Problems with free will, possibility, and causality

[lmelahn]

But there is still the problem with your explanation of free will, that it is partially predetermined (not free) and partially random (also not free). So it still does not work.

Not exactly partly predetermined and partly random. As a matter of fact, there is no randomness in the will at all: the will is precisely the faculty that governs what is deliberate and intentional.

So the will is party determined, yes: it always tends to something good (or at least something that the subject thinks is good, or perceives as good). It can’t tend to evil for its own sake (because evil is just a warped good, if you think about it; a “damaged” good, so to speak).

But, when something good is presented to my will, I can receive it, or else refuse it. And that receiving or refusing is entirely up to me. There is no randomness there.

(Where there can be randomness is in factors that are external to the will, such as passions, emotions, external circumstances, and so on. But not in the will itself.)

 

[tonyrey]

The will considers reasons and chooses which one appears best.

The will is defined as “The mental faculty by which one deliberately chooses or decides upon a course of action”. The term “one” in this context obviously means a person.

The question is whether the choice or decision has a physical cause or not. Can it be traced back to all the formative influences on us since we were born? Or can we transcend our genes and environment? In other words, are we capable of genuinely independent activity? And if so **how **do we do it?

 

[belorg]

Ah… I see. I believed that you were only referring to naturalistic causes. Now I understand that you are referring to any external cause whatsoever. It’s fine if you want to call God’s creation of the human soul, which is the basis of the intellect and the will, an external factor. However, the soul is immaterial and is not subject to the same determinate causes that we find in nature.

True, now that I understand your use of the terminology. The external factor to which you refer is God’s creation of the immaterial human soul, which is responsible for our intellect and will. I have no problem agreeing that the ultimate cause of all motives can be called external in this regard. Yet I tend to think you view the creation of the immaterial human soul in the same way you view the creation of a rock or a cucumber; which would be a mistake.

The only question is: Can God create an immaterial human soul that allows for free will? I see no reason why not, unless we assume that all actions of the human soul must be caused the same way the actions of – say - a coffee maker are determined.

Does your will differ from mine, tdgesq?

 

[blase6]

Not exactly partly predetermined and partly random. As a matter of fact, there is no randomness in the will at all: the will is precisely the faculty that governs what is deliberate and intentional.

So the will is party determined, yes: it always tends to something good (or at least something that the subject thinks is good, or perceives as good). It can’t tend to evil for its own sake (because evil is just a warped good, if you think about it; a “damaged” good, so to speak).

But, when something good is presented to my will, I can receive it, or else refuse it. And that receiving or refusing is entirely up to me. There is no randomness there.

(Where there can be randomness is in factors that are external to the will, such as passions, emotions, external circumstances, and so on. But not in the will itself.)

The will makes “deliberate” choices simply because “deliberate” means “chosen of the will”. So your statement that the will makes deliberate choices is circular. The will is a determinant factor in a person’s choice if we decide that it is dependent upon indeterminant possibility. This would mean that the will is governed by randomness, and not free.

 

[blase6]

Ah… I see. I believed that you were only referring to naturalistic causes. Now I understand that you are referring to any external cause whatsoever. It’s fine if you want to call God’s creation of the human soul, which is the basis of the intellect and the will, an external factor. However, the soul is immaterial and is not subject to the same determinate causes that we find in nature.

True, now that I understand your use of the terminology. The external factor to which you refer is God’s creation of the immaterial human soul, which is responsible for our intellect and will. I have no problem agreeing that the ultimate cause of all motives can be called external in this regard. Yet I tend to think you view the creation of the immaterial human soul in the same way you view the creation of a rock or a cucumber; which would be a mistake.

The only question is: Can God create an immaterial human soul that allows for free will? I see no reason why not, unless we assume that all actions of the human soul must be caused the same way the actions of – say - a coffee maker are determined.

Cause and effect can be easily observed in both the physical world and the spiritual world. To claim that cause and effect works differently in the spiritual world is a cop-out and unreasonable.

 

[jerryo47]

Free will sounds more like it’s actually a ’ sense of free will ',
It’s hard to imagine there is anything that’s free from cause and effect.

 

[rinnie]

Hello all,
I am having problems accepting free will. I have three main problems. The first is the apparent meaninglessness of possibility. The second is how cause and effect negate free will. The third is how the will chooses an object.

1. Possibility is a concept wherein nonexistent events are considered to contradict a truth about the existent situation, if they occurred. (In situation A object X can produce event Y or Z without contradiction. So Y and Z are possibilities). The problem is that possibility is meaningless because the things it describes do not exist unless they are actualized. Thus only actualities exist.
2. The world can be seen to operate in either a deterministic or indeterministic way.

From a Catholic view, a deterministic world would be one where God, being the creator of all else that exists, is the first cause of all that exists and happens, and is the one ultimately responsible for all events. Thus a creature could not be held ultimately responsible for its actions, because God was the ultimate cause.

