How do we come to know things?

[lmelahn]

Dear Imelahn:

I would rather advice you to confront what I say with your own experiences. I have had the opportunity to express my thoughts to a certain number of persons, and what I have said has been identified with Aristotle, St. Thomas, Locke (certainly), Berkeley, Descartes, Kant, Charles Sanders Peirce, Henri Bergson, even Leibniz who did not accepted interactions! All depending on what philosopher they were reading at the moment, I guess. I have always told them: In order to understand what I say, you have to establish relations between my several statements, and between them and your experiences; what you are doing is understandable, but wrong: you are trying to superimpose an existing discourse that you scarcely know upon a fragmentary discourse that you are listening from me.

This is what has to be done when we read Aristotle, St. Thomas or any other thinker: To look for internal consistency in their texts and confront their statements with our experiences. Don´t you think so?

So, please Imelahn…

JuanFlorencio

I agree. And my reason for not being in agreement with Locke (or any of the Moderns) is that I don’t think his theory corresponds to experience.

 

[lmelahn]

I still have small children at home, Imelahn. Just last year, one of them learnt in the school that trees are living beings. The other does´t know yet, but she has seen many of them already. I remember the same happened to me. Do they know that plants are substances? not at all!

Naturally, they do not know that such things are called substances, but I am sure that they have the concept of substance implicitly. For instance, I am sure that they understand that trees, rocks, and fence posts can all be categorized in general as “things” (even if they don’t know it by that name); and that such things are among the realities that they encounter every day–to which can be added the people they know, animals, and what have you.

Obviously, children do not have explicit knowledge of such things. They have never formally reflected on the fact that certain realities are “subsistent” (substances) and others “inherent” (accidents), but I guarantee that they have figured it out implicitly. They know that the greenness of the leaves cannot walk down the street, but that the dog can (and can also run and bark after them).

Even if they had known by themselves, as soon as they perceived them, that trees are substances and living beings, this knowledge is not the knowledge of their “essence”. As an example, Aristotle said that man is a rational animal; “animal” being the genus (the direct genus or nearest genus… I don´t know how to say it in english, Imelahn; you must know) to which man belongs, and “rational” being the specific difference. I understand that this kind of definition was considered by Aristotle the most perfect. A definition based on another genus, like “substance” would have been imperfect, because we still had needed to specify more genera. Now, according to Aristotle the essence can finally be reduced to the definition of the entity; and if the definition based on the genus and the specific difference is the most perfect, it must be because it expresses the essence of the object (according to Aristotle, naturally). Therefore, the essence of a tree should not be based on such genus as “substance”.

We say “rational animal,” with the understanding that “animal” can be further analyzed into “living thing that is capable of sensation;” and “living thing” into “material substance that has an intrinsic principle of change;” and “material substance” into “substance that is united to matter.” (There are, of course, many ways of making correct definitions, as long as the “specific difference” is an essential property of the genus or species so defined.)

So the reason that you should not define man as “rational substance” is that you are skipping over three or four levels of specification. Notice that “rational substance” can’t be a definition for man, because it would include the angels. (This is essentially the definition that Boethius gave centuries later for “person.”)

You might say that the most “universal” genera are the ones that we apprehend first (and I would completely agree),

However, the very first thing we grasp is “being” itself, which transcends the genera.

and that we sometimes

progress step by step identifying less “universal” ones (and again I would agree, stressing that it happens just sometimes and to some persons, not to everybody nor every time). If you do, I would like to ask you to think on this: As we go from the more universal to the less universal genera, we add more and more specific differences, which means that the less universal genera comprise many judgements (I use to say: they are sets of relations). What you call “concepts” are not simple.

I agree that judgments are relations, by the way. A judgment is a relation, or anyway entails a relation, between the subject who knows, and the thing known.

I just want to observe that it is not necessary for these steps to be explicit, as I mentioned.

Knowledge is sort of a parabola. We start out with confused and general knowledge, starting from the most generic notions (always beginning with the fact that the thing known exists). With more experience, we gradually fill in the details and are able to acquire more specific notions. Finally, if we are doing a systematic study (as in philosophy, but also in the sciences, for example), we can climb back up the ladder, so to speak, and study the steps by which we acquired our more specific knowledge. Only at that point do we have explicit knowledge of genera and species.

