means I do not accept, but, at the same time, that I do not understand means I cannot condemn. Thus, I know I cannot necessarily accuse the Easterns of making five Gods in the Godhead.

Signing off now from this thread (unless other matters come to our attention), and praying for the unity of the Churches. Theotokos, pray for us. St. Cyril of Alexandria, pray for us; St. Basil, pray for us; St. Gregory Nazianzen, pray for us; St. Gregory of Nyssa, pray for us.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Good Grief, is this going to go on for another 1,000 years!!!

 

[Cavaradossi]

Show me a discussion of Essence/Energy from the early medieval Fathers that is not in the context of the Economy.

From Cyril’s Thesaurus 18: Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ, φύσεως δὲ τὸ γεννᾷν. Φύσις δὲ καὶ ἐνἐργεια οὐ ταθτόν· οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γεννᾷν τὸ ποιεῖν ταθτὸν ἔσται. St. Cyril of Alexandria, like his predecessor St. Athanasius recognized, that essence and energy cannot be the same.

See also what Gregory of Nyssa writes in Against Eunomius II.31-2:They insist that, because the Father’s being is simple, it must be reckoned nothing else but unbegottenness, since it is said to be unbegotten. To them we may also reply that, because the Father is also called Creator and Designer, and the one so called is also simple in being, it is time these clever people announced that the Being of the Father is ‘creation’ and ‘design’, since no doubt the argument from simplicity attaches to his being the meaning of every word which applies to him. So they should either separate unbegottenness from their definition of the divine being, letting it retain its own proper meaning, or, if, because of the simplicity of the Subject, they do define the being by unbegottenness, they should on the same grounds envisage both creation and design in the Father’s being, not as though the potency in the being were what creates and designs but as though that potency itself were seen as creation and design.
The Argument, according to Gregory of Nyssa, is that there must be some ontological distinction between the essence (the being) of God, and the names of God (which describe either the energies of God, or what God is not). Otherwise, to say that God is the Creator is to say that creation is the essence of God, and to say that God is the designer is would be to say that the essence of God is design. The names of God do not name the essence.

All the Fathers say that the Essence is simple. All the Fathers say that the Energy is simple.

When have I said otherwise?

St. Basil immediately comes to mind. He stated that there is not multiplicity or compoundness in God, which is why we say “God is Good” or “God is Holy.” We do not say that God is composed of goodness and holiness, and other attributes.

Again, when did I say in this thread that God is composed?

We do not refer to the Energies of God, but rather the Energy of God. The Energy appears as a multiplicity only from our limited human perspective, but within God Himself, there is no such distinction in attirbutes.

This is not entirely correct or in line with Cappadocian thought. The essence can have nothing predicated of it, because it is unknowable. But the energies can be named, and furthermore, those names apply to God as well, but not to His essence. St. Basil makes this clear in his epistle 234: But God, he says, is simple, and whatever attribute of Him you have reckoned as knowable is of His essence. But the absurdities involved in this sophism are innumerable. When all these high attributes have been enumerated, are they all names of one essence? And is there the same mutual force in His awfulness and His loving-kindness, His justice and His creative power, His providence and His foreknowledge, and His bestowal of rewards and punishments, His majesty and His providence? In mentioning any one of these do we declare His essence? If they say, yes, let them not ask if we know the essence of God, but let them enquire of us whether we know God to be awful, or just, or merciful. These we confess that we know. If they say that essence is something distinct, let them not put us in the wrong on the score of simplicity. For they confess themselves that there is a distinction between the essence and each one of the attributes enumerated.
Notice how he asks the rehtorical question, “And is there the same mutual force, in His awfulness and His loving-kindness, His justice and His creative power, His providence and His foreknowledge, and His bestowal of rewards and punishments, His majesty and His providence?” He answers this very rhetorical question in Against Eunomius 1.8:Gladly, then, would I scrutinize him to see if he similarly sticks to this prudence in the case of all that is said about God, or if he does so only in the case of this word. For if he does not consider anything at all by way of conceptualization so as to avoid the appearance of honoring God with human designations, then he will confess this: that all things attributed to God similarly refer to his substance [for context, Basil is arguing that Eunomius cannot privilege one attribute, unbegottenness, to refer to the essence, while not affirming the same of all of the other attributes]. But how is it not ridiculous to say that his creative power is his substance? Or that his providence is his substance? Or the same for his foreknowledge? In other words, how is it not ridiculous to regard every activity of his as his substance? And if these names converge upon a single meaning, each one has to signify the same thing as the others, such as is the case with polyonyms, as when we call the same man ‘Simon,’ ‘Peter,’ and ‘Cephas.’ In the same vein, whoever has heard that God does not change will be lead to his unbegottenness, and whoever has heard that he has no parts will also be brought to his creative power. What is more absurd than this confusion? Each of these names is deprived of its proper signification, and conventions are established that contradict both common usage and the teaching of the Spirit.

