How do we come to know things?

[Linusthe2nd]

If you got through the previous post , here are a few observations.

1. 
   *]What we know (according to Aquinas) is things, like trees, birds, and people. The various representations that we have in our minds (the phantasm, the concept) are only the means by which we know the things. It was a common error (in my opinion) of Modern philosophers (like Descartes, Kant, or even Locke) to confuse the two. They began to think that what we know is the representation itself; and in my opinion, that small error caused a whole series of philosophical problems (a topic, however, for another thread).
   *]We know those things, whole and entire, before we come to know their constituent parts (such as their accidents). We might have a vague and confused notion at first, but our knowledge is always of whole beings, not just of colors and geometric forms.
   *]Our intellects, as I said, are fundamentally receptive. They simply register what our senses place before them. There are pine trees outside my window, and they are green, whether I like it or not. (Really nice Roman umbrella pine, actually.)
   *]It is sufficient to have a single experience of a thing, in order to form a concept about it. Even if the pine tree outside my window were the first tree I ever saw in my life, I would still form a valid concept about it, albeit a very vague and confused one. Concepts are “universal” inasmuch as they are applicable to many concrete individuals, not because the knower has actually had contact with many such individuals.
   *]What does the “concept” consist of? Aquinas says that the proper object of the human intellect is quidditas rei materialis, literally the “whatness of material things” (Summa, I, q. 84, a. 2, corpus). However, “quiddity” is another name for essence, and I think we may need to reconsider the premise that the essence is unknowable. (I think it goes back to specifying what we mean by “essence;” that is a topic, however, for another post.)

1. 
   We look forward to your analysis. I do disagree with your analysis of the " common sense." I view it as an act of the intellect. It receives the diverse data of senses, collates and organizes them, producing a phantasm. I do not see how the brain could be doing these things. The authors I referenced in my earlier posts, including Klubertanz, offered no insight on where the " commen sense " might be.
   
   Also, I am sure I will be disagreeing with you on " essence. " Considering what we know about the accidents of the species remaining after the Consecration, their substance having been changed into the Body and Blood of Christ, I don’t see how we could " see " the essence of anything. I think what we see are the accidents of an essence or substance, which we know to be there by reason of the accidents.
   
   Linus2nd.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Hi Juan,

As Linus observes, and is clear to anyone, I am no philosopher.
And, that may make it easier for me to see that a two-year-old may “know” more than he will later in life.

Dear Louis:

As I said before, I find nothing wrong on not being you a philosopher. I know that a lot of people is bothered with the existence of philosophers; but I have never paid anyone with the same coin. I am happy with the existence of philosophers and non-philosophers.

I am going to assert that
the relationship that exists between the mystery of the person and of the reality in which he participates,
while made possible in its human form
by these “mechanisms”,
may be broken
as the ideas themselves
take the place of the reality
which they are supposed to reveal.

Did you say that you know nothing about philosophy, Louis? I would take your words as mine.

I do actually observe what is revealed in scripture:
Matt 11:25 - At that time Jesus said, "I praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and learned, and revealed them to little children.
Now, imho scientists are far worse than philosophers in this regard; and they, with all the thinking about theories and categories going on, may actually no longer see a pretty flower.

Regards Louis.

Think it twice, Louis. Are you saying that God hid the things Jesus was speaking about to the Church Fathers, St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, etcetera, who were wise men, just because they were wise? Do you think our Church has not done good when it preserved the culture, and created libraries and great universities to spread it?

You should not judge something that you don’t know from inside. That is prejudice. One of the things that a philosopher does for a long time is precisely to eliminate prejudices from his own mind? There is nothing wrong with it.

Nevermind…

Have a good night
JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

As other readers have noted, the theory of knowledge is a philosophical problem, because, on the one hand, the things that we know are material and concrete, whereas our thoughts are universal and immaterial. (At least to some degree: obviously, when I know a tree, it is not as if the tree starts to grow in my brain. There is some kind of image or representation in me, through which I know the tree. This turns out to be probably the strongest argument for the spirituality of the soul, but let’s leave that aside for the moment.)

Dear Imelahn:

You have proposed a reasonable outline of the subject. I want to say something concerning your paragraph above. But first of all, I entirely agree with you that our intellectual capabilities are a strong foundation to support the idea of our spirituality. And I would eliminate your phrase “at least to some degree”, from your post.