I think what confused some philosophers–particularly the Moderns (Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, etc.)–is thinking that the only valid knowledge, at the end of the day, is explicit, scientific knowledge. They only wished to accept what could be demonstrated like a mathematical theorem. So, if you like, they wanted to ignore the downward portion of the parabola, and wanted to start right away with the upward portion. But that is not how our intellects work: there is plenty that is grasped immediately (albeit only implicitly).

Please, excuse me Imelahn. I have to leave now. Tomorrow I will travel first hour of the day. I will come back to you later.

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

Have a safe trip!

 

[lmelahn]

Even if they had known by themselves, as soon as they perceived them, that trees are substances and living beings, this knowledge is not the knowledge of their “essence”.

Let me illustrate what I mean with an example. I will use the one I have been using: the Pinus pinea (umbrella pine) outside my window. (I live in Rome, Italy, in case you have not figured that out.)

Let’s look at some possible true statements I can make about it:

This tree is a substance.
This tree is a body *.
This tree is a living thing.
This tree is a plant.
This tree is a tree.
This tree is a pine.
This tree is a umbrella pine.

I have arranged them, obviously, in order of specificity. (There are more divisions that I left out for the sake of simplicity. There is also more than one way of arriving at the species.)

Some of these can be grasped immediately, albeit implicitly: substance (from the fact that it subsists, or exists by itself; body (from the fact that it occupies space). The others all require more or less specialized knowledge. (I am sure that most people in the world would be able to identify it as a “tree,” but, say, people who have lived all their lives in a treeless plain might have trouble at first.)

Again, 95% (or more) of people have never been instructed in the Aristotelian notion of “substance,” and so they undoubtedly could not identify it as a substance explicitly. But they can see without difficulty that it exists by itself and is a concrete individual.

The important thing here is that, even the first two judgments (the easiest ones) demonstrate knowledge of the tree’s essence, even though that knowledge is very generic.

As people gain more experience with umbrella pines (and even with other pines, and other plants, and so on), they begin to learn more about them and form more specific notions.

I should also point out that our capacity for intellection is much richer than language can actually express. Merely stating “this is an umbrella pine” does not reflect the richness of first-hand experience of a pine tree.

With words, I can give you an idea of what this umbrella pine is like–you can get a good picture in your mind through my description, by analogy with other kinds of pines, or with your previous experience of umbrella pines, or what have you–but the words can never fully express the richness of actually seeing the pine tree out my window.*

 

[lmelahn]

Even if they had known by themselves, as soon as they perceived them, that trees are substances and living beings, this knowledge is not the knowledge of their “essence”.

Another way to look at it is that an essence is a rich, multifaceted reality, that we can only grasp by means of a multitude of notions.

Hence, to understand throughly what a Pinus pinea is, we need to know (at least implicitly) a number of those increasingly specific genera that I mentioned in the previous post.

If we only want to know it superficially, it is enough learn only a few of them. But however deep or shallow is the knowledge, it is still valid knowledge of the essence of this umbrella pine outside my window.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Thank you Imelahn, that was well done. The comment on Boethius was indeed rich. It contained, also, a rare reference by Thomas to a vacuum. I can’t recall another instance, though that is probably just my poor memory.

Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Another way to look at it is that an essence is a rich, multifaceted reality, that we can only grasp by means of a multitude of notions.

Hence, to understand throughly what a Pinus pinea is, we need to know (at least implicitly) a number of those increasingly specific genera that I mentioned in the previous post.

If we only want to know it superficially, it is enough learn only a few of them. But however deep or shallow is the knowledge, it is still valid knowledge of the essence of this umbrella pine outside my window.

Dear Imelahn:

I didn’t know that you were living in Rome. Are you Italian?

There are several points in your posts which in my consideration deserve special attention. However, I think that leaving them aside temporarily is the best way to proceed in this discussion (At least, that is what I think now). I would like to continue with what you said in your last message, which seems more promising to me.

If I understand well, you accept that what is called “concept” is not simple. I was saying in one of my previous posts that one important reason why it is so is that every material entity shows its modes of interaction successively, depending on its surroundings. I would say that, in one of its senses, the word “essence” refers to those modes of intrinsic interaction which originate many others (desirably, every other mode). However, it is not easy to “discover” them.

