I am baffled, please explain

[PumpkinCookie]

The thing is… we don’t have knowledge of counterfactuals. We might offer opinions or arguments about what might be (but which does not exist), but we have no knowledge about them. An example might be helpful: if God had created someone (whom He did not, actually, create), and you married them, what would the color of the hair be of the children you would have had? See what I mean? The person doesn’t exist… so we can’t say anything about it; it’s not real … it’s counterfactual.

Yes, I agree. We don’t have certain knowledge of what would have happened since it never does, and there is a certain amount of in-determinism or free will at play. Actually, I would argue that we do know what will happen/ would have happened with respect to many physical laws. This is how we make scientific predictions. However, yes, when humans or complex scenarios are involved, it would be a stretch to say we “know” what would have happened. In your example of the hypothetical marriage, we actually could determine the hair color if we had the hypothetical genetic information of the hypothetical marriage partner.

That’s just a rather poor attempt to shift the burden of proof. If you want to assert that Molinism is true, the burden of proof is on you to demonstrate it’s true; it’s not our job to disprove a theory you cannot prove on your own.

I don’t understand, what would be a “good” attempt to shift the burden of proof? How about this: God knows everything there is to know, that’s the definition of omniscience. Counterfactuals are things that can be known. You disagree, and that is OK. Just explain why counterfactuals are things that can’t be known by an omniscient mind, or why omniscience is distinct from “knowing everything that can be known.”

Explain what your intuition is – in concrete terms – and why it’s logical, and we can discuss it. Simply saying “it seems to me that it should be that way” does nothing to help demonstrate your case.

OK my intuition is simply that God (timelessly or whatever) knows what would have happened as well as what actually is happening or has/have/had/will happen. Since we have this knowledge to a certain extent via science, it would seem reasonable that God would have a perfection of this knowledge. Is that really so far fetched?

Not sure how you’re making the leap from ‘knowledge’ to ‘obliteration of free will’. If I know that your favorite ice cream is pistachio, and I take you to an ice cream shop that sells pistachio ice cream, I might know that you’ll choose pistachio… but that doesn’t mean that I’ve forced or even coerced you into choosing that flavor. The choice is yours; knowledge of that choice is mine. These are two distinct notions.

If you “take me” to the ice cream shop, you have not destroyed my free will unless I don’t agree to go and you force me to go. Actually, this scenario demonstrates Molinism perfectly. You desire for me to eat pistachio ice cream. You know that I would eat it given the opportunity, and you take me to the ice cream store. In this way, your middle knowledge of what I “would do” allows your will to be accomplished (I eat the ice cream) while I still retain my free will (I chose to eat it).

Now, consider Mary. She was acted upon by God from the first moment of her existence in view of the future merits of her son. What if she was only able to say “yes” because of the singular grace given to her? God would be obliterating her free will in that case, unless he knew that she would have said yes anyway, in my opinion.

 

[PumpkinCookie]

All Believers should believe for one reason, and one reason only: because it’s true.

OK well that settles it then. I’ve never actually been a Roman Catholic in that case. I tried desperately to make myself believe, to convince myself, to evangelize myself. Every night I would pray to God “Please, please show me the truth! Help me believe!” I’ve attended lectures, consulted with theologians, and read shelves of books in a desperate attempt to make myself believe. I’ve spent hours in adoration over many years. The whole time praying, “God, please, teach me the truth.”

But, my doubts only became more numerous, powerful, and clear. I thought Satan had me in his grip. I went to a priest and he prayed deliverance prayers over me because he was convinced I was being influenced by the devil due to all of my many persistent doubts and questions. I am grateful for that moment, because it was one of many that helped me realize in a powerful way that God has been answering my prayers quite generously all along, just not in the way I wanted them to be answered.

Because of that, I want to share the knowledge I’ve gained and to ask further questions in the hopes that more truth will be revealed. I’m not here to proselytize or convince anyone of anything. But still, consider that issue. Do you believe, or do you want to believe?