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant said that we have certain knowledge that is universal and necessary. The knowledge he was talking about are certain judgements that, according to him, have these characteristics. Independently of any agreement or disagreement with him (I disagree), I would say that he was really dealing with knowledge.

You are not mentioning judgements, but representations, which -I would say- are not knowledge yet, but, at any rate, the elements of knowledge.

Besides this, your example of the tree as an instance of universal thought does not seem satisfactory to me. I would ask you: what do you mean when you say that your representation of a tree is universal? Isn’t it your representation?

I look forward to your answer Imelahn

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[Aloysium]

. . . are you saying that God hid the things Jesus was speaking about to the Church Fathers, St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, etcetera, who were wise men, just because they were wise? Do you think our Church has not done good when it preserved the culture, and created libraries and great universities to spread it? . . .

I think Peter was referring to people whom society considers wise according to its standards. Wisdom as a grace of the Holy Spirit is given freely to all who seek.
Those whom society considers wise are not necessarily those who are truly wise. Unfortunately too many scientists, for example, never smell the roses.

 

[GEddie]

I think Peter was referring to people whom society considers wise according to its standards. Wisdom as a grace of the Holy Spirit is given freely to all who seek.
Those whom society considers wise are not necessarily those who are truly wise. Unfortunately too many scientists, for example, never smell the roses.

The nose always knows!

ICXC NIKA

 

[Nixbits]

Aloysium:

Now, imho scientists are far worse than philosophers in this regard; and they, with all the thinking about theories and categories going on, may actually no longer see a pretty flower.

Aloysium:

Unfortunately too many scientists, for example, never smell the roses.

Aloysium, I don’t share your opinion about scientists. As an engineer (an ‘applied-scientist’, perhaps) I feel obliged to speak up in their defence. In my experience, scientists are just as likely as anyone else to appreciate the beauty of flowers, and the delicacy of their scent (if they don’t suffer from hay fever). Scientists are perhaps more likely than most people, however, to appreciate the beauty of mathematics, cosmology, genetics and many other fields of study of the physical world.

 

[lmelahn]

Dear Imelahn:

You have proposed a reasonable outline of the subject. I want to say something concerning your paragraph above. But first of all, I entirely agree with you that our intellectual capabilities are a strong foundation to support the idea of our spirituality. And I would eliminate your phrase “at least to some degree”, from your post.

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant said that we have certain knowledge that is universal and necessary. The knowledge he was talking about are certain judgements that, according to him, have these characteristics. Independently of any agreement or disagreement with him (I disagree), I would say that he was really dealing with knowledge.

You are not mentioning judgements, but representations, which -I would say- are not knowledge yet, but, at any rate, the elements of knowledge.

Besides this, your example of the tree as an instance of universal thought does not seem satisfactory to me. I would ask you: what do you mean when you say that your representation of a tree is universal? Isn’t it your representation?

I look forward to your answer Imelahn

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

When I say “at least to some degree,” it is not that I don’t think that our concepts are truly immaterial and universal–they are. I just don’t think we can take it for granted. It is something that needs to be proved.

Regarding whether representations are “knowledge” or not: they are certainly acts of our cognitive faculties. Concepts are acts of the intellect; sensible species (phantasms) are acts of our faculties for sensual knowledge. Aquinas calls the formation of concepts the “first” or “imperfect” act of the intellect.

A judgment–which at its most basic level is an assessment of whether a certain concept really exists–is the “perfect” or “second” act of the intellect.

(I didn’t mention judgments because I didn’t want to complicate things further, but I agree with you that the intellect does not make a “complete” act until it “composes” or “divides”–Aquinas’ terminology for affirming or denying.)

For Aquinas (and I think I agree with him), strictly speaking, knowledge is a “habit” of the intellect, which disposes the intellect to produce true judgments. (For example, if I possess the knowledge, or “science,” of entomology, I will be able to make true affirmations about insects.)

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is a fascinating work, but I think it suffers from several flaws. For one thing, Kant asserts (frankly, without proof) that it is impossible to have certain and universal knowledge of anything that is a posteriori (i.e., known through experience). There can only be certain, necessary, and universal knowledge that is a priori (obtained without recourse to experience). That is why his categories and schemata are necessary: unified knowledge of something (according to Kant) has to be “constructed” by the understanding.

 

[lmelahn]

Dear Imelahn:

…]

Besides this, your example of the tree as an instance of universal thought does not seem satisfactory to me. I would ask you: what do you mean when you say that your representation of a tree is universal? Isn’t it your representation?