In the first book of the Aristotelian metaphysics you can read about the different degrees of knowledge that Aristotle had in his mind when he said: “All men by nature desire to know”. It is clear to me that just a few men are fond of prime philosophy or wisdom, that enables them to explain everything. Many others have the tendency to build explanations about certain specific things. Much more individuals just like to accumulate experiences; and all of us like to see, to hear, to touch… And Aristotle says that wisdom is the search of causes and principles, and that he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser (You might know that Aristotle distinguished four causes: material, formal, efficient, and final). Now, it seems clear to me too that -for Aristotle- none of this causes is known to he who is in the first degree of knowledge. Even the second degree does not imply a knowledge of any of those principles or causes. I have doubts concerning the third degree. I tend to think that it involves the knowledge of the efficient causes at least. And the higher degree, wisdom, which is reached only by a few, comprises the knowledge of all of them, but -as Aristotle implies too- some wise men are more exact than others.

It seems to me that St. Thomas focuses too much on the formal cause (I am postponing the discussion about the abstraction of the essence or the abstraction of the form). Even when he refers to natural science he tends to see it as a system of definitions (the knowledge of essences, or forms if you like -for the moment). But the examples he proposed are such that it becomes clear how the alleged knowledge of essences is extremely poor (I have in my mind the text that you recommended me to read, De Trinitate). It would have been highly commendable that St. Thomas would have spent some time developing a method for us to get such knowledge; but it seems that nobody did. Was it possible at all?

Apparently you are saying that everybody knows essences, though some know them superficially; and you say also that those “concepts” which for Aristotle constituted the highest degree of knowledge (wisdom) are commonly known. Not only that, but you also say that they are known through our first experiences. It is hard to me to conceive such statements as forming part of the Aristotelian philosophy. It is even harder to accept that they are founded on experience.

However, let’s suppose that what we get in our first experiences is already a knowledge of essences. And you say that such knowledge is superficial, but still, a true knowledge of essences. Now, as I said above, one of the senses of the word “essence” refers to what is the fountain, so to say, of the peculiar interactions of objects. But I think you will accept that our first impressions do not enable us to foresee those interactions. This is another reason to reject those impressions as a knowledge (even superficial) of essences.

What I say is that we can progressively know more and more interactions of material entities (I have called this knowledge “relation”, and I would associate it to what Aristotle understood as experience); but some of us are able to work upon those relations and elaborate “relations of relations” (or second order relations) that enable us to explain those particular experiences. Tycho Brahe collected a great amount of data about the relative positions of celestial bodies. Johannes Kepler worked upon that collection of data and formulated his laws for the movements of planets. Isaac Newton successfully mathematized those laws based on the idea of gravitational fields. What is the most essential here, if not the gravitational fields? And which is more exact and capable of explaining the successive positions of planets, if not Newton’s models? However, those gravitational fields are just mimicking images of an alleged essential (universal) aspect of bodies.

What is your “implicit knowledge” if it is not our existence in the realm of interactions, from which we can establish systems of relations that enable us, step by step, to grasp with growing power what is going on in our surroundings?

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[opusAquinas]

I’m trying to remember this…

How does one even begin to know something as something separate from something else? A flower from another kind. If simply we are designed internally to recognize it. The categorizes are internally designed to be recognized as such. Adam sees Eve. He sees a woman. What you want to know is what steps are the mental steps taken for the first recognition? We recognize the form and substance because we are simply designed to. The question is why are some people better at it than others?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I’m trying to remember this…

How does one even begin to know something as something separate from something else? A flower from another kind. If simply we are designed internally to recognize it. The categorizes are internally designed to be recognized as such. Adam sees Eve. He sees a woman. What you want to know is what steps are the mental steps taken for the first recognition? We recognize the form and substance because we are simply designed to. The question is why are some people better at it than others?

Dear opusAquinas:

Why does a car run so fast? Because it is designed to!

Every question could be responded like that, and so, there would be no science, no philosophy… But the fact is that besides experience there is science, and there is philosophy… The question is what are them?, and how do we develop them? But the answer cannot be “because we are designed so!”.

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I’m trying to remember this…

How does one even begin to know something as something separate from something else? A flower from another kind. If simply we are designed internally to recognize it. The categorizes are internally designed to be recognized as such. Adam sees Eve. He sees a woman. What you want to know is what steps are the mental steps taken for the first recognition? We recognize the form and substance because we are simply designed to. The question is why are some people better at it than others?

