Is EVERYTHING meaningless?

[Oreoracle]

Such axioms, because so basic, are virtually impossible to prove deductively. Or if proven deductively, one has to ask why bother, since they are so self-evident.

Keep in mind that at one time, it was believed the Parallel Postulate was “self-evident”, and yet a perfectly consistent and useful system emerged from its alternatives.

The point is that no one can claim to have an objective morality, since morals are not entirely derived from mere observations, but partially by morals that are assumed. And no one can claim to have the “correct” morality, because to use one’s morality to prove one’s morality is circular. It would be like using Euclid’s axioms to prove Euclidean geometry is correct. I’ve heard of various forms of moral relativism, but this version is the one I subscribe to.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

The point is that no one can claim to have an objective morality, since morals are not entirely derived from mere observations, but partially by morals that are assumed.

This sounds suspiciously like “No one can have objective truth.”

Relativism is self-defeating because it assumes the objective axiom: “There is no objective truth.”

It is an objective axiom that we should not kill the innocent.

There is no reason why morals that are assumed should not be objective. Some morals that are assumed might be relative, but others might be objective.

Assuming cannibalism is good might be an example of relative morality, seemingly good for some societies, not good for others.

Assuming we should not kill the innocent should be universal, and therefore objective.

 

[Oreoracle]

This sounds suspiciously like “No one can have objective truth.”

That’s not what it means, in spite of what it may “sound like”. Please do not put words in my mouth. I know Christians have thousands of prejudices and misunderstandings about relativism, so perhaps it is best to just eschew the label and focus on the essential ideas.

My form of “relativism” consists of two tenets: 1) All morals are either taken as axioms or derived by means of other morals. 2) Morals are only “true” within a particular framework, just as theorems are only true within particular axiomatic systems.

For example, suppose I disagree with someone on a moral issue. Their position may upset me, and I may try to persuade them to change their opinion. I could even state that, within my moral framework, it would be better if they agreed with me. However, I cannot state that I can prove their morality wrong. They simply assumed different axioms than I did. If that is the source of our disagreement, I cannot claim that my axiom is somehow “better” than theirs without making a circular argument that assumes the superiority of my axiom from the outset.

You have already conceded (1) within your own moral framework. It seems to me that (2) is a consequence of (1). You cannot prove my axioms wrong without assuming that your own axioms are correct beforehand, so there is no “broader perspective” from which we can view both of our moralities and decide which is right. Yours is correct within your framework, and mine is correct within my framework. To try to make our moralities duel each other for correctness is to intermingle two different axiomatic systems, an absurdity.

And to address your last comment in your post: I apply my own morals to everyone, just as you do. The difference is that I don’t claim they can be demonstrated apart from my own moral framework.

 

[fred_conty]

Originally Posted by Nihilist

Nevertheless, I still have a feeling of universal futility, but I suppose that nothing more than something like indigestion or fatigue…

This thought almost sums up Life of Christ by T A K

Be careful of this book. It isn’t for beginners and may do a person spiritual harm. It is very negative in its wording and eventually gives one the feeling of hopelessness in life. It is written in a critical spirit of this world and fear of it. I could go on but that is the jist.

Yes I know, there are parts that seem to be quite catchy and to the point. But the overall theme is sin, sin, and more sin, exam, exam and more exam, and to search out our faulty life for the last crumb of badness.

Stop reading and things of this book. Get yourself some real good enlightening books that will concentrate on the how the true view is of God and yourself.

I know this might wound some people who love the book, but I don’t mean this to offend anyone but to save some whom this book has wounded in their spiritual outlook.

May God bless and keep you. May God’s face shine on you. May God be kind to you and give you peace.

 

[ChainBreaker]

This sounds suspiciously like “No one can have objective truth.”

Relativism is self-defeating because it assumes the objective axiom: “There is no objective truth.”

It is an objective axiom that we should not kill the innocent.

There is no reason why morals that are assumed should not be objective. Some morals that are assumed might be relative, but others might be objective.

Assuming cannibalism is good might be an example of relative morality, seemingly good for some societies, not good for others.

