Capital Punishment

[Ender]

Again, it is not enough for you to claim that Catholic doctrine taught that “it is the punishment itself that achieves [repairing the disorder],” without evidence of a magisterial citation in support. Aquinas’ quote does not support the claim that punishment itself restores right order.

*God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them. *(Aquinas ST I-II 87, 3 ad 3)

*For guilt cannot be restored to order save by punishment *(Aquinas ST III 71, 5 ad 2)

If absence of the word “retribution” has caused a misunderstanding then the confusion would be evidenced in the USCCB statements on capital punishment subsequent to 1995.

Subsequent to 1995? Are you really willing to discount everything the church taught prior to the very end of the 20th century? When did the understanding of retribution change, that its meaning today is different than it was less than forty years ago?

As to the words “redress” and “retribution” having identical meanings in philosophy or law, I still disagree. While redress may certainly include retribution, it is not accomplished by it. Redress seeks to restore the order for all – offender, victim and society. Retribution, as one of the justifications of punishment, is aimed at the offender.

It is the order of justice that has been damaged. Giving back what was taken, repairing what was broken, rehabilitating the offender are all proper objectives, but none of them restores the disorder.*the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice. *(Aquinas ST I-II 87,1)

What is more important than what we think is what did JPII think. In EV, he disallows retribution as a morally valid reason for capital punishment.

No, he did not because he could not. This is a misunderstanding of what he said. He would not simply rewrite 2000 years of church doctrine on the nature of punishment. His opposition to capital punishment was prudential, not theological.

Kaczor is correct: punishment’s primary purpose is retributive justice. He does not write, however, (as you claim) that retributive justice is historically in Catholic doctrine a valid moral reason for capital punishment.

Now that you accept that retributive justice is the primary objective of punishment (which is what Dulles, Rice, and the USCCB said) we can move on to whether the church ever taught that retributive justice is a valid moral reason for capital punishment. Or do you still reject the notion that retribution and “redress the disorder” mean the same thing?

Ender

 

[Ender]

You are using “directly intended” in an ordinary language sense I believe - which is not the meaning in moral theology.

Very likely.

The phrase “directly intended” is used to refer to the (intentional) choice of the act itself, which is directly ordered toward its object. What is “directly intended” is the moral object.

Do you use “object” as synonymous with “end” or “objective”? Is there a difference between object and moral object? Going back to my bank robbery example, is the only thing directly intended the ability to pay for the operation? Does moral theology hold that robbing a bank is only indirectly intended?

The intended means (death of the guilty party, a harm, but not immoral) and the intended end are both in the first font of intention.

I don’t think the ends and the means can both be part of the intention. Ends yes, means no. The means chosen define the object. This is why the church says “the end does not justify the means.”

The second font is always the intentional choice of the act, its nature, and its object.

(I think you’ve reversed the fonts: 1st is the object, 2cd the intent but…) the object is “the matter of a human act.” It is the “what” as opposed to the “why”.

Ender

 

[o_mlly]

What I was referring to in 2267 was the caveat that capital punishment was accepted by the church “when this is the only practicable way to defend the lives of human beings effectively against the aggressor.” I asserted that this claim was not substantiated by historical church teaching, and I made the point that both the 1997 version and the 1992 version referred to “the traditional teaching of the church”, yet the 1992 version did not contain the restriction claimed in the 1997 version.

The rather obvious point is this: if that really is the traditional teaching of the church then surely someone should be able to cite where it was actually taught. I can cite a dozen (Magisterial) references to capital punishment that don’t include it, but have never seen one that does.
The realm of human affairs is a messy one, full of at least apparent inconsistency and incoherence, and the recent teaching of the Catholic Church on capital punishment—vitiated, as I intend to show, by errors of historical fact and interpretation—is no exception.

