Problems with free will, possibility, and causality

[blase6]

Requiring a motive does not mean it is the cause of the choice any more that oxygen is the cause of a fire even though oxygen is required for a fire.

Yes, a spark or other is the immediate cause of the fire, just as the person is the immediate cause of their actions. But oxygen is necessary for the fire to happen, just as a motive is necessary for a person to act. The oxygen can be called the ultimate cause of the fire, because it preceded the fire. But yours is an imperfect analogy. Since the will considers motives with a wholly invariable behavior of choosing the best-appearing motive, this means that the will is determined by the motives. If the will is indeterministic regarding motives, then the motives are not the determinant cause, but still necessary for the action. But a random choice of motives cannot be called “free”.

 

[davidv]

Yes, a spark or other is the immediate cause of the fire, just as the person is the immediate cause of their actions. But oxygen is necessary for the fire to happen, just as a motive is necessary for a person to act. The oxygen can be called the ultimate cause of the fire, because it preceded the fire. But yours is an imperfect analogy. Since the will considers motives with a wholly invariable behavior of choosing the best-appearing motive, this means that the will is determined by the motives. If the will is indeterministic regarding motives, then the motives are not the determinant cause, but still necessary for the action. But a random choice of motives cannot be called “free”.

This is not very convincing. It is certainly not a valid logical argument. Being necessary does not imply the ultimate cause.

It appears that your position is immune to any criticism.

 

[tdgesq]

There is the difference being that the amoeba is a physical object and the angel is a spiritual object. Also, the angel is aware of itself. We don’t know if or how an amoeba is aware, but we do not believe it is a rational person. But both are not their own ultimate cause; the ultimate cause is God for both creatures.

On this we both agree. The point of departure is whether a voluntary cause (God) can create another voluntary cause (the human will). God can certainly create natural causes (ultimately the amoeba), even when the ultimate cause is voluntary.

I see no reason why cause and effect would work differently in either world.

God is the first cause of all being; nevertheless, caused being can cause (proximately) other being. You seem to concede that this is possible, but not that it is possible God could create voluntary causes rather than natural causes.

As far as I believe, yes. As far as I can see, no.

That is an honest answer. The only way I was able to get past this same dilemma was looking at something very practical. I sat down and analyzed my own decisions for a while. No matter how hard I tried I couldn’t convince myself that many of these choices I was making were anything other than voluntary. I compared them to a lot of other involuntary actions, like physical stimulus. Well, it’s not the same. The philosophy behind libertarian free will started to make a lot more sense to me then. I just ask you to try it.

 

[blase6]

This is not very convincing. It is certainly not a valid logical argument. Being necessary does not imply the ultimate cause.

It appears that your position is immune to any criticism.

I will distinguish between an ultimate and immediate cause.
Ultimate cause: Cause which precedes all other causes in a chain of cause and effect
Immediate cause: A non-ultimate cause which directly precedes an action to some extent

If the chain of events is entirely deterministic, then the ultimate cause is the same as the determinant cause. If the chain of events is indeterministic, then the will cannot be free, because it is only a random choice.

So if we consider the chain of events by which the will comes to a decision:

1. Motives arise for the will to consider. Predetermined, or random.
2. In an instant of decision, the will chooses the motive that appears to be the best motive to act on (non-random behavior, so by extent is predetermined by the motives which arise)
3. Alternatively to #2, the will chooses a motive to act upon randomly. (Not free, determined by chance)
   The person is never the ultimate cause of their own actions, and thus cannot be held responsible beyond being the immediate cause.

 

[lmelahn]

The will makes “deliberate” choices simply because “deliberate” means “chosen of the will”. So your statement that the will makes deliberate choices is circular. The will is a determinant factor in a person’s choice if we decide that it is dependent upon indeterminant possibility. This would mean that the will is governed by randomness, and not free.

As far as my own reasoning is concerned, I don’t think it is circular, because I am beginning with what I consider the more easily verified fact (that the movement of the will is discretionary) and from there I seek the foundation of that property of the will (namely, the limitedness of the goods presented).

