How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[utunumsint]

You reply to someone by copying and pasting the very post to which your interlocutor was replying? What is the point of that?

In any case, this makes no sense whatsoever. It’s just another argument by gibberish. You don’t even understand what you just said because there is nothing in it to be understood; you’ve simply redefined the terms to fit your argument.

A thing is assigned to a genus by its essence because the essence tells us what particular kind of thing it is, as does genus. The act of being is not a genus because it can be predicated of anything that is, regardless of what kind of thing it is.

Aquinas is a very exacting thinker and an equally exacting communicator and would not say “act of being” if he meant “essence”, to begin with, to say nothing of the fact that his meaning is entirely clear here, as it is throughout “De potentia.” A genus is common to everything which falls under that genus, as “animal” is common to every species of animal, and as the species “man” is common to every individual man. That there can be many things under a single genus and species (essence) is because they have their own individual acts. That’s exactly what Aquinas means; he speaks quite plainly and clearly for himself; he wasn’t waiting for you to come along 800 years later and tell everybody that when he said “act of being”, he really meant “essence.” That’s ludicrous.

But don’t take my word for it. Look at the passage you’ve just butchered in the original Latin, where he specifically uses the term “esse”:

Respondeo. Dicendum quod Deus non est in genere: quod quidem ad praesens tribus rationibus ostendi potest: primo quidem, quia nihil ponitur in genere secundum esse suum, sed ratione quidditatis suae; quod ex hoc patet, quia esse uniuscuiusque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cuiuslibet alterius rei; sed ratio substantiae potest esse communis: propter hoc etiam philosophus dicit, quod ens non est genus.

“quia esse uniuscuiusque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cuiuslibet alterius rei” translates roughly to: “for the existence of each thing is proper to it, and distinct from the being of the thing of any other.” Or, to retain the Latin term: “for the esse of each thing is proper to it, and distinct from the esse of any other thing.”

But now we know he didn’t mean to say esse. Glad you’re here to clear that up.

No, no, sigh…prodigalson2011! You are taking Aquinas at face value! Capital offense! He can’t mean what he is clearly saying, because that would contradict Linux!



God bless,
Ut

 

[Slash]

He didn’t.
Bam.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Things are actual natures; otherwise what are they?

They are beings, substances composed of essence (nature) and existence. A nature is only part of a real being. (More on this and other points addressed in these next 2 posts in my forthcoming reply to your request for specific Aquinas references.)

You say that things move by virtue of their intrinsic existence which does not make sense of the act and potency distinction, it is also just something you made up.

You are putting words in my mouth. I did not say “intrinsic existence”, I simply said, “existence.” Their existence is not intrinsic, but received.

Nor is it something I just made up. That is what is meant by, “That whereby a thing acts is its act.” These are Aquinas’ words, not mine. Or again, “A thing acts so far as it is actual.” Or again, “Esse is the actuality of all acts.” In other words, a thing must have existence in order to do anything else. It is a self-evident truth that a thing cannot act if it doesn’t exist.

I don’t understand why you think that a thing cannot act according to its nature while being powered by something external to its nature in order to do so. In any case, more power cannot come from less or nothing (non-power), and God’s power cannot be distinct from himself. Its really irrelevant what problems you might have understanding freewill because the alternative is metaphysically impossible which has been made evident.

The only thing that has been made evident is your very insufficient understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics.

You are right that a thing can act according to its nature and you are right that God’s power cannot be distinct from Himself. You are also right that creation is empowered by God. However, created things have their own acts as well as their own powers, as appropriate to their nature (thus a sharp thing has the power to cut, a hot thing has the power to heat, an intellect has the power to think, etc.) and it is these secondary powers which receive their power through God’s power, as the acts in which they inhere are received into their form through God’s power.

That is not true and it is not hard to see why.

Is that supposed to be a rebuttal? If a thing does not have an act (esse), it does not exist. If it does not exist, it can’t do anything. That the esse cannot be God’s has already been shown numerous times. Therefore, it makes no sense to speak of anything behaving in any way if it doesn’t have act, because it makes no sense to speak of the behavior of something which doesn’t exist.

No it can’t as that would mean God has done the Metaphysically impossible feat of getting power from non-power, more from less/nothing. Nothing is the antithesis of power.

It’s funny; no matter how many times your error is corrected on this point, you keep repeating it: God does not turn nothing into something. He creates new things by His own power and nothing else. His power is infinitely greater than anything he may create, so it is not a case of more coming from less, but of less coming from infinitely more.

Saying that a being has infinite creative power does not make it evident that God can produce power from the absence of reality. You haven’t showed any logical connection between the two concepts at all. You are just asserting it just like much of everything else you have written so far on this thread.

If he can’t, then he doesn’t have “infinite creative power.” And, yes, I have made several extended arguments to that effect. It is best summed up by this short argument from the “Compendium Theologiae”:

…the more remote a potency is from act, the greater must be the power that reduces it to act. But whatever distance may be imagined between potency and act, the distance will ever be still greater if the very potency itself is withdrawn. To create from nothing, then, requires infinite power. But God alone is infinite in power, since He alone is infinite in essence. Consequently God alone can create.

I’ll break this down line by line:

“The more remote a potency is from act, the greater must be the power that reduces it to act.” Whatever has a lesser tendency towards some particular act requires a more powerful act to reduce that potency to act, just as metal, for instance, requires a much greater source of heat to ignite it then does paper.