Assuming we should not kill the innocent should be universal, and therefore objective.

Well, an assumption can turn out to be true, but that does not mean that people should accept assumptions.

However, its interesting that any creature should find themselves with the capacity to experience guilt, and its even more interesting that we find ourselves guilty when we believe ourselves to have done something truly wrong, not just in somebodies opinion but in the truth of the matter itself. While peoples moral opinions on particular issues may differ to the extent that morality may appear relative, I think we all know deep down that raping a baby is truly wrong regardless of opinion to contrary, because the personal experience/idea and meaning of such an event presents to us the absence of what ought to be. We all indirectly experience moral truth when we experience unreasonable/irrational suffering. The more horrific the experience the more easier it is to discern.

Discerning moral truth is no different from solving a maths equation. The human action in question is either rationally consistent with our dignity and nature as human beings or it isn’t at all. And we cannot know this without knowing what it means to have true dignity. We find out what dignity is when we lose it. We discover it, firstly because we discover that we are persons self-evidently distinct from mere objects. And so when we are treated like objects we immediately recognise that the way in which we are being treated does not reflect our nature as persons - that we ought to be treated like persons and that to do so would be consistent with our nature.

It is certainly rather odd that a particular physical pattern would find itself to be a person with the anguishes of conscience.

I just can’t take people seriously when they deny the existence of moral truth and yet find themselves complaining that how they are being treated is unfair or wrong.

One might not be obliged to believe in objective moral truth, but it certainly is not unreasonable to believe in what appears to be an object of our experience.

 

[ChainBreaker]

We should not find these experiences in a world that is objectively meaningless and without a true objective standard of value. There is clearly such a thing as an objective moral standard that we are all called to achieve.

 

[tonyrey]

tonyrey;12162511:

OK, I agree with all you are saying. Clearly, defining the word ‘objective’ is difficult.

My initial take was that was ‘a view from nowhere’- a view without a subject.

Yet, in common usage, things are described as being ‘objective’ if they apply to all human beings, etc.

In common usage, I agree, it makes sense to call God’s point of view objective, although, technically, even that is situated in a subject (although an omnipresent and omniscient one).

Clearly, the idea of a ‘view from nowhere’ is absurd. So, I retract the philosophical substance of my arguments, and concede that I was using ‘objective’ in a non-customary sense.

Nevertheless, I still have a feeling of universal futility, but I suppose that nothing more than something like indigestion or fatigue…

Feelings are notoriously deceptive. In a secular society we are more likely to be influenced by the view that life is "a tale told by an idiot full of sound and fury, signifying nothing… " That is why it is essential to grasp the absurdity of materialism which is self-refuting:

In a purposeless universe nothing makes sense - including the hypothesis that nothing makes sense!

 

[tonyrey]

We should not find these experiences in a world that is objectively meaningless and without a true objective standard of value. There is clearly such a thing as an objective moral standard that we are all called to achieve.

:clapping: Being reasonable implies that the truth is valuable and worth discovering. It wouldn’t exist in a meaningless world…

 

[tonyrey]

Well, an assumption can turn out to be true, but that does not mean that people should accept assumptions.

However, its interesting that any creature should find themselves with the capacity to experience guilt, and its even more interesting that we find ourselves guilty when we believe ourselves to have done something truly wrong, not just in somebodies opinion but in the truth of the matter itself. While peoples moral opinions on particular issues may differ to the extent that morality may appear relative, I think we all know deep down that raping a baby is truly wrong regardless of opinion to contrary, because the personal experience/idea and meaning of such an event presents to us the absence of what ought to be. We all indirectly experience moral truth when we experience unreasonable/irrational suffering. The more horrific the experience the more easier it is to discern.

Discerning moral truth is no different from solving a maths equation. The human action in question is either rationally consistent with our dignity and nature as human beings or it isn’t at all. And we cannot know this without knowing what it means to have true dignity. We find out what dignity is when we lose it. We discover it, firstly because we discover that we are persons self-evidently distinct from mere objects. And so when we are treated like objects we immediately recognise that the way in which we are being treated does not reflect our nature as persons - that we ought to be treated like persons and that to do so would be consistent with our nature.

