Problems with free will, possibility, and causality

[blase6]

Hello all,
I am having problems accepting free will. I have three main problems. The first is the apparent meaninglessness of possibility. The second is how cause and effect negate free will. The third is how the will chooses an object.

1. Possibility is a concept wherein nonexistent events are considered to contradict a truth about the existent situation, if they occurred. (In situation A object X can produce event Y or Z without contradiction. So Y and Z are possibilities). The problem is that possibility is meaningless because the things it describes do not exist unless they are actualized. Thus only actualities exist.
2. The world can be seen to operate in either a deterministic or indeterministic way.

From a Catholic view, a deterministic world would be one where God, being the creator of all else that exists, is the first cause of all that exists and happens, and is the one ultimately responsible for all events. Thus a creature could not be held ultimately responsible for its actions, because God was the ultimate cause.

An indeterministic worldview would be one where God does not determine the actions of created free persons, but allows those actions to happen independently and randomly from his will. Thus created persons would randomly either choose good or evil. This presents a terrifying image of God: a being who would allow persons to suffer eternally, simply out of a desire for some other persons to choose him without necessity.
In addition, it could be argued that random events are not free.

1. It can be seen that the will considers motives and chooses the motive which appears the most good. The motive can be good or evil, reasonable or unreasonable, but it must appear good to the will to be considerable. A person’s virtue/vice, fear, insanity, etc. will affect how the will perceives different motives, but the will always chooses that which appears most good. This invariable behaviour of the will prevents the possibility of free will.

 

[The_DNA_Rose]

Hello all,
I am having problems accepting free will. I have three main problems. The first is the apparent meaninglessness of possibility. The second is how cause and effect negate free will. The third is how the will chooses an object.

1. Possibility is a concept wherein nonexistent events are considered to contradict a truth about the existent situation, if they occurred. (In situation A object X can produce event Y or Z without contradiction. So Y and Z are possibilities). The problem is that possibility is meaningless because the things it describes do not exist unless they are actualized. Thus only actualities exist.
2. The world can be seen to operate in either a deterministic or indeterministic way.

From a Catholic view, a deterministic world would be one where God, being the creator of all else that exists, is the first cause of all that exists and happens, and is the one ultimately responsible for all events. Thus a creature could not be held ultimately responsible for its actions, because God was the ultimate cause.

An indeterministic worldview would be one where God does not determine the actions of created free persons, but allows those actions to happen independently and randomly from his will. Thus created persons would randomly either choose good or evil. This presents a terrifying image of God: a being who would allow persons to suffer eternally, simply out of a desire for some other persons to choose him without necessity.
In addition, it could be argued that random events are not free.

1. It can be seen that the will considers motives and chooses the motive which appears the most good. The motive can be good or evil, reasonable or unreasonable, but it must appear good to the will to be considerable. A person’s virtue/vice, fear, insanity, etc. will affect how the will perceives different motives, but the will always chooses that which appears most good. This invariable behaviour of the will prevents the possibility of free will.

All of these things are controlled by your DNA, including the question.

cbsnews.com/news/twin-brothers-separated-at-birth-reveal-striking-genetic-similarities/

 

[blase6]

All of these things are controlled by your DNA, including the question.

cbsnews.com/news/twin-brothers-separated-at-birth-reveal-striking-genetic-similarities/

Why is your religion listed as “Roman Catholic”?

 

[lmelahn]

Hello all,
I am having problems accepting free will. I have three main problems. The first is the apparent meaninglessness of possibility. The second is how cause and effect negate free will. The third is how the will chooses an object.

There are a few things that can be said.

1. Possibility is a concept wherein nonexistent events are considered to contradict a truth about the existent situation, if they occurred. (In situation A object X can produce event Y or Z without contradiction. So Y and Z are possibilities). The problem is that possibility is meaningless because the things it describes do not exist unless they are actualized. Thus only actualities exist.

I think there are two related concepts here that ought to be properly distinguished. One is logical possibility, which has to do with the absence of contradiction. For example, it is is not logically contradictory for me to be in Paris right now (but in fact I am not there). On the other hand, it is logically contradictory to say that the computer I am using is both on and off at the same time. (Those, in logical terms, are what are called “contraries.”)