*The most reasonable conclusion to draw from this discussion is that, once again, the Catechism is simply wrong from an historical point of view. Traditional Catholic teaching did not contain the restriction enunciated by Pope John Paul II. *
(Kevin L. Flannery, S.J., Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome; Consultor to the CDF, 2007)
Ender

Is the new argument that, rather than contradicts, EV conflicts with Tradition? If so, what is the difference between a teaching that “contradicts” and one that “conflicts”?

 

[o_mlly]

What I was referring to in 2267 was the caveat that capital punishment was accepted by the church “when this is the only practicable way to defend the lives of human beings effectively against the aggressor.” I asserted that this claim was not substantiated by historical church teaching, …

To insure I understand your position, do you claim the pope misused his teaching authority in EV simply because the teaching was novel, that is without historical precedent?

If so, do you think that Innocent III also abused his papal authority in the promulgation of the Fourth Lateran Council Canon 18?
Clerics may neither pronounce nor execute a sentence of death. Nor may they act as judges in extreme criminal cases, or take part in matters connected with judicial tests and ordeals.

 

[Ender]

To insure I understand your position, do you claim the pope misused his teaching authority in EV simply because the teaching was novel, that is without historical precedent?

Not at all. To say that I dispute your understanding of what he said is not the same as disputing what he said.

If so, do you think that Innocent III also abused his papal authority in the promulgation of the Fourth Lateran Council Canon 18?Clerics may neither pronounce nor execute a sentence of death. Nor may they act as judges in extreme criminal cases, or take part in matters connected with judicial tests and ordeals.

Again, no. Especially if you consider what else Innocent III said. Before he allowed the breakaway Waldensians to return to the church (for those who wished to return) he required that they repudiate some of their beliefs, including one that appeared to condemn capital punishment. He required them to sign a document that included the following:*“Concerning secular power we declare that without mortal sin it is possible to exercise a judgment of blood as long as one proceeds to bring punishment not in hatred but in judgment, not incautiously but advisedly” *
*“It is this statement that has come down as the authoritative teaching of Innocent III on the morality of the death penalty.” *(Michael A. Norko)

Ender

 

[Ender]

Is the new argument that, rather than contradicts, EV conflicts with Tradition? If so, what is the difference between a teaching that “contradicts” and one that “conflicts”?

I’d rather you dealt with the accuracy of my claim than try to make it seem as if I’m calling JPII either inept or a borderline heretic. It should be easy enough to falsify my claim. If it really is the traditional teaching of the church that capital punishment is valid only when it is necessary for protection you should be able to provide at least one citation that actually says that, or something like it, or something that suggests it.

I recognize that there are documents that acknowledge the protective aspects of capital punishment, but recognizing that benefit is not the same as requiring it for justification.

Ender

 

[o_mlly]

God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them. (Aquinas ST I-II 87, 3 ad 3)

*For guilt cannot be restored to order save by punishment *(Aquinas ST III 71, 5 ad 2)

Remembering that Aquinas thought is magisterial only if it is cited in a magisterial document, I note further that both your citations indicate justice’s need for punishment but do not specify that that punishment ever need be capital. Life w/o parole is punishment. The citation you are looking for is one where the Church teaches that to redress the disorder** requires** (not merely allows) capital punishment to satisfy justice.

[Now that you accept that retributive justice is the primary objective of punishment (which is what Dulles, Rice, and the USCCB said) we can move on to whether the church ever taught that retributive justice is a valid moral reason for capital punishment. Or do you still reject the notion that retribution and “redress the disorder” mean the same thing?

