As I’ve stated multiple times in this thread, my points, as well as Bradski’s and oldcelt’s, apply equally well even if time is disregarded. Consider the following modal argument:
- God acts according to his nature. That is, if it is God’s nature to do something, he does it.
- God’s nature is necessary. That is, God cannot have been anything other than what he is.
It is a basic axiom of modal logic that necessity distributes over conditionals. In laymen terms, to say that it is necessarily the case that A implies B is to say that the necessity of A implies the necessity of B. Another axiom of modal logic is that theorems are necessary truths. (1) is a theorem since it is true merely because of the way in which God is defined. Even if God didn’t exist, it would still be true. So the conditional in (1) is a necessary truth. This means that, by the first axiom I mention, we have:
- If God’s nature is necessary, his actions are necessary.
By modus ponens, (2) and (3) lead to the conclusion:
- God’s actions are necessary.
So there you have it. God can’t help but do what he does. He lacks free will in any meaningful sense. Now I know that some of modal logic is considered controversial, but the two axioms I mentioned are never questioned. It’s not like I’m using S5 or something. They are the most basic axioms you can use to even call your logic a modal logic.