 

[PRmerger]

OK well that settles it then. I’ve never actually been a Roman Catholic in that case.

Ok. It’s clear you weren’t ever catechized.

I tried desperately to make myself believe, to convince myself, to evangelize myself. Every night I would pray to God “Please, please show me the truth! Help me believe!” I’ve attended lectures, consulted with theologians, and read shelves of books in a desperate attempt to make myself believe. I’ve spent hours in adoration over many years. The whole time praying, “God, please, teach me the truth.”

And yet you still can’t correctly articulate basic Catholic teachings.

Now, to be sure, you are heads and shoulders above many lump-in-the-pews Catholics, but don’t delude yourself into thinking you know what it is that you’re rejecting.

 

[PRmerger]

Do you believe, or do you want to believe?

Do I believe…what?

Your question is incomplete. It needs a direct object.

 

[Aloysium]

. . . . “The propositions of the Roman Catholic faith sound like gibberish to you because you don’t have a relationship with God.”

Is that what you mean? Now, do you mean this generally, as in “Only those who have a relationship with God will understand the propositions of the Roman Catholic faith” or does it only apply to me because I’m somehow especially 1) evil, 2) silly, 3) ignorant? Do you mean something else?

It really doesn’t matter anyway. The question at hand is whether God could or even should have created a better world or not. This is a legitimate problem, in my opinion.

Thank you for encouraging me to pray. I will offer you one thing upon which to meditate. Do you believe, or do you want to believe?

too

You know what it is like to be involved more-or-less in a marital relationship even if you are not married, by observing people. You will have a deeper understanding of the joys and tensions one encounters in intimate relationships, if you are actually married. In fact, one is always learning. It is through our relations with each other and with the Ground of our being, the basic Reality of our existence, that we grow in knowledge. It is important to share our experiences; but, although we may use the same word, it can have diverse meanings.

I don’t think you are evil or silly; we are all ignorant, as this is the reality of being in this world. We can rise above this.
That said, I don’t see shrewdness and practicality (knowledge of the workings of this world) as having anything to do with that Truth which is synonymous with Goodness and Beauty.

To ask if a better world could have been created, I don’t see as a valid question.
It presupposes a number of things, including:

• We know and understand what this world is all about. (We don’t know very much, only what has been revealed.)
• We know what is good. (God is the ultimate Good. We are so far from Home.)
• We have something other than what is in this world with which to contrast. (We can only compare the negative parts with the positive, and it is likely that you cannot have one without the other.)
  I do not think there could be a better world. Any such considerations simply reveal my deficiencies (cowardice, lust, envy, pride, you name it).

I actually know and want to know more.

 

[tonyrey]

If you do not care whether anyone exists the death wish is still lurking…

It belittles the daughter. Any normal parent would wish for a son as well as a daughter.

If I wish that there would be no rapists and murderers that is not a death wish for the “human race”.

Your starting point was that God should have created another human pair who would not have succumbed to the temptation - which implies that you reject the existing human race lock, stock and barrel.

Do you believe the sum total of suffering in the world outweighs the value of life on this planet?

These are incommensurables. But I know that the suffering can be decreased and many people devote their lives to that noble endeavor.

They can’t be incommensurable if you are prepared to sacrifice the existing human race in favour of a sinless couple and their descendants.

You do not really reject the world but the world as it is.

Of course not. And I never said otherwise. I have no problems with the rocks, the trees, etc…

The OP makes it clear that you reject the world with its people.

On that we are all agreed - in theory if not in practice. It is within our power to reduce the man-made misery in the world even if we can’t eliminate it completely just as we have found solutions to much of the natural evil in the world. Our views are not so different after all…

Correct. Except I like to contemplate feasible solutions, even if those solutions are beyond my abilities to put into practice. Yes, sometimes the changes WOULD BE drastic.

What makes you think I don’t ? There are far more realistic solutions than wishing for a sinless world.

 

[Pallas_Athene]

It belittles the daughter. Any normal parent would wish for a son as well as a daughter.