“But whatever distance may be imagined between potency and act, the distance will ever be still greater if the very potency itself is withdrawn.” In other words, no matter how great the distance between a particular potency and a particular act we can imagine, that distance is infinitely greater if there is no pre-existing substance in which some potency may be found. Where there is no act, there is no potency. The distance between them is literally infinite.

“To create from nothing then requires infinite power.” Since God’s power is infinite, an infinite distance between act and potency does not deter him from bringing something to act. An infinite power can bridge an infinite distance.

Further, as indicated above, creation ex nihilo means that things are created from no prior existing substance, which would include God. If God’s creatures are just various forms draped over God’s existence, nothing has really been created. God has just put on costumes.

God can do something because you say he can. Great logical argument:thumbsup:

No, God can do anything because He is God, and God has infinite power, which means his power is unlimited, which means He can do anything.

 

[prodigalson2011]

That is simply a misunderstanding and an assertion on you part. First of all Potency is not a real power; in and of itself it is nothing at all in reference to actuality.

Anytime you see something you don’t like you call it “an assertion”, even though virtually everything I’ve said has already been said by Aquinas or the Church. A potency is a real power, it is just an inactive power. And, yes, it is “something in reference to actuality”; it is a real potential towards some act. A seed’s potential to grow is a real thing; a ball’s potential to roll is a real potential.

Everything that has an act is not an “intrinsic power”; that is to say that its power to act is not something generated from its own nature, but is instead something received just like its actuality. Its activity is completely contingent upon the power of God.

And no one has denied that, but it has nothing to do with the question at hand. All of a creature’s properties–its act of being, its nature and powers, etc.-- are all received from God. The types of powers a thing receives, though, are determined by its nature. A rock, by its nature, is not going to have the power to perform photosynthesis; a plant, by its nature, will not have the power of sight.

More cannot ontologically come from less.

Everything comes from God’s creative power, which is infinitely more than anything He creates, so I don’t know why you keep saying this. As I’ve said before, it’s because you view God as a part of creation that you cut Him out of the picture every time you try to argue against the contrary position; in other words, to you, if He is not a part of creation, then He plays no part in it.

God conjoins his actuality with the abstract conception of that which is only potential, the idea of a thing. The abstract conception itself is a simultaneous manifestation of his self knowledge.

Why the double standard? So, as long as God is the esse, the “idea of a thing” can be in potency to receive esse, but if, rather, God effects a new esse onto the potency of the “idea of a thing” (for an act only requires some potency to receive it), the “idea of a thing” is, in that case, just nothing and cannot be brought into existence.

This is just a self-serving double standard. It’s perfectly logical, as long as it supports your argument, but it becomes illogical when applied to an argument that contradicts yours.

You can’t have it both ways. It has already been shown that God cannot be part of His existence, and it’s just as easy to say that God, being pure and infinite act, can reduce the (infinitely negative) potency of the “idea of a thing” to act, and thus bring that thing to act.

That is meaningless, since more reality cannot come from less.

The acts he creates come from Him, and He is not less than his effects.

Creating esse from the antithesis of esse is a contradiction. Esse is not a genus

These two sentences don’t even logically connect. And, as has already been pointed out over and over and over and over, God does not create esse from anything other than His own power, which is not the antithesis of esse. “An agent effects its like”: a being in motion effects motion upon a lesser being; fire effects fire; God effects existence.

Or it can just mean something receptive.

“Something receptive” means something in potency.

How can it be the act of existence if it requires God to keep it in existence? Your words just don’t add up. Like I said this finite esse you speak of is impotent and pointless. You are not really talking about the act of existence. It is your own meaningless invention.

How can a ball’s “act of spinning” be an “act of spinning” if it requires an agent, such as a finger, to keep it spinning?

Anything which does not have an act by its nature must have that act sustained by some outside force. So a ball, which does not have the act of spinning by its nature, but only the potential to spin, must have that act not only imparted but sustained by some outside force. Likewise, all created things, which do not have the act of existing, but only the potential to exist by their nature, must have that act not only imparted but sustained by God, the only being who exists by His own power.

You can keep saying “its my own meaningless invention” all you want. I don’t think you’re fooling anyone but yourself. The abundant reference material I have provided is enough to put that lie to rest.

 

[JamesCaruso]

For Catholics, other Christians, Jews, and Muslims

It is Defined Catholic Dogma that God created, in time, all creatures out of nothing ( with no parsing of the word " nothing. " It means from no prior existing matter of any kind, including the " near nothing " states proposed by some " wild eyed," popular cosmologists of the day.

So Catholics must believe that God and His creatures are absolutely other than each other. God is no part of His creatures and they are no part of Him. God and His creatures are absolutely distinct, but His creatures are absolutely dependent upon Him for their existence, and they prosper by His Providence and Government…

It is Defined Catholic Dogma that the essential nature of God is that He is One and Simple. Other attributes are also defined but are not essential to this debate.

There is nothing in Catholic teaching about God’s " Esse, " or His " Act of Existence. " These are philosophical terms and no Catholic is bound to accept them. These same terms have been applied to creatures as well. And we are not bound to acknowledge their validity. However it would be foolish to deny their validity in either case, if they are correctly applied. And that is just where the problem lays.

It is interesting that the O.P. useses the term " act of exisiting " and asks us to prove how God could create the " act of exiting " out of nothing. This term was originated by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century and showed that God ( the Pure Subsisting Act of Exising ) created the entire universe of creatures ex nihilo, absolutely. And when He did so, He created entire substances, including their " act of existing. " That this is the correct interpretation has been shown in my post # 17. Thomas Aquinas showed in the S.T. Part 1that God is the First Cause of all creatures. In Part 1, he also shows that God created all creatures out of nothing.