I look forward to your answer Imelahn

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

My knowledge of the tree is by means of both a representation (sensual and intellectual) and a judgment. As soon as I see the tree, my mind immediately affirms (perhaps not in words), “That is an umbrella pine tree.”

The “universality” of intellectual representations (i.e., concepts) does not depend on their being actually in the minds of many people. Nor does it strictly depend on their applying to many things.

It is “universal” in the sense that it is not a concrete individual, but an abstraction of the kind of thing that is. My intellect grasps the “umbrella pine tree in general,” so to speak.

In fact, according to Aquinas (and again, I find it hard to refute him), in order for me to know that particular and concrete pine tree, I need help of a phantasm (sensual representation) produced by my cogitative power.

My intellect gets “pine tree in general;” but I have to look at what my cogitative power is telling me to say, “this thing here is a pine tree.”

 

[JuanFlorencio]

My knowledge of the tree is by means of both a representation (sensual and intellectual) and a judgment. As soon as I see the tree, my mind immediately affirms (perhaps not in words), “That is an umbrella pine tree.”

Hi Imelahn!:

Please, look at yourself attentively while you think on an object in different circumstances. I think you will observe that your knowledge of it comprises not only your “representation” and one judgement, but many judgements. This is extremely important, and I would like to say more about it later. Another element of your knowledge, quite important as well, is language. A great part of our knowledge comes from learning through language, without direct experience, and, therefore, many times without images.

It is not strange to find people who talks as if they knew something as experts, but that on examination it turns that they don’t have personal experiences that support their discourses. However, I wouldn’t dare to say that they know nothing; it’s simply that they learned almost exclusively through language.

The “universality” of intellectual representations (i.e., concepts) does not depend on their being actually in the minds of many people. Nor does it strictly depend on their applying to many things.

It is “universal” in the sense that it is not a concrete individual, but an abstraction of the kind of thing that is. My intellect grasps the “umbrella pine tree in general,” so to speak.

Intellectual representations (IR) are concrete. If you can distinguish one from another in your mind, and count them it is because they are concrete. “The same intellectual representation” in the mind of many people would be just a multitude of concrete representations. So, I agree with you when you say that the universality of IR does not depend on their being in the minds of many people. But I would say that it certainly depends on their applying to many things. But there is a complexity here…

I would ask you again to look attentively at yourself when you think of an object in different circumstances. I am sure you will notice that your IR varies from one occasion to the other. Your conception of the pine tree is not simple, but composed of many elements, and it becomes richer and richer (it would not happen if it were simple) as you gain in experience. Now, you can gain in experience because the pine tree shows itself in different ways depending on circumstances. For each different circumstance you add new elements to you IR of the pine tree. So, when you find new pine trees in different circumstances, different sets of elements in your IR emerge in your conscience (those that are relevant in that moment), and you can recognize the particular pine tree in front of you. Your IR varies from one occasion to the other.

In fact, according to Aquinas (and again, I find it hard to refute him), in order for me to know that particular and concrete pine tree, I need help of a phantasm (sensual representation) produced by my cogitative power.

My intellect gets “pine tree in general;” but I have to look at what my cogitative power is telling me to say, “this thing here is a pine tree.”

There is one reason why Aristotle proposed that our intellect always needs images to think. He was influenced by the idea that the like knows the like. Therefore, our intellect cannot know material entities directly because our soul is immaterial. And he said that images are identical to material objects, except because they are not material. So, the intellect must know material objects through images.

I think most of us have a false conception about the powers of imagination. Unless you possess a photographic memory, you are unable to describe correctly the characteristics of a more or less complex object that you just have seen some minutes ago. And if no one asks you, you will tend to think that the image you have of it is “exact”; but it is not.

It wouldn’t be strange if Aristotle, “the intelligence of the Academy” (as Plato used to call him), had a photographic memory, but most of us don’t. We cannot know material objects through the images we form of them; we have a direct experience of them.

Now, what do we know of material objects? We know their interactions. If you ask me, for example, “what is gold?”, I will mention as many interactions as I can from those that characterize “gold”: it is a chemical element which has a density of so and so under so and so conditions, etcetera. Even though interactions define the materiality of those objects, there is no problem in saying that our intellect has direct access to interactions.

But imagination certainly plays an important role in cognition. I say that it allows us to mimic interactions. That is the main function that I can attribute to imagination.