That is right, we know things because God designed our senses and intellect to know the world. The exact manner this takes place is explained by Thomas Aquinas as Imelahn has explained above and as I tried to explain earlier above. But it all boils down to: " Because that is the way God made us. " And of course some know things better than others because of factors like greater intellectual depth, wider experience, and better education. Be not intimidated, you did just fine.

Linus2nd.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Dear OpusAquinas:

Yes, as Linus says, don’t be intimidated; especially because no one wants to intimidate you. I tend to think that every person who comes to the forum would like to share something, but signals of difference are usually rejected by some persons. You can read and reflect, and ask questions, until you are satisfied. If you are not satisfied, you remain as you were, or better, because you know now there is more than you thought. To know what other persons think is not bad.

Regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[lmelahn]

Dear Imelahn:

I didn’t know that you were living in Rome. Are you Italian?

There are several points in your posts which in my consideration deserve special attention. However, I think that leaving them aside temporarily is the best way to proceed in this discussion (At least, that is what I think now). I would like to continue with what you said in your last message, which seems more promising to me.

…]

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

No, I am American, but I am a priest living here at my order’s seminary here in Rome.

I am familiar with the Metaphysics of Aristotle, and I think it does shed a lot of light on our problem. However, I think it would be helpful to take a step backward.

First off, I think that knowledge does not consist primarily in grasping a series of relationships or interactions. (I hope I am representing your thoughts correctly, but that, it seems to me, is contrary to experience.)

Rather, it consists in correspondence between our intellects and the reality that surrounds us. (Perhaps you have heard “truth” defined as adaequatio rei et intellectus—that is the idea.)

Now, I agree that that this correspondence entails a relationship between the person who knows and the thing that he knows, but it is not the relationship that we naturally grasp first.

Just because we don’t know the mathematical formulas that govern the movement of the planets does not mean that our knowledge of the plants, gained simply by looking at them with our naked eyes, is invalid. It is pre-scientific, certainly, but not invalid.

But I suggest leaving that part of the discussion for later. You seem skeptical that ordinary people (people not trained in philosophy) can know the essence of things, if I understood correctly.

Hence, let’s do things in order: what does “essence” mean for you? (I realize that Linus opened a similar thread about “substance”—I may contribute the fruit of this discussion there.)

I fundamentally accept Aristotle’s conception of essence; how do you understand Aristotle when he uses the term “essence”?

Note that Aristotle uses at least four terms that we translate with the same word “essence” (in my opinion, legitimately, because Aristotle uses them synonymously): ousia (variously translated as “substance” or “essence”), tode ti (the “this what”), ti esti (the “what-is-it?”), and the infamous to ti en einai (incredibly difficult to translate, but essentially “what something is inasmuch as it is”).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

No, I am American, but I am a priest living here at my order’s seminary here in Rome.

Dear Father:

It is an honor for me to be discussing with you. Which Order do you belong to?

Please, allow me to continue addressing you as “Imelahn” during our discussion. I will need to divide my answer in two parts. This is the first part.

I am familiar with the Metaphysics of Aristotle, and I think it does shed a lot of light on our problem. However, I think it would be helpful to take a step backward.

First off, I think that knowledge does not consist primarily in grasping a series of relationships or interactions. (I hope I am representing your thoughts correctly, but that, it seems to me, is contrary to experience.)

Rather, it consists in correspondence between our intellects and the reality that surrounds us. (Perhaps you have heard “truth” defined as adaequatio rei et intellectus—that is the idea.)

Now, I agree that that this correspondence entails a relationship between the person who knows and the thing that he knows, but it is not the relationship that we naturally grasp first.

I agree, let’s take that step backward. But I also need to clarify something about “interactions” and “relations”. For the moment I will limit myself to propose some examples of them, so that you can see how I use those terms:

EXAMPLES OF INTERACTIONS:

1. A moving ball “X” hits a stationary ball “Y”. As a result, the status of movement of each of them changes: Ball “X” accelerates ball “Y”; ball “Y” des-accelerates ball “X”.
2. A hot body is submerged into cold water. As a result, the hot body becomes colder, and water becomes hotter.
3. A crystal of sucrose is submerged into pure water. As a result, the crystal grows smaller and smaller until it disappears (provided there is enough water); the water becomes colder.
4. Two massive bodies are suspended close to each other, and after stabilizing them they are left alone. It happens that they move closer and closer to each other.
5. Someone hits a bell in my presence. As a result, among some other things, the bell vibrates, the air around it vibrates too, the vibration reaches my ears…, so and so and so…, and I hear.
6. A battery is electrically connected to a lamp in an obscure room. As a result, the lamp turns on and emits light and heat, the air around it becomes hotter, it’s density decreases, convective currents of air are formed…, and I see the lamp and the objects around it.