You know, I would have been very pleasantly surprised if you had said: “Indeed, there is no death wish for the daughter, BUT it would be belittling for the daughter”. And you are again not in the position to declare that people with certain preferences are “abnormal”. If a parent discovers that her daughter is tone-deaf, and would love to have a child with musical talent, that does not mean that she would prefer the existing child to be DEAD. I rather hope that we can bypass this stage of “death wish”.

Your starting point was that God should have created another human pair who would not have succumbed to the temptation - which implies that you reject the existing human race lock, stock and barrel.

Not “ALL”. There could be many exceptions, but in any case wishing to have a DIFFERENT set of people, does not include that the existing one should be “killed”.

They can’t be incommensurable if you are prepared to sacrifice the existing human race in favour of a sinless couple and their descendants.
The OP makes it clear that you reject the world with its people.

I reject a world, where there is unnecessary pain and suffering. If the remedy would necessitate that some people would be created DIFFERENTLY, then so be it. It is still not a death wish.

What makes you think I don’t ? There are far more realistic solutions than wishing for a sinless world.

First of all, I never said anything about a “sinless world”. I only talked about a world without pain and suffering. As of yet you have never elucidated on your “far more realistic solution”. Why not start a new thread about it, since this one is way over the usual 1000 posts limit. You could use an eye-catching title like: “Tony’s solution of eliminating pain and suffering”. That would be rather cool.

 

[Aloysium]

This world includes the Path leading to paradise. It contains everything one needs to find infinite Joy.

 

[Gorgias]

If that “merely possible” is all there is, then I have a pretty good “omniscience”. Take a coin toss. There are exactly 4 outcomes: heads, tails, the edge (unlikely, but possible) and none (if someone grabs the coin in mid-air and runs away with it).

Your ‘omniscience’ knows the possibilities, but has no clue which will come to pass. If that’s what you think ‘omniscience’ is, it’s no wonder you have little respect for God.

The future does not exist as an ontological entity

Can you see that this is where your reasoning falls apart? The future doesn’t exist to you as a human; to God, who is outside of the bounds of time, all of time exists equally.

the “could have happened” is not an existing ontological entity. If God is supposed to know the “future”, then he is equally supposed to know the outcome of the “could have happened”

Wow. PA, in all charity… you might consider carrying on fewer simultaneous discussions; you seem to be getting confused. The issue here isn’t whether God is capable of #4-#6 on your list; we both agree that He is ‘supposed to’ be capable of these. Rather, we’re discussing whether these are what ‘counterfactuals’ consist of. You say that they are; I’ve countered that these are precisely what the documents you cited have identified as the ‘merely possible.’

This is a transitive function:

1. God is directly responsible for Joe’s existence
2. Joe is directly responsible for his actions
3. God foresaw what Joe will do if created… and created him, knowing full well what will happen
4. Therefore God is indirectly responsible for Joe’s actions - after all, if God would NOT have created Joe, then his putative actions would never come to reality.

Not all sets of functions are transitive, PA. I’d hope that you’d recognize that. For example, if Anna is the mother of Beth, and Beth is the mother of Cecilia, this does not imply that Anna is the mother of Cecilia. You yourself admit that this is the case, inasmuch as you assert that a pair of ‘direct responsibility’ relationships does not result in a ‘direct responsibility’ relationship between ‘God’ and ‘the actions of Joe’. Yet, without proof or argument, you baldly assert that some new relationship – ‘indirect responsibility’ – is the relationship we see. Worse yet, having freely asserted this relationship, you use it as a bludgeon against God. Let’s play your game, though: if you want to assert a relationship of ‘indirect responsibility’, what does this relationship mean? What does it imply? You want to argue the special case of ‘omniscience’ in the context of this new relationship, but don’t put the cart before the horse: before you tell us that God’s omniscience makes Him ‘indirectly responsible’ for evil, you’ll need to define this relationship and open it up to scrutiny.