I think that trying to refute Aristotle or St. Thomas is fruitless; but if we explain their doctrines, it can become clear how they need to develop. That is what I try to do.

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[lmelahn]

I will have to respond in parts .

Hi Imelahn!:

Please, look at yourself attentively while you think on an object in different circumstances. I think you will observe that your knowledge of it comprises not only your “representation” and one judgement, but many judgements. This is extremely important, and I would like to say more about it later. Another element of your knowledge, quite important as well, is language. A great part of our knowledge comes from learning through language, without direct experience, and, therefore, many times without images.

It is not strange to find people who talks as if they knew something as experts, but that on examination it turns that they don’t have personal experiences that support their discourses. However, I wouldn’t dare to say that they know nothing; it’s simply that they learned almost exclusively through language.

I agree. Indeed there are many representations (for one thing, the notion of “tree” includes that of “living creature” and “substance,” at a minimum). And each of these is representable in language (which can be “internal”–the verbum mentis–or “external”–the words we all know). And our judgements are expressible in “internal” enunciations, as well as “external” propositions (to use the classic terminology).

And clearly, we can use language to transmit knowledge to others. (As we are doing now, I hope .)

Intellectual representations (IR) are concrete. If you can distinguish one from another in your mind, and count them it is because they are concrete.

At least according to Aquinas (and I think I agree with him), strictly intellectual representations–the concepta, the final products of abstraction–are not “concrete,” because they abstract from the particular matter of the thing known. We can, however, know individuals by comparing the conceptum with the phantasm. That is, actually, the most basic kind of judgment: “This individual is an umbrella pine.”

(For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, and practically all the medieval philosophers, a “universal” is essentially the same thing as one of Plato’s “ideas” or “forms.” The question is: where does the idea, or universal, reside? For Plato, it was in the Hyperuranion–Plato’s way of saying that the Ideas existed by themselves, independently of human minds. For Aquinas, they exist always in a mind: as Divine Ideas in the mind of God, and as “concepts” in the human mind.)

“The same intellectual representation” in the mind of many people would be just a multitude of concrete representations.

I think we have to distinguish two levels here.

A conceptum, considered as an act of the intellect, a passio animae, to use the classical terminology, is concrete, yes. But, if we look at the contents of that conceptum, I think there it tells a different story.

There is a subtle point here of the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of knowledge (which I consider the best one out there): the form that constitutes the conceptum and the form that constitutes the thing known are exactly the same. When we know something, our intellects (in a certain respect) actually become the thing that is known.

Hence–speaking in terms of contents–the concept that you have of “umbrella pine” and the one I have are exactly the same, and it is exactly identical to the form that all concrete umbrella pines possess (inasmuch as they are umbrella pines, obviously).

Clearly, there are different intellects involved, and hence different passiones animae, but there is perfect identity of form.

So, I agree with you when you say that the universality of IR does not depend on their being in the minds of many people. But I would say that it certainly depends on their applying to many things. But there is a complexity here…

In my opinion, they are applicable to many things, but not necessarily applied to many things. There is only one Eiffel Tower, but I can make valid a concept of it. If ever another tower of the same kind were built, I would know how to apply the concept to it. But it is not actually applicable to more than one tower at the moment.

I would ask you again to look attentively at yourself when you think of an object in different circumstances. I am sure you will notice that your IR varies from one occasion to the other. Your conception of the pine tree is not simple, but composed of many elements, and it becomes richer and richer (it would not happen if it were simple) as you gain in experience. Now, you can gain in experience because the pine tree shows itself in different ways depending on circumstances. For each different circumstance you add new elements to you IR of the pine tree. So, when you find new pine trees in different circumstances, different sets of elements in your IR emerge in your conscience (those that are relevant in that moment), and you can recognize the particular pine tree in front of you. Your IR varies from one occasion to the other.

I can enrich my understanding of umbrella pines, certainly, but I am not forming different concepts here, just getting a better grasp of that unique concept.

There is only one concept or notion of umbrella pine, but that doesn’t meant that I can’t have many sensual representations (phantasms). I have as many of those as pine trees I have seen, and I can even use my imagination to make more.

 

[lmelahn]

There is one reason why Aristotle proposed that our intellect always needs images to think. He was influenced by the idea that the like knows the like. Therefore, our intellect cannot know material entities directly because our soul is immaterial. And he said that images are identical to material objects, except because they are not material. So, the intellect must know material objects through images.

