Free will and foreknowledge revisited

  • Thread starter Thread starter Confessor01
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
P.S. I’m glad you’re still on the forum 🙂 It is a pleasure discussing with you, even when it is frustrating 😉
 
Let me present the argument this way: it is clear that our actions are influenced in some degree by unchosen dispositions, motives, etc. Now, either these dispositions influence us completely or only partially. if the former is true, then determinism follows. If the latter is true, then some factor, “free choice,” must be the ultimate arbiter in a decision, and this “free choice” must itself be wholly unaffected by dispositions and motives (otherwise it would be coerced). But if it is wholly unaffected by dispositions and motives, then it follows that the ultimate arbiter of a decision is entirely arbitrary. And decisions which are entirely arbitrary do not fall under the auspices of moral discourse. Therefore, it follows that if dispositions affect our choices only partially, then morality is destroyed.
I am curious, do you mind if we say that the other factor only partially influenced by unchosen dispositions is “the essential identity of the actor, which has the power of free choice”? This makes “the free individual” the ultimate arbiter in decision-making rather than choice-itself. Now, why would you suggest that unless the arbiter is “wholly unaffected” by the other factors, it is coerced? Can it not look to other factors to inform its decision? That’s the way it seems in human experience - influenced but not controlled.
Secondly, why don’t arbitrary decisions fall under the auspices of moral discourse? Do you mean that the arbiter was wholly ignorant because he was wholly unaffected by other motives? Why would being unaffected (i.e. not coerced) imply lack of knowledge of good & evil, the determinants of morality in decision-making? How do you personally define what falls under moral discourse? Does it depend on the actors knowledge of morality, their power over their actions, or on what bases they came to their decision? I am just curious how you make this argument…
 
Im still having trouble figuring out what you mean by this. Can you give a real life example. I also dont understand what it has to do with my brain argument.

“Let me present the argument this way: it is clear that our actions are influenced in some degree by unchosen dispositions, motives, etc. Now, either these dispositions influence us completely or only partially. if the former is true, then determinism follows. If the latter is true, then some factor, “free choice,” must be the ultimate arbiter in a decision, and this “free choice” must itself be wholly unaffected by dispositions and motives (otherwise it would be coerced). But if it is wholly unaffected by dispositions and motives, then it follows that the ultimate arbiter of a decision is entirely arbitrary. And decisions which are entirely arbitrary do not fall under the auspices of moral discourse. Therefore, it follows that if dispositions affect our choices only partially, then morality is destroyed.”
I’ll do my best. 🙂

Let’s say that you have a decision laid out before you: either beat up on a guy no one likes, or refrain from doing so. Now, this guy is really annoying, and he has displayed personal animosity towards you. He’s extremely annoying, rude, and mean. But you here have a chance to gain revenge and beat the guy into a pulp. You have very strong desires to beat him down.

On the other hand, you also realize that it is your duty not to exact personal revenge. (If you don’t believe this, we’ll say you do for the sake of explanation.) You have a desire to maintain this duty and therefore to refrain from beating the guy up. The situation is very enticing, as you could certainly argue that he “deserves it”; but nonetheless you realize that it’s wrong to indulge in the massacre, and you do not desire to take part in any wrongdoing. You therefore are being tugged in two directions.

Now, it either is the case that these two tugging desires are the only determining factors in your decision-making process, or it isn’t. If it is the case that desires are the only factors, then determinism clearly follows, as desires are not chosen by the individual. If it is not, then we must decide what this other aspect is. Most people who believe in free will would maintain that there is some overarching “free choice” that selects which of the desires to comply with, i.e., that the “other aspect” of decision-making, besides desires, is this free choice. They would say that free choice is “above” the desires and selects from them.

However, if this were the case, then it necessarily follows that this free choice, in choosing which desires to follow, must necessarily be totally unaffected by these desires. For, inasmuch as free choice were swayed or coerced at all by the unchosen desires, to that extent is the choice not made freely. In the example above, if what the free-willists argue is correct, then you must have some “free choice” that is totally unaffected by the two tugging desires. Your decision-making process must at some point involve you making a choice while not affected at all by either the desire to hurt the guy or the desire to uphold your duty.

