Is the death penalty really inadmissable?

[StephenW]

I’m not sure how much more authoritative you can be than God, Jesus, and Paul all explicitly accepting of slavery. Jesus condemned a lot, but never any of the slavery he frequently encountered, and was happy to use slaves and slavery as characters and metaphors in his teaching.

Paul also writes about slaves a number of times, specifically where he demands that they remain loyal to their masters (Ephesians 6).

None of which you have mentioned amounts to Jesus or Paul explicitly approving slavery. An explicit acceptance of something would have to be a positive statement about it, not simply mentioning it in a parable or not condemning it. If you wish to prove that Jesus or Paul explicitly accepted slavery, then you would logically have to find them saying something like, “Masters have a right to keep slaves” or “Slavery is good and just”. It is a logical fallacy to argue something like this based on silence. Abortion, for example, was not uncommon during the time of Jesus. The Roman’s practiced it and they even killed children after birth. Based on your line of reasoning, then, if Scripture does not record Jesus and Paul condemning abortion, they must have approved of it. Jesus also does not condemn the Roman government and their practices, which were often barbaric. Again, based on silence, one would have to conclude that he approved of the Roman government. Jesus did not say that the Roman’s were wrong to conquer the Jewish nation, which was, effectively, a form of slavery.

One could go on and on with this, showing that it does not logically follow from silence that one approves of something. Jesus answered the centurion’s request. Are we to take this to mean that he approved of the Roman army, their imperialism, unjust war and so on? Does this mean Jesus approved of everything the centurion may have done as a soldier or approve of being a centurion in the first place? Jesus and Paul did not explicitly approve of slavery, but one, I think, could say that they accepted it as a social fact, a reality of the times.

The topic of St. Paul and slavery is, of course, not new. There are many good and balanced articles and such out there that scholars have developed. I just did a quick searched for an article and found this one, which seems decent.

Was Paul Indifferent to Slavery?

A controversial passage, 1 Corinthians 7:21-24, has often been used by Paul’s critics to say he was indifferent to the plight of slaves. And some Christians have cited it as justification for ignoring social concerns in favor of proclaiming the gospel. But an examination of the passage’s...

www.biola.edu

After reading this article, try this one—I mean, read them in conjunction with each other.

How Paul Worked to Overcome Slavery

Paul did not opt for a full on frontal assault against slavery, but instead chose to set a trajectory for its eradication.

www.desiringgod.org

And then, finally, this article concerning slavery and the papacy seems decent, but I admit, I only skimmed it.

The Popes and Slavery: Setting the Record Straight | EWTN

I hope these things are helpful.

 

[acanonlawyer]

So the US tribunals and the Vatican Rota do not agree on what is valid and what is invalid.

Sometimes, different groups of judges at the Rota come to opposite conclusions, too. The cause of this is not that they don’t agree on what “valid” means. They merely take the information in the case and come to their own conclusion as to whether or not the marriage has been proven invalid.

Similarly, when civil judges or people on juries come to opposite conclusions about a person’s guilt, it’s not as though they don’t know (or agree on) what “guilty” or “not guilty” means.

Dan

 

[MarysLurker]

Sometimes, different groups of judges at the Rota come to opposite conclusions, too. The cause of this is not that they don’t agree on what “valid” means. They merely take the information in the case and come to their own conclusion as to whether or not the marriage has been proven invalid.

Similarly, when civil judges or people on juries come to opposite conclusions about a person’s guilt, it’s not as though they don’t know (or agree on) what “guilty” or “not guilty” means.

Dan,

I think a lot of the confusion here seems from teachings being confused with applications. I.e., the Church’s teaching on what conditions make a sacrament valid versus whether a particular celebration of a sacrament was valid. Likewise with the Church’s teaching on the morality of the death penalty itself, versus whether the death penalty is moral in a given case. These are different questions and the Church answers them in different ways.

As a canonist, you may be the best person here to explain the difference.

 

[Ender]

If you believe there is a principle of the ‘common good’ which is the end of human justice. If you believe in the collective social conscience, that being the capacity of ‘the people’ to recognize by moral reasoning what is good for society and what is harmful.

I clearly believe in the common good. It is discussed in the catechism, it was discussed by Aquinas, and it has been discussed here. As for a collective social conscience, I see little evidence of it in countries that accept abortion, gay marriage, and euthanasia.

That is obviously not true since the death penalty for intentional murder has been abolished in all Judeo Christian countries and the Church has never called that a failure of justice.