Right, although there are different degrees of abstraction from matter, as I mentioned; there is a sensual image (“phantasm”–I don’t think this is Aristotle’s exact terminology, but the essential notion is there), and the intellectual image (the conceptum in Aquinas’ terminology).

The sensual image (phantasm) abstracts from matter to a certain degree, but not completely. We are still on the level of our physical, bodily faculties, and so we cannot yet go beyond this concrete individual. It takes the agent intellect to abstract completely, and allow the intellect to assume the form of the thing that is known.

I think most of us have a false conception about the powers of imagination. Unless you possess a photographic memory, you are unable to describe correctly the characteristics of a more or less complex object that you just have seen some minutes ago. And if no one asks you, you will tend to think that the image you have of it is “exact”; but it is not.

It wouldn’t be strange if Aristotle, “the intelligence of the Academy” (as Plato used to call him), had a photographic memory, but most of us don’t. We cannot know material objects through the images we form of them; we have a direct experience of them.

Of course, it is not strictly speaking through our imagination that we know things, as I mentioned, but through the intellect. And knowing things does not require a prodigious memory.

Now, what do we know of material objects? We know their interactions. If you ask me, for example, “what is gold?”, I will mention as many interactions as I can from those that characterize “gold”: it is a chemical element which has a density of so and so under so and so conditions, etcetera. Even though interactions define the materiality of those objects, there is no problem in saying that our intellect has direct access to interactions.

Hm. In tongue and cheek, this sounds an awful lot like John Locke’s theory of knowledge .

I think that the best reading of Aristotle and Thomas is that we know the essence of the thing known. (Here, I must respectfully disagree with Linus2nd.)

We know that essence by means of its actions (interactions, if you will) and properties (which produce those interactions).

When a man proposes to a woman and gives her a golden ring, she does not say, “What a high density this metal has, and what exquisite thermal and electrical conductivity!” No, she says, “What beautiful gold!”

Do you see what I mean? We are capable of grasping the essence of things immediately. Clearly, it is by means of the gold’s properties and actions; but the essence is the first thing we grasp (right after we grasp that it is a “being”). We might have a confused and vague knowledge at first, but it is valid nonetheless.

But the portion of the essence that actually makes contact with our intellects, so to speak, is the form (whether that be the substantial form or the accidental form). We know when our intellect con-forms (in the technical sense of that word) to thing that is known. We actually (in Aristotle’s language) become that thing. (Not in every respect, obviously, but only–to use the classical terminology–in intention.)

(As you can see, I that that Descartes was very much in error when he said that certainty can only be obtained through clear and distinct ideas.)

Have you ever heard the expression, attributed to Aristotle, that the soul is “to a certain degree all things” (quodammodo omnia)? That is what the expression refers to: that our intellects can “become” the things that it knows.

But imagination certainly plays an important role in cognition. I say that it allows us to mimic interactions. That is the main function that I can attribute to imagination.

In my opinion, it is not primarily the interactions, but the sensual experience that is reproduced in imagination. It stores the result of the unification that the “common sense” does, taking the various signals received by the external senses. Our external senses report unordered data points, if you like: green and brown at such–and–such a location in space; this kind of smell; that kind of taste; that sound; and so on. What that is put together into a coherent “picture,” the “picture” is stored in the imagination, ready to be recalled when necessary.

I think that trying to refute Aristotle or St. Thomas is fruitless; but if we explain their doctrines, it can become clear how they need to develop. That is what I try to do.

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

I agree. I think that they have the key to overcoming the major problems of Modern philosophy.

 

[Bahman]

Learning is a complex phenomena which is tightly related to consciousness. You cannot possibly understand how learning is possible if you don’t know what consciousness is. Consciousness is the essence of any being with the ability to experience and create mental states. Mental states however has to have a minimal property, so called unitary, in order to be experienced. By unitary we mean that the content of mental state should be perceivable in one single experience. Learning can then be defined as creating a new concept which allows a relation between existing concepts and what is experienced. Concepts are irreducible mental states related to what we have learn and they mainly reside in subconsciousness at rest. What resides in subconsciousness is practically what we know. The process of recalling is equal to bringing a mental state which resides in subconsciousness to consciousness.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think that the best reading of Aristotle and Thomas is that we know the essence of the thing known. (Here, I must respectfully disagree with Linus2nd.)

We know that essence by means of its actions (interactions, if you will) and properties (which produce those interactions).

