Non-theistic foundation of morality?

[PRmerger]

Isn’t it blazingly obvious that what could be considered correct or not depends on the circumstances.

I should add that the concept that an action could be “considered correct” is testimony to the fact that you believe in objective morality.

That is, no one ever discusses which is “considered correct”, okra is the tastiest vegetable or the turnip.

That’s because some things are a matter of preference, and it’s absurd to consider one preference to be better than another…because there is no standard to which we can measure.

However, IF someone believes an action to be “considered correct”…then that presupposes that there is a standard to which we approach, and compare this behavior.

And…that standard is…

nothing more…

and nothing less than…

God.

 

[Bradski]

I should add that the concept that an action could be “considered correct” is testimony to the fact that you believe in objective morality.

Thanks, but I think I’ll pass on having you telling me what is right or wrong.

 

[PRmerger]

Thanks, but I think I’ll pass on having you telling me what is right or wrong.

Not the point.

The fact that you say that a behavior can be “considered correct” is testimony to this: there is a standard of morals.

Here’s something for which there is no standard: what color brides should wear.

So anyone who presents this: “It’s considered correct for a bride to wear red, not white” as a thread topic here is going to get about 3 pages, max, as a discussion.

Why? Because no one argues about what’s “more correct” when it’s simply a preference, or a cultural norm.

 

[o_mlly]

…So hopefully this is clear: circumstances can change an object from good/neutral to evil, but in each of these cases the circumstances speciate the object…

I suggest your re-read your Summa citations. Aquinas does not teach that circumstances change the object of an act. Nor does he teach that circumstances “speciate” the object. Your confusion, I believe, is in equivocating Aquinas’ phrases “moral species” and “moral action.” The former references the object and the latter references the action.

The object is essential; circumstances are accidental. The accidents cannot change the essential genus of the object but they do change the the morality of the action.
To wit:

Article 3. Whether man’s action is good or evil from a circumstance?
Reply to Objection 1. Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the essence.

Article 8. Whether any action is indifferent in its species?
I answer that, As stated above (2,5), every action takes its species from its object; while human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the object, in relation to the principle of human actions, which is the reason.

Article 10. Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?
On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
Hence it is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species. But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that determines the action’s species.

Hope this helps.

 

[Tandem]

The fact that you say that a behavior can be “considered correct” is testimony to this: there is a standard of morals.

Right. But from this it does not follow that the standard is unchanging.

Why? Because no one argues about what’s “more correct” when it’s simply a preference, or a cultural norm.

In certain cultures cannibalism was the cultural norm. In the ancient Greek societies there was an island called “Lesbos”, and even today that name is related to that culture’s “cultural norm”. In the ancient Aztec society the human sacrifices were considered “correct”, and even the chosen victims considered it the highest form of honor to be selected.

The definition is:

a) “principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior.”
b) “a particular system of values and principles of conduct, especially one held by a specified person or society.”

Every society has a set of “norms” which are considered correct in that society. Observe the word “considered”. These norms can be similar or equivalent to the norms of a different society, but do not have to be. In the majority of the contemporary Western societies public nudity or publicly performed sex is considered “immoral”, while these behaviors are and were perfectly acceptable in tribes close the Equator.

Question: “What is the difference between ‘moral’ behavior and the ‘culturally accepted’ behavior”? Because that is the crux of the matter.

 

[PRmerger]

Right. But from this it does not follow that the standard is unchanging.

True, true.

In certain cultures cannibalism was the cultural norm. In the ancient Greek societies there was an island called “Lesbos”, and even today that name is related to that culture’s “cultural norm”. In the ancient Aztec society the human sacrifices were considered “correct”, and even the chosen victims considered it the highest form of honor to be selected.

The definition is:

a) “principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior.”
b) “a particular system of values and principles of conduct, especially one held by a specified person or society.”

Every society has a set of “norms” which are considered correct in that society. Observe the word “considered”. These norms can be similar or equivalent to the norms of a different society, but do not have to be. In the majority of the contemporary Western societies public nudity or publicly performed sex is considered “immoral”, while these behaviors are and were perfectly acceptable in tribes close the Equator.

No argument from me here.

Question: “What is the difference between ‘moral’ behavior and the ‘culturally accepted’ behavior”? Because that is the crux of the matter.

Egg-zactly.

Moral behavior is that which is in conformity to the moral law.