The dog is not a “moral agent”, but that is completely irrelevant. Not being a moral agent the dog cannot be held responsible for its own action.

Actually… the fact that a “dog cannot be held responsible for its own action” is precisely the reason that your example fails. A person can be held responsible for his own action – remember your assertions above, in which ‘Joe’ is directly responsible for his actions? Your example needs someone who is directly responsible for his actions – which you admit a dog is not. Perhaps you’d like to try again?

 

[Gorgias]

Yes, I agree. We don’t have certain knowledge of what would have happened since it never does, and there is a certain amount of in-determinism or free will at play.

No – counterfactuals aren’t simply things that are ‘merely possible’ but which do not happen; they’re things that do not exist. It was only ‘merely possible’ that I crossed a street (which I did not) today; both I and the street exist. God knows these. On the other hand, I did not meet and fall in love with a woman (whom God did not create) today. That is a counterfactual. God cannot know about our relationship… since her existence is counterfactual. It’s a significant difference.

Actually, I would argue that we do know what will happen/ would have happened with respect to many physical laws. This is how we make scientific predictions.

The physical laws operate over things which exist. Therefore, they are not ‘counterfactuals’ in the sense of the ‘middle knowledge’ of God which has been being posited.

However, yes, when humans or complex scenarios are involved, it would be a stretch to say we “know” what would have happened. In your example of the hypothetical marriage, we actually could determine the hair color if we had the hypothetical genetic information of the hypothetical marriage partner.

That’s the whole point: the ‘marriage partner’ is hypothetical, and therefore, there is neither genetic information nor hair color. It’s all counterfactual, and so, it does not exist.

How about this: God knows everything there is to know, that’s the definition of omniscience. Counterfactuals are things that can be known.

You’re begging the question: you cannot define counterfactuals as things that can be known, if you’re attempting to prove that they’re things that can be known.

Just explain why counterfactuals are things that can’t be known by an omniscient mind

Because they are things that never exist.

or why omniscience is distinct from “knowing everything that can be known.”

It isn’t. It’s just that counterfactuals aren’t in the set of things that can be known.

OK my intuition is simply that God (timelessly or whatever) knows what would have happened as well as what actually is happening or has/have/had/will happen.

As long as we’re in the realm of things that exist (or had existed / will exist), we’re all good. Once we exit that realm, we cannot ascribe knowledge.

Since we have this knowledge to a certain extent via science

You’re still in the realm of the ‘merely possible’ – and I agree: God does have knowledge of the merely possible!

In this way, your middle knowledge of what I “would do”

That’s not what middle knowledge is. If you don’t exist – or ice cream doesn’t exist – then ‘middle knowledge’ would be "what (non-existent) ice cream does the (non-existent) person PumpkinCookie eat when that (non-existent) person goes to the (non-existent) ice cream shop. That’s middle knowledge – and that’s what cannot be known, since it does not exist.

Now, consider Mary. She was acted upon by God from the first moment of her existence in view of the future merits of her son. What if she was only able to say “yes” because of the singular grace given to her? God would be obliterating her free will in that case, unless he knew that she would have said yes anyway, in my opinion.

None of this is ‘middle knowledge’, though: Mary existed, her choice existed (albeit hidden from her prior to making the choice); and therefore, none of this information is ‘middle knowledge’.

 

[Pallas_Athene]

Your ‘omniscience’ knows the possibilities, but has no clue which will come to pass. If that’s what you think ‘omniscience’ is, it’s no wonder you have little respect for God.

It would be nice to see what your definition of omniscience might be. I already asked you, but you were busy, and never came back with it.

Can you see that this is where your reasoning falls apart? The future doesn’t exist to you as a human; to God, who is outside of the bounds of time, all of time exists equally.

No, actually this is where your defense falls apart. Existence is not contingent upon the observer. Something either exists or does not. The future is contingent upon OUR actions, which have not happened YET. Therefore the future is exactly like what we call “merely possible”. If God can foresee the future, then he can foresee what Joe MIGHT do under different circumstances.