But this is false on two accounts: (1) it is entirely contrary to experience, and (2) it would destroy morality.

(1) It is entirely contrary to experience. There is no point during which you choose entirely apart from the influence of motives and desires. You can’t just “turn off” the influence by desires and then make a choice. Furthermore, it is absolutely false that desires, though unchosen, would detract from freedom. Imagine you are in a court case and the defendant, who has been charged with murdering a man, explains himself: “No, I wanted to do it! I really, really wanted to murder him! I had the motivation to kill him along!” Desires and motives, though ultimately unchosen, are what fortify and create freedom, not what detract therefrom.

(2) It would destroy morality. Morality always involves weighing decisions in light of agents’ motives, dispositions, etc., and actions that are made entirely apart from motives and dispositions are therefore not the subject of moral discourse. If your decision to beat up the guy or not was without any type of external influences at all, then the choice was made in a totally arbitrary fashion, in which case it could not be judged as good or bad. By implication, it follows that no choice could be judged as good or bad – the “free choice” that must be unaffected by desires completely annihilates any trace of morality.

There, that’s a bit more fleshed out. Please don’t hesitate to tell me where, if anywhere, I have been unclear.
 
Chiral,

It seems that these two subjects have merged into the same discussion, so I will just respond to this for now:
Causal control is only extrinsic to you if you are not free at T2, but you are. It is already “set in stone” only means that someone knows that you do make that choice (in the present tense) at a future time. Your proposition is future tense, “will choose”, and is not true at any moment after T2 because of the tense. The correct logical proposition is “Ben chooses X at T2” - see how this is contingent on the moment T2? Nothing about the proposition removes causal control from the actor.
First, again, foreknowledge is not really crucial here. As I conceded a few (many?) posts back, the argument from foreknowledge is simply one way of delivering the argument that bivalence necessitates determinism. Whether or not it is true that bivalence necessitates determinism, it still follows that bivalence is the topic of discussion and not foreknowledge.

Second, I’m having a hard time understanding how your argument is not just an example of begging the question, so I’m going to try to start “from scratch” at the moment by just asking you a question and going from there:

You have said that the truth of the proposition “Ben chooses X at T2” is contingent upon Ben’s choosing X at T2. However, how can you consistently say that it is contingent upon that exact moment (T2) and also say that it is true prior to that exact moment? Would not its truth come into existence only at T2, only when I actually choose X?
I am curious, do you mind if we say that the other factor only partially influenced by unchosen dispositions is “the essential identity of the actor, which has the power of free choice”? This makes “the free individual” the ultimate arbiter in decision-making rather than choice-itself. Now, why would you suggest that unless the arbiter is “wholly unaffected” by the other factors, it is coerced? Can it not look to other factors to inform its decision? That’s the way it seems in human experience - influenced but not controlled.
Secondly, why don’t arbitrary decisions fall under the auspices of moral discourse? Do you mean that the arbiter was wholly ignorant because he was wholly unaffected by other motives? Why would being unaffected (i.e. not coerced) imply lack of knowledge of good & evil, the determinants of morality in decision-making? How do you personally define what falls under moral discourse? Does it depend on the actors knowledge of morality, their power over their actions, or on what bases they came to their decision? I am just curious how you make this argument…
(1) I don’t mind if you call the determining factor “the essential identity of the actor, which has the power of free choice” or “free choice” itself; it seems that the same objection would apply to it either way, viz. that the determining factor is completely separated from any persuasive influences.

(2) By “arbitrary” I mean “without any motives, reasons, or influences at all.” I am not referring to situations in which the decisions are often called arbitrary, e.g. “He placed a bet on team X to beat team Y arbitrarily.” Those types of “arbitrary” situations have some relevance to the arbitrariness I am referring to, but they are still distinctly different.

Presumably, knowledge of good and evil can play a role in this, but for now I do not see it as having great relevance. It seems that if all persuasive influences are absent from a decision (whether “persuasive influences” is inclusive of knowledge of good and evil or not), then morality has been destroyed already.

By the way, this is my last post for the day today. I’ve got some other things I’d like to do at the moment.

See ya tomorrow.
 