Accepted behavior is just that. It can be accepted but immoral (like the Aztecs and Lesbos natives–if that’s even a true thing. I seem to remember reading that Lesbos want really a thing) or accepted and moral (like the aid to widows and orphans by the early Christians)

 

[Tandem]

True, true.
No argument from me here.

Thank you. So the definition of morality is: “a particular system of values and principles of conduct, especially one held by a specified person or society”. I am glad we agree here.

Moral behavior is that which is in conformity to the moral law.

Where does that moral law come from? And how can we find out what it is?

Accepted behavior is just that. It can be accepted but immoral (like the Aztecs and Lesbos natives–if that’s even a true thing. I seem to remember reading that Lesbos want really a thing) or accepted and moral (like the aid to widows and orphans by the early Christians)

So in the stone age, when cannibalism was the norm, was is just a cultural norm, or was it moral? Is public nudity and openly, publicly performed sex just a cultural norm?

 

[PRmerger]

So in the stone age, when cannibalism was the norm, was is just a cultural norm, or was it moral? Is public nudity and openly, publicly performed sex just a cultural norm?

I’m kind of surprised that this questioned needs to be answered…but, yes, cannibalism was wrong then, even if it was the norm. As was sacrificing Aztec (and other) humans.

As was exterminating 6 million Jews.

All of that transgressed the moral law.

 

[Tomdstone]

Where does that moral law come from? And how can we find out what it is?

I am interested in this question. For example, is it true that any act that God has commanded us to perform is morally permissible and in accord with an unchangeable and absolute moral law?

 

[Tandem]

I’m kind of surprised that this questioned needs to be answered…but, yes, cannibalism was wrong then, even if it was the norm. As was sacrificing Aztec (and other) humans.

As was exterminating 6 million Jews.

All of that transgressed the moral law.

I am still waiting for you to enlighten me. Where does that “moral law” come from? And how could those ancient Aztecs know “what” is “immoral”? These are important questions.

There is a “minor” difference between the Jews and the Aztecs. The Aztec victims of those sacrifices considered their fate to be a high honor. The Jews did not. Don’t you see the difference between a voluntary participant in the sacrifice and being herded into a gas-chamber? I am sure you do…

By the way, when that plane went down in the Andes (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Andes_flight_disaster), and the survivors had to resort to cannibalism, no one condemned them for their actions, not even the Vatican. So maybe cannibalism is not “really” immoral, is it?

 

[Tomdstone]

So maybe cannibalism is not “really” immoral, is it?

It seems that according to Scripture, God said that under certain conditions, He would make people resort to cannibalism. Jer 19:9.

 

[Bradski]

It seems that according to Scripture, God said that under certain conditions, He would make people resort to cannibalism. Jer 19:9.

So that drinking someone’s blood and eating their body would be ok? I seem to recall that certain religious groups use that idea in their ceremonies.

 

[inocente]

Grace of course.

But you seemed to be offering a rule about how to view the Catechism.

And a rule that rules deny Grace.

Yes? Is that a correct assessment of what you were asserting?

 

[o_mlly]

…
It’s free online. And if you look at its objectives, it’s a teaching aid for those responsible for catchesis [sic],

And for Christians, who is not responsible for catechizing their fellow Christians?

… not a rule book for laity. Rules deny Grace. There’s a section on Grace, 1987 to 2005. They’re not rules.

Yes, the sections on Justification and Grace are not rules but explanations on their relationship. Grace is a mystery and in as much as the Sacred Scripture, Sacred Tradition and the Teaching Church have discerned, this section explains the operation of grace within us. Grace is the power of God in us that enables us to express His goodness. Our response to this grace within us is a free response. We can choose to negate the effect of grace, reject God’s offer of friendship, and this is sin.

Rules do not deny grace.

 

[inocente]

Are you sure about that? There sure seems to be just a bit of divinely-sanctioned war in the Bible subsequent to the Mosaic covenant…

The fifth commandment prohibits murder of humans.

Well, I’m sure that scouring the bible to try to authorize whatever we want is exactly what Atlantic slave traders did. I mean at a stretch that would authorize selling our own daughters as slaves.

Do you think Christians should err on the side of righteousness, or try to find get-out clauses and loopholes?

*No – on two counts. First off, what do you think a ‘covenant’ is, exactly? It’s a contract that makes its participants into family!