In order to move past definitional difficulties, I would accept the identity in the notions of “retribution” and “redress the disorder”, iff “retribution” is understood to include the reforming, restoring, stabilizing and maintaining of the just order for victim, offender and community. To wit:

In stressing this, I do not concede that retribution is “purely backward-looking,” as is so often said. The retributive shaping point of punishment, like other purposes to which punishment can be adapted, is forward-looking. The “medicinal” or “healing” point of punishment, of which Aquinas often speaks, is envisaged by him as including its purpose of retribution. There is a notable difference here between St. Thomas’s terminology and the language of the Catechism of the Catholic Church. The catechism uses the term “medicinal” to refer exclusively to punishment’s possible value as reformative: “Finally punishment has a medicinal value; as far as possible it should contribute to the correction of the offender.” But when he speaks of punishment’s medicinal function, Aquinas has in mind not only reform and deterrence and restraint and coercive inducement to decent conduct, but also the function which the Catechism calls primary: the redressing of the disorder caused by the offense. Why is this medicinal, curative healing? Because it is the healing of a disorder-precisely an unjust inequality-introduced into a whole community by the wrongdoer’s criminal choice and action. (John Finnis, Biolchini Family Professor of Law, Notre Dame University)
scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1858&context=law_faculty_scholarship
[/quote]​

 

[o_mlly]

Not at all. To say that I dispute your understanding of what he said is not the same as disputing what he said.

Clearly, you have a some problem with what he said but cannot concisely, consistently write exactly what that problem is: “contradicts”, “conflicts” ,?

Again, no. Especially if you consider what else Innocent III said. Before he allowed the breakaway Waldensians to return to the church (for those who wished to return) he required that they repudiate some of their beliefs, including one that appeared to condemn capital punishment. He required them to sign a document that included the following:“Concerning secular power we declare that without mortal sin it is possible to exercise a judgment of blood as long as one proceeds to bring punishment not in hatred but in judgment, not incautiously but advisedly”
*“It is this statement that has come down as the authoritative teaching of Innocent III on the morality of the death penalty.” *(Michael A. Norko)

See the bold face type above. This citation still does not support what I presently believe is your problem with EV (subject to your next revelation).

 

[o_mlly]

I’d rather you dealt with the accuracy of my claim than try to make it seem as if I’m calling JPII either inept or a borderline heretic. It should be easy enough to falsify my claim. If it really is the traditional teaching of the church that capital punishment is valid only when it is necessary for protection you should be able to provide at least one citation that actually says that, or something like it, or something that suggests it.

I recognize that there are documents that acknowledge the protective aspects of capital punishment, but recognizing that benefit is not the same as requiring it for justification.

Ender

I have already documented that papal teaching authority does not proscribe development of doctrine. He may not, however, contradict established doctrine. On this, I think, we agree. So, the burden is on the one who claims EV contradicts, conflicts or is, at least, contrary or disordered to what the Church (not her theologians or commentators) has always taught.

A citation which shows magisterial teaching that capital punishment (not merely punishment) is required (not merely allowed) as the only punishment that satisfies retribution or redress of disorder for certain crimes would end the debate. Do you have one?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I am willing to discuss and debate pretty much anything. What I am not willing to do is endure gratuitous taunts, ridicule, and insults, so the choice is yours: keep your comments civil (as you did here) or debate with someone else.

As I say, I neutrally observe for your own spiritual growth that you invariably take great umbrage when reasonably demonstrated to make poor use of English or illogical statements.
That is not conducive to honest debate. If you cannot accept what I say that’s fine, just ignore it. To react the way you are simply makes my point further:shrug:.

Determining the morality of a just execution is no different than determining the morality of any other act. If the means are acceptable, if the intention is good, and if the foreseeable results are beneficial, the act is moral.

Where are the other two fonts in this “analysis”? You only mention intention but neither the object nor the circumstances?

For capital punishment, if the crime is deliberate murder then death is a just punishment (font 1).

If you assume the object is already moral (“just”) from the start you have already largely proven what you allegedly set out to analyse . And what is an indirectly intended murder exactly (as opposed to deliberate murder).

If the intent behind the sentencing is directed at achieving justice then font 2 is satisfied.

You mean retribution and only retribution surely? You have made it clear that secondary ends of this sort of justice are not essential for licitness of intent.

If the foreseeable outcome of a death sentence is believed to have minimal harmful side effects, the third font is satisfied and the execution is just.