EXAMPLES OF RELATIONS:

1. I determine the momentum of the system above, composed of balls “X” and “Y”, before and after the impact and say: “the momentum of this system remained constant”.
2. I measure the temperatures of the body and the water above, before and after the immersion of the body in the water. I measure also the mass of both bodies. Then I practice certain calculations and say: “the specific heat of water is “z” times the specific heat of the body”.
3. I measure the mass of the sucrose crystal and the mass of water, and after performing certain calculations I say: “the concentration of sugar in the water is “k” in weight percent”.
4. I compare the relative movement of the massive bodies with the movement of the handles of a clock, and after performing certain calculations I say: there was a force of attraction of “f” units between them".
5. I say, “sound is a longitudinal wave”.
6. I say, “light is a transverse wave”.
7. Extra example I: I compare bodies A and B, and say “A is bigger than B”.
8. Extra example II: I touch the hot body and the cold water and say “the body is hotter that the water”.
9. Extra example III: I look at the ceiling in my room and say “the ceiling is above me”.
10. Extra example IV: I read the premises of an argument and conclude even before reading the conclusion.
11. Extra example V: but, it might happen too that I read the premises of an argument and don’t conclude even after reading the conclusion (I don’t establish the relation).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Just because we don’t know the mathematical formulas that govern the movement of the planets does not mean that our knowledge of the plants, gained simply by looking at them with our naked eyes, is invalid. It is pre-scientific, certainly, but not invalid.

Please, read my post again and you will see that I never rejected such knowledge as invalid.

But I suggest leaving that part of the discussion for later. You seem skeptical that ordinary people (people not trained in philosophy) can know the essence of things, if I understood correctly.

Please excuse me, Imelahn: I said “according to Aristotle” (first book of the metaphysics). What I say is that not only ordinary people but also philosophers do not know essences. Our object as cognitive entities is not the essence of objects, but their interactions. Without interactions we don’t even perceive those objects.

Hence, let’s do things in order: what does “essence” mean for you? (I realize that Linus opened a similar thread about “substance”—I may contribute the fruit of this discussion there.)

I fundamentally accept Aristotle’s conception of essence; how do you understand Aristotle when he uses the term “essence”?

Note that Aristotle uses at least four terms that we translate with the same word “essence” (in my opinion, legitimately, because Aristotle uses them synonymously): ousia (variously translated as “substance” or “essence”), tode ti (the “this what”), ti esti (the “what-is-it?”), and the infamous to ti en einai (incredibly difficult to translate, but essentially “what something is inasmuch as it is”).

I tend to think that the relevant Aristotelian statement concerning essence for the subject of this thread -how do we come to know things-, is this (Metaphysics, Book I, Part 3):

“Evidently we have to acquire knowledge of the original causes (for we say we know each thing only when we think we recognize its first cause), and causes are spoken of in four senses. In one of these we mean the substance, i.e. The essence ( for the “why” is reducible finally to the definition, and the ultimate “why” is a cause and principle).”

“The essence is finally reducible to the definition”

Best regards, Father.
JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

First off, I think that knowledge does not consist primarily in grasping a series of relationships or interactions. (I hope I am representing your thoughts correctly, but that, it seems to me, is contrary to experience.)

Rather, it consists in correspondence between our intellects and the reality that surrounds us. (Perhaps you have heard “truth” defined as adaequatio rei et intellectus—that is the idea.)

Dear Imelahn:

Concerning the scholastic definition of truth, I see this difficulty: in order to ascertain the correspondence of our intellect and the reality that surrounds us, we should have two modes of access to such reality: One should be a direct and nude access. The other, an indirect access through our intellect (as you mentioned in one of your previous posts). But if we have a direct and nude access to reality, truth should be defined as such direct and nude access, and the alleged indirect access would be unnecessary. But, as Aristotle thought that due to its immateriality our soul cannot have a direct knowledge of material entities, scholastics have to reject the direct and nude access. So, according to them, we only count on the indirect access. Therefore, we don’t have any way to evaluate the mentioned correspondence.