Wow. PA, in all charity… you might consider carrying on fewer simultaneous discussions; you seem to be getting confused. The issue here isn’t whether God is capable of #4-#6 on your list; we both agree that He is ‘supposed to’ be capable of these.

So what are we talking about?

Rather, we’re discussing whether these are what ‘counterfactuals’ consist of. You say that they are; I’ve countered that these are precisely what the documents you cited have identified as the ‘merely possible.’

I already stated that I am not “married” to a phrase itself.

Not all sets of functions are transitive, PA. I’d hope that you’d recognize that. For example, if Anna is the mother of Beth, and Beth is the mother of Cecilia, this does not imply that Anna is the mother of Cecilia.

Indeed. If Beth is the offspring of Anna and Cecilia is the offspring of Beth, then Cecilia is the offspring of Anna. Some relationships are transitive, others are not.

You yourself admit that this is the case, inasmuch as you assert that a pair of ‘direct responsibility’ relationships does not result in a ‘direct responsibility’ relationship between ‘God’ and ‘the actions of Joe’. Yet, without proof or argument, you baldly assert that some new relationship – ‘indirect responsibility’ – is the relationship we see.

What “argument” would you need? It is simply obvious.

Worse yet, having freely asserted this relationship, you use it as a bludgeon against God. Let’s play your game, though: if you want to assert a relationship of ‘indirect responsibility’, what does this relationship mean? What does it imply? You want to argue the special case of ‘omniscience’ in the context of this new relationship, but don’t put the cart before the horse: before you tell us that God’s omniscience makes Him ‘indirectly responsible’ for evil, you’ll need to define this relationship and open it up to scrutiny.

Either God knows Joe’s future actions or does not. If he does and still creates Joe, then he bears at least a partial responsibility. Now for a “deistic” god, who merely set the ball in motion, the responsibility is less than for the Christian God, who not only started the whole shebang, but also keeps Joe in existence, even if he would “disapprove” of those actions. As a matter of fact, I should say that God bears full responsibility for Joe’s actions, because he sustains Joe all throughout his actions.

Let me clarify: I do NOT bludgeon God. I bludgeon what certain believers say ABOUT God. Things that are illogical and irrational.

Actually… the fact that a “dog cannot be held responsible for its own action” is precisely the reason that your example fails. A person can be held responsible for his own action – remember your assertions above, in which ‘Joe’ is directly responsible for his actions? Your example needs someone who is directly responsible for his actions – which you admit a dog is not. Perhaps you’d like to try again?

You completely misunderstood. The OWNER is responsible for the actions of the dog. Fully and completely. First, because he created / trained it to attack indiscriminately, and second, because he let the dog roam free. Maybe you would assert that no one is responsible? That the mayhem that the well-trained dog would spread in the neighborhood is just like a force of nature, where there is no one responsible? On second thought, God is fully responsible for the destructions caused by the forces of nature, because he maintains the particles that cause the destruction.

I can’t understand what your problem might be. If someone knowingly starts a sequence of events, and knows what the outcome of those events will be, then he is responsible for the outcome. Whether fully or partially, could be debated, but the responsibility cannot be denied.

 

[Pallas_Athene]

No – counterfactuals aren’t simply things that are ‘merely possible’ but which do not happen; they’re things that do not exist.

Definition: “counterfactual : relating to or expressing what has not happened or is not the case”. Now there are two possibilities: 1) the event could happen (or could have happened), or 2) it could not happen (or could not have happened).

Something cannot happen if it entails or leads to a logically impossible state of affairs. This is obviously not “knowable”. But what could happen and did not happen is (allegedly) knowable. So what are we arguing about?

 

[PumpkinCookie]

You’re begging the question: you cannot define counterfactuals as things that can be known, if you’re attempting to prove that they’re things that can be known.

Because they are things that never exist.

It isn’t. It’s just that counterfactuals aren’t in the set of things that can be known.

