Non-theistic foundation of morality?

[PRmerger]

I said it several times.

Not on this thread.

 

[e_c]

Not on this thread.

Bye.

 

[PRmerger]

I don’t think you could, which I imagine is why you choose not to. Sharing and communication require a mutual giving. If the other person is argumentative, or resistant to new understandings, when they are committed to a particular world view or politics, intent on confounding rather than clarifying, if the other person has a hidden agenda and is interested in debunking whatever is being discussed for extraneous reasons, if only because the dialogue is contaminated with mistrust, cynicism and doubt, why bother. I’m no Miss Manners, but it seems to me that a few moments of patience, nodding to signify one’s having paid attention, is all that polite conversation requires before moving on.

Indeed.

And one should always consider the lurkers.

Often, when I see a poster who is recusant, my answers are not to them, but to show the lurkers the idiocy of a particular position and the veritable reasonableness of mine.

And, of course, a seed is always planted in those who appear to be adamantine.

 

[e_c]

Omlly - Let me ask two questions before going into detail in response to your last post.

1. While playing tennis is a morally neutral act in itself, would the circumstance of being in a church make that action morally bad?
2. What is your take on the Paul VI Congo nuns contraception shenanigans?

 

[o_mlly]

Omlly - Let me ask two questions before going into detail in response to your last post.

1. While playing tennis is a morally neutral act in itself, would the circumstance of being in a church make that action morally bad?
2. What is your take on the Paul VI Congo nuns contraception shenanigans?

I think staying focused on a scenario (simplified and crystalized as possible) without introducing more distractions will draw out the important distinctions and areas of agreement and disagreement.

In the simplified scenario (2 people) you and I have agreed that the one in the lifeboat may push the other away if the intention is to save one’s own life and the action does not put the other into a lethal situation.

o_mlly: 4. “Can we act in self-defense against those who aren’t aggressors, strictly speaking?” e_c: Yes, see point #6. There is a subtlety involved. You can’t target that individual - he is innocent, and you become an aggressor to him by intentionally putting him into a lethal situation.

Using the same principles, in the more complicated scenario, I say one may push another overboard if the intention is to save 4 lives and the action does not put the other into a lethal situation. You say, No, because the action “targets” another putting one into a lethal situation and is not permitted.

But in both the simple and complicated scenarios, the one acted upon is already in a lethal situation. Therefore, the actions – either “pushing away” or pushing overboard” do not put the other into a lethal situation for that is already the situation. Both actions are not intrinsically evil. The proportionality rule for weighing good and bad effects is met. The good effect is intended in both. The good effects do not proceed from the bad effects. Therefore, both actions are morally permitted.

 

[e_c]

1. I think staying focused on a scenario (simplified and crystalized as possible) without introducing more distractions will draw out the important distinctions and areas of agreement and disagreement.

2. In the simplified scenario (2 people) you and I have agreed that the one in the lifeboat may push the other away if the intention is to save one’s own life and the action does not put the other into a lethal situation.

o_mlly: 4. “Can we act in self-defense against those who aren’t aggressors, strictly speaking?” e_c: Yes, see point #6. There is a subtlety involved. You can’t target that individual - he is innocent, and you become an aggressor to him by intentionally putting him into a lethal situation.

3. Using the same principles, in the more complicated scenario, I say one may push another overboard if the intention is to save 4 lives and the action does not put the other into a lethal situation. You say, No, because the action “targets” another putting one into a lethal situation and is not permitted.

4. But in both the simple and complicated scenarios, the one acted upon is already in a lethal situation. Therefore, the actions – either “pushing away” or pushing overboard” do not put the other into a lethal situation for that is already the situation. Both actions are not intrinsically evil. The proportionality rule for weighing good and bad effects is met. The good effect is intended in both. The good effects do not proceed from the bad effects. Therefore, both actions are morally permitted.