I am trying to understand you here, and there is an element of your reasoning that I am not following: how is it possible for something done on purpose to be “random”?

 

[blase6]

As far as my own reasoning is concerned, I don’t think it is circular, because I am beginning with what I consider the more easily verified fact (that the movement of the will is discretionary) and from there I seek the foundation of that property of the will (namely, the limitedness of the goods presented).

I am trying to understand you here, and there is an element of your reasoning that I am not following: how is it possible for something done on purpose to be “random”?

Because something being done “on purpose” only means that it is done with the consent of the will. If the will is either predetermined by which motive will appear best, or just chooses randomly, then it cannot be free. If the will makes random decisions, then there is still the element of being “predetermined” by chance, or luck.

 

[davidv]

Because something being done “on purpose” only means that it is done with the consent of the will. If the will is either predetermined by which motive will appear best, or just chooses randomly,

Why are these the only choices? What do you mean by the word random?

then it cannot be free. If the will makes random decisions, then there is still the element of being “predetermined” by chance, or luck.

 

[blase6]

Why are these the only choices? What do you mean by the word random?

If we consider causality, we can see that it is either deterministic (same chain of events with same conditions produce same result) or indeterministic (same chain of events with same conditions produce different results). The will must have either method of causality; there are no other apparent reasonable options. If the will chooses the motive that appears best, then this is a deterministic choice, and is not free. An indeterministic will makes no sense, because then it would be determined by blind chance beyond one’s awareness, but one would still have a sense of being responsible for one’s actions.

 

[davidv]

If we consider causality, we can see that it is either deterministic (same chain of events with same conditions produce same result) or indeterministic (same chain of events with same conditions produce different results). The will must have either method of causality; there are no other apparent reasonable options. If the will chooses the motive that appears best, then this is a deterministic choice, and is not free. An indeterministic will makes no sense, because then it would be determined by blind chance beyond one’s awareness, but one would still have a sense of being responsible for one’s actions.

This is not helpful, as is seems to be repeat of what you have already posted. There is no further justification for your conclusion.

The obvious reasonable option is that free will exists. Because in this case the choice is not determine by the conditions, but by the will of the choser. The choser decides which conditions will hold sway to the choice not the other way around. Nor is the choice "random’, otherwise the chooser would consult some kind of random number generator to select the choice.

I believe this demostrates that you argument is invalid. It is question begging as it is based on the unstated assumption that there is no free will. Why? Because without this assumption you would not have proposed the dicotomy that you did.

 

[blase6]

This is not helpful, as is seems to be repeat of what you have already posted. There is no further justification for your conclusion.

The obvious reasonable option is that free will exists. Because in this case the choice is not determine by the conditions, but by the will of the choser. The choser decides which conditions will hold sway to the choice not the other way around. Nor is the choice "random’, otherwise the chooser would consult some kind of random number generator to select the choice.

I believe this demostrates that you argument is invalid. It is question begging as it is based on the unstated assumption that there is no free will. Why? Because without this assumption you would not have proposed the dicotomy that you did.

It simply does not work that, after I am placed in external circumstances which I did not choose, and those external circumstances give rise to thoughts in my mind which I did not choose, and those thoughts give rise to motives which I did not choose, and when one of those motives appears to be the best choice, and I inevitably go with it, then somehow it is ultimately my responsibility that I made that choice.

All the arguments for free will I have seen have the assumption that somehow the will is exempt from causality and has responsibility for itself. I cannot see that.

 

[davidv]

It simply does not work that, after I am placed in external circumstances which I did not choose, and those external circumstances give rise to thoughts in my mind which I did not choose, and those thoughts give rise to motives which I did not choose, and when one of those motives appears to be the best choice, and I inevitably go with it, then somehow it is ultimately my responsibility that I made that choice.

All the arguments for free will I have seen have the assumption that somehow the will is exempt from causality and has responsibility for itself. I cannot see that.

How is free will exempt for causality? Free will has a cause. It’s cause is God. Free will is one of His images with which we were created.

 

[blase6]

How is free will exempt for causality? Free will has a cause. It’s cause is God. Free will is one of His images with which we were created.