Such a consideration appears to be about consequences (rather than circumstances) and suggests you are in fact considering proportionality arguments. But such considerations suggest that consequences could be such as to render the act as a whole immoral.
Yet the 3rd font cannot render an act bad that is already good by reason of its good object and good intent unless we speak of double effect and indirect intention.

But you deny indirect intention in CP do you not? You opine that willing death by the State can be both moral and deliberate/direct?
If so your above analysis is not correctly analysing the three fonts and you need to retry.

To be clear, the calculation of the side effects of an execution (or any other act) do not involve questions of morality. There is no moral analysis involved in predicting the likely outcome of an action.

Yes there is in the way you tried to explain the 3rd font above. It’s quite a confused and seemingly self contradictory pottage.
Clearly if the details of an analysed act likely bear on its licitness then either those details belong to the object font not the circumstances font OR they remain in the circumstances font and we are speaking of a double effect scenario and proportionality judgements arise. You have just done exactly the latter.

The “impact on the community” refers to the consequences of the act, consequences that are, however, influenced by whether the community sees the punishment as just as well as whether they accept the reasons given for applying it. As to whether this is a proportionality argument (how much good v how much bad), to a degree I think it probably is. We shouldn’t do something that brings more harm than good.*That which is hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the common good. *(Aquinas)
That said, we may surely disagree about what is or is not harmful, and what is or is not good for the community, and as that is not a moral discussion, opposite conclusions are equally justifiable.

Not sure of the relevance of all this.
It’s just a consideration of scandal to me. The Magisterium has little issue with material scandal arising from a moral decision, it’s an indirect evil only.

 

[o_mlly]

Again, no. Especially if you consider what else Innocent III said. Before he allowed the breakaway Waldensians …

This post may be interesting but it deflects from the point. The point is that Innocent III developed Church doctrine further limiting the use of capital punishment. How is Innocent III’s development of doctrine acceptable and John Paul II’s development not acceptable?

Both popes continue in the tradition of the Church over the millennia in developing this doctrine that continues to progressively limit the moral use of capital punishment.

You may find the ideas of JAMES J. MEGIVERN, Professor of Religion Emeritus University of North Carolina, Wilmington interesting:
*Capital Punishment: The Curious History of its Privileged Place in Christendom *
A part of the problem that has been all too little explored is that it was not the Hebrew Scriptures, with the framework of rabbinical interpretation, that were inherited, but their Greek translation, the Septuagint, which was adopted as prologue to the New Testament writings to form the Christian Bible. This meant that they came to be viewed in an entirely different context in the Greco-Roman culture. One feature that was lost was the restraint in the actual use of death as a penalty in the ancient Hebrew ethos.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

What is the primary objective of punishment? It is to “redress the disorder”. Which of the four objectives of punishment (rehabilitation, retribution, protection, deterrence) does this refer to? If retributive justice is inadequate to justify the use of capital punishment, is it justifiable for LWOP? Finally, if justice itself does not justify capital punishment, how can protection possibly justify it? By saying retributive justice does not permit the death penalty you have essentially said “this person does not deserve to die for his crime”, but if he doesn’t deserve to die for what he has already done how is it possible to believe any situation could justify killing him? You’ve already acknowledged that he doesn’t deserve to die yet you can justify killing him anyway if you perceive him to be a threat. Why bother with trying him for the crimes he has committed, why not just put him in jail to prevent him from committing future ones?

OMilly and others have not yet called into question the assertion of your 4 ends of justice approach. However they have opined that it seems all four ends must be met, not just the alleged primary one, for the punishment to be judged a good object.
You on the other and take a minimalist binary approach and say the primary alone is not only necessary but suffices as well. Yet the Magisterium of late is reasonably read to disagree with you. And that does not seem to intrinsically deny tradition does it? Tradition has never clearly decided let alone seriously debated this point as far as I know.