Second, what do you call the rainbow in the Noah story, or the split animals in the Abraham story, or even the blood in the Mosaic covenant story? These are all signs of the contract (aka covenant) God is making with His people there! (And now, for the kicker: what does Jesus say that the chalice contains, in his Last Supper ‘institution narrative’?) *

Satan writes contracts. God writes covenants. Contracts can be broken, covenants can’t. When we fail, God does not break His covenant, He has made an unconditional commitment.

*I’m not sure I agree that their consent comes into play. (For instance, if they’re standing in the path of a boom that’s swinging their way, then pushing them overboard in order to avoid getting crushed is morally good – even though they don’t consent to it.)

Otherwise, I agree: to argue that pushing someone off a boat is morally neutral requires an analysis of the circumstances*. In some, it’s morally good; in others, neutral; in still others, evil.

Yes, I think consent has to be given for the act to be morally neutral. If no consent is given, the act can’t be neutral, it must either be good as in your example, or evil, as in pushing them off a lifeboat to drown.

 

[inocente]

inocente - The word used in the 5th commandment is “ratsach,” which is a little more specific than “kill.” In other places, you have God commanding people to be put to death under certain circumstances. You can’t reconcile these with the way you’re thinking.

If we kill accidentally or in self-defense it may be justified, otherwise it isn’t. What’s to reconcile? Christian morality is surely not a labyrinth of clauses, we surely don’t need to be contract lawyers to know right from wrong?

Also, pushing someone off a boat is not always wrong. Therefore, in itself, it’s at least morally neutral.

Killing someone is not always wrong. That doesn’t make the act of killing morally neutral. I’m being told that pushing someone off a lifeboat far from land is morally neutral. Of course it isn’t.

 

[inocente]

Nor does a time delay make it intentional.

Correct, a time delay between act and consequence cannot change the intention of the act.

Being Catholic is not for wimps or those who want easy answers.

You don’t sound exactly moderate here. Jesus is for everyone bro, wimps included.

Done and dusted? I don’t think so. Read the posts more carefully. Consequentialism only examines consequences to determine morality. I’ve examined far more than that. Are you really confused or just trying to be clever?

You wrote “Did you forget that we agreed “bombing” is not intrinsically evil and that the bomber’s intention to mitigate an unjust aggressor is good. The next issue is one of balance. The issue is not “worth” but proportionate. Does the good effect equal or outweigh the evil.”

Now dude, that’s pure unadulterated consequentialism. You’ve not accepted that anything about the act is intrinsically evil, and you’ve considered nothing but consequences. Consequentialism, by definition.

*No, you incorrectly **infer ***any manipulation or modification effort on my part. (See Rash Judgment in the catechism.) Each paragraph has its own subheading and stands alone – one does not modify the other: “Legitimate Defense” and “Intentional Homicide.”

It was your choice to quote them out of order. It’s good you agree the unconditional nature of “The fifth commandment forbids direct and intentional killing as gravely sinful”. Now if we could just match that up with your direct intention to plant a bomb for the sole purpose of killing people who are watching a show.

Apparently you don’t understand Catholic teaching on just war doctrine. It’s in the catechism. CCC#2321 The prohibition of murder does not abrogate the right to render an unjust aggressor unable to inflict harm. Legitimate defense is a grave duty for whoever is responsible for the lives of others or the common good.

Hmm. Rather than using a one-liner summary from an “In Brief” section, let’s look at the full statement instead:

CCC 2265 Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for one who is responsible for the lives of others. The defense of the common good requires that an unjust aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm. For this reason, those who legitimately hold authority also have the right to use arms to repel aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their responsibility.

The right to “use arms to repel aggressors against the civil community”. Not the right to plant a bomb in a theater with the direct intent to kill people indiscriminately while they’re watching a show.

It’s not moral at all. Suicide is intrinsically evil and never permitted.

Oh. So using a bomb to kill people indiscriminately while they’re watching a show is morally justified as long as you don’t put your own life in danger?

And for Christians, who is not responsible for catechizing their fellow Christians?

The CCC says otherwise, it does make a distinction:

*CCC 12 This work is intended primarily for those responsible for catechesis: first of all the bishops, as teachers of the faith and pastors of the Church. It is offered to them as an instrument in fulfilling their responsibility of teaching the People of God. Through the bishops, it is addressed to redactors of catechisms, to priests, and to catechists. It will also be useful reading for all other Christian faithful. *

Course, as a Baptist I’m allowed to point these things out.

Rules do not deny grace.