This answer has nothing to do with my assertion, which was that capital punishment was before and is now a just punishment in the sense of being commensurate with the severity of the crime.

Given this passage from Sacred Scripture, how might you answer the question you have posed, if someone asked you the same question?

My answer would be no; this doctrine cannot change, which is the same thing I would say about the doctrine permitting capital punishment. That question was really posed to those who believe the latter doctrine can be reversed. I am addressing the idea that because some things can change all things can change even to the point of repudiating the doctrines of the past.

Ender:

When was slavery ever pronounced as a doctrine?

It’s all over the Bible. God gives several commands about treating slaves properly.

That slavery existed when the Bible was written in no way suggests that it was a Christian doctrine that slavery was acceptable. Where did the Church teach it was a right of States or individuals?

 

[Ender]

Definitions, as they often do, settle questions and end controversies.

As I understand your explanation, a defined doctrine is one that has been taught infallibly and may be finally proclaimed infallible as the necessity arises. I would put the question of women priests in that category, which JPII declared was an infallible teaching even as he was clear that he was not declaring it so based on his authority.

Probably the best way to approach the question of defined doctrine, then, is to start with a theological question and, then, research what the Church has held over the centuries. If the Fathers of the early Church all agreed on a particular question, and if too, that agreement carried on from century to century in the Church, that is a really good indication that it is true.

By these criteria I think a very strong argument can be made that capital punishment is in fact defined doctrine.

There are certain moral norms that have always and everywhere been held by the successors of the Apostles in communion with the Bishop of Rome. Although never formally defined, they are irreversibly binding on the followers of Christ until the end of the world. Such moral truths are the grave sinfulness of contraception and direct abortion. Such, too, is the Catholic doctrine which defends the imposition of the death penalty. (Fr John Hardon, 1998)

 

[Ender]

True, but the question is whether or not the teaching can change. Already we see cracks in the teaching, although not a complete overthrow at this time:
Roman Catholic colleges congratulate SS couples on their marriages.
Roman Catholic candidate for President marries a SS couple and is not excommunicated…

This indirectly brings up a serious issue, which is what we think the church actually is. If her doctrines are simply the collective opinions of her members, and especially of the clergy, then she is more like a political party than a church, and any change is possible. If, however, we believe what she herself professes, then her doctrines are based on objective moral truths, and while change (development) is reasonable, wholesale reversal is not.

I’m attempting to point out that while you say that mine (the Churchs) position is a slippery slope, that so is yours. The articles you linked only had 3 cases where the released prisoner re-offended. 2 of those were in districts that already had the death penalty on the books but it wasn’t used. To guarantee that a murderer can’t be released to reoffend would mean executing all murder convictions. That is a very slippery slope.

It is fairly difficult to come up with data on this, but in the US there are roughly 40 murders a year committed by recidivist killers. The argument that we risk executing an innocent man typically ignores the risk to innocents of not executing killers in the first place.

A slippery slope to what? Radical justice that transcends mere eye-for-eye justice?

I don’t think most people have a clear understanding of retributive justice, and denouncing it as “mere eye-for-an-eye justice” is an indication of that.

…when Our Lord says: “You have heard that it hath been said of old, an eye for an eye, etc.,” He does not condemn that law, nor forbid a magistrate to inflict the poena talionis… (St Bellarmine)

‘…the Church in her theory and practice has maintained retributive as well as medicinal penalties’ and that ‘this is more in conformity with what the sources of revelation and traditional doctrine teach regarding the coercive power of legitimate human authority. (Pius XII)

 

[StephenW]

I am addressing the idea that because some things can change all things can change even to the point of repudiating the doctrines of the past.

If this is what someone is actually arguing, then, one can easily show that this is internally illogical. One does not need to draw on anything outside of this assertion. I mean to say, “because some things can change all things can change” is not a logical statement in itself. It just does not follow, logically.

Applying this to the question of capital punishment, the pope’s teaching that it is inadmissible, does not amount to a repudiation or contradiction of Church doctrine. In another of my posts, I tried to explain how this is so; I will not repeat all of that here.

 

[Ender]

Applying this to the question of capital punishment, the pope’s teaching that it is inadmissible, does not amount to a repudiation or contradiction of Church doctrine. In another of my posts, I tried to explain how this is so; I will not repeat all of that here.

If the argument is that “inadmissible” is based on an evaluation of the capacities of modern prisons then I would agree that it is not a repudiation of Church doctrine. It would be a judgment that society today is better off without it, and in no way contradicts the doctrine that States have a right to employ it.