Is a soul the primary cause of a human being? Of course.
Is a soul necessary for a human being? Of course.
Is a soul sufficient for a human being? No. A soul without a body is not a human being.

Likewise with retribution and justice.
If justice is retributive only then it is not justice.

If I rob a bank to get the money necessary for a life saving operation is there any sense in which it can be claimed that robbing the bank was indirectly intended? Yes, I only did it to save a life, which was my ultimate end, but the intermediate end was to steal from a bank, and that intermediate end was directly intended. You cannot strap a person in a chair and electrocute him indirectly. Whatever else was also directly or indirectly intended, his death was as intentional as any act could ever be.

As Aquinas says, one who steals to pay for a prostitute is more adulterer than thief.
Indirect intent may well be in play, but for proportionality reasons the stealing is imputable all the same.

But as for CP. If it is ever allowed (contra Aquinas) to deliberately deal a final lethal and certain blow in self defence then as Rau states it would seem in principle possible to intend CP indirectly if it was judged licit.

However I cannot personally see how retrib CP alone could ever be indirect.
Which leads me to believe the Magisterium is now saying CP for retrib justice alone is immoral in principle … and also even if done for the Common Good it is now immoral in practise due to reasonable bloodless means being available.

 

[Rau]

Very likely.
Do you use “object” as synonymous with “end” or “objective”? Is there a difference between object and moral object? Going back to my bank robbery example, is the only thing directly intended the ability to pay for the operation? Does moral theology hold that robbing a bank is only indirectly intended?

Moral Object = Object is the proximate end in terms of morality to which the chosen act (“the act itself”) is directly ordered. What is “directly intended” is to rob the bank/ deprive the bank of cash. “Objective” would refer to the Intended End / Purpose.

I don’t think the ends and the means can both be part of the intention. Ends yes, means no. The means chosen define the object. This is why the church says “the end does not justify the means.”

The intended end and the intended means - all that is intended - are considered to be part of the Intention font.

(I think you’ve reversed the fonts: 1st is the object, 2cd the intent but…) the object is “the matter of a human act.” It is the “what” as opposed to the “why”.

Font numbering is a matter of preference, not doctrine. Logically, Intention comes before Object before Consequences - that’s the way the “Will” moves.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Moral Object = Object is the proximate end in terms of morality to which the chosen act (“the act itself”) is directly ordered. What is “directly intended” is to rob the bank/ deprive the bank of cash. “Objective” would refer to the Intended End / Purpose.

The intended end and the intended means - all that is intended - are considered to be part of the Intention font.

Font numbering is a matter of preference, not doctrine. Logically, Intention comes before Object before Consequences - that’s the way the “Will” moves.

Agreed mostly.

I would only add that when we talk about mixed evil/good scenarios we have to first decide if we are talking about a single human act (as in double effect operating where there is only one object and one direct intention);OR
are we talking about two separate human acts that are linked by a means/end ordering which means there are in fact two objects and two direct intentions (but one subordinated to the other)?

This is a huge confusion in 98% of moral analysis discussions I have seen on the Net even by theologians. Ron Conte is the prime example. Ender is clearly influenced by Ron in his autodidactic understanding of these terms.

I spent three of my six degree years studying purely Aquinas and his moral theology and I still don’t claim to be anywhere near proficient in moral analysis using Aquinas’s principles. But I know when I hear things that don’t mesh with what I believe I did understand from Aquinas and my Dominican professors. There is a lot of “Readers Digest” condensed version of Aquinas out there. I believe Ron is heir to one of those versions and he hasn’t quite worked through to more solid ground yet.
The above confusion is one such area I believe.

Re " Logically, Intention comes before Object before Consequences - that’s the way the “Will” moves".
Of course numbering of the fonts doesn’t matter.
However object and intention are so interwoven you probably cannot get away with this statement about logical ordering. Intention comes from the will which is an “appetite” of the intellect. It is the intellect that presents the object to the will which is then drawn to it as desirable by reason of some good that this appetite seeks in that understood presentment.
Yes, we could say that the will had a preceeding orientation to universal good or a “missing” good that it commanded the intellect to seek out amongst the many particular good objects that life presents to us everyday. So its complicated.