I think that either I said something poorly or that you misunderstood what I have said. I agree with all that you have said so far. We know the essence of a thing two ways. First by the abstracted universal as it exists in the intellect and then as it applies to a particular individual. But we know the essence of the individual through the physical accidents which flow from it and are its accidents, dimensive quantity, shape, color, weight, smell, taste, etc. What we actually esperience is the physicality of its accidents and through them we know the essence.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I think that the best reading of Aristotle and Thomas is that we know the essence of the thing known. (Here, I must respectfully disagree with Linus2nd.)

We know that essence by means of its actions (interactions, if you will) and properties (which produce those interactions).

When a man proposes to a woman and gives her a golden ring, she does not say, “What a high density this metal has, and what exquisite thermal and electrical conductivity!” No, she says, “What beautiful gold!”
Do you see what I mean? We are capable of grasping the essence of things immediately. Clearly, it is by means of the gold’s properties and actions; but the essence is the first thing we grasp (right after we grasp that it is a “being”). We might have a confused and vague knowledge at first, but it is valid nonetheless.

But the portion of the essence that actually makes contact with our intellects, so to speak, is the form (whether that be the substantial form or the accidental form). We know when our intellect con-forms (in the technical sense of that word) to thing that is known. We actually (in Aristotle’s language) become that thing. (Not in every respect, obviously, but only–to use the classical terminology–in intention.)

This answer is too weak, Imelahn. Would you like to modify it or add something else, before I respond this afternoon. You can cheat your girlfriend with a ring that looks like gold, but her mother will not be cheated, I can tell you.

 

[lmelahn]

This answer is too weak, Imelahn. Would you like to modify it or add something else, before I respond this afternoon. You can cheat your girlfriend with a ring that looks like gold, but her mother will not be cheated, I can tell you.

Well, even if she were mistaken as to the composition of the ring, she would still be able to grasp its essence, albeit confusedly. She would know that it is a metal, or anyway (at a minimum) an inanimate, material substance.

Then, if she had some knowledge of chemistry, she could do some tests to make sure it was really gold (the easiest one is to test for density, as Archimedes did).

My point was, the human intellect grasps a substance immediately and in its entirety; only afterwards does it learn its properties in detail.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Hm. In tongue and cheek, this sounds an awful lot like John Locke’s theory of knowledge .

Dear Imelahn:

I would rather advice you to confront what I say with your own experiences. I have had the opportunity to express my thoughts to a certain number of persons, and what I have said has been identified with Aristotle, St. Thomas, Locke (certainly), Berkeley, Descartes, Kant, Charles Sanders Peirce, Henri Bergson, even Leibniz who did not accepted interactions! All depending on what philosopher they were reading at the moment, I guess. I have always told them: In order to understand what I say, you have to establish relations between my several statements, and between them and your experiences; what you are doing is understandable, but wrong: you are trying to superimpose an existing discourse that you scarcely know upon a fragmentary discourse that you are listening from me.

This is what has to be done when we read Aristotle, St. Thomas or any other thinker: To look for internal consistency in their texts and confront their statements with our experiences. Don´t you think so?

So, please Imelahn…

JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

At least according to Aquinas (and I think I agree with him), strictly intellectual representations–the concepta, the final products of abstraction–are not “concrete,” because they abstract from the particular matter of the thing known. We can, however, know individuals by comparing the conceptum with the phantasm. That is, actually, the most basic kind of judgment: “This individual is an umbrella pine.”

Imelahn,

I think that you have to read what St. Thomas says in the Summa Part I, Question 85, Article 1, answer to the second objection:

*"Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common, and “signate” or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from “this flesh and these bones,” which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect form “flesh and bones.”

Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as “being,” “unity,” “power,” “act,” and the like; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality."*

Form is not the same as essence in the thought of St. Thomas, because essence comprises both matter and form; and according to him, what we abstract is not the form, but the essence.

Matter was understood as the principle of individuation for forms. It would mean that forms had a peculiar mode of existence that was different from the existence of a material entity (it is necessary to consider carefully what it meant, for example, for Plato). Many individual entities in the world participated of the being of each form. Within this interpretation, the abstraction of forms from matter by the intellect would restitute them their peculiar mode of existence (something that you and other persons call “universality”).

Now, given the fact that abstraction, according to St. Thomas, is abstraction of the essence, I don´t see why the intellectual representation should acquire a peculiar mode of existence similar to the mythic platonic forms. I accept that it is immaterial, but not universal.