1. Well, you’ve claimed several times now that circumstances can’t change the goodness of an act. That’s just plain wrong. Playing tennis in a church is wrong because of the circumstances, even if the intention is good. So hopefully this is clear: circumstances can change an object from good/neutral to evil, but in each of these cases the circumstances speciate the object. The fact that circumstances are considered by the Catechism to be a component of moral evaluation should suffice to show that they are relevant. Here’s the Summa on it:

newadvent.org/summa/2007.htm#article2

newadvent.org/summa/2018.htm#article3

newadvent.org/summa/2018.htm#article10 (Especially this one!)

newadvent.org/summa/2018.htm#article11

The Congo nuns fiasco is extremely relevant. A nun can take a contraceptive, not because the intention differs (avoiding pregnancy, or avoiding having a child, or something very close to this), but because the object differs (the mere repulsion of unwanted seed). I asked you this to highlight the importance of distinguishing the object and intention, which you have muddled repeatedly, and even changed a few times. The intention is something specific. In the 4 lives scenario, it is not “lightening the lifeboat,” nor is it “preventing the lifeboat from sinking,” nor is it “making it back to shore,” nor is it “seeing my family again,” nor is it “happiness.” It’s not that these are unrelated, it’s that they are either prior to the intention or they are after it.

We are dealing with a series of events and motivations - you’ve not realized that there’s a natural place to label “object” and a place to label “intention.” It is based on how the will works. The object is the means actively used to achieve the intention. The intention is the first good obtained in the series that is delighted in for its own sake which motivated the action, which in the 4 lives case, is saving the 4 lives.

1. Sure. It is true defense - whosoever may approach will be turned away, there’s no discretion, and no introduction into a lethal situation. Actually, there is targeting here, and this is permissible because it is an aggressor.
2. It is interesting that you just now say this: “and the action does not put the other into a lethal situation.” If this were the case, there would be no issue. Throwing someone off a boat is, in itself, morally neutral after all.
3. If it were a truly lethal situation to begin with, then there would not be the reasonable certainty of being saved if one does xyz. It is merely a potentially lethal situation, where there is an option to forego death if one is willing to do certain things - like throwing someone else overboard who will surely die. In other words, it’s not certain that so and so will die. But you make it certain by throwing him overboard.

 

[Aloysium]

. . . Throwing someone off a boat is, in itself, morally neutral after all. . .

If you touch someone without their permission or where it is not purely to help someone who is incapable of giving consent, it is considered assault.

 

[inocente]

”Just because there’s a time delay between the action and the death doesn’t make it unintentional.” Taking this argument – that any action which causes the delayed death of a human being is always intentional and, therefore immoral – to an absurdity would proscribe conception, the ultimate cause of death. Leaving absurdity aside for the moment, your argument would condemn our Department of Transportation (DOT) as murderers. If it is always wrong to kill another person, then it is wrong to build highways, because we know that these highways will cause the deaths of some people in traffic accidents. Or are we excusing these deaths because they are “accidents”? But they are not accidents, because they are foreseen! The mother and father and the DOT (and the bomber) foresee their action as causing death but death in all these cases is an unintended effect and an intended proportionate good effect moves them to act.

Bit desperate. The DOT didn’t start out with any intent to kill, so the delay before the accident can’t make it unintentional, it already was unintentional.

No, strictly speaking I’m using the double effect’s proportionality rule that the good effect must equal or outweigh the bad effect.

You said you’d decide whether the enemy causalities you cause with your bomb are worth the death of the townspeople by enemy retaliation. You didn’t say your decision would be based on anything other than those consequences. That’s consequentialism.

If we agree that waterboarding is torture, yes.

Not sure Christian morality should be about finding loopholes in the small print, but yes, it’s torture:

“For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind” - un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm

Waterboarding is a form of water torture in which water is poured over a cloth covering the face and breathing passages of an immobilized captive, causing the individual to experience the sensation of drowning. Waterboarding can cause extreme pain, dry drowning, damage to lungs, brain damage from oxygen deprivation, other physical injuries including broken bones due to struggling against restraints, lasting psychological damage, and death. - en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waterboarding

Torturing a human being is intrinsically evil. However, striking a lethal blow in self-defense is morally permissible (CCC #2263).

