How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[prodigalson2011]

It is very clear to me that this is talking about the difference between what it means for God to be a being and what it means for a creature to be a being,

It is clear to you because that is what you already think. It’s called confirmation bias. An objective reading does not yield to such an interpretation.

and when it speaks of the being of creatures it is not speaking of esse in a distinct sense, but rather he is speaking of creatures** as they are actual**.

This is nothing but sophistry and doublespeak completely unsubstantiated by anything in the passage. Pure eisegesis.

So when it speaks of being in regards to creation it is speaking of substances as actual and not as having a distinct esse. It says that God has the fullness of being as compared to creatures.

No, it does not. You’ll note that it makes repeated reference to determinate character of God’s being; the dictionary defines “determinate” as:

1. having defined limits; definite.
2. settled; positive.
3. conclusive; final.

In other words, God’s being is God’s being, period. It is not the being of anything else.

The context is revealed as such that when it says God is not the formal being of creatures (is not universal being), it means only that creatures do not have esse in the divine sense of the word; and that is only to say that our essence is not identical with the act of existing. An when it speaks of universal being it means those essences that become substances (existing-essence) only by a limited participation in actuality.

That is not at all what it means, and if you actually read any substantial amount of Thomistic literature, you would know that. This statement alone clearly demonstrates you still do not understand what Thomas means by participation.

It says nothing about God creating distinct esse. That is your interpretation of Aquinas and every other commentator you read.

This particular passage does not, but several others I have cited have. And “every other commentator I read” constitutes a collection of the most respected and devoted Thomistic scholars in the world, so I feel much safer siding with them than a guy whose attitude is more reflective of a cocky freshman philosophy major who thinks he’s surpassed the product of centuries of rigorous thought in the span of a few forum posts.

But if you insist on interpreting Aquinas as saying that essences have their own distinct essence, then this is easily refuted for the following reasons.

1. A nature begins to exist because it is conjoined to the “act” of existing, which cannot happen unless esse is already actual and objectively distinct.

Already you show your ignorance of the subject. Apart from form, esse is neither actual or distinct. As I have said before, you are fallaciously conflating transcendent actions and realities with temporal ones. Creation is not a temporal act. An esse never exists apart from an essence. They are two principles within one creative act.

The only esse that is itself a distinct nature is God; which is an important point for no other esse can meaningfully exist as a distinct thing in itself without it also being synonymously an essence; which absolutely rules out the possibility of a real distinct esse that is not identical to its essence.

It is an important point, but it doesn’t weigh in your favor. Indeed God’s esse is a distinct nature, which means that nothing can be added to it. Which means another essence cannot be added to it. As stated above, an esse never does exist apart from an essence. They are distinct in definition and principle, not in temporal actuality.

Otherwise it amounts to saying that God has taken two things that are not actual (esse and essence) and put them together to make them both actual, which doesn’t make any rational sense since that which is not actuality itself has no power to make another thing actual.

This borders on the incoherent. You are creating a false conundrum by reifying a metaphysical expression. Again, the act of creation is not temporal and God does not create by conjoining two separate things. God, being pure actuality and thus the necessary basis of all other actuality, can create. He does not do so by binding things that already exist, otherwise he would not be a CREATOR, thus the act of creation is not itself a conjunction. The conjunction is an intrinsic principle of the creation.

 

[prodigalson2011]

An esse first has to be actual in-order to actualize potency.

God’s esse is sufficient to actualize all potencies, including that of giving an essence its own being (though not in the temporal, conjunctive sense you keep positing).

Linus’s interpretation of Aquinas renders the idea of esse arbitrary and functionally useless as it relates to actualizing substances. In which case, why does God need to create an “esse” when it is his power alone that actualizes and sustains things in existence?

Because the individual “act” is what allows something to be other than God. The “to be” of God is God. The “to be” of you is you; it is not me.

What rational function could a created esse possibly serve?

As I quoted Aquinas as saying earlier: That whereby an agent acts, is its act.

The function of the creature’s esse is to allow it to be a creature. God’s being is determinate. It is fully God and cannot be less than God. Thus, no creature can share it intrinsically. Sharing in the divine nature, as both Aquinas and the Church teach, comes through grace, not nature.