In my opinion, a lot of groups claiming to follow the Bible understand that God is allowed to dispense grace as He so pleases, that He is not obliged in any way to save anybody, that grace is sufficient, that some form of predestination, etc. do not consistently adhere to these beliefs. It’s fairly effortless to say, “Well of course, God has mercy on whom He has mercy; it’s His privilege, not His obligation,” etc., but it takes more to understand the logical implications of this.

Also, ambiguity plays a huge role. If a Calvinist were to write that entire commentary (i.e., the section you quoted), I would think he was perfectly orthodox. It all comes down to what people mean. I believe that the mechanism by which God hardened Pharaoh was a withdrawal of grace and in that sense a “permission” of evil, which is different from the Catholic viewpoint. But nonetheless both Catholic and Calvinist conceptions of God’s permission of evil can be said with the same words.

This leads to the importance of asking very direct, very revealing questions – e.g. not, Do you believe in predestination?, but, Do you believe the reprobates have any choice in being reprobate or elect?, or, Do you believe God wants only His elect to be saved?

Also, what could be important is simply inquiring into how predestination occurs in a Catholic theology, given free will, etc. Anyway, I’m done ranting.
I agree with most of your “ranting.” We can use the same terminology and mean different things. But based on what you said regarding Pharoah, I don’t think a Catholic would necessarily disagree. Pharoah’s heart was hardened not in the sense that God actively and positively hardened it, but in the sense that God withdrew His grace. Regarding the number of the elect (predestined), the Catholic Church teaches that the number is immutable. In other words, none of those who are numbered among the predestined can be lost and none can be added.
Would you agree that the text is where this dispute is to be solved?
Turning to the “text” hasn’t resolved the dispute when we have at least four major views regarding predestination and free will (Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Arminian).

I
think you misunderstood my point. By my saying that there is no a priori contradiction between them, what I mean is that it’s not completely inconceivable to think of a world in which God creates men with libertarian freedom. That world would be substantially different from our present one. Given this world, the two are in fact impossible. Given experience of this world, the contradiction is insurmountable; hence it is a posteriori.
But you made an a priori statement regarding the relationship between omniscience and free will:
I I am humbly asking that any readers please ignore the fact that the free will/omniscience argument has been visited many times in the past and look to this argument. It’s not anything special or distinct from older versions of the argument,** but I am convinced that omniscience cannot be reconciled with free will**.
And you then go on to present an argument that allegedly demonstrates that omniscience and free will cannot coexist. If God can create a world in which libertarian free will can exist, even if the world is substantially different from this world, then omniscience can be reconciled with free will. For God can never cease to be omniscient regardless of what world He creates.

God Bless,
Michael
 
I realize we often have conflicting desires, and that we very rarely have only one desire. But my point is that we always have a strongest desire at a particular moment (which could be among 1000 conflicting desires for all I know), viz. for whatever we think to reflect “the good” most at a particular moment. And our choices always act in accord with this strongest desire.

Let me present the argument this way: it is clear that our actions are influenced in some degree by unchosen dispositions, motives, etc. Now, either these dispositions influence us completely or only partially. if the former is true, then determinism follows. If the latter is true, then some factor, “free choice,” must be the ultimate arbiter in a decision, and this “free choice” must itself be wholly unaffected by dispositions and motives (otherwise it would be coerced). But if it is wholly unaffected by dispositions and motives, then it follows that the ultimate arbiter of a decision is entirely arbitrary. And decisions which are entirely arbitrary do not fall under the auspices of moral discourse. Therefore, it follows that if dispositions affect our choices only partially, then morality is destroyed.
But what makes a desire the “stronger” one? And does this “determinism” apply to God’s will as well?

God Bless,
Michael
 
But this is false on two accounts: (1) it is entirely contrary to experience, and (2) it would destroy morality.

(1) It is entirely contrary to experience. There is no point during which you choose entirely apart from the influence of motives and desires. You can’t just “turn off” the influence by desires and then make a choice. Furthermore, it is absolutely false that desires, though unchosen, would detract from freedom. Imagine you are in a court case and the defendant, who has been charged with murdering a man, explains himself: “No, I wanted to do it! I really, really wanted to murder him! I had the motivation to kill him along!” Desires and motives, though ultimately unchosen, are what fortify and create freedom, not what detract therefrom.