Now to demand a blow by blow account as to just how God pulled off these stupendous miracles is asking us to examine the mind of God and that is just spurious in the extreme. All the best minds the world has ever known can do is demonstrate that this is a necessary conclusion. That is, because God exists, we exist.

The O.P. has put forward a number of propositions which cannot be held by Catholics.

1. God cannot create an " act of existing " which is not His Own Act of Existing
2. God cannot create an " act of existing " ex nihilo.
3. We exist, ontologically, in the mind of God.
4. The universe exists, ontologicallly, in the mind of God.
5. God’s " Act of Existing " is the " act of existing " of creatures.
6. God is the only Esse
7. There are no created esses that are separate and distinct from God’s own Esse.
   8, That God creates Essences by sharing with them His Own Esse
8. To excape the odium of an heresy akin to Pantheism because of point # 8, he says that Essence is distinct from Esse. And so God’s Esse is not a part of the created Essence. He fails to see that this has left him in the realm of Prue Ideas, that the world is nothing but a collection of Forms without real substance, a world of non-being, because for a being to exist, it must have its own Esse. But under his philosophy, this is impossible.

• It is possible that I have overlooked other errors.

** It should be noted that Thomas Aquinas teaches that essence and esse are distinct, yet esse is the most important principle of a substance, it is most interior to it and is that whereby an essence becomes a being or substance. It composes with the form and the matter, if any, to make one substance, one being.

*** St Thomas, contrary to what the O.P. says, teaches that God creates entire substances in His act of creation, and the first of His created effect, interior to the substance, is the substance’s very own act of existence,, which is limited by the form or nature of each particualr substance. And further, Thomas teaches that we must hold on Faith, that God has created the universe ex nihilo in time.

He futher teaches that God, though operating most intimately in His creation. is absolutely transcendent to it and does not mix with it in any ontological way. This is also the teaching of the Church.

**** All the arguments against his positions have been given by myself, Utunumsint, Hicetnunc, and Prodigal Son, and Polytropos earlier in this thread. You can read them for yoursef, they are St. Thomas’ own arguments.

Linus2nd

:thumbsup:Thank you for your clear exposition of Church teaching as it applies to this thread. Even I can understand it. )

 

[JamesCaruso]

We are not setting ourselves up as authorities of anything. We have allowed Thomas to speak for himself. He does not say what you calim. And whatever you are trying to say by the above, you are saying that the " act of existence " of each being is different from the " act of existence " of every other being. Therefore, the " act of existence " of created beings cannot be the " act of existence " of God, which cannot be divided. For if His " act of existence " is divisible, then He is not God. And clearly, He is God and is not divisible.

Linus2nd.

Please explain further. For me, existence is existence, at least at first blush, It does not seem to matter what the thing is, “that it exists” has no other attributes than existence itself. OTOH, existence is qualified by its time and place of origin if it has an origin, and time and place of ending, if it has an ending. If these are attributes of existence, then I can see that no two things have the same act of existence, as you call it. As I recall, even bodiless angels have place, albeit, they can move from place to place by merely thinking where they want to be. (I don’t claim this as Catholic dogma, just something that was taught to me in Catholic school. lol) God of course has neither time nor place of origin, and so his existence is always apart from our own.

 

[JamesCaruso]

I suppose existence is also defined by what it is that exists, it’s essence. Is that right?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Please explain further. For me, existence is existence, at least at first blush, It does not seem to matter what the thing is, “that it exists” has no other attributes than existence itself. OTOH, existence is qualified by its time and place of origin if it has an origin, and time and place of ending, if it has an ending. If these are attributes of existence, then I can see that no two things have the same act of existence, as you call it. As I recall, even bodiless angels have place, albeit, they can move from place to place by merely thinking where they want to be. (I don’t claim this as Catholic dogma, just something that was taught to me in Catholic school. lol) God of course has neither time nor place of origin, and so his existence is always apart from our own.

Later.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

A potency is a real power, it is just an inactive power.

That which does not exist has no power for it does not exist.

it is a real potential towards some act.

So long as you are not interpreting potential as an object, i can agree with this. You are speaking about what an actual thing could actually be. But what a thing could be has to be brought into reality by that which is identical with reality.

A seed’s potential to grow is a real thing; a ball’s potential to roll is a real potential.

But that doesn’t make potential a real object which is what you seem to be implying. That would be irrational since the thing that an object could become does not exist. That a “thing” has a potential to do something does not make potential a real “thing”; also the concept of potentiality is merely a signifier of what an actual thing could become, the understanding that things become different things and change.

The fact that a thing could become something else does not necessitate or imply that it has an** intrinsic self actuating power** to become something else; it merely necessitates or implies that a power is moving it to that act. And potency certainly does not have any power. That is completely irrational. The power to give existence to some thing only exists in act, in perfection; otherwise you are saying that the negation of power has the power to become an actual power which is clearly ridiculous to anyone whose bias is not motivating his or her conclusion.

And no one has denied that, but it has nothing to do with the question at hand. All of a creature’s properties–its act of being, its nature and powers, etc.-- are all received from God.

That is what you are saying, but that is not the logical implication of your interpretation. Given your take on esse and essence and substance, one would have to believe that God turns the negation of actuality into actuality (thus treats nothing as an object of his knowledge since his power would be acting on nothing), and that contradicts the absolute distinction between something and nothing (contradicts the principle that more cannot come from less; more objective reality cannot come from less formal reality.).