 

[Rau]

Agreed mostly.

I would only add that when we talk about mixed evil/good scenarios we have to first decide if we are talking about…two separate human acts that are linked by a means/end ordering which means there are in fact two objects and two direct intentions (but one subordinated to the other)?.

Can you provide an example of this?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Can you provide an example of this?

Indirectly mentioned in posts
#291
#275

Whenever there is a scenario with mixed harm/good “chosen” it seems that we can discern two basic situations each involving two “choices”
(1) One where there is only a single moral act involved which has only one (direct) intent and one corresponding object. There is a 2nd choice involved which is an indirect intent (the praeter intent or “beside intent” as Aquinas usually calls it) with its corresponding “praeter object” (my expression) which is in the circumstances.
Lethal self defence would seem a classic example. There is only one moral act - it is either completely morally good (yet contained chosen disorder/harm of killing) or completely morally bad.

(2) But we also seem to recognise other scenarios were the evil and good “choices” are decoupled and are independent moral acts in a means/end causal relationship. Here there are two direct intents with their corresponding objects. The object of the “means” act
is usually the one that involves harm and the object-intent is often called the “proximate end”. Aquinas’s example (taken from Aristotle) seems apposite here. That of the man who steals to pay for a prostitute. Aquinas says he is more adulterer than thief, but he is still a thief of sorts. We can judge the morality of each act in itself though that determination does involve consideration of the other act. Alternatively there is the man who steals to give alms.

I suppose (2) is amenable to the (1) (double effect) type of moral analysis but I think it is somewhat ill fitting.

The distinct types of relationships involved between the two “choices” re good/harm in each scenario is reminiscent of how Aquinas sees the difference between soul/body in men versus materialised angels.

It is also similar to that between Plato and Aristotle re the soul and the body.
For Plato the soul was more pilot then form of the body. A much looser coupling.

 

[Rau]

…I attach this very readable paper on Aquinas’s analysis of “indirect intention”. It concurs with exactly what I thought my Thomist professors taught me 30 yrs ago on this point which I find felicitous.

forums.catholic-questions.org/attachment.php?attachmentid=23973&stc=1&d=1495930225

The author, I believe with strong justification, concludes that todays PODE is significantly different from Aquinas and it is used to justify far more than Aquinas would ever justify.
That’s OK, if the Church says something is licit I will agree even if the alleged explanation for it actually is mistaken.

It is not evident to me how the usual Aquinas citations make clear that ordinary man may use killing/death as a means in self-defence. I do note that not everyone who reads Aquinas understands him to be saying the same thing, however!

Speaking generally, I find it hard to understand how it could be held to be wrong to refrain from what seems like the only reasonable defence on account of a view that it renders death of the aggressor inevitable. So much else - be that Scripture or other statements by St Thomas - suggests this ought not be an impenetrable impediment.

The reason the Magistrate can do so is because he is a representative of the State,…

That administering death for purposes of punishment and the common good is restricted to proper authority seems wise and appropriate, however it is not evident why the far more restrictive right of killing when necessary to preserve innocent life would be denied to ordinary man.

In other words, the purposing of any means that involves foreseeing a certain outcome (ie an inevitable one), by definition defines direct intent

As per my earlier post, I don’t believe that’s the definition adopted by moral theologians…

How then does the Magisterium explain why the valid ectopic procedure you finally describe is licit if modern PODE understandings are flawed and not based on Aquinas at all?

A few thoughts arise:

1. Modern day understandings are not automatically flawed if they differ from St Thomas;
2. It can be that Aquinas did not get it quite right;
3. It can be that Aquinas is not correctly understood.

I am undisturbed with pleading ignorance as to understanding this question, while remaining comfortable with the understanding I have regarding self-defence and CP.