Yes they do. We are saved by Grace, not by following rules. Jesus gets very angry with those who think redemption is about outwardly following rules without any inward change:

*"Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you hypocrites! You clean the outside of the cup and dish, but inside they are full of greed and self-indulgence. Blind Pharisee! First clean the inside of the cup and dish, and then the outside also will be clean.

“Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you hypocrites! You are like whitewashed tombs, which look beautiful on the outside but on the inside are full of the bones of the dead and everything unclean.” - Matt 23*

 

[e_c]

I’m being told that pushing someone off a lifeboat far from land is morally neutral. Of course it isn’t.

Make the distinctions, pick up on the subtleties, and be sure you respond to what is actually said.

I suggest your re-read your Summa citations. Aquinas does not teach that circumstances change the object of an act. Nor does he teach that circumstances “speciate” the object. Your confusion, I believe, is in equivocating Aquinas’ phrases “moral species” and “moral action.” The former references the object and the latter references the action.

The object is essential; circumstances are accidental. The accidents cannot change the essential genus of the object but they do change the the morality of the action.

They change the morality of the act by changing the object. He says that actions take their species from their object. He says that circumstances can change the object if they enter into the essence. Let’s go through what you quoted. My emphases and comments… follow the *'s too.

Article 3. Whether man’s action is good or evil from a circumstance?
Reply to Objection 1. Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence [which means sometimes they can be]; but they are in an action as accidents thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the essence.

Article 8. Whether any action is indifferent in its species?
I answer that, As stated above (2,5), every action takes its species from its object; while human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the object, in relation to the principle of human actions, which is the reason. [And sometimes reason* is bound to consider the circumstances in the action.]

Article 10. Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?
On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad. [When your reason* ought to know that what you are doing is bad precisely because of the circumstance.]

Hence it is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species. But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. [Like we can think about our arms moving, or that our arms are connected to a tennis racket, and that we are in a church, etc.] And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing reason [huzzah!*], as the principal condition of the object that determines the action’s species." [The circumstance can change the object, the object can change the goodness of the act.]

I have said circumstances “speciate” the object (or specify if you prefer), because the object is specifying the whole act… since it really is the whole act. The distinction between them in Thomas is this: objects are specific kinds of acts (murder, almsgiving, etc.) and actions are good, bad, or neutral. The intention is only the motivation for the act and makes the action bad by association. The circumstances are what surrounds the act and don’t matter unless they enter into the object.

You want “circumstance” to sit alone and remain its own little aspect of a moral evaluation, but that’s just not what happens. It is useful to distinguish it at the start of an evaluation only insofar as it clarifies what is being brought to bear on one’s intuitive conception of the more basic action being evaluated.

 

[e_c]

Yes they do. We are saved by Grace, not by following rules. Jesus gets very angry with those who think redemption is about outwardly following rules without any inward change.

This is a false dichotomy. Ask John how we know we love God.

 

[o_mlly]

They change the morality of the act by changing the object. He says that actions take their species from their object. He says that circumstances can change the object if they enter into the essence. Let’s go through what you quoted. My emphases and comments… follow the *'s too.

Article 3. Whether man’s action is good or evil from a circumstance?
Reply to Objection 1. Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence [which means sometimes they can be]; but they are in an action as accidents thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the essence.

The object, or more correctly, the moral object is the end of the moral act. The intention is the end-in-view of the moral actor. The moral object does not merely specify the physicality of the act but must, if properly specified, include the reasonable end-in-view of the act. The moral object of the act is independent of the who, where or when circumstances unless the who, when or where are essential to define the moral end of the act alone.

If proper specification of the moral object requires incorporation of elements that are circumstantial then those, and only those, circumstances become essential to the proper specification of the moral object.

Using your prior example, “playing tennis in church”:

Moral object: playing tennis to improve muscle tone, strength and flexibility. Morally good.

Intention: To reinforce one’s social connection with others through athletic competition and cooperation. Morally good.

Circumstances: Who - wife and adult children - morally good.
When - 10:00 am - 12:00 pm Saturday- morally neutral
Where: Church - morally evil

The action is immoral by circumstance since a morally good action requires goodness in all three fonts. However, the moral object remains morally good.
The purpose of analysis is the opposite of synthesis. Analysis seeks to dissect, break down, divide a complex whole into its parts or elements so as to discover its true nature or inner relationships. The Church teaching on determining the morality of an action is to analyze the action by examination of the action’s constitutive elements - object, intent and circumstance. Prematurely synthesizing circumstance into object defeats the analytical process.