The types of powers a thing receives, though, are determined by its nature. A rock, by its nature, is not going to have the power to perform photosynthesis; a plant, by its nature, will not have the power of sight.

Agreed. I did not disagree with the idea that things act according to their natures (in that sense they are secondary causes). What i disagree with is the idea that their natures have the intrinsic power (a power that is identical with their nature), as distinct from God, to bring potency to act. I cannot accept that for pain of irrationality. Their nature is not identical to act, and therefore they cannot have the power to act by themselves.

Everything comes from God’s creative power.

What does that mean to you?

As I’ve said before, it’s because you view God as a part of creation

I never argued that God is a part of the essence of things.

that you cut Him out of the picture every time you try to argue against the contrary position; in other words, to you, if He is not a part of creation, then He plays no part in it.

If God gives something its own distinct power to exist, it makes no sense to claim that God is required to sustain it in the act of existence.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Please explain further. For me, existence is existence, at least at first blush, It does not seem to matter what the thing is, “that it exists” has no other attributes than existence itself. OTOH, existence is qualified by its time and place of origin if it has an origin, and time and place of ending, if it has an ending. If these are attributes of existence, then I can see that no two things have the same act of existence, as you call it. As I recall, even bodiless angels have place, albeit, they can move from place to place by merely thinking where they want to be. (I don’t claim this as Catholic dogma, just something that was taught to me in Catholic school. lol) God of course has neither time nor place of origin, and so his existence is always apart from our own.

Existence has synonyms as follows: act of existence, act of to be, act, or simply to be.

We think Thomas got the idea for the act of existence from Genesis where God told Moses, " I Am Who Am, tell the Israelites I Am sends you…"

There are four levels of existence.
First there is God which Thomas calls Perfect Subsistent Existence. Only in God is Existence a Being or Substance. And, in God, there are no attributes or properties. Those attributes or properties we attribute to God are one with his Existence. In Him Existence is the source of all Perfections and Absolutely so. We attribute these properties to him because that is our way of speaking.

Below God the act of existence is not a being or substance or thing. It is the principle or power which composes with another principle called essence or form to make a being or substance which really exists. In created beings or substances neither the essence nor the act of existence has any reality whatsoever except as they act as principles of a particualr being or substance. But as principles of a being or substance they, together, make a real being or substance.

In created beings it is the essence or nature or form which determines the " amount " of existence a being has. I put amount in parenthesis because, properly speaking, an act of existence can only be described as having an amount if we consider it as a power or some type of accident. We can say a thing is more or less white, so we can say, in the same way, a thing has more or less existence or is more or less perfect because of this particular perfection.

Angels of course are spirits as is the soul of man. In each of these the essence of the spirit limits the act of existence each receives from God.

Man’s essence is a composition of matter and soul where the soul is the substantial form bringing existence to man, the Person.

Purely material beings are composed of an essence ( a particular matter + a form or nature) and an act of existence. And again, neither the essence nor the act of existence has any independent existence. Each composes with the other to make an acutually existing being or substance.

In all the cases above the act of existence suffuses the entire essence, substance or being, making it real, an objective reality.

As far as the " place " of spiritual beings, they exist wherever their power is active. This may or may not always be where material beings or substances exist.

Thomas never defined existence or the act of existence, so it is a little dangerous for anyone else to try. I regard it as a power, the power which enables a being to exist.

Hope I haven’t confused you. It is nice to talk to someone who isn’t always arguing.

Linus2nd

 

[prodigalson2011]

That which does not exist has no power for it does not exist.

And this relates to what I said how? Potencies do exist. They are simply the inclination of a particular thing towards some kind of act or behavior. Those potencies are a real part of the things in which they inhere.

So long as you are not interpreting potential as an object, i can agree with this. You are speaking about what an actual thing could actually be. But what a thing could be has to be brought into reality by that which is identical with reality.

A potency must be reduced to act by something else that is in act, just as a stationary billiard ball must be moved by another ball (or any other object) which is already in motion. What is necessary is for a first mover to initiate the first act of a thing, and once that thing is in act, it can act on other things; so we see that the billiard player can set the cue ball in motion which can then set other balls in motion, which can in turn set yet other balls in motion.

The ability to move is really present in the billiard balls, but it must be activated by something that is in motion. It does not have to be something that is identical to motion which sets each particular ball in motion.

But every agent is restricted in its ability to actualize potencies by its nature; it can only actualize those potencies which are within the range of its power, as a weaker force cannot overpower a stronger resistance; so a spark may ignite a dry leaf (which offers little resistance) but not a metal beam (which is highly resistant). The more power required to actualize some potency, the greater must be the power that actualizes that potency.

Now, as has already been shown, to actually cause something “to be” from nothing at all requires infinite power, and no creature has a nature of infinite power, thus no creature can initiate or sustain its act of being by its own power, as such an act requires infinite power. And so only God can bring things to act from no potency at all.

But, on the other hand, to cause changes in other created things does not require infinite power, as the resistance to such changes is far from infinite. Whether or not a particular agent can reduce some potency to act depends on the strength of the agent’s power versus the resistance of its recipient to that act.

But that doesn’t make potential a real object which is what you seem to be implying. That would be irrational since the thing that an object could become does not exist. That a “thing” has a potential to do something does not make potential a real “thing”; also the concept of potentiality is merely a signifier of what an actual thing could become, the understanding that things become different things and change.

No, I am saying that a potential is a part of a real object. It is a natural tendency within a real thing towards some state or act. It is a dormant power that a thing possesses by its very nature. Its reality is implied by the very nature of the thing.