As long as we’re in the realm of things that exist (or had existed / will exist), we’re all good. Once we exit that realm, we cannot ascribe knowledge.

You’re still in the realm of the ‘merely possible’ – and I agree: God does have knowledge of the merely possible!

Definition of “counterfactual” as I mean it:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_conditional

This term is a creation of 20th century analytic philosophy. Louis de Molina would be unfamiliar with this term, but nonetheless I think it is appropriate and useful for this discussion. You want to use the term “merely possible.” I think that is OK but I am unfamiliar with the tradition out of which that term emerges, so when you use it the meaning is a little blurry. Can you please clarify how the term is distinct from “possible” or explain what the “merely” means?

Further, would you affirm this proposition?:

“Nothing can be known about that which does not exist.”

If you say yes, what do you mean by exist? Santa Claus does not exist, and yet we “know” that he lives at the north pole and wears a red suit. Or, does this not count as knowledge? Why not? Or, does Santa exist in the sense that he is a fictional character?

You would consider all the religious (except yours) and fictional literature in the history of humanity to be detailing what precisely if not “knowledge of things that don’t exist?” Is this not really knowledge? Why not? What is it?

If you say no, what counts as knowledge of things that don’t exist, in your opinion?

 

[tonyrey]

A “gift” that no one asked for. He pushes that “gift” on us, whether we want it or not.

Please explain how a non-existent person can ask to be born? Do you regard that as a** logical **possibility?

 

[Pallas_Athene]

Please explain how a non-existent person can ask to be born? Do you regard that as a** logical **possibility?

It is a “mystery”, of course. Or a manifestation of God’s omnipotence. If God already knows what the person will do in his whole life, then it is not problematic to ask the poor guy if he wants it or not. But God does not ask… he just pushes that “gift” on him.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I understand omniscience as “knowing all that can be known.”
I understand counterfactuals as "something that can be believed about a hypothetical situation.

I believe that no human being is “omniscient” not only because no one knows all there is to know, but also that the certainty of our knowledge isn’t absolute. We have justified and/or warranted beliefs that we call “knowledge” but maybe the kind of knowledge we have never reaches absolute certainty in the way God “knows” everything. I believe that the church teaches that God knows everything with absolute and infallible certainty. Is that true? If not, of what is he ignorant? Is he ignorant of things that have never or will never happen? Why? I believe you should offer an explanation for why God would be ignorant of counterfactuals.

I misspoke in my prior post. I did not mean to say that because we have an inkling of counterfactuals, God must therefore have certainty about them since we are the image and he is the ground of being. I am just suggesting that he might have that knowledge based on those grounds.

You, however, seem to be asserting that he in fact does not have this knowledge?

Well, no, if I were to carefully assess where I stand on the question it would be that this kind of “knowledge” isn’t knowledge to be had in any meaningful sense of the word,

There are many issues that arise even if we do grant that this kind of knowledge is crucial in some sense for God to possess; it is not clear, to me at least, that the problem for God is what you and PA make of it.

Let’s assume that, to be omniscient, God must have knowledge of what you insist are counterfactuals. So you now have to show that all those living in the past, present and future will unjustly receive from God what they have not deserved in order for him to be unjust. How could you know that, short of pre-empting the final judgement with a bald assertion that God WILL BE unjust?

Given God’s hypothetical omniscient knowledge of all counterfactuals, it could be, in the end, true that he did, in fact, only ever create two types of beings: those who truly merited eternal punishment and those he saved from any long, but necessary, punishment by his deft use of counterfactuals. He could, also in fact, NOT have created anyone who would suffer excessively, though justly, from the evil they would choose to do had they existed.

If we grant the claim that “knowledge” of counterfactuals is legitimate knowledge, then it would seem we also must grant that God would traffic (by allowing human or other agents to find counterfactuals believable) in the use of that knowledge to bring about intended ends. In that sense, an impending threat of hell could be one such counterfactual, the belief in which functions to steer those susceptible to temptation away from evil.