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[opusAquinas]

I think there are people who are intellectually gifted and then are people who have superior intuition. God chooses those with superior intellect and intuition to discover and explain to others. Thomas Aquinas was an INTJ so was Aristotle and so was our Lord. The rest memorize and explicate the teachings. However God has to help us understand or we will never understand. The higher angels pass down information to the lower angels. Infusing knowledge. Some can communicate without sound. That’s intelligence. That’s the angelic doctor

Without intuition we can understand the meaning of things. We can only understand operational functionality. Finally, Adam sees a woman, Eve. How did he do it? Form and substance. We know he did it (well in a way), we cannot prove how he did it. The best we can do is create a language on intuitive insight.

So Adam sees Eve. But what does it mean? The meaning of her was a given because love was in our heart. We are corrupt and so common sense and love and everything has to be explained to us. God comes down to earth shows us what love is. What it looks like. We point and say what does it mean when He said this or did that? Even the Little Flower knows as well as the Angelic Doctore because it requires God to know the meaning of things. The essence of it. That is why it is called the gift of tears.

 

[GEddie]

I think there are people who are intellectually gifted and then are people who have superior intuition. God chooses those with superior intellect and intuition to discover and explain to others. Thomas Aquinas was an INTJ so was Aristotle and so was our Lord. The rest memorize and explicate the teachings. However God has to help us understand or we will never understand. The higher angels pass down information to the lower angels. Infusing knowledge. Some can communicate without sound. That’s intelligence. That’s the angelic doctor

Without intuition we can understand the meaning of things. We can only understand operational functionality. Finally, Adam sees a woman, Eve. How did he do it? Form and substance. We know he did it (well in a way), we cannot prove how he did it. The best we can do is create a language on intuitive insight.

So Adam sees Eve. But what does it mean? The meaning of her was a given because love was in our heart. We are corrupt and so common sense and love and everything has to be explained to us. God comes down to earth shows us what love is. What it looks like. We point and say what does it mean when He said this or did that? Even the Little Flower knows as well as the Angelic Doctore because it requires God to know the meaning of things. The essence of it. That is why it is called the gift of tears.

You must be guessing that our LORD was INTJ, correct?

It would be awesome if He were, given that He and I would have least that in common beyond our male DNA; but He never let anybody examine His head.

I’d imagine He was more in the “E” category.

ICXC NIKA.

 

[lmelahn]

Dear Father:

It is an honor for me to be discussing with you. Which Order do you belong to?

The Legionaries of Christ. I have been studying here at our college (philosophy, among other things.) Right now I am studying for a doctorate in bioethics.

Please, allow me to continue addressing you as “Imelahn” during our discussion. I will need to divide my answer in two parts. This is the first part.

I agree, let’s take that step backward. But I also need to clarify something about “interactions” and “relations”. For the moment I will limit myself to propose some examples of them, so that you can see how I use those terms:

EXAMPLES OF INTERACTIONS:

1. A moving ball “X” hits a stationary ball “Y”. As a result, the status of movement of each of them changes: Ball “X” accelerates ball “Y”; ball “Y” des-accelerates ball “X”.
2. A hot body is submerged into cold water. As a result, the hot body becomes colder, and water becomes hotter.
3. A crystal of sucrose is submerged into pure water. As a result, the crystal grows smaller and smaller until it disappears (provided there is enough water); the water becomes colder.
4. Two massive bodies are suspended close to each other, and after stabilizing them they are left alone. It happens that they move closer and closer to each other.
5. Someone hits a bell in my presence. As a result, among some other things, the bell vibrates, the air around it vibrates too, the vibration reaches my ears…, so and so and so…, and I hear.
6. A battery is electrically connected to a lamp in an obscure room. As a result, the lamp turns on and emits light and heat, the air around it becomes hotter, it’s density decreases, convective currents of air are formed…, and I see the lamp and the objects around it.

I can see that. These are all examples of what Aquinas would call “action and passion” pairs. And in material substances, things always interact mutually: ball X strikes ball Y, and ball Y simultaneously stops the motion of ball X (an example of Newton’s Third Law).

EXAMPLES OF RELATIONS:

1. I determine the momentum of the system above, composed of balls “X” and “Y”, before and after the impact and say: “the momentum of this system remained constant”.

…]

I am not necessarily in disagreement with you, but I think it is important to note that Aristotle and Aquinas have a slightly different understanding of “relation.” That is important, because, for example, the Church Fathers (and Aquinas) incorporate Aristotle’s concept into their doctrine on the Trinity.