 

[Rau]

Indirectly mentioned in posts
#291
#275
… we also seem to recognise other scenarios were the evil and good “choices” are decoupled and are independent moral acts in a means/end causal relationship. Here there are two direct intents with their corresponding objects. The object of the “means” act
is usually the one that involves harm and the object-intent is often called the “proximate end”. Aquinas’s example (taken from Aristotle) seems apposite here. That of the man who steals to pay for a prostitute. Aquinas says he is more adulterer than thief, but he is still a thief of sorts. We can judge the morality of each act in itself though that determination does involve consideration of the other act. Alternatively there is the man who steals to give alms.

I suppose (2) is amenable to the (1) (double effect) type of moral analysis but I think it is somewhat ill fitting.

Blue - I see each act chosen as having but one moral object - since only 1 is a proximate end.

A) “A man intends to steal money so that he can engage a prostitute…”

The Intention font seems loaded with moral evil, both by way of intended End (engage prostitute) and intended means (steal);

Moral object - steal. *

Consequences - someone has lost money.

Seems to be no good effects in sight - no scope for PODE.

B) A man proposes to help the poor by stealing money. He arranges a financial transfer direct from a wealthy man’s account (recently hacked) to his favourite charity.

I see only one moral object. The moral object is evidently connected to the theft, not the “gift”, by virtue of the theft being the proximate /B] moral end of the act chosen. The Intended end is good, but the intended means is bad (morally bad).*

 

[Rau]

It is not evident to me how the usual Aquinas citations make clear that ordinary man may use killing/death as a means in self-defence. I do note that not everyone who reads Aquinas understands him to be saying the same thing, however!

If I had to have a go at explaining this, perhaps I would argue that when Thomas speaks of what is “intended” he is referring to the moral object. That would be consistent with my earlier explanation of the meaning of “directly intended”. There is the moral object (both for self-defence and for CP) and there is the other effect.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

It is not evident to me how the usual Aquinas citations make clear that ordinary man may use killing/death as a means in self-defence. I do note that not everyone who reads Aquinas understands him to be saying the same thing, however!

If the author I cited is correct, and nothing he says seems amiss outside of his startling reading of Aquinas on how he distinguishes between indirect and direct killing here, then I have to conclude the Magisterium likely does not agree with Aquinas on this point.
I am mildly shocked to discover this only now if it is true

Speaking generally, I find it hard to understand how it could be held to be wrong to refrain from what seems like the only reasonable defence on account of a view that it renders death of the aggressor inevitable.

I completely agree. Yet Aquinas, like Augustine, seems to be saying that.

So much else - be that Scripture or other statements by St Thomas - suggests this ought not be an impenetrable impediment.

Needs more Thomistic research I suppose.

That administering death for purposes of punishment and the common good is restricted to proper authority seems wise and appropriate, however it is not evident why the far more restrictive right of killing when necessary to preserve innocent life would be denied to ordinary man.

I suppose it was the strongly accepted tradition of Aquinas’s time (like usury)?
Look what happened to usury.

As per my earlier post, I don’t believe that’s the definition adopted by moral theologians…

That is certainly true. I have never heard any have any remonstrations over the foreseeing of a necessity outcome as denying licitness of the lethal blow by a layman. Not even my Thomist professors ever mentioned this. (Perhaps they did but I was too much of a novice at the time to remember this fine point).

A few thoughts arise:

1. Modern day understandings are not automatically flawed if they differ from St Thomas;
2. It can be that Aquinas did not get it quite right;
3. It can be that Aquinas is not correctly understood.

Of course, though I would expect Dominican professors to understand their own man best.

I am undisturbed with pleading ignorance as to understanding this question, while remaining comfortable with the understanding I have regarding self-defence and CP.

Indeed. While I put much store on the Church’s moral theology system - in the end we follow the lead of the Magisterium even if we don’t exactly know how they come to the conclusions they do.