Because causality is either deterministic or indeterministic. Either way, there is no room for a genuinely free choice.

If the will is caused deterministically, then God is the determinant of all that that person does.
If the will is caused indeterministically, then it is controlled by chance.

 

[davidv]

Because causality is either deterministic or indeterministic. Either way, there is no room for a genuinely free choice.

If the will is caused deterministically, then God is the determinant of all that that person does.
If the will is caused indeterministically, then it is controlled by chance.

Please demonstrate how this can be true.

Repeating yourself is not demonstration.

 

[blase6]

Please demonstrate how this can be true.

Repeating yourself is not demonstration.

It should be obvious.

A deterministic chain of events is one where with everything in a certain arrangement always leads to a definite result. If the will is deterministic, then a motive to do something that was more desirable than any other motive, would be picked by the will.

Even if the will is indeterministic, it is still not a first cause. Only God is the first cause of everything that exists external to him. If I am not my own first cause, then my action is not my ultimate responsibility. It is ultimately the responsibility of the one who caused my action.

 

[davidv]

It should be obvious.

A deterministic chain of events is one where with everything in a certain arrangement always leads to a definite result. If the will is deterministic, then a motive to do something that was more desirable than any other motive, would be picked by the will.

Even if the will is indeterministic, it is still not a first cause. Only God is the first cause of everything that exists external to him. If I am not my own first cause, then my action is not my ultimate responsibility. It is ultimately the responsibility of the one who caused my action.

It is not obvious and the rest of this post make it less so.

Help me understand because what you have offered is an impossibility to me. Let’s try from a different direction.

If free will were to exist how is causality violated.

 

[blase6]

It is not obvious and the rest of this post make it less so.

Help me understand because what you have offered is an impossibility to me. Let’s try from a different direction.

If free will were to exist how is causality violated.

Yes, it is very difficult to find the right words and examples to express what I am trying to point out which is plain to me.

Free will violates causality in either of two ways:

1. Causality is either completely deterministic or not. (disputed) A free choice must necessarily be independent of deterministic causality, but it cannot be purely random, as in indeterministic explanations of causality.
2. God is the first cause of all that exists apart from him. For a free will to exist it would have to be its own first cause of its decisions. This contradicts the uniqueness of God.

 

[davidv]

Yes, it is very difficult to find the right words and examples to express what I am trying to point out which is plain to me.

Free will violates causality in either of two ways:

1. Causality is either completely deterministic or not. (disputed) A free choice must necessarily be independent of deterministic causality, but it cannot be purely random, as in indeterministic explanations of causality.
2. God is the first cause of all that exists apart from him. For a free will to exist it would have to be its own first cause of its decisions. This contradicts the uniqueness of God.

See bold above. I don’t understand how this is true.
A. Free will
B. Decisions

A is first, then comes B. A is the immediate cause of B.

Whether A caused itself (not true) or was caused by another, the relationship between A and B is unaffected.

 

[blase6]

See bold above. I don’t understand how this is true.
A. Free will
B. Decisions

A is first, then comes B. A is the immediate cause of B.

Whether A caused itself (not true) or was caused by another, the relationship between A and B is unaffected.

For a free decision to exist, it must not be determined by a preexisting factor. Since the will is not its own first cause, then its decisions must be predetermined by external factors. The will invariably is dependent upon external motives.

 

[davidv]

For a free decision to exist, it must not be determined by a preexisting factor. Since the will is not its own first cause, then its decisions must be predetermined by external factors. The will invariably is dependent upon external motives.

What is a “free decision”? I thought we were talking about free will.

By free will, I mean the power to choose ones course.

1704 The human person participates in the light and power of the divine Spirit. By his reason, he is capable of understanding the order of things established by the Creator. By free will, he is capable of directing himself toward his true good. He finds his perfection "in seeking and loving what is true and good."7

 

[blase6]

What is a “free decision”? I thought we were talking about free will.

By free will, I mean the power to choose ones course.

A free decision is one that is not necessitated by external factors. It is a logical property of free will.