The fact that a thing could become something else does not necessitate or imply that it has an** intrinsic self actuating power** to become something else;

I never said it did.

it merely necessitates or implies that a power is moving it to that act.

That’s exactly what I said.

(continued…)

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

And potency certainly does not have any power.

What you mean by simple “power” is what is more specifically called “active power.” This distinction is philosophically important. I said that a potency is a passive power. A passive power is simply “an ability to be acted upon;” or in other words, “potency.” But if a potency is not a real thing, it makes no sense to say that a thing’s potency is reduced to act, as the act then becomes arbitrary. If a thing does not have a real potential to melt, then the fact that it does indeed melt is in no way related to the nature of the thing. It might as well turn into a unicorn. But things behave in predictable ways because they have very real tendencies towards different acts. Those tendencies are a part of their nature and, thus, a part of their being.

There is a difference between “inactive” and “non-existent.” While existence is being in act, there is nothing to stop a being which is in act from also being in potency at the same time. Ah, a logical contradiction, you may say, but no. A thing can be in act and potency at the same time, just not in respect to the same thing. Thus, a ball can be in the act of rolling while it may, at the same time, be in potency to bouncing. It cannot, however be in the act of rolling and at the same time also be in potency to rolling.

If the potencies towards alternative states were not real properties of a thing, there would be no logical reason to expect that it would begin to do such things, rather than something else altogether. As Aquinas himself says, all creatures are admixtures of act and potency, which implies that potency is a real part of a creature’s being. Indeed, they are simply descriptions of the thing in respect to different behaviors it will exhibit in the proper circumstances. So, yes, a potency does have power, inasmuch as it is a power intrinsic to a thing’s nature; it is just a power that remains inactive until activated by the proper agency.

That is completely irrational. The power to give existence to some thing only exists in act, in perfection; otherwise you are saying that the negation of power has the power to become an actual power which is clearly ridiculous to anyone whose bias is not motivating his or her conclusion.

The actualization of a thing’s potency is not “giving existence” to that potency; it already exists, it is simply a dormant power within something that already exists. It is more accurate to say that the potency is “awakened.”

So none of this follows at all from my argument. I have quite clearly stated that a thing can only be reduced from potency to act by something that is in act, and I have stated it numerous times.

But the fact remains that for a particular act to result from some agent’s activity, the recipient must have an inherent potency towards that act.

That is what you are saying, but that is not the logical implication of your interpretation. Given your take on esse and essence and substance, one would have to believe that God turns the negation of actuality into actuality (thus treats nothing as an object of his knowledge since his power would be acting on nothing)

No, one would have to believe that if one were committed to the conclusion that “God cannot create an act of existing.” (Let’s not forget what you said about bias. That street runs both ways.)

For one who likes to make charges of “assertion”, your replies are often severely wanting in logical exposition. As regards this particular charge, it has already been addressed over and over again, even in my last post. I repeat, for the umpteenth time: God does not turn “nothing” into “something”. Creation is not a change, it is the radical causing of the whole existence of something. (Again, this is the teaching of the Church and Aquinas; not my own definition.)

(continued…)

 

[prodigalson2011]

(…continued)

, and that contradicts the absolute distinction between something and nothing (contradicts the principle that more cannot come from less; more objective reality cannot come from less formal reality.).

:compcoff: Yeah, yeah. You’ve said that once or twice already. And so I say, yet again, more does not come from less. Less comes from more: everything that exists comes from God, who is not less than what he creates.

Agreed. I did not disagree with the idea that things act according to their natures (in that sense they are secondary causes). What i disagree with is the idea that their natures have the intrinsic power (a power that is identical with their nature), as distinct from God, to bring potency to act. I cannot accept that for pain of irrationality. Their nature is not identical to act, and therefore they cannot have the power to act by themselves.

You are misconstruing my argument. When I say a power intrinsic to a nature, I mean simply that if such a thing as described by that nature exists, it will necessarily have those powers. But such a thing will only exist if it is given an act, and thus power, by an agent powerful enough to bestow such an act (and that agent is God). So even though the power is intrinsic to the nature, a being with such a nature must be created in order for those powers to be real.

To illustrate the point, if something exists whose nature is intellectual, then the power of intellect is intrinsic to that nature. If something exists whose nature is to produce heat, then the power of heating is intrinsic to that nature. This does not mean that these powers are self-actualizing. It simply means that once these things are brought to act through creation, they may then act by their own power, not to the exclusion of the power that brings them to and sustains them in act, but rather, separate from yet contingent upon that power.

To reiterate, inasmuch as things are given an act, and are thus in act, they can and do have the power to actualize potencies by their own power, just as a ball which is rolling can, by its own power, cause other balls of similar size to roll by acting upon them, even though the ball is not identical to its act of rolling and must have that act of rolling imparted by some outside force.

What does that mean to you?

It means that everything that exists is a product of God’s will and power and nothing else, as though a man’s ideas could become manifest through the power of thought and will alone.

We cannot do that because our power is limited by our nature. We have finite power. God’s power, however, is unlimited, pure act. Finite beings are limited in what they can bring to act by the relation between the degree of their active power and the degree of resistance to that power in the things they act upon (i.e. the power of the act must be greater than the resistance of the potency.)

Thus, we cannot even move potencies whose degree of separation from act is greater than the degree of our power to reduce such a potency to act, much less bring things into being from nothing. But God, being of infinite power, has no limitations upon His power and thus can bring to act anything which may possibly be.

That is what it means to me. And not only me, but Aquinas. And not only Aquinas, but the Church.