(2) It would destroy morality. Morality always involves weighing decisions in light of agents’ motives, dispositions, etc., and actions that are made entirely apart from motives and dispositions are therefore not the subject of moral discourse. If your decision to beat up the guy or not was without any type of external influences at all, then the choice was made in a totally arbitrary fashion, in which case it could not be judged as good or bad. By implication, it follows that no choice could be judged as good or bad – the “free choice” that must be unaffected by desires completely annihilates any trace of morality.
This is very clear. It reminded me of last year, when I spent of great deal of time working on an essay about free will, an essay that went nowhere.🙂

I agree that, in nearly every case, our choices are causally determined by something other than ourselves. I squish a mosquito. Why did I squish it? Because I don’t like mosquitoes. Why don’t I like mosquitoes? Etc. This chain of actions can be traced back causally to my birth (and beyond). The choice was *my *choice, but it was causally determined by my past.

To get *real *free will in, in my estimation, we need something that is not determined, that “have no causes which they uniformly and implicitly obey” (J.S. Mill). This is generally called indeterminacy, and thus it is said that there is no moral worth in indeterminate actions. True enough.

But what if there is another kind of cause? Is God capable of creating this? Is God capable of creating beings that create their own causal chains?

There seems to be no logical impossibility here. Of course, the decisions I’m talking about would be very rare. Maybe once in a month, or once in a year, you would make a truly moral (metaphysical cause) choice – and it would be a simple choice between right and wrong. This is known in common language as coming to a crossroads, and it is a nearly universal human experience.

These decisions are not caused by your past; they simply determine your future. Consider the cocaine addict who somehow – by the grace of God of course, but not irresistible grace – manages to say no once, and lives a life transformed. The cause **is **the action. It does not precede the action.

This idea seems to accord quite well with the Bible. “Choose this day whom you will serve”. “Now is the acceptable time; now is the day of salvation.”

I think this idea of libertarianism is compelling, although I will agree that I had very little “free will” in expressing it.😉
 
I agree with most of your “ranting.” We can use the same terminology and mean different things. But based on what you said regarding Pharoah, I don’t think a Catholic would necessarily disagree. Pharoah’s heart was hardened not in the sense that God actively and positively hardened it, but in the sense that God withdrew His grace. Regarding the number of the elect (predestined), the Catholic Church teaches that the number is immutable. In other words, none of those who are numbered among the predestined can be lost and none can be added.
I would have questions regarding how God can withdraw grace from a person without implying compatibilism. . .but we’ll leave this one alone for now.
Turning to the “text” hasn’t resolved the dispute when we have at least four major views regarding predestination and free will (Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Arminian).
Then why do you discuss texts in the first place? This particular issue, from what I have seen, is a fatal inconsistency that is almost necessarily present among Roman Catholics, but again I’m trying to end this thread here, not continue it (and I’ve discussed it elsewhere, albeit briefly), so I’ll leave this alone as well.
But you made an a priori statement regarding the relationship between omniscience and free will:
…]
And you then go on to present an argument that allegedly demonstrates that omniscience and free will cannot coexist. If God can create a world in which libertarian free will can exist, even if the world is substantially different from this world, then omniscience can be reconciled with free will. For God can never cease to be omniscient regardless of what world He creates.
Actually, to tell the truth I’m not sure if my argument is a priori or a posteriori, since the fact that it is based on is the fact that propositions regarding agents’ choices are always either true or false. Presumably, God is capable of limiting His omniscience to allow for such free acts, or of creating certain creatures who can make choices in such a way that bivalence would not apply to their choice-propositions, but in either case we would stray far from this present world.

Really, it’d be as if I made an argument based solely on the premise “Some humans have two feet,” and you said that it was not legitimate because it’s not a priori. On the contrary, my argument is unaffected by that objection. Either my argument is a priori, or if the fact that choice-propositions require bivalence is a fact of experience, then my argument is a posteriori but based on an obvious fact about our actual world. In both cases my argument is not damaged.