The problem, it seems to me, is that by using counterfactuals in this way, God would come perilously close to being a “deceiver” or “mind-gamer” of sorts.

The other issue is that if you are going to allow Omniscience access to countertfactuals you CANNOT in the same instance restrict the use Omniscience/Omnibenevolence would make of them to your limited number or rendition of them. After all, the range of counterfactuals available to you or I would be severely constricted by our limitations compared to the range Omniscience would be capable of “imagining” and orchestrating.

In the end, the problem would still remain for you regarding the problem of hell and merited or unmerited punishment, and what some would consider “excessive” severity. Perhaps, God has anticipated those who would suffer “too much” and simply opted not to create THOSE individuals. The remaining would still need some “training” to walk the straight and narrow – God being the respecter of free will that he is – or they would straight out merit eternal punishment.

What I don’t grant, however, is that “eternal” means something like “going on forever.” Eternal means absent time, so granting the idea of eternal punishment makes no concession to a view that the punishment is forever and ever. You will need to demonstrate that the idea of punishment lasting “forever” is one literally espoused in the doctrines of the Church or Scripture.

 

[Peter_Plato]

It is a “mystery”, of course. Or a manifestation of God’s omnipotence. If God already knows what the person will do in his whole life, then it is not problematic to ask the poor guy if he wants it or not. But God does not ask… he just pushes that “gift” on him.

It seems to me that what you are missing is the fact that “asking” the question requires the appropriate time and place. How would “the poor guy” know if HE wants it [life] or not without actually living life and experiencing it HIMSELF?

And I don’t mean treating life as a fast food item, chosen “on the spur,” as it were. No I mean honestly and completely knowing all of its potential joys and sorrows, the heights and depths. How could anyone know if “he wants it” without the actual and complete experience of it?

What you are faulting God for is NOT having made the decision on behalf of “the poor guy,” before the fact, so that “the poor guy” never has the opportunity to see what “a poor guy” he has actually made himself to be. Yet, how could God make that determination absent “the poor guy” to begin with?

What you assume is that “the poor guy” has absolutely no autonomous (name removed by moderator)ut with regard to the making of himself into “a poor guy,” as if that were a merely predetermined outcome. It is that contention that is debatable.

That is precisely what you assume and by assuming it, you beg the question entirely regarding what (name removed by moderator)ut is REQUIRED as necessitated by the actual (and not merely hypothetical) existence of the “poor guy.”

Yes, I understand your claim that, then, God’s knowledge is contingent upon the actions and choices of “the poor guy,” but I don’t think that is true. God’s knowledge is contingent ONLY upon his omniscience – he knows infallibly what “the poor guy” freely chooses over time by virtue of what “the poor guy” does, in fact, freely choose.

 

[PumpkinCookie]

Well, no, if I were to carefully assess where I stand on the question it would be that this kind of “knowledge” isn’t knowledge to be had in any meaningful sense of the word,

There are many issues that arise even if we do grant that this kind of knowledge is crucial in some sense for God to possess; it is not clear, to me at least, that the problem for God is what you and PA make of it.

Let’s assume that, to be omniscient, God must have knowledge of what you insist are counterfactuals. So you now have to show that all those living in the past, present and future will unjustly receive from God what they have not deserved in order for him to be unjust. How could you know that, short of pre-empting the final judgement with a bald assertion that God WILL BE unjust?

Given God’s hypothetical omniscient knowledge of all counterfactuals, it could be, in the end, true that he did, in fact, only ever create two types of beings: those who truly merited eternal punishment and those he saved from any long, but necessary, punishment by his deft use of counterfactuals. He could, also in fact, NOT have created anyone who would suffer excessively, though justly, from the evil they would choose to do had they existed.

If we grant the claim that “knowledge” of counterfactuals is legitimate knowledge, then it would seem we also must grant that God would traffic (by allowing human or other agents to find counterfactuals believable) in the use of that knowledge to bring about intended ends. In that sense, an impending threat of hell could be one such counterfactual, the belief in which functions to steer those susceptible to temptation away from evil.