JuanFlorencio

 

[Aloysium]

Aloysium, I don’t share your opinion about scientists. As an engineer (an ‘applied-scientist’, perhaps) I feel obliged to speak up in their defence. In my experience, scientists are just as likely as anyone else to appreciate the beauty of flowers, and the delicacy of their scent (if they don’t suffer from hay fever). Scientists are perhaps more likely than most people, however, to appreciate the beauty of mathematics, cosmology, genetics and many other fields of study of the physical world.

My gross generalization was to highlight how a meaningful, loving relationship with creation, and God, Himself, is not a function of educational level or what society considers as wisdom.

I do have a different opinion, but unfortunately, this would end up in a long-winded pointless argument since I don’t know how such study could be conducted - deciding upon and defining the populations to be compared and the operational variables to describe the various sorts of relationship with reality.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I will have to respond in parts .
I agree. Indeed there are many representations (for one thing, the notion of “tree” includes that of “living creature” and “substance,” at a minimum). And each of these is representable in language (which can be “internal”–the verbum mentis–or “external”–the words we all know). And our judgements are expressible in “internal” enunciations, as well as “external” propositions (to use the classic terminology).

And clearly, we can use language to transmit knowledge to others. (As we are doing now, I hope .)

I still have small children at home, Imelahn. Just last year, one of them learnt in the school that trees are living beings. The other does´t know yet, but she has seen many of them already. I remember the same happened to me. Do they know that plants are substances? not at all!

Even if they had known by themselves, as soon as they perceived them, that trees are substances and living beings, this knowledge is not the knowledge of their “essence”. As an example, Aristotle said that man is a rational animal; “animal” being the genus (the direct genus or nearest genus… I don´t know how to say it in english, Imelahn; you must know) to which man belongs, and “rational” being the specific difference. I understand that this kind of definition was considered by Aristotle the most perfect. A definition based on another genus, like “substance” would have been imperfect, because we still had needed to specify more genera. Now, according to Aristotle the essence can finally be reduced to the definition of the entity; and if the definition based on the genus and the specific difference is the most perfect, it must be because it expresses the essence of the object (according to Aristotle, naturally). Therefore, the essence of a tree should not be based on such genus as “substance”.

You might say that the most “universal” genera are the ones that we apprehend first (and I would completely agree), and that we sometimes progress step by step identifying less “universal” ones (and again I would agree, stressing that it happens just sometimes and to some persons, not to everybody nor every time). If you do, I would like to ask you to think on this: As we go from the more universal to the less universal genera, we add more and more specific differences, which means that the less universal genera comprise many judgements (I use to say: they are sets of relations). What you call “concepts” are not simple.

Please, excuse me Imelahn. I have to leave now. Tomorrow I will travel first hour of the day. I will come back to you later.

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[lmelahn]

Imelahn,

I think that you have to read what St. Thomas says in the Summa Part I, Question 85, Article 1, answer to the second objection:

*"Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common, and “signate” or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from “this flesh and these bones,” which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect form “flesh and bones.”

Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as “being,” “unity,” “power,” “act,” and the like; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality."*

Form is not the same as essence in the thought of St. Thomas, because essence comprises both matter and form; and according to him, what we abstract is not the form, but the essence.

Matter was understood as the principle of individuation for forms. It would mean that forms had a peculiar mode of existence that was different from the existence of a material entity (it is necessary to consider carefully what it meant, for example, for Plato). Many individual entities in the world participated of the being of each form. Within this interpretation, the abstraction of forms from matter by the intellect would restitute them their peculiar mode of existence (something that you and other persons call “universality”).

Now, given the fact that abstraction, according to St. Thomas, is abstraction of the essence, I don´t see why the intellectual representation should acquire a peculiar mode of existence similar to the mythic platonic forms. I accept that it is immaterial, but not universal.

JuanFlorencio

Yes, I am aware that the form is not the same thing as the essence (neither for Aristotle nor for Aquinas). (To be perfectly precise, the form is not identical to the essence in material creatures; in angels, the form is indeed the same as the essence.) It is, however, the form that becomes impressed on our intellects when we abstract. To wit (from the corpus of the same article):

And therefore it is proper to it [the human intellect] to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms.

I am familiar with this article, and actually Thomas discusses this topic in much greater detail in his commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate. (See lc. 2, q. 5, a. 3.)

In other words, we know the essence (including the so-called “common matter”) by means of the (substantial) form.