In other words, the fact that omniscience (or bivalence) might be able to be reconciled with free will in some world does not negate that we already have a fact in our possession with shows that they indeed cannot be reconciled in this world.
But what makes a desire the “stronger” one? And does this “determinism” apply to God’s will as well?
Ultimately God is in control of the strength of creatures’ desires, because He’s the Creator.

As for whether it applies to God, I have no idea. He’s the Creator, and I’m not willing at the moment to say that if compatibilism is true for humans then it’s true for God. I would have to do more work in that subject. Good question, though.
 
To get *real *free will in, in my estimation, we need something that is not determined, that “have no causes which they uniformly and implicitly obey” (J.S. Mill). This is generally called indeterminacy, and thus it is said that there is no moral worth in indeterminate actions. True enough.

But what if there is another kind of cause? Is God capable of creating this? Is God capable of creating beings that create their own causal chains?

There seems to be no logical impossibility here. Of course, the decisions I’m talking about would be very rare. Maybe once in a month, or once in a year, you would make a truly moral (metaphysical cause) choice – and it would be a simple choice between right and wrong. This is known in common language as coming to a crossroads, and it is a nearly universal human experience.

These decisions are not caused by your past; they simply determine your future. Consider the cocaine addict who somehow – by the grace of God of course, but not irresistible grace – manages to say no once, and lives a life transformed. The cause **is **the action. It does not precede the action.

This idea seems to accord quite well with the Bible. “Choose this day whom you will serve”. “Now is the acceptable time; now is the day of salvation.”

I think this idea of libertarianism is compelling, although I will agree that I had very little “free will” in expressing it.😉
(1) Really, I don’t think we can appeal to another type of cause. The reason I lump desires, motives, dispositions, etc. into one category (and the reason I often use different terms to represent the category) is because they are all unchosen influences persuading the agent. As a result, whatever aspect of decision-making is wanted to be the ultimate determiner must necessarily be free from all types of desires, etc. And although I haven’t argued specifically for this, I don’t think it’s possible in the first place for humans to choose without a desire for what they are choosing – even if the choice is “random.” But regardless of that point, what necessarily follows from the fact that the ultimate determiner of choices is free of unchosen persuasive influences is that, inasmuch as these influences are necessary for morality, morality is destroyed.

(2) Even crossroads, like the type expressed in Deut. 30:11ff., do not imply that these influences are gone. They just imply that two options are presented and that the choice is important.

(3) Although you didn’t bring up this topic, what you said could logically lead to it, so I’ll say it anyway: Not all of our desires are unchosen. It is not uncommon for someone to “will” themselves into wanting something. But nonetheless, these chosen desires are ultimately unchosen, because the desires needed to cause the “willing” of the desire must be present, and there has to be some point at which the unchosen desires start the process – because if there weren’t, then you run into all the problems with morality being destroyed, etc.
 
(1) Really, I don’t think we can appeal to another type of cause. The reason I lump desires, motives, dispositions, etc. into one category (and the reason I often use different terms to represent the category) is because they are all unchosen influences persuading the agent. As a result, whatever aspect of decision-making is wanted to be the ultimate determiner must necessarily be free from all types of desires, etc.
A slight quibble. The ultimate determiner need not be free of *all *desires, but it may not be determined by any desires of the agent, not even the desire to “be good”. This is why when we try to “be good” – acting as if this is something against our nature – we often fail. Or if we succeed, we succeed out of habit or desire, not out of free will.

The impetus (or grace) to do the right thing in a fully undetermined (free will) decision must come from God, but it may be resisted by the agent. It is not resisted or accepted because of any desires in the agent, but rather out of a fundamentally chosen decision between life or death, goodness or sin. It is not random.
And although I haven’t argued specifically for this, I don’t think it’s possible in the first place for humans to choose without a desire for what they are choosing – even if the choice is “random.”
I tend to agree, except for the rare exceptions that I am arguing for. When you pick a random number, you always do have a reason for picking that number.

It’s clear that you don’t agree with what I’m arguing for, but that’s alright – I’m not really trying to convince you. But I would like you to commit to whether my scenario is logically possible. The questions I asked before are these: But what if there is another kind of cause? Is God capable of creating this? Is God capable of creating beings that create their own causal chains?
 