This esse that linus is speaking of is absolutely impotent. Obviously the idea, although it may appear legitimate on the surface, is very problematic and does more harm to God’s intelligence than anything else. Therefore for good reason i reject Linus’s interpretation as erroneous and short sighted.

It is not impotent, it is necessary to the being of creatures. And I fail to see how it “does harm to God’s intelligence.” That seems a bit melodramatic, honestly.

1. Essences cannot cause esse, for an essence has no existential power by itself or as distinct from esse, so it is meaningless to speak of an essence limiting an esse unless created essences are not really distinct from the act of existence

Again, this is virtually incoherent. Noone has said essences cause esse. That is obviously ridiculous. And your conclusion is a baffling non sequitur. Limitation and causation are completely separate notions. A glass doesn’t cause water, but it limits the volume of water that may be contained within it. Likewise, an essence limits a thing’s existence by restricting it to a certain form, whether material or immaterial.

Aquinas would have to say that what he really means by essences limiting esse is that the degree to which a thing is actual is limited by the kind of nature it has. In other words he is not saying that an essence is literally limiting the existence of the act of existence, but rather he is saying that things are actual only to the degree to which they participate in the act of existing.

“Aquinas would have to say.” I must say, if nothing else, I admire your boldness. This clearly shows that you are still operating on a very faulty understanding of what Aquinas means by participation.

All this amounts to is, “Aquinas must mean this, because this is what I think.” There is nothing in any of this to suggest what you are saying, you are simply reading your own preconceptions into it.

3. Existence is not a genus. The act of existence is the act of existence. Actuality is actuality. Asserting that an esse can be finite and therefore distinct from God does not change the fact that it is still the act of existence

, and neither does it alleviate the pain of contradiction involved in making a species of existing which is exactly what you are doing by saying that God creates finite esse. There can be difference in essences precisely and only because they are not identical to esse and that is why the word “Being” applies to them only in an analogous respect.

Existence is not a genus because it is not itself an existent thing, it is an operative principle. It is the same operative principle in all creatures. It is what makes a creature real. But it is not God’s esse.

Nothing is the absolute antithesis of existence, therefore the act of existence can only be intrinsic to that which is the act of existence.There cannot be an existence that is not existence, and thus it is absolutely necessary that God is the esse of all contingent essences.

Existence is only intrinsic to God, but God’s infinite power includes the power to create existences analogous to his own.

The bible itself says that we exist in God: Acts 17:28 For in him we live and move and have our being.

And that is why the Catholic Church has a Magisterium: the Bible does not lend itself well to individual interpretation. This particular verse has been dealt with elsewhere in either this or another of your threads.

 

[prodigalson2011]

“What I call being, esse, is the most perfect of all: and this is apparent because the act is always more perfect than the potency. For a certain form is not understood to be in act unless it is said to be. For humanity or fieriness can be considered either as latent in the potentiality of matter or in the power of an agent, or even just in the mind; but by having esse, it actually comes to exist. From which it is clear that what I call esse is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections. And to what I call esse nothing can be added that is more formal, which determines it, in the way that the act determines the potency: for esse, taken in this manner, differs essentially from something to which an addition can be made by way of determining.[14]”

And yet Aquinas never once says esse is God. I wonder why that is?

To go back to your harping on the point of “Being is not a genus,” let’s look at why exactly that is. I quote from a retired philosophy professor who now blogs under the name of the “Maverick Philosopher”:

Being is not a genus: To put the point rather more simply, when we say of a thing that it is a being, or even more simply, that it is, we are not saying anything about what kind of thing it is. We are not saying anything about WHAT it is: we are underscoring that it IS. Being is not a highest quidditative determination. For when we speak of the being (esse) of a being (ens) we are referring to its sheer existence, not its nature or essence or quiddity.

And that is why being is not a genus, and that is why it is the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections (in the case of creatures, the perfection of all perfections contained in the essence). It is the very principle by which anything is. But for anything that exists, its existence is not the existence of something else.

It is indeed a critical point that Aquinas never refers to God as simply “esse.” He has a very specific term for God’s relationship to esse, and for good reason.

