Definition of “counterfactual” as I mean it:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_conditional
This term is a creation of 20th century analytic philosophy. Louis de Molina would be unfamiliar with this term, but nonetheless I think it is appropriate and useful for this discussion. You want to use the term “merely possible.”
No – that’s precisely the opposite of what I’m saying. Let’s go back a few pages… PA asserted the following:
The point is that God is supposed to know whatever:
- happened in the past,
- happens in the present,
- will happen in the future, AND
- whatever could have happened in the past (but never did),
- could happen in the present (but never does), or
- could happen in the future (but never will).
If you don’t wish to call this “counterfactual”, present a better word for it.
PA is claiming that #4-#6 is what we refer to as ‘counterfactual’; I (and apparently you, too) disagree. What is ‘counterfactual’ is not merely the things that were possible but did not happen – rather they are the things that, as Hume is quoted in your citation, “where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.” In other words, in the ‘merely possible’, the protasis is true but the apodosis is false. (That is what PA presents in #4-#6 above, and mistakenly calls it ‘counterfactual’.) However, counterfactuals deal in statements in which the protasis is false, and as a result, the apodosis
also never comes into existence.
I believe that your citation shows that you agree with this analysis: PA’s assertions #4-#6 are
not counterfactuals. Now, I’m not claiming that the ‘merely possible’ are beyond a claim of ‘omnipotence’ – in fact, I agree with the citation that PA provided many moons ago: the ‘merely possible’
is part of God’s omnipotence. However, the counterfactuals – that is, the things that are not in existence are not part of God’s omnipotence, since they are logically excluded from the following conjunction of sets: { {those things that exist at any point in time}, {those things that, being contingent on things that exist, may exist} }. What’s
not part of this set are the counterfactuals: {those things that, being contingent on things that never existed, themselves never existed}.
For whatever reason, this understanding is something that PA is having trouble grasping, and therefore, our conversation is stalled.
But, inasmuch as we seem to agree on our definitions, then it seems that
our conversation can make progress…
Further, would you affirm this proposition?:
“Nothing can be known about that which does not exist.”
Let’s deal with your ‘Santa Claus’ assertion, first. Do we ‘know’ that “Santa Claus lives at the North Pole”? Does this qualify as ‘knowledge’? I would assert that it
is knowledge: but, it’s knowledge of the details of a fable – that is, the fable exists, and so, we can know about the story; but, to assert that it’s knowledge about a real person ‘Santa Claus’ is difficult to defend.
By the same token, your quotation gives us the opportunity to enter into a disccusion about epistemology; but, in order to evaluate the truth value of the statement, we would have to agree first on a series of definitions which would ground our discussion. In our present context, it seems to me that ‘omniscience’ extends to that which
may be known; it is a statement about real things (and the possibilities that real things experience). It is, however, not a statement about un-real things or the imagined ‘possibilities’ about these non-existent things. To claim that God’s omniscience does not extend to those things which do not exist (and those things which would be contingent on those things), is itself not a ‘limit’ on God or His attributes. Rather, this claim appears to be a simple statement of logic: that which does not exist – or which is not possible, inasmuch as it is contingent on things that do not exist – is not in the domain of the set “what may be known.” To my intuition, we’re talking about things that exist and a function over that set. If we wish to (name removed by moderator)ut the empty set (i.e., something that doesn’t exist) into that function, we get an undefined result. To say that God is disproven, or even limited, in that He does not ‘know’ a result that, by definition, is ‘undefined’, is illogical. Counterfactuals fall into this category, it would seem.
You would consider all the religious (except yours) and fictional literature in the history of humanity to be detailing what precisely if not “knowledge of things that don’t exist?” Is this not really knowledge? Why not? What is it?
LOL! Well played!
I would answer that all untrue and fictional accounts are ‘knowledge’ – not of things that exist, but of accounts that exist. Knowledge of the accounts is well within the realm of knowledge. Attempting to cast these as things that per se exist (and subsequently, attempting to use that assertion to cast aspersions on the notion of the omniscience of God) is a completely different – (and untenable!) – assertion!
If you say no, what counts as knowledge of things that don’t exist, in your opinion?
Again, I think you must first distinguish between things that exist and accounts of things that do not exist.