Related to that is the notion of capability or capacity, which is in fact more useful for this discussion. Although it is not logically impossible for me to go to Paris, it is realistically impossible right now, because I can’t afford it. (I realize that I could probably find a way to raise the money and so on, but that isn’t my point: going to Paris is a real possibility—if I may use that expression—for me to the degree that I have the means—the capacity or ability—to do so.) Going to the moon, although still logically possible is even less realistic an option for me.

This—real capability or capacity—is the concept that Aristotle calls dynamis (potency in English).

Hence, although it is strictly true that actualities are the only things that exist, potencies (these capacities or capabilities) exist virtually: my car may be idling at the moment, so it is not actually going 100 miles a hour. But it does have that capacity (potency). It is (to use the technical expression) speeding in potency but idle in act.

1. The world can be seen to operate in either a deterministic or indeterministic way.

From a Catholic view, a deterministic world would be one where God, being the creator of all else that exists, is the first cause of all that exists and happens, and is the one ultimately responsible for all events. Thus a creature could not be held ultimately responsible for its actions, because God was the ultimate cause.

God is certainly responsible for all events, but it does not follow from this that all events are deterministic.

God has endowed his most favored creatures (men and angles) with certain capacities that are not deterministic: namely their intellect and will. (The intellect is what allows men and angles to know; the will is what allows them to love.)

God has endowed us with faculties (i.e., capabilities) so powerful (in comparison to sub-human creatures) that their exercise is discretional. A man has the ability to love God and neighbor, but he is free to exercise, or actuate, that ability or not.

An indeterministic worldview would be one where God does not determine the actions of created free persons, but allows those actions to happen independently and randomly from his will. Thus created persons would randomly either choose good or evil. This presents a terrifying image of God: a being who would allow persons to suffer eternally, simply out of a desire for some other persons to choose him without necessity.
In addition, it could be argued that random events are not free.

Nothing can happen quite independently from God. God offers us whatever is necessary to be happy and fulfilled. We are free to take it or not (and fortunately, God gives us a lot of opportunities and helps along the way). God even offers us choices between goods: a choice between good and better. (For example, when a young man contemplates a priestly vocation, he is not obliged to follow it, but if he is called, he will be more fulfilled if he answers the call.)

1. It can be seen that the will considers motives and chooses the motive which appears the most good. The motive can be good or evil, reasonable or unreasonable, but it must appear good to the will to be considerable. A person’s virtue/vice, fear, insanity, etc. will affect how the will perceives different motives, but the will always chooses that which appears most good. This invariable behaviour of the will prevents the possibility of free will.

Note that the fundamental freedom of the will does not consist in choosing between good and evil, or even in choosing among goods. That is actually the function of the intellect. (It is the intellect that tells me, “I need to help this neighbor in need” or “I must not steal this money.”)

The freedom of the will consists in being able to choose the good that the intellect has discerned, or to refuse it.

So no, we are not determined to choose whatever appears the best. If we had the Beatific Vision, the direct vision of God, we would be unable to refuse it; however, we always have the option to say “no thanks” to a partial, creaturely good.

 

[blase6]

There are a few things that can be said.

I think there are two related concepts here that ought to be properly distinguished. One is logical possibility, which has to do with the absence of contradiction. For example, it is is not logically contradictory for me to be in Paris right now (but in fact I am not there). On the other hand, it is logically contradictory to say that the computer I am using is both on and off at the same time. (Those, in logical terms, are what are called “contraries.”)

Related to that is the notion of capability or capacity, which is in fact more useful for this discussion. Although it is not logically impossible for me to go to Paris, it is realistically impossible right now, because I can’t afford it. (I realize that I could probably find a way to raise the money and so on, but that isn’t my point: going to Paris is a real possibility—if I may use that expression—for me to the degree that I have the means—the capacity or ability—to do so.) Going to the moon, although still logically possible is even less realistic an option for me.

This—real capability or capacity—is the concept that Aristotle calls dynamis (potency in English).

Hence, although it is strictly true that actualities are the only things that exist, potencies (these capacities or capabilities) exist virtually: my car may be idling at the moment, so it is not actually going 100 miles a hour. But it does have that capacity (potency). It is (to use the technical expression) speeding in potency but idle in act.