The impetus (or grace) to do the right thing in a fully undetermined (free will) decision must come from God, but it may be resisted by the agent. It is not resisted or accepted because of any desires in the agent, but rather out of a fundamentally chosen decision between life or death, goodness or sin. It is not random.
Well if you want to say that the decision is “fundamentally chosen” yet “not…because of any desires in the agent,” then you must explain how.
 
Well if you want to say that the decision is “fundamentally chosen” yet “not…because of any desires in the agent,” then you must explain how.
After all of the desires have influenced me to make one or the other decision, yet I still exist as a person making that decision. I may accept the grace of God to do the right thing, or reject His grace. I may choose which motivations I will be compelled by, if you will. This decision manifests an emergent cause, a binary decision between affirming or denying the purpose of my life.

Why do I make the choice accept His grace? Because that is me. There is no other answer, and this answer posits causation in the hands of a sovereign being – that is, myself.

The answer to *how *is *through the power *of God. You could say that I am a co-creator with God, because this decision was mine from the foundation of the world. You need to explain to me why God could not do this.
 
After all of the desires have influenced me to make one or the other decision, yet I still exist as a person making that decision. I may accept the grace of God to do the right thing, or reject His grace. I may choose which motivations I will be compelled by, if you will. This decision manifests an emergent cause, a binary decision between affirming or denying the purpose of my life.

Why do I make the choice accept His grace? Because that is me. There is no other answer, and this answer posits causation in the hands of a sovereign being – that is, myself.

The answer to *how *is *through the power *of God. You could say that I am a co-creator with God, because this decision was mine from the foundation of the world. You need to explain to me why God could not do this.
I understand that, according to the Catholic notion, God made humans as “mini-creators” and in doing so gave them the free will that He already has. I get that. But it doesn’t follow that asserting this – saying that you have free will “through the power of God,” etc. – is conducive to explaining how my argument is not cogent.

You said, “I may choose which motivations I will be compelled by, if you will.”

This is the exact problem I am trying to reveal that is necessarily inherent in the free-willist paradigm, viz. how one goes about choosing which things he will be influenced by, when those influences are always unchosen. This is contrary to experience and destroys morality; please see my explanations of that above.

You can say that the choice is all yours after your influences have done their work, but this doesn’t avoid the problem I have laid out above.
 
Actually, to tell the truth I’m not sure if my argument is a priori or a posteriori, since the fact that it is based on is the fact that propositions regarding agents’ choices are always either true or false. Presumably, God is capable of limiting His omniscience to allow for such free acts, or of creating certain creatures who can make choices in such a way that bivalence would not apply to their choice-propositions, but in either case we would stray far from this present world.
I agree that we should leave the other topics alone because we already have enough to talk about with this one alone! 😃

How can God limit His own omniscience? How can He chose to not know something?

God Bless,
Michael
 
How can God limit His own omniscience? How can He chose to not know something?
No idea. But I don’t know if we have enough to presently rule out that God could do it in some possible world. (I would never say this is the case in our actual world, given the Biblical witness.)
 
This is the exact problem I am trying to reveal that is necessarily inherent in the free-willist paradigm, viz. how one goes about choosing which things he will be influenced by, when those influences are always unchosen. This is contrary to experience and destroys morality; please see my explanations of that above.

You can say that the choice is all yours after your influences have done their work, but this doesn’t avoid the problem I have laid out above.
You argue that a person will always pick the stronger desire and that ultimately it is God that determines whih is the stronger desire. How does that occur, for Scripture says God does not tempt anyone? Does God directly cause a desire to strengthen? I ask this because our desires are not static, they are dynamic. A desire that at one point was the “stronger” can cease being the “stronger.” For example, the desire to use drugs is no longer that strongest desire in a former drug addict, though the desire may remain. Or a person can chose to purchase something - the desire to purchase being the strongest - and then regret that decision and return the product and get his or her money back.