I understand your position that the “change” refers to the application of doctrine, and not the doctrine itself. Given that capital punishment is not intrinsically evil, its application is by the meaning of the term at least theoretically admissible. The claim that it is “inadmissible given modern means” seems clearly a judgment. More significantly, however, I think it misapprehends the nature of punishment as it appears to be tied primarily to protection rather than justice.

 

[MarysLurker]

It would be a judgment that society today is better off without it, and in no way contradicts the doctrine that States have a right to employ it.

Anybody making a judgment (whether they sit on the Chair of Peter or not) must inform themselves before making a judgment, regardless of what they are judging. I just don’t see how anyone with any basic knowledge of capital prosecution could arrive at a conclusion that it is never necessary in today’s society, based on the evidence.

 

[StephenW]

By these criteria I think a very strong argument can be made that capital punishment is in fact defined doctrine.

I think it is important here to be as precise as possible. As far as I can tell, capital punishment is not a defined doctrine of the Church. This is even indicated in the quote you gave from Hardon, in which he states, “…the Catholic doctrine which defends the imposition of the death penalty.”

In other words, the Church’s tradition (doctrine) defends the right of the state to punish, and this tradition includes the death penalty. The Catechism, in 2266, summarizes the teaching.

“The efforts of the state to curb the spread of behavior harmful to people’s rights and to the basic rules of civil society correspond to the requirement of safeguarding the common good. Legitimate public authority has the right and the duty to inflict punishment proportionate to the gravity of the offense. Punishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense. When it is willingly accepted by the guilty party, it assumes the value of expiation. Punishment then, in addition to defending public order and protecting people’s safety, has a medicinal purpose: as far as possible, it must contribute to the correction of the guilty party.”

I believe that this is the most one can say. In other words, the tradition of the Church does not exclude using the death penalty, but it does not say that the state must or should use it. Circumstances may very well mitigate against it. I offered some of the mitigating circumstances in another post. So, I will not repeat those here.

Now, certainly, this pope can be wrong about the inadmissibility of the state to use capital punishment. Nevertheless, in another post, I explained how this is not an unreasonable position, at least, in my opinion. It is not entirely clear how this could be correct in every case, in every state and circumstance. As a general principle, however, I think this pope may have some argument. That this general principle, always applies, however, seem clearly incorrect.

While the language of this pope is too often ambiguous and off the cuff at times, it is important to note that he did not say that capital punishment is intrinsically evil. What is clear, at least it seems to me, is that, given a new set of circumstances in the modern world, using the death penalty is no longer morally acceptable. Are those circumstances fulfilled in every place, state and situation? The answer is, obviously, no. If you compare what he is saying with what the Catechism says regarding abortion (See 2270-75), I think this helps to make a critical distinction between the possibility that the death penalty is inadmissible under the certain circumstances the pope mentions, compared to abortion, which is intrinsically evil, and thus, never allowed under any circumstances.

 

[Ender]

In other words, the Church’s tradition (doctrine) defends the right of the state to punish, and this tradition includes the death penalty.

This is the doctrine I suggested was defined. That is: the state may use it. The questions of whether the state should or must use it are very different, and I think everyone recognizes that circumstances exist such that in some cases it should not be used.

The real argument is over the question of whether the state may use it, or whether that option has been closed, which would be a reversal of the church’s tradition (doctrine).

What is clear, at least it seems to me, is that, given a new set of circumstances in the modern world, using the death penalty is no longer morally acceptable.

I take no issue with you judging that it ought not be used for practical reasons. I am not open, however, to its use being considered immoral on that account. Your prudential judgment does not determine what is or is not moral, nor do my judgments determine the morality of your actions.

If I believe that capital punishment provides a valuable function, then while you would (apparently) believe I am wrong, can you reasonably claim that it would be immoral of me (e.g. as a jurist) to impose it? I don’t accept that its use is “no longer morally acceptable” since that is an opinion based on the anticipated outcome.

 

[StephenW]

I wrote: What is clear, at least it seems to me, is that, given a new set of circumstances in the modern world, using the death penalty is no longer morally acceptable.

This statement of mine was in reference to the meaning the pope is implying. It is not necessarily what I think. That was not clear by the way I wrote this-- apologies for any misunderstanding.

You wrote: I am not open, however, to its use being considered immoral on that account. Your prudential judgment does not determine what is or is not moral, nor do my judgments determine the morality of your actions.

Yes and no. The objective nature of an act is not determined by my personal judgment (or anything else) just as reality itself is not determined by what I think or what is in my mind. Things that are immoral, in themselves, are always wrong to do. Again, abortion is one of those.