An indeterministic worldview would be one where God does not determine the actions of created free persons, but allows those actions to happen independently and randomly from his will. Thus created persons would randomly either choose good or evil. This presents a terrifying image of God: a being who would allow persons to suffer eternally, simply out of a desire for some other persons to choose him without necessity.
In addition, it could be argued that random events are not free.

1. It can be seen that the will considers motives and chooses the motive which appears the most good. The motive can be good or evil, reasonable or unreasonable, but it must appear good to the will to be considerable. A person’s virtue/vice, fear, insanity, etc. will affect how the will perceives different motives, but the will always chooses that which appears most good. This invariable behaviour of the will prevents the possibility of free will.

Why do you have a problem with God letting us choose to accept him or reject him.

And how in the world do you expect God to give a human being free will and then take it from him and not let them use it. Really?

 

[rinnie]

Bottom line. I think a relative of mine summed this up at his death.

He said I sure pray that I was right and there is a God, because my decisions would have sure been different in this world if I knew I did not have a God to answer to.

So yes God gives us free will to choose the best to our knowledge to do what we believe in our hearts is right all the time. Do we choose ourselves over God at times, yes we do, and always regret it.

Your conscience in you is your God, you either obey it or disobey it. The choice is yours.

You can obey it and choose to obey God and not steal, kill, ten commandments. Or disobey them and not choose God. Its simple.

In the end you are accountable.

 

[blase6]

Bottom line. I think a relative of mine summed this up at his death.

He said I sure pray that I was right and there is a God, because my decisions would have sure been different in this world if I knew I did not have a God to answer to.

So yes God gives us free will to choose the best to our knowledge to do what we believe in our hearts is right all the time. Do we choose ourselves over God at times, yes we do, and always regret it.

Your conscience in you is your God, you either obey it or disobey it. The choice is yours.

You can obey it and choose to obey God and not steal, kill, ten commandments. Or disobey them and not choose God. Its simple.

In the end you are accountable.

It is simple. If the decisions of our will, and our actions resulting thereof, are dependent upon external factors, then we cannot be held ultimately responsible for our actions. The ability to “obey or disobey” is dependent upon motives to either obey or disobey. And the will moves towards which of those motives appears best. Thus this definition of free will as an independent choice simply cannot coexist with cause and effect.

 

[davidv]

It is simple. If the decisions of our will, and our actions resulting thereof, are dependent upon external factors, then we cannot be held ultimately responsible for our actions. The ability to “obey or disobey” is dependent upon motives to either obey or disobey. And the will moves towards which of those motives appears best. Thus this definition of free will as an independent choice simply cannot coexist with cause and effect.

Why not? The “cause” of a moral decision (“effect”) is the free will of the moral agent. All of the external factors and internal feelings are considered, but none of them can override the will. If this is not true, the basis for most human justice systems is a sham.

 

[blase6]

Why not? The “cause” of a moral decision (“effect”) is the free will of the moral agent. All of the external factors and internal feelings are considered, but none of them can override the will. If this is not true, the basis for most human justice systems is a sham.

The cause cannot simply come from the will without external influence. A decision of the will must originate in the consideration of motives. To reject an influence also requires a motive for that rejection. So if the will chooses which motive appears best, there is no independent choice.

 

[davidv]

The cause cannot simply come from the will without external influence. A decision of the will must originate in the consideration of motives.

Why? Please explain why this must be so. So far, no evidence has been offered to defend this claim.

To reject an influence also requires a motive for that rejection.

Where did I reject these influences. I plainly indicated that they are considered.

So if the will chooses which motive appears best, there is no independent choice.

So you keep claiming. Where is the evidence that it is true?

 

[blase6]

Why? Please explain why this must be so. So far, no evidence has been offered to defend this claim.

Where did I reject these influences. I plainly indicated that they are considered.

So you keep claiming. Where is the evidence that it is true?

An action cannot be performed without a motive. This is a very simple rule of cause and effect. Please explain how you could act without a motive.

I meant in “to reject an influence” as “to act against a motive”. It had nothing to do with what you said.

The will moves towards what appears most good. This is supported by Aquinas. The motive does not have to be the most good in actuality, it just has to appear most good. The will would choose an evil action simply because it appeared good. Something without any appearance of good would be entirely repulsive to the will and could not be considered for an action.

 

[davidv]

An action cannot be performed without a motive. This is a very simple rule of cause and effect. Please explain how you could act without a motive.

Where did I claim one cannot act without a motive? However, it appears that reflexive actions are without a conscience motive. What if the motive is freely chosen?

I meant in “to reject an influence” as “to act against a motive”. It had nothing to do with what you said.

Then I don’t understand the point.

