Problems with free will, possibility, and causality

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Repeating a claim does not make it so. Please defend yourself. I don’t accept the above as a true statement.

Also, can you speak for God now?

Likewise
All actions are dependent upon motives. If you can’t see how obvious this is, then I don’t know how to explain it any clearer. Nothing in this world ever “just happens”. It is always caused by something else. And that is called a motive.
 
All actions are dependent upon motives. If you can’t see how obvious this is, then I don’t know how to explain it any clearer. Nothing in this world ever “just happens”. It is always caused by something else. And that is called a motive.
Why do you think I am saying “it just happens”?
 
Why do you think I am saying “it just happens”?
Because an action not dependent on at least one motive out of several, is irrational. All willful and natural events are dependent on motives.
 
Because an action not dependent on at least one motive out of several, is irrational. All willful and natural events are dependent on motives.
But are they dependent by necessity?

A fire is dependent on fuel. If fuel is present, is a fire necessary?
 
But are they dependent by necessity?

A fire is dependent on fuel. If fuel is present, is a fire necessary?
One of the motives will result in the action because one of them will be the most appealing.

The presence of fuel does not necessitate a fire. It does not directly result in fire. The striking of the fuel in a way which produces fire necessitates it. This is like a person receiving the motive to act in a certain way.
 
One of the motives will result in the action because one of them will be the most appealing.

The presence of fuel does not necessitate a fire. It does not directly result in fire. The striking of the fuel in a way which produces fire necessitates it. This is like a person receiving the motive to act in a certain way.
Likewise the presence of desire does not directly result in an action. It is the act of the will that strikes the desire and makes it become an act.
 
Likewise the presence of desire does not directly result in an action. It is the act of the will that strikes the desire and makes it become an act.
The act of the will is dependent upon the overriding motive, just as the fire is dependent upon something that will set off the fuel.
 
First of all, for this purpose, a motive and reason is the same. Human actions obviously result from whichever motive had the overriding influence.
That was my point. I don’t agree with the other posters who claim that there is no motive for action. It is whether the cause is voluntary or not that matters.
Second of all, a “voluntary will” is a circular description.
Then I wonder if the term “free will” is similarly circular. I recognize that often in the semantics of philosophy the will is already defined as being voluntary. If you want to discuss this in terms of humans having a will or not having a will, that’s fine. I prefer Aquinas’ terminology of voluntary cause versus natural cause.
As I see it, the “locus of causal control” must necessarily lie within God alone. If a created person had their own locus, they would be elevated to the determinant power of God, and that would contradict the uniqueness of God.
I don’t think that’s a valid argument. Both God and humans have an intellect, just not the same degree. Both God and humans can love, but not to the same degree of perfection. Both God and humans are spiritual beings. If God can impart these attributes to humanity without compromising his own uniqueness, then I see no similar compromise with respect to voluntary causes.
Even assuming that God has free will, I don’t see how a created person can have causal control. It simply does not work in a deterministic world.
That’s because you’ve presupposed that all causes, other than God, are purely deterministic. That is, since all natural causes in the material world are deterministic, that causes in the immaterial world must also be mechanistic and deterministic in the same way. It really is just the same thing as saying that God as voluntary cause cannot create other voluntary causes. As a bare presupposition though, that’s not very convincing; especially since we experience ourselves as free and voluntary actors.
 
That was my point. I don’t agree with the other posters who claim that there is no motive for action. It is whether the cause is voluntary or not that matters.

Exactly.

Then I wonder if the term “free will” is similarly circular. I recognize that often in the semantics of philosophy the will is already defined as being voluntary. If you want to discuss this in terms of humans having a will or not having a will, that’s fine. I prefer Aquinas’ terminology of voluntary cause versus natural cause.

I read some of Aquinas’ defense of free will. It is not convincing because he begins by assuming that free will exists, and thus his arguments become circular-sounding.

I don’t think that’s a valid argument. Both God and humans have an intellect, just not the same degree. Both God and humans can love, but not to the same degree of perfection. Both God and humans are spiritual beings. If God can impart these attributes to humanity without compromising his own uniqueness, then I see no similar compromise with respect to voluntary causes.

I am still not convinced that a real voluntary cause can exist, even with God. It goes against how the world appears wholly deterministic.