It is certainly rather odd that a particular physical pattern would find itself to be a person with the anguishes of conscience.

I just can’t take people seriously when they deny the existence of moral truth and yet find themselves complaining that how they are being treated is unfair or wrong.

One might not be obliged to believe in objective moral truth, but it certainly is not unreasonable to believe in what appears to be an object of our experience.

It is unreasonable not to believe in the value of reasoning!

 

[opusAquinas]

If you don’t go to Mass on Sunday knowingly and willfully is that a mortal sin? Or if someone says OMG is that a mortal sin?

 

[Charlemagne_III]

For example, suppose I disagree with someone on a moral issue. Their position may upset me, and I may try to persuade them to change their opinion. I could even state that, within my moral framework, it would be better if they agreed with me. However, I cannot state that I can prove their morality wrong. They simply assumed different axioms than I did. If that is the source of our disagreement, I cannot claim that my axiom is somehow “better” than theirs without making a circular argument that assumes the superiority of my axiom from the outset.

Would you take it as your axiom that all morals are relative? I thought you did earlier.

If you would, all I have to do is find ONE example of a moral value that we could agree on as objectively universal. In which case, your axiom of moral relativism is defeated.

Do you also believe that all knowledge is relative, not objective?

Then how do you describe the belief that all knowledge is relative?

Relative or objective?

 

[Charlemagne_III]

One might not be obliged to believe in objective moral truth, but it certainly is not unreasonable to believe in what appears to be an object of our experience.

Or as Boswell put it in his Life of Johnson:

“After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley’s ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it – ‘I refute it thus.’”

 

[Oreoracle]

Would you take it as your axiom that all morals are relative? I thought you did earlier.

As I asked, I want you to forego the term “relative” for now, so that you can approach my position without prejudice. This is because you have clearly already decided what I must mean when I say “relative”, so it’s best to avoid the term entirely until my position is well understood.

No, I do not take it as axiomatic that morals are relative. I think one can make a case, as I have done, for the position that all moral codes begin with at least one moral among their axioms. In other words, as Hume said, you cannot derive “ought” statements from “is” statements alone; you must begin with some ought statement(s) in mind. This is all that is meant by saying morality is relative. That’s it. No sleight of hand, no trickery, no fine print, no scary implications, nothing. Zip, zilch, zero extra implications. That is all I’ve ever meant by “morality is relative”.

This notion of relativity doesn’t carry over to knowledge or objective matters such as the sciences at all, because this kind of relativity is characteristic only of “ought” statements. No moral relativist would disagree with the assessment that 2+3=5 is an objective fact. A moral relativist may disagree that we ought to use versions of arithmetic for which this is true, but notice that that is an entirely different question.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

No, I do not take it as axiomatic that morals are relative. I think one can make a case, as I have done, for the position that all moral codes begin with at least one moral among their axioms. In other words, as Hume said, you cannot derive “ought” statements from “is” statements alone; you must begin with some ought statement(s) in mind. This is all that is meant by saying morality is relative.

Would you mind explaining this again using a different approach? I’m having trouble understanding what you want to say, as it appears to be a contradiction of remarks in blue.

I would go further than you have gone and say that all moral codes ought to begin with the same single moral axiom which is objective and universal.

 

[Oreoracle]

Would you mind explaining this again using a different approach? I’m having trouble understanding what you want to say, as it appears to be a contradiction of remarks in blue.

“It is not axiomatic that morals are relative” and “morals are relative” are not contradictory. It is, I think, demonstrable that morals are relative in the sense I described before. That is, it is not axiomatic but rather a conclusion that they are relative (in my sense of the word).

There is a simple thought experiment with which anyone can convince themselves that morality begins with “ought” axioms and not “is” axioms. Start out with something that you feel is obviously good or obviously evil. Ask yourself why it is good or evil. You will likely reference some entity in your answer, be it truth, justice, God, happiness, etc., depending on your morality. Then ask yourself why the thing you referenced is important. You will likely reference some entity in that answer. Ask yourself why that is important. Rinse and repeat. Eventually you will reach something you simply can’t justify, and it will be an assumption of the form “X is valuable”. If two people begin with different assumptions, their moralities will be irreconcilable and any debate between them will devolve into a war of axioms.

