B
Blue_Horizon
Guest
I I am not sure if your observation is quite subtle or your contribution is perhaps a little off topic?While there can be mitigating circumstances regarding whether a particular act is morally licit, such as violence against another person being justifiable if the other person is an aggressor and the violence against the aggressor is in self-defense, in other instances an act can never be moral. St. Thomas writes that certain acts “have a deformity which is inseparably annexed to them, such as fornication, adultery and other things of this sort, which can in no way be done morally” (Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 9, q.7, a.2). Recall that Canon Law, John Paul II’s FC, the CDF’s document from 1994 does not focus on mortal sin, but rather the objective sin of the “irregular” situation.
Can you simplify your point perhaps?
I accept killing is grave matter yet on occasions can be done in a fully free act of self-defence.
And the reason is only because of the pr of double effect whereby the direct act is Not the killing. So really this boils down to a non imputable killing because the consent is not fully there but only indirectly there. But that’s a very subtle point you may not mean?