God is certainly responsible for all events, but it does not follow from this that all events are deterministic.

God has endowed his most favored creatures (men and angles) with certain capacities that are not deterministic: namely their intellect and will. (The intellect is what allows men and angles to know; the will is what allows them to love.)

God has endowed us with faculties (i.e., capabilities) so powerful (in comparison to sub-human creatures) that their exercise is discretional. A man has the ability to love God and neighbor, but he is free to exercise, or actuate, that ability or not.

Nothing can happen quite independently from God. God offers us whatever is necessary to be happy and fulfilled. We are free to take it or not (and fortunately, God gives us a lot of opportunities and helps along the way). God even offers us choices between goods: a choice between good and better. (For example, when a young man contemplates a priestly vocation, he is not obliged to follow it, but if he is called, he will be more fulfilled if he answers the call.)

Note that the fundamental freedom of the will does not consist in choosing between good and evil, or even in choosing among goods. That is actually the function of the intellect. (It is the intellect that tells me, “I need to help this neighbor in need” or “I must not steal this money.”)

The freedom of the will consists in being able to choose the good that the intellect has discerned, or to refuse it.

So no, we are not determined to choose whatever appears the best. If we had the Beatific Vision, the direct vision of God, we would be unable to refuse it; however, we always have the option to say “no thanks” to a partial, creaturely good.

So, you believe in an indeterministic will? One that will randomly accept or reject God? How is that more free than a predetermined will?

 

[Bahman]

Hello all,
I am having problems accepting free will. I have three main problems. The first is the apparent meaninglessness of possibility. The second is how cause and effect negate free will. The third is how the will chooses an object.

Ok. Lets see what are the problems and how they could be resolved.

1. Possibility is a concept wherein nonexistent events are considered to contradict a truth about the existent situation, if they occurred. (In situation A object X can produce event Y or Z without contradiction. So Y and Z are possibilities). The problem is that possibility is meaningless because the things it describes do not exist unless they are actualized. Thus only actualities exist.

Possibilities by definition are potentials appearing in consciousness hence they are true. It is up to us to make them come through otherwise you are fighting against the divine powers.

1. The world can be seen to operate in either a deterministic or indeterministic way.

From a Catholic view, a deterministic world would be one where God, being the creator of all else that exists, is the first cause of all that exists and happens, and is the one ultimately responsible for all events. Thus a creature could not be held ultimately responsible for its actions, because God was the ultimate cause.

An indeterministic worldview would be one where God does not determine the actions of created free persons, but allows those actions to happen independently and randomly from his will. Thus created persons would randomly either choose good or evil. This presents a terrifying image of God: a being who would allow persons to suffer eternally, simply out of a desire for some other persons to choose him without necessity.
In addition, it could be argued that random events are not free.

The key point is to understand consciousness. Consciousness is the ability to experience and affect other mental states. Nothing can be performed unless it passes under consciousness. Determinism is false in the sense that event X always causes event Y. Event X has to always pass to consciousness providing the infinite possibilities if conscious being is divine. For a normal mind, which is defined by level of awareness, possibilities are limited. You can move your body, can’t you?

1. It can be seen that the will considers motives and chooses the motive which appears the most good. The motive can be good or evil, reasonable or unreasonable, but it must appear good to the will to be considerable. A person’s virtue/vice, fear, insanity, etc. will affect how the will perceives different motives, but the will always chooses that which appears most good. This invariable behaviour of the will prevents the possibility of free will.

Motives always exist. These are beings appear to consciousness as awareness. Awareness dose not exist without consciousness hence motives. It is very you that make the decision in the last instant and no-one can forfeit you if you are self aware. Self-aware is the ability to know what part of your thoughts, impressions, feeling do really belong to you and what are given to you!

 

[tdgesq]

So, you believe in an indeterministic will? One that will randomly accept or reject God? How is that more free than a predetermined will?

You are proposing a false dilemma: (1) that the will must be predetermined or (2) that the will must be indeterminately random. But there is no reason to believe that these are the only two possibilities. In fact, there are good reasons to believe that “indeterminacy” does not always equal “randomness.”

You can do a simple social science experiment by viewing people’s activity and documenting it. While it may seem like multiple repeated activities occur randomly or without purpose, all you have to do is ask the person why they did what they did. If they had a reason, then the action is directed by the actor and is not random. So while much of human activity is indeterminate, it isn’t necessarily random.