 

[Cavaradossi]

Notice that Basil denies that the names all signify the same thing. If they do not signify the same thing, then this admits that the energies are distinct. To say that ‘in God there is no distinction between the attributes’ is not entirely correct, because the attributes are distinct (that is, creation is not mercy, and judgment is not light), even when they are considered in God. And while it is might be tempting to argue that this only refers to the economy, notice that among the things St. Basil lists are God’s foreknowledge and providence, which certainly had no beginning, since God foreordained the world according to his foreknowledge from the very beginning. I must reiterate that the version of divine simplicity described in your arguments is very Thomistic. There is absolutely no reason to suspect that the Eastern Fathers held to it, especially since Duns Scotus, another scholastic, allows for the names of God to be distinct without necessarily implying composition. As Scotus writes in his Ordinatio I d 8. q 4. n 192-4So there is there a distinction preceding the intellect in every way, and it is this, that wisdom is in the thing from the nature of the thing – but wisdom in the thing is not formally goodness in the thing.

The proof of this is that, if infinite wisdom were formally infinite goodness, wisdom in general would be formally goodness in general. For infinity does not destroy the formal idea of that to which it is added, because in whatever grade some perfection is understood to be (which ‘grade’ however is a grade of that perfection), the formal idea of that perfection is not taken away because of that grade, and so if it as it is general does not include it formally as it is in general, neither does it as infinite include it formally as it is infinite.

I make this clear by the fact that ‘to include formally’ is to include something in its essential idea, such that, if a definition of the including thing be assigned, the included thing would be the definition or a part of the definition; but just as the definition of goodness in general does not include wisdom in itself, so neither does infinite goodness include infinite wisdom; there is then some formal non-identity between wisdom and goodness, insofar as there would be distinct definitions of them, if they were definable. But a definition does not indicate only the idea caused by the intellect, but also the quiddity of the thing; there is then a formal non-identity on the part of the thing, and I understand it thus, that the intellect when combining this proposition ‘wisdom is not formally goodness’, does not, by its collative acts, cause the truth of the proposition, but it finds the extremes in the object, from the combining of which the act is made true.

And this argument ‘about non formal identity’ the old doctors [e.g. Bonaventure] stated by positing in divine reality that there was some predication true by identity that yet was not formal; thus I concede that by identity goodness is truth in the thing [by which he means there is no real distinction between the two, insofar as they are inseparable], but truth is not formally goodness.

In this case, it simply is incorrect to say that the fathers necessarily thought of the attributes of God as referring to the same thing in God, because the idea that no distinction can be made between realities within a thing was not universally held even among the scholastics.

Further, there is no distinction within the Godhead of Essence and Energy, which is why in one place, St. Basil taught "goodness is essence in the Holy Spirit.

That passage you cited from Basil is mistranslated. In Greek, it reads Ἀγαθόν· ὡς ἀγαθὸς ὁ Πατὴρ, καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γεννηθείς· οὐσίαν ἔχον τὴν ἀγαθότητα.

The first part corresponds roughly to the English translation ([the Spirit] is good, as the Father is good, and the one Who is begotten of the good is good). The problem comes with this last phrase, οὐσίαν ἔχον τἠν άγαθότητα. The noun οὐσίαν, in the accusative, ought to be interpreted as an accusative of respect. That would be rendered then as, "having with respect to essence the [His] goodness,” which can hardly be interpreted as meaning that the essence of the Spirit is the Goodness of God. That reading (that the essence of the Holy Spirit is goodness) would be completely inconsistent with St. Basil’s theology, since he, like his brother, Gregory of Nyssa, denies that the essence of God can be named.

 

[Cavaradossi]

“Essence” and “Energy” are merely names we give as creatures with a limited understanding of God - we give the name of “Essence” to that of the Godhead which we cannot experience, and we give the name of “Energy” to that of the Godhead which we can experience, and from our limited human perspective this Energy appears to us as a multiplicity.

Yet I have now provided two clear examples of Fathers denying this. St. Gregory of Nyssa distinguishes between the energies of God and His essence when he writes, “They insist that, because the Father’s being is simple, it must be reckoned nothing else but unbegottenness, since it is said to be unbegotten. To them we may also reply that, because the Father is also called Creator and Designer, and the one so called is also simple in being, it is time these clever people announced that the Being of the Father is ‘creation’ and ‘design’, since no doubt the argument from simplicity attaches to his being the meaning of every word which applies to him.” Similarly, St. Basil ridicules the idea that God’s energies are to be associated with His essence in that quote from Against Eunomius 1.8: “But how is it not ridiculous to say that his creative power is his substance? Or that his providence is his substance? Or the same for his foreknowledge? In other words, how is it not ridiculous to regard every activity of his as his substance?” And again when he writes, “When all these high attributes have been enumerated, are they all names of one essence? And is there the same mutual force in His awfulness and His loving-kindness, His justice and His creative power, His providence and His foreknowledge, and His bestowal of rewards and punishments, His majesty and His providence? In mentioning any one of these do we declare His essence?” And again, it is impossible for to try and pin this distinction upon only being in the economy, since Basil denies that the foreknowledge and providence of God (both of which are eternal) are the essence of God.

But these names do not have the power to make distinctions within the Godhead itself. To claim that these mere names that we use to accomodate our frail understanding of God are real distinctions within God himself is surely beyond the patristic evidence.