For Aristotle (and Aquinas), a relation (Greek: pros ti, “towards which”) means a reference that one substance has to another. Strictly speaking, only substances can have relations, although relations can be attributed to accidents (such as the intellect; see below).

For example, “fatherhood” is a relation belonging to a child’s father; and “sonship” is a relation belonging to someone’s son. Notice that we can’t help but imagine relations in pairs: fatherhood and sonship, husband and wife, and so on, although their can be situations in which the relation is inherent only to one of the substances involved.

When I know something, for example, there is a relation established between me and the thing that I know. However, the thing that I know remains unaffected, per se. So the relation resides in me, but not in the thing that I know.

So, let’s look at your first example.

(I am going to have to open a whole can of worms here, but I would rather not open up a debate on this thread about how to interpret physical properties—just bear with me here, and I would be glad to discuss this later on, on a different thread.)

A physical property, such as momentum is, in Aristotelian parlance, a quality (a quality of the third species, but there no need to get into that at the moment). Momentum is basically the velocity of an object weighted by its mass, which indicates its capacity to change the velocity of another object—so, although it is measurable, it is not exactly a quantity in the classical (Aristotelian) sense (which would refer to an objects geometrical form and dimensions).

What the law of conservation of momentum tells us is that, between any two objects, there is always a mutual relation (in the strict Aristotelian sense) between them, such that the sum of each object’s momentum (mass times velocity) is always constant (assuming these are the only interacting objects, obviously.)

However, I would say that their relations (in Aristotle’s sense) of momentum are subject to change: the momenta of ball X and ball Y change during their collision. Hence, their mutual relations change as well, even though the sum of their momenta remains the same.

(Presumably, at first, ball Y has a momentum of 0, and ball X has a momentum of mv; afterwards, the situation is exactly reversed, assuming a perfect, head-on collision and equal mass.)

I think a similar reflection can be made about the other phenomena you describe.

Again, it is not that I am questioning the science behind it, or necessarily disagreeing with your position; I am just pointing out that there is discrepancy (it seems to me) between the meaning you are attributing to “relation” in your examples, and the way Aristotle and Aquinas take it. That difference needs to be taken into account when reading their philosophy.

 

[lmelahn]

Please, read my post again and you will see that I never rejected such knowledge as invalid.

Please excuse me, Imelahn: I said “according to Aristotle” (first book of the metaphysics). What I say is that not only ordinary people but also philosophers do not know essences. Our object as cognitive entities is not the essence of objects, but their interactions. Without interactions we don’t even perceive those objects.

I agree with the second part—that we cannot know things unless they act upon us (and they have to act upon us for us to know them; it is not enough for them to be interacting with one another, because the news would never reach us, so to speak)—but, as you can probably guess, I disagree with the first part—that the object of our knowledge is interactions, rather than essences.

I will try to justify my position (and why I think it corresponds better with experience) below.

I tend to think that the relevant Aristotelian statement concerning essence for the subject of this thread -how do we come to know things-, is this (Metaphysics, Book I, Part 3):

“Evidently we have to acquire knowledge of the original causes (for we say we know each thing only when we think we recognize its first cause), and causes are spoken of in four senses. In one of these we mean the substance, i.e. The essence ( for the “why” is reducible finally to the definition, and the ultimate “why” is a cause and principle).”

Good eye.

Here is part of the same passage with a couple of the original Greek words thrown in:

In one of these we mean the substance ousia], i.e., the essence (to ti en einai).

It is here that Aristotle first defines substance or essence (which are perfectly synonymous for Aristotle—even the very same word, ousia) as “to ti en einai,” which I think is the key concept here.

Notice what Aristotle is doing: he is about to list his famous four species of causes, and if you look at the list, the first kind of cause is “formal cause” (followed a little further on in this passage by material, then efficient, and then final).

Hence, Aristotle is giving an extremely close association between the formal cause (the first of the four kinds of cause that he is about to list) and the substance/essence, without neatly identifying them. (Indeed, he rejects an identification in Book VII; see below. But it is a substance’s form that determines what kind of thing it is—its “species,” in technical terms.)

“The essence is finally reducible to the definition”

I really don’t think, therefore, that Aristotle is saying that “essence” is the same thing as “definition” (which, if I understood rightly, is what you concluded from this passage).