God creates things according to their entire substance (essence and esse, matter and form) from no prior existing materials.

I never argued that God is a part of the essence of things.

I didn’t say “a part of the essence of things.” I said “a part of creation.” Creation is not simply an essence, it is a real thing. It is an existence. These word games you keep playing are not going to work.

If God gives something its own distinct power to exist, it makes no sense to claim that God is required to sustain it in the act of existence.

An “act of existence” is not the power to exist. It is an act which makes something exist. Pushing a book along a table gives it an “act of motion”, but that does not mean the book now has the “power to move” on its own. It is an act which exceeds the natural power of the book, and must thus be sustained by some higher power. Likewise, the “act of existing”, as regards creation, exceeds the natural power of created beings, and must thus be imparted and sustained by some power higher than creation, and that power is God.

 

[prodigalson2011]

P.S. Another way in which we may consider “the reality of a thing’s potencies,” is the fact that it is the particular kind of potencies a thing has which limit its act and thus make it the kind of being it is. If potencies were not a real part of things, then there would be nothing which limited their acts, and there would be no distinction between things. Indeed there would be no things between which to distinguish.

In sum, a “potency” is not just “a way a thing may be,” as though it’s one of several options a thing has in a given situation. It is rather the way a thing simply is, though only as regards its relation to something else.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

To the readers of this debate. Whether my arguments are in line with Aquinas or not has no relevance whatsoever with whether or not my argument is correct. Linus claims that his interpretation is in line or even identical with Aquinas, but I would look very carefully at the full body of Aquinas’ work and tell me where you find it explicitly said…

1. That esse and essence in creatures are co-contingent or interdependent or each-other for both their actuality as distinct.

I don’t think Thomas uses these terms exactly. But they are distinct as principles of a being. A particular being cannot exist without either. These sentiments would be found in S.T., Part 1, Ques 2- 109. Why are you making this an issue now after nearly a 1,000 pgs of debate?

1. Tell me where esse is describe as merely a principle that is not a real thing in itself, and that this non-actual thing, which is not even potency itself, brings potency to act.

Ques 2-109, it follows from all that Thomas says.

1. Tell me where you find Aquinas saying that creatures positively bring potency/nothing to act by their own distinct power, as opposed to God’s power which is mediated by contingent beings?

He never says that and neither did I. Apparantly you haven’t read anything I wrote. Why doesn’t that surprise me?

1. Tell me where Aquinas says that more can come from less.

Again, he never said that and neither did I. Why are you insinuating either of us did? Again, you haven’t read anything I have written.

1. Tell me where Aquinas says that created substances are identical with their actuality?

What do you mean by " their actuality? " If you can’t ask your questions so that there is no danger of misunderstanding, you shouldn’t ask them.

Thomas never says substances are identical to their act, if that is what you mean. If that is not what you mean, I have not idea what you do mean.

1. And tell me where Aquinas makes a distinction between actuality and esse?

I am sure he never did and I didn’t either. But now that you mention it, we speak of a being as an actuality, that is, something that exists in reality. But that actuality certainly would not be identified with their act of existence.

And I will show you an Aquinas that is not the same Thomas who wrote the Summa theologica.

All these things are their own made up interpretation developed in the attempt to counter my argument. And they all lead to metaphysical irrevocable contradictions.

And who said he says any of these things or that I did, or that we did? You have raised a bunch of phoney questions, I don’t believe you have any idea yourself why you raised them. They certainly demonstrate a lack of sincerity, a lack of earnestness in argument. A whole page of red herrings.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

I don’t think Thomas uses these terms exactly. But they are distinct as principles of a being. A particular being cannot exist without either.

Lets deal with one thing at a time.

I want to discuss your use of the word esse and how it seems to transform into different things when you describe it.

My take on the matter is that an essence cannot be made actual unless it is conjoined to that which is actuality itself. The reason i conclude this is because otherwise potency is being conjoined to that which is not an actual thing and this non-actual thing has an active power to bring potency to act. But it is clearly incoherent to describe esse as the “act of existence” if it is not in itself actual existence, or as that which has a distinct active power to bring potency to actuality if it is not an actual thing, for only **actual reality has an active power. **

Also if you render esse as that which is nothing more than an ontological principle then you have to accept that such a principle by itself is nothing at all, much less an abstraction, unless you are describing something intrinsic to a things essense. For example a man is walking. However when we speak of walking in itself as distinct from the person doing the walking then ontologically speaking it is nothing at all accept an abstraction. Similarly an essence either is esse or contingent upon esse, but esse cannot be meaningfully spoken of within an ontological context as that which is not intrinsic to what an essence is, since principles have no meaning outside of natures; that is to say it has no meaning outside of what an actual essence is doing. Thus you are left with only one more move and that is to say that an esse, as a principle, is the potential activity of an actual essence (putting the kart before the horse since actuality is then something that comes after the existence of a essence as its activity; which is clearly irrational). I don’t think you need me to tell you the problem with that belief and why Aquinas could never have agreed.

In that specific case you are in fact saying that more can come from less and I see nowhere in the writings of Aquinas where he describes esse as that which is not an actual thing itself as distinct from essence. I think you and prodigalson are making it up to hide inconsistency.

I am sure he never did and I didn’t either. But now that you mention it, we speak of a being as an actuality, that is, something that exists in reality. But that actuality certainly would not be identified with their act of existence.

So now you are saying that the act of existence (esse) is not the actuality of an essence (the isness of an essence). Of course you would have to believe this in order to escape my argument. But for the reasons i presented above it simply does not make sense to make a distinction between esse and the actuality of a thing. I don’t see such a distinction in the works of Aquinas.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Lets deal with one thing at a time.