That’s because you’ve presupposed that all causes, other than God, are purely deterministic. That is, since all natural causes in the material world are deterministic, that causes in the immaterial world must also be mechanistic and deterministic in the same way. It really is just the same thing as saying that God as voluntary cause cannot create other voluntary causes. As a bare presupposition though, that’s not very convincing; especially since we experience ourselves as free and voluntary actors.

Well yes. People perceive superficially that they have free will, because they perceive that they are the immediate cause of their actions, and are aware of having considered motives. I am saying that that is insufficient for real freedom, and thus seems to be a misleading perception of one’s own decisions.
 
The act of the will is dependent upon the overriding motive, just as the fire is dependent upon something that will set off the fuel.
No it does not. The will exists whether there are any desires or not.
 
No it does not. The will exists whether there are any desires or not.
There can be no willed action without a motive/desire. If you won’t accept that, then I can’t argue with you anymore.
 
I read some of Aquinas’ defense of free will. It is not convincing because he begins by assuming that free will exists, and thus his arguments become circular-sounding.
I don’t think we have any choice (ironically) other than to begin with the assumption that free will exists. That is our naïve experience of reality from a very young age, prior to any philosophical or scientific analysis. There are many naturalist/atheist scientists who agree with this observation.
I am still not convinced that a real voluntary cause can exist, even with God. It goes against how the world appears wholly deterministic.
But the whole world doesn’t appear deterministic. Not even materialists would claim that is true. Quantum mechanics has introduced us to a reality of indeterministic causes, which are entirely physical.
Well yes. People perceive superficially that they have free will, because they perceive that they are the immediate cause of their actions, and are aware of having considered motives. I am saying that that is insufficient for real freedom, and thus seems to be a misleading perception of one’s own decisions.
This is another way of saying that free will is an illusion. It’s logically possible that you are correct, but there isn’t any reason to begin with that presupposition when our experience informs us otherwise. It all comes down to whether you can prove that a voluntary cause cannot possibly create another voluntary cause. You hold to the presupposition that it cannot, but haven’t provided a demonstration.
 
There can be no willed action without a motive/desire. If you won’t accept that, then I can’t argue with you anymore.
Seems to me you are confusing the will with the acts of the will. Why do you think they are the same?
 
Seems to me you are confusing the will with the acts of the will. Why do you think they are the same?
The will is the faculty of a person by which they desire to act in a certain way. It must be motivated before it will do anything.
 
I don’t think we have any choice (ironically) other than to begin with the assumption that free will exists. That is our naïve experience of reality from a very young age, prior to any philosophical or scientific analysis. There are many naturalist/atheist scientists who agree with this observation.

But the whole world doesn’t appear deterministic. Not even materialists would claim that is true. Quantum mechanics has introduced us to a reality of indeterministic causes, which are entirely physical.

I do not know much about quantum mechanics. But I am not convinced that they necessitate a literally indeterministic physical world. I think they are just an example of how scientists have run out of intelligible explanations of physical phenomena.

This is another way of saying that free will is an illusion. It’s logically possible that you are correct, but there isn’t any reason to begin with that presupposition when our experience informs us otherwise. It all comes down to whether you can prove that a voluntary cause cannot possibly create another voluntary cause. You hold to the presupposition that it cannot, but haven’t provided a demonstration.

My experience shows that I only superficially seem to have free will. If I look at how I come to will things, I see an invariable pattern of willing what appears best to me at the moment. And I am still struggling to see how God can be voluntary cause. I have a problem with the idea of a voluntary cause itself. A voluntary cause contradicts every conceivable system of causality.
 
The will is the faculty of a person by which they desire to act in a certain way. It must be motivated before it will do anything.
I still cannot tell if you are equating the faculty with the result of using that faculty. Can the faculty exist without it being motivated?
 
I still cannot tell if you are equating the faculty with the result of using that faculty. Can the faculty exist without it being motivated?
Yes, but it does not function without motivation.
 
Which means that from a causality perspective, the will logically must precede any choice it makes.
The will, as in the capacity to consider motives, does exist before the choice. But the choice itself is dependent upon motives.
 
The will, as in the capacity to consider motives, does exist before the choice. But the choice itself is dependent upon motives.
So, given this there is no conflict between free will and causality.
 
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