They’re watching a show in the theater, it’s not self-defense. You know your bomb will kill and maim them while you make your getaway, that’s not self-defense. Just as deliberately throwing someone overboard and then continually pushing them away while they plead to be let back is direct and intentional killing.

In both cases it’s intentional homicide, which the CCC states is categorically a sin “that cries out to heaven for vengeance” (CCC 2268). There are no sub-clauses or loopholes, it is categorically evil.

Torture, yes. Deliberate killing, no. Intention and circumstance may justify the unintended killing of a human being. Would you not want the moral authority to defend your mother, father, brother, sister or any innocent person from murder even by lethal means if necessary?

The intent should be to protect, not to kill. If you shoot him ten times in the head, you intend his death. Whereas if you punch him and he falls, hits his head and dies, you didn’t intend the death. Intentional killing is always immoral.

 

[e_c]

If you touch someone without their permission or where it is not purely to help someone who is incapable of giving consent, it is considered assault.

Well here we start to get into a further distinction - act and object. Objects are not the same as acts.

Maybe this act (throwing someone off a boat) has very few circumstances in which it goes to constitute a good object. But some acts have none - like heresy.

The larger point I would make is that “intriniscally evil” gets stamped on too many things, unless we admit for the dance between act and circumstance in forming the object. We should start by looking at what the moral agent is doing with his body, for instance, and then look at what is going on around him, then possibly return to looking at his action. “He’s playing tennis.” “He’s in a church.” “He is committing sacrilege.” Or, “He is playing tennis.” “There’s nothing strange about his situation.” And then we would move on to his intent… Maybe he is playing tennis to “impress” a woman who isn’t his wife, which would be vanity. Maybe there is a small wager on the game, and he intends to use his winnings to further nefarious purposes. Etc.

 

[inocente]

Bradski;14025176:

This theistic morality? Let me know when you have it all sorted out so I will know what to do. Take your time. There’s no rush.

Catechism of the Catholic Church Mass Market Paperback – April 15, 1995

So theistic morality has only been around for twenty years? Little wonder it’s got all these different interpretations then.

I’d suggest the moral code which stands head and shoulders above the rest is: always let your conscience be your guide.

 

[e_c]

Intentional killing is always immoral.

Someone should have told Moses before all those battles. And the Judges of Israel before they invaded Canaan. And David before campaigning against the Philistines. And Peter before that encounter with Ananias and Saphira. Etc.

 

[inocente]

Throwing someone off a boat is, in itself, morally neutral after all.

Can’t see how throwing someone off a boat can ever be morally neutral unless perhaps (a) they have consented to being thrown and (b) you have a high degree of certainty that they will come to no harm and (c) you do all in your power to keep them from harm until safely back on the boat.

Someone should have told Moses before all those battles. And the Judges of Israel before they invaded Canaan. And David before campaigning against the Philistines. And Peter before that encounter with Ananias and Saphira. Etc.

CCC 2268 The fifth commandment forbids direct and intentional killing as gravely sinful. The murderer and those who cooperate voluntarily in murder commit a sin that cries out to heaven for vengeance.

Seems clear enough.

 

[o_mlly]

1. Well, you’ve claimed several times now that circumstances can’t change the goodness of an act. That’s just plain wrong.

All right. Stop right there. Gotta call a “Bradski” on you for not reading the posts. Never said that; in fact, said the exact opposite, to wit:

…
For an act to be morally good it must be good in all three sources: object, intent and circumstance. CCC# 1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

… Intention and circumstance may justify the unintended killing of a human being. Would you not want the moral authority to defend your mother, father, brother, sister or any innocent person from murder even by lethal means if necessary?

CCC #1754* The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves*; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil. (Emphasis mine).

So I will dismiss as irrelevant the portion of your comment that follows from this false premise.

… the circumstances speciate the object.

Wrong again, my friend. The circumstances do not specify the object of the act. Let’s try again.

*CCC#1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good.

CCC#1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject …

CCC#1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context.*

Do you not see that the object of the act is independent of the subject (1752) and the circumstances (1756). The object of the act is specified by, and only by, the definition of the act regardless of circumstance that provides context to the act.

We can derive from these teachings that circumstances are unimportant in determining the moral character of an act already evil in its object or intention.

We can derive from these teachings that circumstances are only important in determining the moral character of an act as a good act which is neutral or good in its object and good in its intention. The circumstances on balance must also be good.

There is no need to scramble the eggs as in “dance the object and circumstances” to determine the object of an act. The object of the act, as the Catechism explains, is one of definition. We only need to examine the circumstances of acts which are good in their defined object and good in the subject’s intention to confirm that the circumstances do not render the morality of the act (not the object) as evil. If circumstances are such that the act is immoral, the object remains, as it was, good or neutral.

**We are dealing with a series of events and motivations - you’ve not realized that there’s a natural place to label “object” and a place to label “intention.” It is based on how the will works. The object is the means actively used to achieve the intention. The intention is the first good obtained in the series that is delighted in for its own sake which motivated the action, which in the 4 lives case, is saving the 4 lives.**I hope the above has cleared up your confusion of “object” and “intention.”

2. Sure. It is true defense - whosoever may approach will be turned away, there’s no discretion, and no introduction into a lethal situation. Actually, there is targeting here, and this is permissible because it is an aggressor.

Making some headway here.

3. It is interesting that you just now say this: “and the action does not put the other into a lethal situation.” …

Ah, too bad. Gotta hit you with another “Bradski.” How can I “just say now” what has always been an obvious conclusion. The simplified scenario stated the swimmer was in a lethal situation and the complicated scenario that all were in a lethal situation.

**4. If it were a truly lethal situation to begin with, then there would not be the reasonable certainty of being saved if one does xyz. It is merely a potentially lethal situation, where there is an option to forego death if one is willing to do certain things - like throwing someone else overboard who will surely die. In other words, it’s not certain that so and so will die. But you make it certain by throwing him overboard. **

Could you run this by me again? It’s a thought-experiment! The situation and the moral actors’ foreseeable ends are specified. Morality deals with the object of the act, the subject’s foreseeable ends, the subject’s intentions and the circumstances. There is no certainty or lack of certainty required in the subject’s foreseeable ends. Sounds like a red herring just jumped into the boat.

 

[o_mlly]

Bit desperate. The DOT didn’t start out with any intent to kill, so the delay before the accident can’t make it unintentional, it already was unintentional.

Did you mean “disparate” as in moving from conception to highway construction? I thought the logic unassailable in defeating the argument “that any action which causes the delayed death of a human being is always intentional and, therefore immoral.”

And I was right. At last a breakthrough! You are now very Catholic in your thinking.

You said you’d decide whether the enemy causalities you cause with your bomb are worth the death of the townspeople by enemy retaliation. You didn’t say your decision would be based on anything other than those consequences. That’s consequentialism.

Oh, you’re back-sliding a bit. Did you forget that we agreed “bombing” is not intrinsically evil and that the bomber’s intention to mitigate an unjust aggressor is good. The next issue is one of balance. The issue is not “worth” but proportionate. Does the good effect equal or outweigh the evil.

Not sure Christian morality should be about finding loopholes in the small print, but yes, it’s torture:

No argument here. I also believe water-boarding as I understand it to be torture. Others, some more knowledgeable than me in the procedure, disagree.

They’re watching a show in the theater, it’s not self-defense. You know your bomb will kill and maim them while you make your getaway, that’s not self-defense. Just as deliberately throwing someone overboard and then continually pushing them away while they plead to be let back is direct and intentional killing.

They are combatants waging an unjust war watching a show in the theater.

In both cases it’s intentional homicide, which the CCC states is categorically a sin “that cries out to heaven for vengeance” (CCC 2268). There are no sub-clauses or loopholes, it is categorically evil.

You’ve got to read the whole book.

Yes, the killing of humans is evil but it may be an unintended and tolerated evil if a proportionate good is intended.

CCC#2268 The fifth commandment forbids direct and intentional killing as gravely sinful. The murderer and those who cooperate voluntarily in murder commit a sin that cries out to heaven for vengeance.69

CCC#2263 The legitimate defense of persons and societies is not an exception to the prohibition against the murder of the innocent that constitutes intentional killing. "The act of self-defense can have a double effect: the preservation of one’s own life; and the killing of the aggressor… the one is intended, the other is not."65

CCC#2269 … Unintentional killing is not morally imputable. But one is not exonerated from grave offense if, without proportionate reasons, he has acted in a way that brings about someone’s death, even without the intention to do so.

The intent should be to protect, not to kill. If you shoot him ten times in the head, you intend his death. Whereas if you punch him and he falls, hits his head and dies, you didn’t intend the death. Intentional killing is always immoral.

We agree:

CCC#2264 Love toward oneself remains a fundamental principle of morality. Therefore it is legitimate to insist on respect for one’s own right to life. Someone who defends his life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced to deal his aggressor a lethal blow:
If a man in self-defense uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repels force with moderation, his defense will be lawful. . . . Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one’s own life than of another’s.66

Did I mention the Catechism is available on Amazon.com?

 

[e_c]

1. All right. Stop right there. Gotta call a “Bradski” on you for not reading the posts. Never said that; in fact, said the exact opposite, to wit:

So I will dismiss as irrelevant the portion of your comment that follows from this false premise.

2. Wrong again, my friend. The circumstances do not specify the object of the act. Let’s try again.

[quotes]

3. Do you not see that the object of the act is independent of the subject (1752) and the circumstances (1756). The object of the act is specified by, and only by, the definition of the act regardless of circumstance that provides context to the act.

4. We can derive from these teachings that circumstances are unimportant in determining the moral character of an act already evil in its object or intention.

5. We can derive from these teachings that circumstances are only important in determining the moral character of an act as a good act which is neutral or good in its object and good in its intention. The circumstances on balance must also be good.

6. There is no need to scramble the eggs as in “dance the object and circumstances” to determine the object of an act. The object of the act, as the Catechism explains, is one of definition. We only need to examine the circumstances of acts which are good in their defined object and good in the subject’s intention to confirm that the circumstances do not render the morality of the act (not the object) as evil. If circumstances are such that the act is immoral, the object remains, as it was, good or neutral.

7. I hope the above has cleared up your confusion of “object” and “intention.”

8. Making some headway here.

9. Ah, too bad. Gotta hit you with another “Bradski.” How can I “just say now” what has always been an obvious conclusion. The simplified scenario stated the swimmer was in a lethal situation and the complicated scenario that all were in a lethal situation.

10. Could you run this by me again? It’s a thought-experiment! The situation and the moral actors’ foreseeable ends are specified. Morality deals with the object of the act, the subject’s foreseeable ends, the subject’s intentions and the circumstances. There is no certainty or lack of certainty required in the subject’s foreseeable ends. Sounds like a red herring just jumped into the boat.

1. The third quote proves my point, and I also had in mind post #598 (though I had first read it on my phone… my fault, I did not see the distinction clearly enough). The Catechism isn’t wrong. We may say one of two things: first, it is using less articulate language, which is to be expected from such a document. (Ask BXVI whether he thinks everything was put clearly in the CCC… Look in Salt of the Earth.) We have moved past the basics. Second, however, and I prefer this option, it is using such precision that it takes a good deal of attention to pick up on. Remember my earlier claim that “acts” are distinct from “objects”? That is a big deal. I wonder if you can explain the difference?
2. You didn’t read the Summa articles.
3. You are assuming that certain things are clear which are not any longer. Back to, “I’m just moving the sword, I’m just moving my arms, I’m just sending electrical impulses to my muscles.” No, the object is determined by quite a bit of factors. It is not as simple as you would like to think.
4. No, actually, circumstances can make such an action much worse.
5. And if the circumstances AREN’T good, like you’re in a church when you’re playing tennis (which you’ve never responded to, by the way), then the object of your action becomes sacrilege. This is what you are actually doing - profaning a sacred place. Just like the object of the average use of contraception isn’t “taking a hormonal pill,” it is “sterilizing the marital act.” You don’t realize how the exact same method you are advocating here was used by guys like Curran back when Humanae Vitae came out. “You have a neutral object, taking a pill, a good intention, preventing children from being introduced into a bad situation, and circumstances which create that bad situation.” See if you can deconstruct that position with the method you are using. I think you’ll become very frustrated.
6. On one level, you’re right… the object, in an equivocal way, could be said to remain good or neutral. But once you start demanding the precision required in these dilemmas (or even most of sexual ethics), you need to set that aside.
7. I think you’re frustrated that I keep saying that you’re confused about these things, so now you’re just putting it back on me. This exact topic was once an obsession for me, when I was surrounded by phenomenal professors and had all the time in the world to think about it. I was once exactly where you are now, but there was a certain dilemma (which has not come up yet, and I don’t intend to bring it up) which threw me for a loop. Your understanding of these things works up until you start talking about trolleys and lifeboats. At that point, you must demand higher precision when speaking about intention and object.
8. Ok.
9. There is very little in this discussion which is obvious.
10. This is important. It would not be immoral to change someone from one lethal situation to another, but I made a claim that this is not what is occurring in the 4 lives scenario. Can you offer a counter-argument to the defense I gave of this position? You simply contradicted me.

I would like to know what you think about the tennis scenario.

Remember now that there are two competing terminologies for “act” and “object.” Have you picked up on that? There is the material act, and the moral act. The object is in between. I’ve given a specific formula for defining/demarcating it. You just seem to wing it.

 

[e_c]

CCC 2268 The fifth commandment forbids direct and intentional killing as gravely sinful. The murderer and those who cooperate voluntarily in murder commit a sin that cries out to heaven for vengeance.

Seems clear enough.

Read the paragraphs about capital punishment, just war, etc. Then we can discuss whether or not it is clear.

 

[Bradski]

If you touch someone without their permission or where it is not purely to help someone who is incapable of giving consent, it is considered assault.

If I’m in a pub and I ‘touch someone without their permission’, is it justified because he supports a different team? And is it justified if he just molested my wife?

Isn’t it blazingly obvious that what could be considered correct or not depends on the circumstances.

 

[e_c]

If I’m in a pub and I ‘touch someone without their permission’, is it justified because he supports a different team? And is it justified if he just molested my wife?

Isn’t it blazingly obvious that what could be considered correct or not depends on the circumstances.

We’re having a ball talking about what exactly circumstance means for morality in one of the several threads in this megathread.

The issue is that it’s more than the circumstances. There are some acts which, regardless of the circumstances, are wrong. No doubt you will disagree. But then we are back to empathy as a measure, which varies from person to person in intensity and direction. And whose empathy is the most empathetic?

 

[Aloysium]

If I’m in a pub and I ‘touch someone without their permission’, is it justified because he supports a different team? And is it justified if he just molested my wife? Isn’t it blazingly obvious that what could be considered correct or not depends on the circumstances.

Tell it to the cops. They might agree that boys will be boys if no one complains in the first instance. You might have to prove things in court if there are different versions of the story. It seems to me that the circumstances usually define the event; at the very least they are hard to separate. Throw a bunch of clothes overboard - no problem. Someone is still wearing the clothes - problem.

 

[Bradski]

We’re having a ball talking about what exactly circumstance means for morality in one of the several threads in this megathread.

The issue is that it’s more than the circumstances. There are some acts which, regardless of the circumstances, are wrong. No doubt you will disagree. But then we are back to empathy as a measure, which varies from person to person in intensity and direction. And whose empathy is the most empathetic?

There are zero acts which are wrong in themselves. None whatsoever.

Killing someone? Under what circumstances? Was it a cop killing a terrorist or a psyco killing for pleasure?

Having sex? Under what circumstances? Was it a happily married couple trying to start a family or a pack rape in a jail cell?

Causing harm? Under what circumstances? Was it injecting your kid against measles or torturing a cat for the hell of it?

Our very system of justice is based on this simple fact. That you have to know the circumstances under which an act was comitted before you can determine to what degree it was acceptable or not. And that determination is a personal one. Nobody can, or should be allowed, to make it for you.