Nevertheless, prudential judgment, since you seem to be applying this to whether or not the state should or should not execute someone, does have, as its aim, to determine what is moral or immoral. Based on what I have already posted, you are aware that I am not asserting that capital punishment is intrinsically immoral, and the pope has not said this either. If you hold that the pope’s teaching here is a prudential judgment, he is not, by that fact, mistaken in coming to the conclusion that he does (i.e. given the circumstances he outlines, the death penalty is inadmissible). Thus, an execution, while it is not intrinsically immoral, may be immoral given the other elements of a moral act. See CCC 1750-54. I think this is the key to dealing with this whole issue of capital punishment.

You wrote: If I believe that capital punishment provides a valuable function, then while you would (apparently) believe I am wrong, can you reasonably claim that it would be immoral of me (e.g. as a jurist) to impose it? I don’t accept that its use is “no longer morally acceptable” since that is an opinion based on the anticipated outcome.

As far as I can tell, there is nothing wrong with holding that capital punishment provides a valuable function. You might be wrong, of course, but there is nothing to say that you should not hold that position. Also, it would not, necessarily, be immoral for you to impose it, since it is not intrinsically immoral. Again, see CCC 1750-54 for what I mean. In my opinion, then, one may disagree with the pope’s teaching here.

Perhaps we are not as much in disagreement as it may first have appeared.

 

[Ender]

prudential judgment, since you seem to be applying this to whether or not the state should or should not execute someone, does have, as its aim, to determine what is moral or immoral.

I think the state has as its aim what is beneficial, that is, the common good. This is not to suggest it may choose immoral actions, only that its choices are normally between helpful vs harmful rather than moral vs immoral.

If you hold that the pope’s teaching here is a prudential judgment, he is not, by that fact, mistaken in coming to the conclusion that he does (i.e. given the circumstances he outlines, the death penalty is inadmissible).

If I correctly understand his judgment as prudential then that can justify disagreeing with it. It is not necessarily wrong, but neither is it necessarily right.

Thus, an execution, while it is not intrinsically immoral, may be immoral given the other elements of a moral act. See CCC 1750-54. I think this is the key to dealing with this whole issue of capital punishment.

It is the “may be immoral” part that I contest. If the object is not wrong (it is not intrinsically evil), and the intent is not wrong (I intend to do the right thing), then all that is left are the circumstances and the judgments to be made about them, but it seems to me an honest disagreement about the circumstances cannot include a question of morality except in egregious cases. I do not see anything that justifies calling this a moral consideration.

Perhaps we are not as much in disagreement as it may first have appeared.

I think most of our “disagreements” may be explained by your being careful about the proper meaning of terms, a caution I appreciate.

 

[Motherwit]

Motherwit:

If you believe there is a principle of the ‘common good’ which is the end of human justice. If you believe in the collective social conscience, that being the capacity of ‘the people’ to recognize by moral reasoning what is good for society and what is harmful.

I clearly believe in the common good. It is discussed in the catechism, it was discussed by Aquinas, and it has been discussed here. As for a collective social conscience, I see little evidence of it in countries that accept abortion, gay marriage, and euthanasia.

That is where the Church in her unique role as the moral compass of Christ comes in. It is her duty to address and guide the collective social conscience as the Compendium of Social Doctrine does.

The growing aversion of public opinion towards the death penalty and the various provisions aimed at abolishing it or suspending its application constitute visible manifestations of a heightened moral awareness.

When the Church denounces immoral laws like abortion and euthanasia she does so with the moral authority to define a ‘culture of death’ behind it.

This answer has nothing to do with my assertion, which was that capital punishment was before and is now a just punishment in the sense of being commensurate with the severity of the crime.

And over 2000 years, that determination has changed to suit the particular conditions of the times. At different times it was used for different crimes and that was in relation to the needs of that particular society. That is the demand of justice. The common good.

It is fairly difficult to come up with data on this, but in the US there are roughly 40 murders a year committed by recidivist killers. The argument that we risk executing an innocent man typically ignores the risk to innocents of not executing killers in the first place.

Unless you execute every murder conviction then this will continue to be the risk. Is that what you are advocating?

 

[sealabeag]

I think one of the most confusing things in this whole discussion is the word “inadmissible”. I looked up the definition which is:
"(especially of evidence in court) not accepted as valid.
"he held that such evidence was inadmissible" "

Some definitions include “not to be allowed or tolerated”, but generally the word applies to a court of law. Either way, it is a strange word - seemingly used incorrectly in this case, and very unclear and ambiguous.