 

[tonyrey]

You are proposing a false dilemma: (1) that the will must be predetermined or (2) that the will must be indeterminately random. But there is no reason to believe that these are the only two possibilities. In fact, there are good reasons to believe that “indeterminacy” does not always equal “randomness.”

You can do a simple social science experiment by viewing people’s activity and documenting it. While it may seem like multiple repeated activities occur randomly or without purpose, all you have to do is ask the person why they did what they did. If they had a reason, then the action is directed by the actor and is not random. So while much of human activity is indeterminate, it isn’t necessarily random.

There is self-determined activity without which not one of us would be responsible for our decisions and conclusions. In other words no one would be rational and the OP would not make sense…

 

[blase6]

You are proposing a false dilemma: (1) that the will must be predetermined or (2) that the will must be indeterminately random. But there is no reason to believe that these are the only two possibilities. In fact, there are good reasons to believe that “indeterminacy” does not always equal “randomness.”

You can do a simple social science experiment by viewing people’s activity and documenting it. While it may seem like multiple repeated activities occur randomly or without purpose, all you have to do is ask the person why they did what they did. If they had a reason, then the action is directed by the actor and is not random. So while much of human activity is indeterminate, it isn’t necessarily random.

Yes, but the fact that there is a reason is a determinant factor in the decision of the will.

 

[tonyrey]

Yes, but the fact that there is a reason is a determinant factor in the decision of the will.

But **what **causes a person to accept a reason as a determinant factor?

 

[tonyrey]

… Motives always exist. These are beings appear to consciousness as awareness. Awareness dose not exist without consciousness hence motives. It is very you that make the decision in the last instant and no-one can forfeit you if you are self aware. Self-aware is the ability to know what part of your thoughts, impressions, feeling do really belong to you and what are given to you!

Awareness is certainly a necessary condition for decision-making but it does not explain the power to choose to make decisions. We could be helpless observers!

 

[blase6]

But **what **causes a person to accept a reason as a determinant factor?

The will considers reasons and chooses which one appears best.

 

[Bahman]

Yes, but the fact that there is a reason is a determinant factor in the decision of the will.

First, how do we construct reason?

Second, how could you be determined when you have doubt/are undermined (when you are trying to make a decision)?

Third, where does reason come from when you are undermined?

Forth, how could you have doubt if you are determined?

Fifth, what is doubt?

Sixth, what is your definition of free will? I can define it as the ability that appears when neither doubt nor reason can win a battle.

 

[tdgesq]

Yes, but the fact that there is a reason is a determinant factor in the decision of the will.

Right, but then question becomes whether that determinant factor (the reason) is consistent with free will. If “the reason” is purely a function of naturalistic processes such as genetics and prior social conditioning, then “the reason” is predetermined and antithetical to free will. The same is true under certain Calvinistic theories where God acts as the proximate cause of the function of the human soul, foreordaining “the reason” which conflicts with free will.

Then again, if there is agent causation where the locus of causal control remains sufficiently with the actor, the reason and action thereon are not predetermined. So basically tonyrey is asking the right question: what caused the reason and the decision to act on it?

 

[blase6]

Right, but then question becomes whether that determinant factor (the reason) is consistent with free will. If “the reason” is purely a function of naturalistic processes such as genetics and prior social conditioning, then “the reason” is predetermined and antithetical to free will. The same is true under certain Calvinistic theories where God acts as the proximate cause of the function of the human soul, foreordaining “the reason” which conflicts with free will.

Then again, if there is agent causation where the locus of causal control remains sufficiently with the actor, the reason and action thereon are not predetermined. So basically tonyrey is asking the right question: what caused the reason and the decision to act on it?

A reason is caused by external factors. The decision is caused by whatever motive that arises appears most good to the will.

 

[tdgesq]

A reason is caused by external factors.

Reasoning occurs in the mind and requires the application of logical principles to come to conclusions. While I don’t think anyone would deny that reason does rely on some external factors, there are good reasons to reject that external factors alone are a sufficient condition for reason.