Yet to hold to this sort of thinking involves denying that any knowledge of God is true, from which all sorts of absurdities follow. If nothing we say of God is corresponds to anything distinct considered in God, then it necessarily follows that any substitution of God’s energies for another is not only theologically true, but that it is also fitting, since it would elucidate the truth of God’s radical simplicity. Thus we could say that God punishes the reprobate with paradise, He rewards the elect with damnation, He killed the firstborn of Egypt with his mercy, He raised Lazarus with his wrath, he destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah with creation, and that He foreknows with His predestination.

Despite this simplicity, nevertheless, the Fathers all say that in the Godhead, there is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. There is no other distinction within the Godhead except that of the Persons.

Show me an Eastern Father who says, “there is no other distinction within the Godhead except that of the Persons.”

I think that is rather clear. Btw, the reason that the Names of the Persons can indicate distinction, while the names of all other things we use to refer to the Godhead cannot, is because the latter refers to impersonal objects, while the former refers to personal beings with will.

But this is a completely arbitrary category to make. By this logic, individual stones are indistinguishable, since they do not have wills. Furthermore, why would it be that the property of having will allows for things to be distinct from one another? This could only be true if the will constituted a difference between the distinct things, by which we are able to perceive that they differ, such that Peter is distinct from Paul because the operations of their wills differ. But the same cannot be said of God, for the divine will is one, not three, and the divine will operates in the Three persons as one operation, not as three, but as one, just as the goodness, justice, mercy, knowledge, and intellect of God operate in the three persons as but one operation, not as three. So then according to this criterion for distinction, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not distinct. But we know that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit differ with regard to their particular manners of existence (τρόπος ὑπάρξεως) which is how they are known by us to be distinct.

The Fathers make a distinction between the Father, Son and HS. Surely you are not saying that the early Fathers failed to make this distinction? What is your point?

No, I am saying that they never said anything about there being only distinctions between the persons (one could argue that the essence is distinct from the persons in Eastern theology, for example).

If you are saying the early Fathers were scholastic, that is perfectly fine.

That would also be contrary to history. Scholasticism proper was a uniquely Western thing, based on a revival of certain Greek metaphysical texts, and the development of a systematic method for resolving disputed questions.

 

[Cavaradossi]

The Oriental Tradition has never had an aversion to scholasticism in the same way that is evident in certain prominent quarters of EO’xy today.

Of course, the Oriental fathers, like Cyril, Athanasius, and Severus of Antioch never employed scholasticism proper either, so I am not sure what that is supposed to mean. Besides, the Orthodox do not have an aversion to the method of scholasticism, Orthodox Christians take issue with the conclusions that certain scholastics reached.

The rationale you use here for Energy is the exact same rationale the CC uses with respect to Essence. So the issue here is your justification for splitting the Energy from the Essence within the Godhead. You have not given any patristic justification for that.

I have given plenty of justification for distinguishing between the essence and energies of God.

In fact, I think this is the real root of the problem. You obviously are able to make a distinction between souce and agency, without the agency encroaching on the source’s prerogative or quality as source.

The dispute is not about source alone but causality. As I will demonstrate later, there is an interpretive weakness in your argument that the dispute is over source and not causality.

So the real issue here is:
If there is no distinction between Essence and Energy within the Godhead, then the Catholic position is justified.
If a distinction can be made between Essence and Energy within the Godhead, then the Eastern Orthodox position is justified.

Perhaps we should limit our discussion to that particular issue, which I feel would settle it once and for all. I have a theory forming in my mind that could possibly bring an accord, but I’ll wait to see if you can agree that this is in fact the underlying matter in the debate.

No, this is not the underlying matter in the debate. The underlying matter is how the Son manifests the Spirit without encroaching upon the Father’s property as sole cause.

You can’t use St. Gregory of Nyssa to support your idea that this procession only refers to Energy, because he did not recognize that distinction within the Godhead: “For if (according to the idea of those who have been led astray) the nature of the Holy Trinity were diverse, the number would by consequence be extended to a plurality of Gods, being divided according to the diversity of essence in the subjects. But since the Divine, single, and unchanging nature, that it may be one, rejects all diversity in essence, it does not admit in its own case the signification of multitude; but as it is called one nature, so it is called in the singular by all its other names, God, Good, Holy, Saviour, Just, Judge, and every other Divine name conceivable: whether one says that the names refer to nature or to operation, we shall not dispute the point.”
This is the identical to St. Basil’s position, btw, who wrote that “goodness is essence in the Holy Spirit.”

As I pointed out above, that St. Basil quote was mistranslated. As for this quote, from Not Three Gods, it is being taken out of context. It should be clear that here, Gregory of Nyssa is not talking about divine simplicity; he is talking about how the trinity can be understood to be one, even though the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three distinct hypostaseis. That is why he writes, “The Father is God: the Son is God: and yet by the same proclamation God is One, because no difference either of nature or of operation is contemplated in the Godhead. For if (according to the idea of those who have been led astray) the nature of the Holy Trinity were diverse, the number would by consequence be extended to a plurality of Gods, being divided according to the diversity of essence in the subjects.”