 

[prodigalson2011]

In my second-to-last post, I accidentally lumped some of my replies into one quote. So, for purposes of clarification, I’m reposting that particular section:

Aquinas would have to say that what he really means by essences limiting esse is that the degree to which a thing is actual is limited by the kind of nature it has. In other words he is not saying that an essence is literally limiting the existence of the act of existence, but rather he is saying that things are actual only to the degree to which they participate in the act of existing.

“Aquinas would have to say.” I must say, if nothing else, I admire your boldness. This clearly shows that you are still operating on a very faulty understanding of what Aquinas means by participation.

All this amounts to is, “Aquinas must mean this, because this is what I think.” There is nothing in any of this to suggest what you are saying, you are simply reading your own preconceptions into it.

1. Existence is not a genus. The act of existence is the act of existence. Actuality is actuality. Asserting that an esse can be finite and therefore distinct from God does not change the fact that it is still the act of existence, and neither does it alleviate the pain of contradiction involved in making a species of existing which is exactly what you are doing by saying that God creates finite esse. There can be difference in essences precisely and only because they are not identical to esse and that is why the word “Being” applies to them only in an analogous respect.

Existence is not a genus because it is not itself an existent thing, it is an operative principle. It is the same operative principle in all creatures. It is what makes a creature real. But it is not God’s esse.

Nothing is the absolute antithesis of existence, therefore the act of existence can only be intrinsic to that which is the act of existence.There cannot be an existence that is not existence, and thus it is absolutely necessary that God is the esse of all contingent essences.

Existence is only intrinsic to God, but God’s infinite power includes the power to create existences analogous to his own.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

" Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The creature receives from God a certain existence which would not continue unless God preserved it: wherefore even after it has received existence, it needs the divine action to preserve it in being and consequently is of a needy nature. On the other hand the Son receives from the Father identically the same being and identically the same nature as that of the Father; wherefore he is not of a needy nature. " ( Disputed Questions on the Power of God, Q X, Art 1, Is There Processions in God. dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#1:1

If the creature receives " a certain existence " which must be preserved in act by Gods conservancy, then this act of existence cannot be God’s act of existence. For God does not need to keep His own Existence in Act, but only that which He creates and gives to creatures.

Linus2nd

Hey Linux, I haven’t found your quotation yet, but don’t you think I’m doing pretty well without it?

Linus2nd

 

[daler]

How does God create “the act of existing” out of nothing?

I believe that such an act would violate the absolute distinction between something and nothing, and therefore I would say that it is metaphysically impossible; no more rational than saying the universe popped out of nothing.

There is a tradition which states “God says “BE” and it is.”

reference.bahai.org/en/t/b/SLH/slh-4.html

It is a powerful read.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Conclusion of these Debates

Over the spand of three or four threads in this forum the following positions have been proposed as true.

1.That the Esse of God is the only esse.
2.That the esse of creatures is the esse of God
3.That there is no creation ex nihilo.
4.That we exist, ontologically, in the mind of God.
5.that the universe exists, ontologically, in the mind of God

We have shown that none of these positions are tenable

1. That the Esse of God is the only esse was an assumption which was not proven. Whereas we have shown that this could not be the case for a number of reasons. Futher, it is contrary to Catholic Doctrine and the meaning of Scriptures.

2.That the esse of creatures is the esse of God, we have shown by numerous references from Thomas Aquinas to be untrue. Not only that, but this would bring into question many Cathoic Doctrines and is contrary to the clear meaning of Scriptures. Futher, those who proposed this position have not been able to offer any reasonable proof of their position.

3.That there is no creation ex nihilo we have demonstrated to be false from the works of St. Thomas. Futher, such a position would be contrary to Catholic Doctrine and contrary to the clear meaning of the Scriptures.

4.That we exist ontologically in the Mind of God, has been shown to untenable and unsupportable. No solid reasons have been advanced in its support. And of course such a position would be contrary to Catholic Doctrine and to the clear meaning of the Scriptures.

5.That the universe exists ontologically in the Mind of God cannot be held for the same reasons given for denying position #4.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

There is a tradition which states “God says “BE” and it is.”

reference.bahai.org/en/t/b/SLH/slh-4.html

It is a powerful read.

Hey, I have a Ba’ hai buddie who would agree, you bet.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Re: How does God create “the act of existing” out of nothing?

---

Quote:
Originally Posted by Linusthe2nd
" In order to make this point clear… Now the first of all effects is being, which is presupposed to all other effects, and does not presuppose any other effect: wherefore to give being as such must be the effect of the first cause alone by its own power…"
( Disputed Questions on the Power of God, Q III, Art IV, Is the Creative Power or Act Communicable to a Creature? dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#1:1

Thus, God gives to creatures their own being or existence, since it could not be an effect had He not given it. And here we must note that we are talking about the act of existence/or existence per se, the effect which causes, or is that act whereby the creature is said to exist, that whereby all the other created effects become real in a being or substance.

Linus2nd

Quote:
Originally Posted by Linux
From Aquinas’s disputed questions On the Power of God:

“What I call being, esse, is the most perfect of all: and this is apparent because the act is always more perfect than the potency. For a certain form is not understood to be in act unless it is said to be. For humanity or fieriness can be considered either as latent in the potentiality of matter or in the power of an agent, or even just in the mind; but by having esse, it actually comes to exist. From which it is clear that what I call esse is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections. And to what I call esse nothing can be added that is more formal, which determines it, in the way that the act determines the potency: for esse, taken in this manner, differs essentially from something to which an addition can be made by way of determining.[14]”

The perfection of all perfections is clearly God; and is not being spoken of in reference to some fantasy finite esse.

I don’t think Aquinas would contradict himself. Do you? Therefore Linus has a flawed interpretation, and because God has a sense of humor i am correct.

“For God is the judge. One he putteth down, and another he lifteth up:”

Linux

Gee willikers, you pull something out of context and pretend that makes some kind of argument to prove…what? I have asked you for your exact reference. Apparantly you are just playing games now.

Linus2nd

 

[utunumsint]

Gee willikers, you pull something out of context and pretend that makes some kind of argument to prove…what? I have asked you for your exact reference. Apparantly you are just playing games now.

Linus2nd

It is actually a quote that Velde used in his book on Aquinas.

books.google.ca/books?id=ThaJGentJEoC&pg=PA87&lpg=PA87&dq=What+I+call+being,+esse,+is+the+most+perfect+of+all:&source=bl&ots=wtKDLt-nEB&sig=bBZK58D6FnBuQB3AiXxhzECAxGc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NVv8UbT1D7jG4AOZlICwCg&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=What%20I%20call%20being%2C%20esse%2C%20is%20the%20most%20perfect%20of%20all%3A&f=false

It is from De Potentia:

dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#7:2

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Being, as we understand it here, signifies the highest perfection of all: and the proof is that act is always more perfect than potentiality. Now no signate form is understood to be in act unless it be supposed to have being. Thus we may take human nature or fiery nature as existing potentially in matter, or as existing in the power of an agent, or even as in the mind: but when it has being it becomes actually existent. Wherefore it is clear that being as we understand it here is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections. Nor may we think that being, in this sense, can have anything added to it that is more formal and determines it as act determines potentiality: because being in this latter sense is essentially distinct from that to which it is added and whereby it is determined. But nothing that is outside the range of being can be added to being: for nothing is outside its range except non-being, which can be neither form nor matter. Hence being is not determined by something else as potentiality by act but rather as act by potentiality: since in defining a form we include its proper matter instead of the difference: thus we define a soul as the act of an organic physical body. Accordingly this being is distinct from that being inasmuch as it is the being of this or that nature. For this reason Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that though things having life excel those that merely have being, yet being excels life, since living things have not only life but also being.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

It is actually a quote that Velde used in his book on Aquinas.

books.google.ca/books?id=ThaJGentJEoC&pg=PA87&lpg=PA87&dq=What+I+call+being,+esse,+is+the+most+perfect+of+all:&source=bl&ots=wtKDLt-nEB&sig=bBZK58D6FnBuQB3AiXxhzECAxGc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NVv8UbT1D7jG4AOZlICwCg&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=What%20I%20call%20being%2C%20esse%2C%20is%20the%20most%20perfect%20of%20all%3A&f=false