If a desire is instrinically the strongest, then there would be no process of deliberation. But the mere fact that there is deliberation prior to choice means that neither desire is inherently the strongest. Choices are certainly influenced and even constrained by a number of factors (dispostion, environment, etc.). But one thing is to say that our free will is limited and another thing is to say that because of these influences, free will does not exist. Free will simply means the ability to chose available options, not the freedom to do whatever you want. Every human being’s choice, for example, is limited by the fact that they are human. If I am on the 80 the floor, I only have two options as a human if I want to leave the building safely. I can either take the elevator or use the stairs. I cannot fly because that is not an available option. I don’t have wings. But within the lmited range of options I do have, I still have the freedom to chose.

I’ll have to continue this another day because I have to go. I will say that it has been a pleasure discussing this with you. I believe this discussion has been a great spiritual and intellectual exercise for me and I hope you feel the same way. I am very impressed by your posts and I can’t believe you’re 19. I hope you continue to post in this thread because this has been an interesting and informative process. May God Bless you. 🙂

God Bless,
Michael
 
Wow, I have a busy day at work and am not able to reply, and suddenly the thread is really long! My apologies for my delay, and I will get to the other thread about infinity, again my apologies…
Chiral,…First, again, foreknowledge is not really crucial here. As I conceded a few (many?) posts back, the argument from foreknowledge is simply one way of delivering the argument that bivalence necessitates determinism. Whether or not it is true that bivalence necessitates determinism, it still follows that bivalence is the topic of discussion and not foreknowledge.
Second, I’m having a hard time understanding how your argument is not just an example of begging the question, so I’m going to try to start “from scratch” at the moment by just asking you a question and going from there:

You have said that the truth of the proposition “Ben chooses X at T2” is contingent upon Ben’s choosing X at T2. However, how can you consistently say that it is contingent upon that exact moment (T2) and also say that it is true prior to that exact moment? Would not its truth come into existence only at T2, only when I actually choose X?
Indeed the truth of the statement “Ben chooses X at T2” only comes into existence in the sense of actuation at T2… but that does not mean it is only true at T2, it means that it is only true contingent upon T2. The statement includes at least 4 necessary factors upon which its truth is contingent: 1) Ben, the subject, 2) his (your) freedom to choose (event), 3) X and ~X as potential objects, 4) T2, the time of the event. Now, without any one of these factors, the statement cannot be both complete and logically true. If the statement is true, that truth is eternal, for the time that the statement is made is not one of the necessary factors, nor is any prophet, only those 4 factors. Thus, the statement can be true before the event takes place without determining the event. Does that help?

(
  1. I don’t mind if you call the determining factor “the essential identity of the actor, which has the power of free choice” or “free choice” itself; it seems that the same objection would apply to it either way, viz. that the determining factor is completely separated from any persuasive influences.
    (2) By “arbitrary” I mean “without any motives, reasons, or influences at all.” I am not referring to situations in which the decisions are often called arbitrary, e.g. “He placed a bet on team X to beat team Y arbitrarily.” Those types of “arbitrary” situations have some relevance to the arbitrariness I am referring to, but they are still distinctly different.
    Presumably, knowledge of good and evil can play a role in this, but for now I do not see it as having great relevance. It seems that if all persuasive influences are absent from a decision (whether “persuasive influences” is inclusive of knowledge of good and evil or not), then morality has been destroyed already.
You may have replied to this further in this post (I prolly shouldn’t have jumped onto someelse’s subject), but i am still confused as to your objection. In the justice system, the arbiter is considered “arbitrary” when he ignores the laws of the system he has sworn to follow and instead rules according to his own conscience, will, or whim - “arbitrary” is when the reason for the choice exists within the will of the arbiter alone. Your definition of “arbitrary” as “without any motives, reasons, or influences at all” is incorrect - that would be “random” not “arbitrary”, and randomness implies that there is no reason at all, that the choice was determined by chaos and not by the will of any arbiter. Indeed, if that is the case then morality is not part of the discussion. But in free-will, there is an arbiter beyond chaos, namely the human being.
 