I want to discuss your use of the word esse and how it seems to transform into different things when you describe it.

My take on the matter is that an essence cannot be made actual unless it is conjoined to that which is actuality itself. The reason i conclude this is because otherwise potency is being conjoined to that which is not an actual thing and this non-actual thing has an active power to bring potency to act. But it is clearly incoherent to describe esse as the “act of existence” if it is not in itself actual existence, or as that which has a distinct active power to bring potency to actuality if it is not an actual thing, for only **actual reality has an active power. **

My friend there has been 800 years of discussion about the meaning of esse. Philosophers like Etienne Gilson and many others who accept the notion of esse follow its use through Thomas’ Corpus and have determined that it has synonyms such as act of existence, act of to be, act, to be, or simply existence. Thomists who disagree generally treat esse as a being rather than as an act.

And I agree that essence cannot be made actual unless it is accompanied by an act of existence. I would not call the act of existence " actuality itself. " No where in ST. Thomas will you find the term " actuality itself. " So I would not even discuss its meaning since it is not necessary to our long debate. It has no philosophical meaning as far as I know. Usually, in common parlance, an actuality is something that really exists or something which is really taking place. And that is the only way I would use it.

An act of existence is an actual being, an actual substance in God. His act of existence is His Existence, is His Substance. He is Pure Act.

In created beings the act of existence has reality only as conjoined with an essence. Unless conjoined, neither has any actuality, except as a concept in the mind. Neither exists alone in the created universe.

God creates only substances. At one time He creates all that comprises them as real beings or substances. This includes everything that comprises their essence and an act of existence, or an esse which suffuses the entire substence as the principle which makes it exist as a substance. As a principle which makes a substance exist it can be considered as some kind of power because it supplies the power by which a substance exists.

Also if you render esse as that which is nothing more than an ontological principle then you have to accept that such a principle by itself is nothing at all, much less an abstraction, unless you are describing something intrinsic to a things essense. For example a man is walking. However when we speak of walking in itself as distinct from the person doing the walking then ontologically speaking it is nothing at all accept an abstraction. Similarly an essence either is esse or contingent upon esse, but esse cannot be meaningfully spoken of within an ontological context as that which is not intrinsic to what an essence is, since principles have no meaning outside of natures; that is to say it has no meaning outside of what an actual essence is doing. Thus you are left with only one more move and that is to say that an esse, as a principle, is the potential activity of an actual essence (putting the kart before the horse since actuality is then something that comes after the existence of a essence as its activity; which is clearly irrational). I don’t think you need me to tell you the problem with that belief and why Aquinas could never have agreed.

Your thinking is so muddled here that I will have to deal wit this paragraph separately.

In that specific case you are in fact saying that more can come from less and I see nowhere in the writings of Aquinas where he describes esse as that which is not an actual thing itself as distinct from essence. I think you and prodigalson are making it up to hide inconsistency.

Same as previous comment.

So now you are saying that the act of existence (esse) is not the actuality of an essence (the isness of an essence). Of course you would have to believe this in order to escape my argument. But for the reasons i presented above it simply does not make sense to make a distinction between esse and the actuality of a thing. I don’t see such a distinction in the works of Aquinas.

Actually, nothing you say makes sense because you have built your whole case on the infallibility of your own logical processes and ignoring the greater minds of histroy who have already traveled over the same ground. I have not seen your ideas reflected in any philosopher I know of. They seem to be something you have dreamed up on your own, made up out of whole cloth. Why should anyone take them seriously?

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

My friend there has been 800 years of discussion about the meaning of esse. Philosophers like Etienne Gilson and many others who accept the notion of esse follow its use through Thomas’ Corpus and have determined that it has synonyms such as act of existence, act of to be, act, to be, or simply existence. Thomists who disagree generally treat esse as a being rather than as an act.

And I agree that essence cannot be made actual unless it is accompanied by an act of existence. I would not call the act of existence " actuality itself. " No where in ST. Thomas will you find the term " actuality itself. " So I would not even discuss its meaning since it is not necessary to our long debate. It has no philosophical meaning as far as I know. Usually, in common parlance, an actuality is something that really exists or something which is really taking place. And that is the only way I would use it.

An act of existence is an actual being, an actual substance in God. His act of existence is His Existence, is His Substance. He is Pure Act.

In created beings the act of existence has reality only as conjoined with an essence. Unless conjoined, neither has any actuality, except as a concept in the mind. Neither exists alone in the created universe.

God creates only substances. At one time He creates all that comprises them as real beings or substances. This includes everything that comprises their essence and an act of existence, or an esse which suffuses the entire substence as the principle which makes it exist as a substance. As a principle which makes a substance exist it can be considered as some kind of power because it supplies the power by which a substance exists.

Your thinking is so muddled here that I will have to deal wit this paragraph separately.

Same as previous comment.

Actually, nothing you say makes sense because you have built your whole case on the infallibility of your own logical processes and ignoring the greater minds of histroy who have already traveled over the same ground. I have not seen your ideas reflected in any philosopher I know of. They seem to be something you have dreamed up on your own, made up out of whole cloth. Why should anyone take them seriously?