Instead, he says “the ‘why’ * is reducible * finally to the definition.” In other words, by learning the definition* of something, we are learning one of its causes: its formal cause, the type of thing that it is.

Keep in mind that in Book I, Aristotle is only posing the problems. His answer to the question of what substance (or essence) is can be found in Book VII (which is quite possibly the most difficult book to interpret in the history of philosophy!).

Best regards, Father.
JuanFlorencio

I you want to know how I interpret Book VII, stay tuned for my next post … *

 

[lmelahn]

So, we have established that essence (or substance, which is the same thing in Aristotle) is not simply a definition. (At least, I am sufficiently convinced that Aristotle did not mean that.)

Instead, we need to look briefly at a passage from Book IV, 1, in which Aristotle analyzes the various meanings of the word being (in Greek, to on, which is the present participle, hence it refers to concrete beings, not “being in general”):

The term “being” (to on) is used in various senses, but with reference to one central idea. …] For some things are said to “be” because they are substances (ousiai); others because they are modifications of substance (ousias); others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance or of terms relating to substance, or negations of certain of these terms or of substance.

Aristotle does not answer the question of how to on relates to ousia until later, in Book V, where does his famous fourfold division of being. It is not necessary to get into that now. Rather, it is sufficient to observe with Aristotle that ousia is what we think of most readily whenever we are using the term “being.”

(Notice how etymologically ousia comes from the verb to be in Greek, so to a Greek-speaking ear ousia will sound like “being par excellence.”)

In other words, we are talking about “beings” that stand by themselves, like all the things we encounter every day: birds, plants, rocks, other human beings, and so on.

What Aristotle is getting it is that we sometimes use the verb to be in other ways as well: to designate accidents (the tree is green); to designate negations (the tree is not an animal); or privations (I am sick—sickness is a privation of health). However, at least in its participial form, to on (which in Greek would be used more often than in English), “being” most properly means things that exist independently—i.e., ousiai (or substances/essences).

So, for Aristotle, is a bird an essence (or substance)? Yes, absolutely. Is the bird the same as its definition, or even its form? No. And here comes the insight from Book VII.

A substance, or essence, says Aristotle must have two specific characteristics: it must be tode ti (literally “this what”)—I should be able to say “this bird” or “that man;” and it must be choriston (that is, “separate”)—in other words, it should be a being that stands by itself, not an accident that inheres in another being.

In Book VII, Aristotle essentially analyzes three “candidates” for a substance, based on these two criteria.

(1) Could substance be the “underlying substrate,” as the Presocratics thought? No, he says, because it lacks definition and concreteness. A pile of bricks, he argues, do not make a house; they need a form. (In that case, it is strictly speaking an accidental form, but the idea can be applied to substances as well. A bunch of feathers, muscles, and bones do not make a bird.)

(2) Could substance be simply the “form,” or the “universal” of Plato? No, argues Aristotle, because substance/essence refers to this individual. (For Plato, universals are “separate”—they subsist—but not concrete.)

(3) So, what is substance/essence? It is to ti en einai: what something is, simply because it is. The idea is, some attributes (namely the accidents) show that you are a certain way (e.g., musical, funny, studious, sitting, standing, and so on), but only substance/essence shows you who you are, simply because you are:

The essence (to ti en einai) of each is what is said according to itself kath’ auto]. Being ‘musical’ is not being ‘you’: for you are not musical according to yourself kata seauton]” (Book VII, 3, 1029b14-15; I translated this myself from the Greek, to show the parallel between kath’ auto and kata seauton).

There are some important observations, therefore:

1. 
   *]Substance/essence in Aristotle is primarily to be identified with concrete individuals that can stand independently. It is identified with what a thing is, simply because it is (to ti en einai).
   *]Substance (and in particular essence) cannot be reduced merely to the intelligible contents of a thing; that is its (substantial) form.
   *]The form cannot be reduced to a thing’s definition; the definition is only our poor attempt to express the contents of that form. Much less can the essence be reduced to a definition.
   *]Aristotle does say that we may speak of universal, abstract concepts as substances/essences (ousiai), but that, he insists, is only the secondary meaning of the term substance/essence. (He is reacting against Plato, who considered the universals—the ideas—to be the primary meaning of substance; we saw that Aristotle rejects such an outlook)

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Dear Imelahn:

I just want to let you know how pleasurable it is to me to be discussing with you. I am reading your comments and will come back to you later.

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio