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Guest
1.Where does the language you are using come from? The “end of a moral act” sounds a lot like “intention.” That’s very sloppy, and really just plain false. The object is, simply put, what one is doing to achieve the intention… or, if you prefer, the MEANS (which stands in contradistinction to the END).**1. **The object, or more correctly, the moral object is the end of the moral act. The intention is the end-in-view of the moral actor. The moral object does not merely specify the physicality of the act but must, if properly specified, include the reasonable end-in-view of the act. The moral object of the act is independent of the who, where or when circumstances unless the who, when or where are essential to define the moral end of the act alone.
**2. **If proper specification of the moral object requires incorporation of elements that are circumstantial then those, and only those, circumstances become essential to the proper specification of the moral object.
Using your prior example, “playing tennis in church”:
**3. **Moral object: playing tennis to improve muscle tone, strength and flexibility. Morally good.
**4. **Intention: To reinforce one’s social connection with others through athletic competition and cooperation. Morally good.
Circumstances: Who - wife and adult children - morally good.
When - 10:00 am - 12:00 pm Saturday- morally neutral
Where: Church - morally evil
**5. **The action is immoral by circumstance since a morally good action requires goodness in all three fonts. However, the moral object remains morally good.
The purpose of analysis is the opposite of synthesis. Analysis seeks to dissect, break down, divide a complex whole into its parts or elements so as to discover its true nature or inner relationships. The Church teaching on determining the morality of an action is to analyze the action by examination of the action’s constitutive elements - object, intent and circumstance. Prematurely synthesizing circumstance into object defeats the analytical process.
- YES.
- This is a bad demarcation in two ways. First, you assume the proper circumstances of tennis into the object, which is to beg the question. (Why isn’t it “moving my arms,” etc.?) Second, you add an intention to the object. Objects stand in relation to intentions but do not include them. (Remember, the intention is a good willed for its own sake. It is distinct from mere desire… We are talking about delectation, not use.) So I suppose my question is, why is what you are holding in your hand not a circumstance of your action but that you are in a church is a circumstance? Whence the distinction?
- Ok.
- You are free to declare this, but it is simply not true. And again, we may equivocally say that “the circumstance makes the action bad, and the object stays the same,” but not without qualification. (See the asterisks in my commentary.) In the kind of scenarios we are dealing with, we must speak plainly and articulately.
The false distinction you are making between act and object is how you shove in the morality of throwing a person into shark-infested waters. Again, I invite you to use the same lack of rigor in setting up the question of contraception and see what you can make of it.
And anyway, I don’t know how you would consider “shark-infested waters” to be a good or neutral circumstance. This is plainer than contraception, which can invoke the principle of stewardship and man’s dominion over nature, etc.