Linus2nd

I gave logical reasons for speaking of esse - distinct from the essence of creatures - as actual existence itself. Simply because it is ontologically meaningless to speak of the act of existence (esse) as anything other than actual existence itself. It is also meaningless to speak of esse as dependent or contingent upon that which is brought to act from potency. Its not hard to see the contradiction involved in speaking of esse as that which brings potency to act and at the same time arguing that it is contingent upon essence in-order to be the act of existence (to be the the very thing that makes an essence actual!!). Not to mention, existence is a meaningless concept if it is actual wihout being identical to any essence. In that respect you are right that existence cannot exist without being an essence, but you seem to think that an esse can exist as merely conjoined to essense without being an actual essence itself. But if there can be an esse that is not an essence even when conjoined to an essence, then what is it exactly in itself? Its nothing at all. Some meaningless principle you made up.

It is either intrinsic existence or its is not existence. You can either argue that Esse is the essence of creatures (if you want to say that it is their own distinct esse, but that leads to contradictions), or you have to say that esse is the essence of God alone and that creatures do not have their own distinct esse. These new distinctions made-up by you and prodigalson, such as “esse is act but not actual existence itself”, make no rational sense. Your so called rebuttals consist mainly of a resentful bias and an assumption that you really understand what you are talking about.

Aquinas never makes a distinction between esse and actuality. He never cliams that esse is a non-actual principle that brings potency to act. He never speaks of esse as that which begins to exist. Your whole argument is a game of semantics. I take esse for what it is, actual existence itself.
When Aquinas calls a creature a being, he is speaking of being in an analogous sense, that is to say they do not exist or continue to exist through there own intrinsic being but through the being of something else and that being can only be that which is actuality itself.

If Aquinas disagrees, then i disagree with Aquinas. And if you want to say that i am wrong then you have to provide a logically consistent rebuttal and not just quote Aquinas with the assumption that he is correct. I don’t care how many people agree with him.

In other-words, you don’t have a rebuttal, only an assertion that you have a rebuttal and that this rebuttal is found in Aquinas. Why should any true philosopher take you seriously if instead of actually dealing with the argument i presented you have chosen to evade it with assertions of muddy thinking?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I gave logical reasons for speaking of esse - distinct from the essence of creatures - as actual existence itself. Simply because it is ontologically meaningless to speak of the act of existence (esse) as anything other than actual existence itself. It is also meaningless to speak of esse as dependent or contingent upon that which is brought to act from potency. Its not hard to see the contradiction involved in speaking of esse as that which brings potency to act and at the same time arguing that it is contingent upon essence in-order to be the act of existence (to be the the very thing that makes an essence actual!!). Not to mention, existence is a meaningless concept if it is actual wihout being identical to any essence. In that respect you are right that existence cannot exist without being an essence, but you seem to think that an esse can exist as merely conjoined to essense without being an actual essence itself. But if there can be an esse that is not an essence even when conjoined to an essence, then what is it exactly in itself? Its nothing at all. Some meaningless principle you made up.

It is either intrinsic existence or its is not existence. You can either argue that Esse is the essence of creatures (if you want to say that it is their own distinct esse, but that leads to contradictions), or you have to say that esse is the essence of God alone and that creatures do not have their own distinct esse. These new distinctions made-up by you and prodigalson, such as “esse is act but not actual existence itself”, make no rational sense. Your so called rebuttals consist mainly of a resentful bias and an assumption that you really understand what you are talking about.

Aquinas never makes a distinction between esse and actuality. He never cliams that esse is a non-actual principle that brings potency to act. He never speaks of esse as that which begins to exist. Your whole argument is a game of semantics. I take esse for what it is, actual existence itself.
When Aquinas calls a creature a being, he is speaking of being in an analogous sense, that is to say they do not exist or continue to exist through there own intrinsic being but through the being of something else and that being can only be that which is actuality itself.

If Aquinas disagrees, then i disagree with Aquinas. And if you want to say that i am wrong then you have to provide a logically consistent rebuttal and not just quote Aquinas with the assumption that he is correct. I don’t care how many people agree with him.

In other-words, you don’t have a rebuttal, only an assertion that you have a rebuttal and that this rebuttal is found in Aquinas. Why should any true philosopher take you seriously if instead of actually dealing with the argument i presented you have chosen to evade it with assertions of muddy thinking?

I don’t have to prove anything. Thomas has answered you but you don’t seem to understand him. As I said, I don’t know of any philosopher who has the slant on these things that you have. If you could provide one, perhaps you would have something like an argument. Absent of that, all we can conclude is that you are just being obstinate, prefering your own private opinions in preference to the Masters.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

I don’t have to prove anything. Thomas has answered you but you don’t seem to understand him. As I said, I don’t know of any philosopher who has the slant on these things that you have. If you could provide one, perhaps you would have something like an argument. Absent of that, all we can conclude is that you are just being obstinate, prefering your own private opinions in preference to the Masters.

Linus2nd

Likewise I have never seen anybody explicitly argue that esse is co-contingent with essence or the idea that esse is not actuality in and of itself, but “you” wish to argue that this is the logical implication of his statements.

I am not merely asserting that Aquinas means this or that; I am saying that in order for his metaphysics to remain consistent and rational he must mean this or that.

In any case, this idea that I must agree with Aquinas otherwise I am wrong, is not a logical argument, but rather it is fallacy that you keep hiding behind so that you don’t have to make any arguments. But this thread is not about Aquinas and what he really meant, It is about making logical sense of creation out of nothing; a concept you obviously take for granted. How does God create “the act of existing” out of nothing? And if you think he addresses my arguments, then you have to demonstrate logically how he refutes my argument. Pushing quotes out of context and arguing that Aquinas believed in multiple esse and that everyone else agrees accept me is just not an argument at all. It is just another red herring evasion tactic.