The will moves towards what appears most good. This is supported by Aquinas. The motive does not have to be the most good in actuality, it just has to appear most good. The will would choose an evil action simply because it appeared good. Something without any appearance of good would be entirely repulsive to the will and could not be considered for an action.

What here indicates that lack of freedom of the will?

 

[tdgesq]

Cause and effect can be easily observed in both the physical world and the spiritual world.

Where in the spiritual world have you observed cause and effect? I’m just wondering. It seems very odd to me that you see no difference between the causal creation of angels and the causal creation of amoebas.

To claim that cause and effect works differently in the spiritual world is a cop-out and unreasonable.

That’s begging the question though. I mean, sure both an angel and an amoeba have an efficient cause(s) of their existence. But how does that mean that the causal process that we see in microbiology is the same causal process inherent in immaterial beings like angels?

I could go on about the differences between the two. But I think the question I stated in my last post really gets to the ultimate issue here: Can God create an immaterial human soul that allows for free will?

 

[blase6]

Where did I claim one cannot act without a motive? However, it appears that reflexive actions are without a conscience motive. What if the motive is freely chosen?

Then I don’t understand the point.

What here indicates that lack of freedom of the will?

Reflexive actions are without a conscious motive, but not without a motive. For example, you are not willing your heart to beat, so the beating has no conscious motive. It does have the unconscious motive of your brain activity. It would be wrong to say that it just beats without a cause.

My point was that when I pointed out that the will considers motives, people said that the will can reject those motives. I am saying that even a rejection of a motive must have its own motive.

The will cannot be free if it is dependent on determined motives, and chooses the motive that appears best to act on. This would mean that the choice was predetermined.

 

[blase6]

Where in the spiritual world have you observed cause and effect? I’m just wondering. It seems very odd to me that you see no difference between the causal creation of angels and the causal creation of amoebas.

There is the difference being that the amoeba is a physical object and the angel is a spiritual object. Also, the angel is aware of itself. We don’t know if or how an amoeba is aware, but we do not believe it is a rational person. But both are not their own ultimate cause; the ultimate cause is God for both creatures.

That’s begging the question though. I mean, sure both an angel and an amoeba have an efficient cause(s) of their existence. But how does that mean that the causal process that we see in microbiology is the same causal process inherent in immaterial beings like angels?

I see no reason why cause and effect would work differently in either world.

I could go on about the differences between the two. But I think the question I stated in my last post really gets to the ultimate issue here: Can God create an immaterial human soul that allows for free will?

As far as I believe, yes. As far as I can see, no.

 

[davidv]

Reflexive actions are without a conscious motive, but not without a motive. For example, you are not willing your heart to beat, so the beating has no conscious motive. It does have the unconscious motive of your brain activity. It would be wrong to say that it just beats without a cause.

My point was that when I pointed out that the will considers motives, people said that the will can reject those motives. I am saying that even a rejection of a motive must have its own motive.

The will cannot be free if it is dependent on determined motives, and chooses the motive that appears best to act on. This would mean that the choice was predetermined.

Sounds like circular reasoning to me.

Maybe you can help be defining “predetermined” and how this applies to the will.

By the way, I have a lot of experience that tells me that my will is free. So, your case needs to be very thorough and logically valid and sound. So far it has been neither thorough nor valid.

 

[blase6]

Sounds like circular reasoning to me.

Maybe you can help be defining “predetermined” and how this applies to the will.

By the way, I have a lot of experience that tells me that my will is free. So, your case needs to be very thorough and logically valid and sound. So far it has been neither thorough nor valid.

Predetermined: determined by factors outside the will

If an act cannot exist without a motive, and motives occur apart from the will, but directly influence the will, along with any affecting factors such as virtue, vice, fear, insanity, etc. which effect how the will perceives the goodness/desirability of each motive, and the will chooses the motive which appears best, then the will is ultimately determined by external factors. (Not free) If we consider the argument that the will is not determined by the best-appearing motive, but by a random decision, then neither is that will free. It is determined by chance.

So far, I am not convinced that free will is compatible with causality. Causality should be readily apparent in the physical and spiritual world, and if you can’t see that, it will be very hard to attempt to show you.

 

[davidv]

Predetermined: determined by factors outside the will

If an act cannot exist without a motive, and motives occur apart from the will, but directly influence the will, along with any affecting factors such as virtue, vice, fear, insanity, etc. which effect how the will perceives the goodness/desirability of each motive, and the will chooses the motive which appears best, then the will is ultimately determined by external factors. (Not free) If we consider the argument that the will is not determined by the best-appearing motive, but by a random decision, then neither is that will free. It is determined by chance.

So far, I am not convinced that free will is compatible with causality. Causality should be readily apparent in the physical and spiritual world, and if you can’t see that, it will be very hard to attempt to show you.

Requiring a motive does not mean it is the cause of the choice any more that oxygen is the cause of a fire even though oxygen is required for a fire.