Human beings certainly have a brain in which chemical process and synaptic activity occur, yet those aren’t what we experience when we reason. And despite whatever external factors that may be involved, we don’t find ourselves mentally forced to reason about one particular thing or another. Finally, the mind’s ability to abstract universal principles that always and everywhere apply aren’t reducible to chemical states in the brain.

The decision is caused by whatever motive that arises appears most good to the will.

This almost looks like Aquinas’ observation that the will always seeks the good. I don’t deny that, but it’s difficult to see how it forms a sufficient condition for movement of the will. By necessity, all of our “willing” must occur on this Earth. Well, unless we are astronauts. Yet nobody would claim that this necessity somehow deprives us of free will. All action of the will must tend toward the good, just as all action of the will must occur on Earth. Of course, what particular good that is and where on Earth it occurs are still up to us to choose.

 

[lmelahn]

So, you believe in an indeterministic will? One that will randomly accept or reject God? How is that more free than a predetermined will?

I don’t think that “random” and “predetermined” are the only alternatives. In fact, a “random” will would not by any freer than a predetermined one. (Because, at least as I understand the term, if the will chooses God “randomly,” then it is influenced by no other factor, not even the subject who wills.)

Rather, our wills are partly determined (i.e., the will always tends towards goodness, or at least the appearance of goodness), but not entirely so.

Rather than “predetermined” or “random,” I would say that the exercise of the will is discretional. It is up to the one who wills, but neither completely determined, nor random.

 

[blase6]

I don’t think that “random” and “predetermined” are the only alternatives. In fact, a “random” will would not by any freer than a predetermined one. (Because, at least as I understand the term, if the will chooses God “randomly,” then it is influenced by no other factor, not even the subject who wills.)

Rather, our wills are partly determined (i.e., the will always tends towards goodness, or at least the appearance of goodness), but not entirely so.

Rather than “predetermined” or “random,” I would say that the exercise of the will is discretional. It is up to the one who wills, but neither completely determined, nor random.

But there is still the problem with your explanation of free will, that it is partially predetermined (not free) and partially random (also not free). So it still does not work.

 

[blase6]

Reasoning occurs in the mind and requires the application of logical principles to come to conclusions. While I don’t think anyone would deny that reason does rely on some external factors, there are good reasons to reject that external factors alone are a sufficient condition for reason.

Human beings certainly have a brain in which chemical process and synaptic activity occur, yet those aren’t what we experience when we reason. And despite whatever external factors that may be involved, we don’t find ourselves mentally forced to reason about one particular thing or another. Finally, the mind’s ability to abstract universal principles that always and everywhere apply aren’t reducible to chemical states in the brain.

This almost looks like Aquinas’ observation that the will always seeks the good. I don’t deny that, but it’s difficult to see how it forms a sufficient condition for movement of the will. By necessity, all of our “willing” must occur on this Earth. Well, unless we are astronauts. Yet nobody would claim that this necessity somehow deprives us of free will. All action of the will must tend toward the good, just as all action of the will must occur on Earth. Of course, what particular good that is and where on Earth it occurs are still up to us to choose.

Since we are not our own cause, but caused by God, all of our motives ultimately derive from external factors. Yes, we see that some motives arise entirely from within the mind, but the mind must first be set in motion from external factors. Thus all motives can be called “external”.

 

[tdgesq]

Since we are not our own cause, but caused by God, all of our motives ultimately derive from external factors.

Ah… I see. I believed that you were only referring to naturalistic causes. Now I understand that you are referring to any external cause whatsoever. It’s fine if you want to call God’s creation of the human soul, which is the basis of the intellect and the will, an external factor. However, the soul is immaterial and is not subject to the same determinate causes that we find in nature.

Yes, we see that some motives arise entirely from within the mind, but the mind must first be set in motion from external factors. Thus all motives can be called “external”.

True, now that I understand your use of the terminology. The external factor to which you refer is God’s creation of the immaterial human soul, which is responsible for our intellect and will. I have no problem agreeing that the ultimate cause of all motives can be called external in this regard. Yet I tend to think you view the creation of the immaterial human soul in the same way you view the creation of a rock or a cucumber; which would be a mistake.

The only question is: Can God create an immaterial human soul that allows for free will? I see no reason why not, unless we assume that all actions of the human soul must be caused the same way the actions of – say - a coffee maker are determined.