40.png
Confessor01:
I realize we often have conflicting desires, and that we very rarely have only one desire. But my point is that we always have a strongest desire at a particular moment (which could be among 1000 conflicting desires for all I know), viz. for whatever we think to reflect “the good” most at a particular moment. And our choices always act in accord with this strongest desire.
This is neither a logical necessity nor a practical reality. We often have difficulty choosing between conflicting desires precisely because they are quantitatively equal. Choosing one of these quantitatively equal desires often represents avoiding another, strongly undesirable outcome.
That being said, let’s take this proposition P: “Ben will choose X at time T2.” At time T1, this proposition is either true or false; for argument’s sake, we’ll say that it’s true. This means that at time T1, it is already “set in stone” that I will choose X at time T2. This implies that I have no ability to change this prior to choosing X at T2, which in turn implies that the source of causal control in my choosing X is entirely extrinsic to me.
This is a restatement of your OP and it is equally untrue IMHO! You continue to confuse not actually choosing X with not exercising free will with respect to not choosing X.
Let me ask you a very simple question:
Is the exercise of free will by person A in any way contingent upon the knowledge of person B with respect to that choice?? I submit it is not. If I receive future knowledge of an event, that knowledge does not, by necessity, influence the event at all. Knowledge of an event and causation of an event are separate. Simply put:
The reality that an event will occur does not obviate that free will can exist concomitant with its occurrence
 
No idea. But I don’t know if we have enough to presently rule out that God could do it in some possible world. (I would never say this is the case in our actual world, given the Biblical witness.)
Being that omniscience is an attribute of God, I don’t see how he can chose not to know something and still be omniscient. But that’s it for me today. 🙂

God Bless,
Michael
 
You argue that a person will always pick the stronger desire and that ultimately it is God that determines whih is the stronger desire. How does that occur, for Scripture says God does not tempt anyone? Does God directly cause a desire to strengthen?
It’s pretty safe to say that God could alter people’s desires either immediately or by means of secondary causes.

However, we must understand that God’s altering people’s characters is not a matter of temptation. Temptation is always external to oneself and is a matter of appealing to one’s sinful desires. The fact that God is ultimately in control of one’s desires (as He is in control of everything), being an internal action, cannot be considered as temptation.
I ask this because our desires are not static, they are dynamic. A desire that at one point was the “stronger” can cease being the “stronger.” For example, the desire to use drugs is not longer that strongest desire in a former drug addict, though the desire may remain. Or a person can chose to purchase something - the desire to purchase being the strongest - and then regret that decision and return the product and get his or her money back.
I agree that our desires are often, if not always, dynamic and changing. But it still would follow that they would have some specific “value” or “strength” at any given instant.
If a desire is instrinically the strongest, then there would be no process of deliberation. But the mere fact that there is deliberation prior to choice means that neither desire is inherently the strongest.
Deliberation would imply not that there is a “tie” among desires, but that there is some competition among them. If we were to give desires some numerical rating of strength, I’ll put it this way. If you have a desire to do X at 50 units, and a desire not to do it at 49.9 units, then you will deliberate. If you have a desire to do X at 50 units and a desire not to do it at 0 units, then you will not deliberate to any extent at all.
Choices are certainly influenced and even constrained by a number of factors (dispostion, environment, etc.). But one thing is to say that a our free will is limited and another thing is to say that because of these influences, free will does not exist. Free will simply means the ability to chose available options, not the freedom to do whatever you want. Every human being’s choice, for example, is limited by the fact that they are human. If I am on the 80 the floor, I only have two options as a human if I want to leave the building safely. I can either take the elevator or use the stairs. I cannot fly because that is not an available option. I don’t have wings. But within the lmited range of options I do have, I still have the freedom to chose.
I agree with you that free will doesn’t imply the ability to do anything. Our options are certainly limited by our environment. But free will nonetheless implies that among our available options, we have some absolute, innate ability to choose between them – and that is what I am critiquing.

mikeledes;5478203I’ll have to continue this another day because I have to go. I will say that it has been a pleasure discussing this with you. I believe this discussion has been a great spiritual and intellectual exercise for me and I hope you feel the same way. I am very impressed by your posts and I can’t believe you’re 19. I hope you continue to post in this thread because this has been an interesting and informative process. May God Bless you. :slight_smile: [/quote said:
Thank you for your kind words. This certainly has been a pleasant discussion. 🙂
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top