The problem, it seems to me, is that by using counterfactuals in this way, God would come perilously close to being a “deceiver” or “mind-gamer” of sorts.

The other issue is that if you are going to allow Omniscience access to countertfactuals you CANNOT in the same instance restrict the use Omniscience/Omnibenevolence would make of them to your limited number or rendition of them. After all, the range of counterfactuals available to you or I would be severely constricted by our limitations compared to the range Omniscience would be capable of “imagining” and orchestrating.

In the end, the problem would still remain for you regarding the problem of hell and merited or unmerited punishment, and what some would consider “excessive” severity. Perhaps, God has anticipated those who would suffer “too much” and simply opted not to create THOSE individuals. The remaining would still need some “training” to walk the straight and narrow – God being the respecter of free will that he is – or they would straight out merit eternal punishment.

What I don’t grant, however, is that “eternal” means something like “going on forever.” Eternal means absent time, so granting the idea of eternal punishment makes no concession to a view that the punishment is forever and ever. You will need to demonstrate that the idea of punishment lasting “forever” is one literally espoused in the doctrines of the Church or Scripture.

There we go, now we seem to be getting somewhere. 1) Yes, you are exactly right, Molinism does not solve the “problem of hell” however it does explain how we can have free will and how God’s will can be totally and absolutely accomplished simultaneously. 2) I don’t have to demonstrate what you asked, because I don’t believe that God is unjust or unfair to anyone, precisely because I think he has access to the knowledge of “all possible worlds” and we don’t have enough reason to suppose this isn’t the best one (on the whole). The OP (Pallas Athene) and I do not share a common set of beliefs, I can assure you. We (and others) argue that there is a substantial issue here, but I believe in the God of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Issac, and Jacob.

To be precise, the punishment of hell does not seem to me to be eternal but (allegedly) “everlasting.” Only God is eternal. Everything else has a beginning in time. Hell is supposedly one of those things. Even if it is not a discreet “thing” it is totally contingent upon the existence of creatures brought into existence at a specific time, even if that time was “immediately from the first instant.” The CCC uses the word “eternal” to describe the duration of hell, but the Greek word in the “new testament” upon which these teachings seem to be based is variously translated as either everlasting or eternal. From reason we can deduce that “everlasting” is meant, otherwise hell has always existed, or we have always existed, or both.

Of course I can’t judge God or know whether his rewards and punishments are deserved. I take it as axiomatic. However, everlasting torment is the kind of punishment that can never be just, reasonable, loving, beautiful, etc. I think if an angel appeared to me and told me that God wanted me to worship an idol or go kill dozens of children, I would rightfully argue that God wouldn’t want me to do something like that, and therefore the angel can’t possibly represent God. I think eternal hell is like that. If a man/church appears teaching that eternal hell awaits most of humanity, or even one person, that man/church does not represent God.

 

[Peter_Plato]

If you say yes, what do you mean by exist? Santa Claus does not exist, and yet we “know” that he lives at the north pole and wears a red suit. Or, does this not count as knowledge? Why not? Or, does Santa exist in the sense that he is a fictional character?

What can be known is whether or not it is true that Santa Claus actually lives at the North Pole. Once known, that is what knowledge is. It isn’t possible to know that Santa lives at the North Pole and, simultaneously, that he doesn’t. Both cannot be known in the true sense of the word – they are mutually exclusive. Once it is known that he doesn’t – that is the only possible knowledge that can be had.

 

[DCNBILL]

What can be known is whether or not it is true that Santa Claus actually lives at the North Pole. Once known, that is what knowledge is. It isn’t possible to know that Santa lives at the North Pole and, simultaneously, that he doesn’t. Both cannot be known in the true sense of the word – they are mutually exclusive. Once it is known that he doesn’t – that is the only possible knowledge that can be had.

Wait…are we discussing the possibility that Santa does not exist?