It is from De Potentia:

dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#7:2

Thanks Ut. I will review it to see what Thomas meant.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

From Aquinas’s disputed questions On the Power of God:

“What I call being, esse, is the most perfect of all: and this is apparent because the act is always more perfect than the potency. For a certain form is not understood to be in act unless it is said to be. For humanity or fieriness can be considered either as latent in the potentiality of matter or in the power of an agent, or even just in the mind; but by having esse, it actually comes to exist. From which it is clear that** what I call esse** is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections. And to what I call esse nothing can be added that is more formal, which determines it, in the way that the act determines the potency: for esse, taken in this manner, differs essentially from something to which an addition can be made by way of determining.[14]”

:

The perfection of all perfections is clearly God; and is not being spoken of in reference to some fantasy finite esse.

I don’t think Aquinas would contradict himself. Do you? Therefore Linus has a flawed interpretation, and because God has a sense of humor i am correct.

“For God is the judge. One he putteth down, and another he lifteth up:”

O.K., here is the exact reference: dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#7:2

I have analyzed the answer in the context of the whole Article. I’m going to give you a chance to analyze it for youself, explain it proberly, and retract your closing comments. I’ll give you until tomorrow afternoon. If you don’t clean things up, I will come in some time tomorrow afternoon or evening and explain just how deceptive you have been here.

Linus2nd

 

[Peter_Plato]

Better than me art thou. Personally, I would rather be right than loved.

So the question now becomes: Would you rather be right than love?

I will leave you to ponder that for awhile.

 

[Linux]

Well I am glad to hear that. But your conclusion is wrong. We agree with Thomas for two reasons. First, what he taught is certainly reasonable, many highly intelligent and saintly men and women for 800 years have thought so. Secondly, the Church has seen his work ( and that of others ) as beneficial to the Church’s work.

By the way I’m still waiting for your reference to your quotation from Disputed Questions on the Power of God.

Linus2nd

So you believe my argument is wrong because many people believe Aquinas is Right?

Any serious philosopher including Aquinas would reject this argument as a logical fallacy.

Being a saint, and the addition of saints, has nothing to do with producing a valid metaphysical argument.

In any case, it seems to me that I am arguing against your interpretation of Aquinas; since it is clear that Aquinas speaks of being in different senses and it does not follow necessarily that he speaks of being as distinct in a numerical sense especially given the quotes that i have produced.

 

[Linux]

O.K., here is the exact reference: dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#7:2

I have analyzed the answer in the context of the whole Article. I’m going to give you a chance to analyze it for youself, explain it proberly, and retract your closing comments. I’ll give you until tomorrow afternoon. If you don’t clean things up, I will come in some time tomorrow afternoon or evening and explain just how deceptive you have been here.

Linus2nd

I think you should read the other quote, as the book provides a proper understanding of the different sense in which be-ing is used and applies. When Aquinas usese the term being he does not always use it as signifying esse as distinct from essence, but rather he uses it as signifying essence as it is actual.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think you should read the other quote, as the book provides a proper understanding of the different sense in which be-ing is used and applies.

Of course he does, Thomas was very thorough. But just which quote did you have in mind, since there are many?

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

God’s esse is sufficient to actualize all potencies, including that of giving an essence its own being (though not in the temporal, conjunctive sense you keep positing).

Because the individual “act” is what allows something to be other than God. The “to be” of God is God. The “to be” of you is you; it is not me.

As I quoted Aquinas as saying earlier: That whereby an agent acts, is its act.

The function of the creature’s esse is to allow it to be a creature. God’s being is determinate. It is fully God and cannot be less than God. Thus, no creature can share it intrinsically. Sharing in the divine nature, as both Aquinas and the Church teach, comes through grace, not nature.

It is not impotent, it is necessary to the being of creatures. And I fail to see how it “does harm to God’s intelligence.” That seems a bit melodramatic, honestly.

Again, this is virtually incoherent. Noone has said essences cause esse. That is obviously ridiculous. And your conclusion is a baffling non sequitur. Limitation and causation are completely separate notions. A glass doesn’t cause water, but it limits the volume of water that may be contained within it. Likewise, an essence limits a thing’s existence by restricting it to a certain form, whether material or immaterial.