No one can “win” a war of axioms, because a choice of axioms, by definition, can never be justified. If they could, they wouldn’t be axioms.

I would go further than you have gone and say that all moral codes ought to begin with the same single moral axiom which is objective and universal.

I am a utilitarian, so my axiom is a variation of the “greatest happiness principle”. I believe everyone should use this axiom. However, I do not claim that I can demonstrate the truth of the greatest happiness principle. If I could, it wouldn’t be axiomatic. Likewise, you cannot prove your axiom(s) and, like me, you still feel that others should agree with you. Such is life.

 

[opusAquinas]

“It is not axiomatic that morals are relative” and “morals are relative” are not contradictory. It is, I think, demonstrable that morals are relative in the sense I described before. That is, it is not axiomatic but rather a conclusion that they are relative (in my sense of the word).

There is a simple thought experiment with which anyone can convince themselves that morality begins with “ought” axioms and not “is” axioms. Start out with something that you feel is obviously good or obviously evil. Ask yourself why it is good or evil. You will likely reference some entity in your answer, be it truth, justice, God, happiness, etc., depending on your morality. Then ask yourself why the thing you referenced is important. You will likely reference some entity in that answer. Ask yourself why that is important. Rinse and repeat. Eventually you will reach something you simply can’t justify, and it will be an assumption of the form “X is valuable”. If two people begin with different assumptions, their moralities will be irreconcilable and any debate between them will devolve into a war of axioms.

No one can “win” a war of axioms, because a choice of axioms, by definition, can never be justified. If they could, they wouldn’t be axioms.

I am a utilitarian, so my axiom is a variation of the “greatest happiness principle”. I believe everyone should use this axiom. However, I do not claim that I can demonstrate the truth of the greatest happiness principle. If I could, it wouldn’t be axiomatic. Likewise, you cannot prove your axiom(s) and, like me, you still feel that others should agree with you. Such is life.

Since you have no objective moral grounds you are reduced to political agreements.

 

[Oreoracle]

Since you have no objective moral grounds you are reduced to political agreements.

If you think I am mistaken, explain why. Don’t just toss out a flippant response because my conclusion is inconvenient for your worldview.

 

[tonyrey]

The question begs the question.

It presupposes that the question is meaningful.

Therefore the answer is a resounding “No”.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

If two people begin with different assumptions, their moralities will be irreconcilable and any debate between them will devolve into a war of axioms.

No one can “win” a war of axioms, because a choice of axioms, by definition, can never be justified. If they could, they wouldn’t be axioms.

I am a utilitarian, so my axiom is a variation of the “greatest happiness principle”. I believe everyone should use this axiom. However, I do not claim that I can demonstrate the truth of the greatest happiness principle. If I could, it wouldn’t be axiomatic. Likewise, you cannot prove your axiom(s) and, like me, you still feel that others should agree with you. Such is life.

Two people can begin with different axioms, that does not mean both axioms have the same merit as axioms to begin with. Utilitarianism is far from being the basic moral axiom that all people should be able to agree upon as the most objectively basic of moral axioms.

“The greatest happiness” is not even a moral axiom. It is a goal in life, a state of mind and soul that one may pursue. But it says nothing about good and evil. Surely you see that?

 

[Oreoracle]

Two people can begin with different axioms, that does not mean both axioms have the same merit as axioms to begin with.

But there’s no way to evaluate which axiom is better without implicitly assuming one or the other to begin with. Again, I appeal to the various geometries as an example: There is no way to decide whether the Parallel Postulate should beat its alternatives without employing circular reasoning and assuming the truth of one geometry over the others from the outset.

“The greatest happiness” is not even a moral axiom. It is a goal in life, a state of mind and soul that one may pursue. But it says nothing about good and evil. Surely you see that?

The “greatest happiness principle” is a shorthand for “the most moral actions are those that tend to increase the net happiness of all sentient beings”. That is the axiom, although there are several variations of it that have been developed to address its criticisms.