 

[StephenW]

I think the state has as its aim what is beneficial, that is, the common good. This is not to suggest it may choose immoral actions, only that its choices are normally between helpful vs harmful rather than moral vs immoral.

Is it not true that what is helpful to the human person or harmful to the human person (or society) is a matter of moral versus immoral? “Helpful” here, I am not taking to mean something like “convenient” or “useful”, since we are talking about the common good and the question of a person living or dying.

The state has a moral obligation to promote the common good, which concerns human excellence. It is, actually, the reason for the state’s existence. The Church also has such a moral obligation in this regard (common good), which, ultimately, is in human persons attaining eternal life. The common good is very much bound up with morality because it is bound up with the true good of human persons. Thus, the purpose of the state, government—authority, law and so on, is a moral one (On this topic of the common good, I think that Yves Simon’s book, A General Theory of Authority, is excellent).

If I correctly understand his judgment as prudential then that can justify disagreeing with it. It is not necessarily wrong, but neither is it necessarily right.

A prudential judgment here is a moral judgment. I would probably not say that one can justify disagreeing with the pope’s teaching simply because he is making a prudential judgment. It seems better to simply examine his specific moral reasoning on a subject, and then go from there. I would want to be careful not to reduce moral reasoning to mere opinion. It could end up being too easy of a label to throw on something with which one might disagree.

So, yes, the pope is making a moral judgment here, and based on this judgment, he has concluded that the death penalty, in certain circumstances, is inadmissible. This has to be a prudential judgment because he cannot possibly know or cover every possible circumstance. And capital punishment is not intrinsically evil. So, again, it seems to me that CCC 1750-54 is the key to dealing with this whole issue of capital punishment.

It is the “ may be immoral ” part that I contest. […] I do not see anything that justifies calling this a moral consideration.

The moral consideration this. Is it right (moral) to execute this particular person or not? All things considered; can it be justified? If yes, then an execution is moral. If not, then, an execution is immoral. In both cases, there is an execution. In one case it is moral and in another it is not. In neither case, however, is the execution intrinsically immoral.

Thus, an execution, while it is not intrinsically immoral, may be immoral [to carry out] given the other elements of a moral act. See CCC 1750-54 for those elements that go into judging the morality of an act. Again, I think this is the key to dealing with this whole issue of capital punishment.

 

[MarysLurker]

Unless you execute every murder conviction then this will continue to be the risk. Is that what you are advocating?

This assumes that all murderers are equally dangerous, and/or that the future danger a murderer represents cannot be judicially determined.

 

[Motherwit]

Motherwit:

Unless you execute every murder conviction then this will continue to be the risk. Is that what you are advocating?

This assumes that all murderers are equally dangerous, and/or that the future danger a murderer represents cannot be judicially determined.

But who is ever going to be certain of which murderer will go out and murder again. The examples of those given by you were not people that got the death penalty even though it existed on the books. It was determined that they weren’t serious enough for that sentence. So even with the death penalty on the books, these people went back out and murdered. Can you see what I’m saying? The only way to guarantee that a murderer won’t murder again is to give all of them the death penalty.

 

[MarysLurker]

But who is ever going to be certain of which murderer will go out and murder again. The examples of those given by you were not people that got the death penalty even though it existed on the books. It was determined that they weren’t serious enough for that sentence. So even with the death penalty on the books, these people went back out and murdered. Can you see what I’m saying? The only way to guarantee that a murderer won’t murder again is to give all of them the death penalty.

But this sword of “we can never be 100% sure” cuts both ways. If a murder defendant who IS a future danger escapes justice, an innocent person may die. Capital murder prosecution is a heads you lose, tails you lose situation.

Whether to flip the coin is a prudential judgment.

“For all men lay hold on justice of some sort, but they only advance to a certain point, and do not express the principle of absolute justice in its entirety. For instance, it is thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though not for everybody but only for those who are equals; and it is thought that inequality is just, for so indeed it is, though not for everybody, but for those who are unequal; but these partisans strip away the qualification of the persons concerned, and judge badly.” -Aristotle

You, and the Holy Father, are operating on an assumption that people are equally situated when they are not. Simply because they share some characteristics, such as human dignity, does not mean that they are the same notwithstanding all evidence presented in a capital murder trial to the contrary.

 

[Motherwit]

Unfortunately you aren’t understanding my meaning and I don’t know how to explain it better.