Existence is only intrinsic to God, but God’s infinite power includes the power to create existences analogous to his own.

And that is why the Catholic Church has a Magisterium: the Bible does not lend itself well to individual interpretation. This particular verse has been dealt with elsewhere in either this or another of your threads.

Excellent as usual.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

Excellent as usual.

Linus2nd

Prodigalson equivocates between what it means for God to be and for you to be

Because the individual “act” is what allows something to be other than God. The “to be” of God is God. The “to be” of you is you; it is not me.

The “to be” of God is identical, the to be of you is to participle in “to-be”, but to-be is not the identity of your essence; You are not esse.

You essence has an act, that is to say it has an expression as it is actual; but it is not actuality.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

So the question now becomes: Would you rather be right than love?

I will leave you to ponder that for awhile.

Hey, I love everyone, but I admit I’m pretty rough around the edges. To point out the obvious when it seems to be at the root of a problem does not indicate lack charity. You can P.M. me if you have anything specific in mind.

Linus2nd

 

[utunumsint]

I think you should read the other quote, as the book provides a proper understanding of the different sense in which be-ing is used and applies. When Aquinas usese the term being he does not always use it as signifying esse as distinct from essence, but rather he uses it as signifying essence as it is actual.

Hi Linux,

The other quote is referenced to De Potentia. What Linus and I did was go find the quote in its proper context, and what I found in the surrounding context completely contradicts your argument. For example:

I answer that in God there is no distinction between existence and essence. In order to make this clear we must observe that when several causes producing various effects produce one effect in common in addition to their various effects, they must needs produce this common effect by virtue of some higher cause to which this effect properly belongs. The reason for this is that since a proper effect is produced by a particular cause in respect of its, proper nature or form, different causes having different natures and forms must needs have their respective different proper effects: so that if they have one effect in common, this is not the proper effect of any one of them, but of some higher cause by whose virtue they act: thus pepper, ginger and the like which differ in characteristics have the common effect of producing heat; yet each one has its peculiar effect differing from the effects of the others. Hence we must trace their common effect to a higher cause, namely fire to whom that effect properly belongs. Likewise in the heavenly movements each planet has its peculiar movement, and besides this they have all a common movement which must be the proper movement of some higher sphere that causes them all to revolve with the daily movement. Now all created causes have one common effect which is being, although each one has its peculiar effect whereby they are differentiated: thus heat makes a thing to be hot, and a builder gives being to a house. Accordingly they have this in common that they cause being, but they differ in that fire causes fire, and a builder causes a house. There must therefore be some cause higher than all other by virtue of which they all cause being and whose proper cause is being: and this cause is God, Now the proper effect of any cause proceeds therefrom in likeness to its nature. Therefore being must be the essence or nature of God. For this reason it is stated in De Causis (prop. ix) that none but a divine intelligence gives being, and that being is the first of all effects, and that nothing was created before it.

How can I read this in any other way than that God’s proper effect is the being common to all?

And objection 6 seems to be exactly what you have been proposing in this thread all along:

1. Being to which no addition can be made is being common to all things. Now if God is his own being no additions can be made to his being; and then his being will be common to all. Consequently he can be predicated of everything, and will enter into the composition of everything: which is heretical and contrary to the statement of the Philosopher who says (De Causis, prop. xx) that the first cause rules all things without being mingled with them.

And his response to objection 6 seems unequivocal:

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Being to which no addition is made is universal being, though the possibility of addition thereto is not incompatible with the notion of universal being: whereas the divine being is being to which no addition can be made and this enters into the very notion of the divine being: **wherefore the divine being is not universal being. **Thus by adding the difference rational to animal in general we do not add anything to the notion of animal in general: and yet it is not incompatible with the idea of animal in general that an addition to it be possible: for this enters into the notion of irrational animal which is a species of animal.

It just seems eminently plain to me that Aquinas teaches that God, the divine being, causes being, is prior to being, is other than being.

Please, explain to me how I am misreading these passages! Or please admit that you disagree with Aquinas.

God bless,
Ut