Problems with free will, possibility, and causality

[blase6]

So, given this there is no conflict between free will and causality.

Yes there is. The will is dependent upon the desirability of the motives presented to it.

 

[tdgesq]

I do not know much about quantum mechanics. But I am not convinced that they necessitate a literally indeterministic physical world. I think they are just an example of how scientists have run out of intelligible explanations of physical phenomena.

I don’t necessarily disagree, at least from the perspective that we know relatively little about quantum phenomena compared to other scientific fields. That isn’t really my point though. It’s that there are things that appear to us to have indeterminate causes. The same is true of the results of many social studies concerning human action. Yet we are still able to speak of causation in relation to apparently indeterminate events.

My experience shows that I only superficially seem to have free will. If I look at how I come to will things, I see an invariable pattern of willing what appears best to me at the moment.

That is what I would expect. Even in the situation where one tries to decide what would be worst for him and then acts accordingly, it seems that by so acting he thinks it best to do what is the worst for him. I have no problem with your analysis here. What keeps getting lost (in my opinion) in this analysis is who/what determined that this particular act or that particular act is best for the actor? Did God determine it, did genetics determine it, or did the human will determine it?

And I am still struggling to see how God can be voluntary cause. I have a problem with the idea of a voluntary cause itself. A voluntary cause contradicts every conceivable system of causality.

That would not be accurate with respect to Aquinas’ treatment of causation, unless Aquinas is incorrect about his own system. It isn’t true of most counterfactual theories of causation, where it is defined as “but for X occurring, Y would not have occurred.” The nature of the cause as mechanistic or voluntary is not part of the definition. So the objection you have to voluntary causes isn’t one that entails logical contradiction.

 

[blase6]

I don’t necessarily disagree, at least from the perspective that we know relatively little about quantum phenomena compared to other scientific fields. That isn’t really my point though. It’s that there are things that appear to us to have indeterminate causes. The same is true of the results of many social studies concerning human action. Yet we are still able to speak of causation in relation to apparently indeterminate events.

Nothing appears to have indeterminate causes to me. It seems most reasonable to believe that some determinate cause produces the movement of subatomic particles, even if we cannot detect that cause.

That is what I would expect. Even in the situation where one tries to decide what would be worst for him and then acts accordingly, it seems that by so acting he thinks it best to do what is the worst for him. I have no problem with your analysis here. What keeps getting lost (in my opinion) in this analysis is who/what determined that this particular act or that particular act is best for the actor? Did God determine it, did genetics determine it, or did the human will determine it?

**If the course of decision is invariable, then it is determined by what causes the consideration of the decision. (The motive/s) A determinant factor must be able to “choose” between possible outcomes without unequal weight on the possible outcomes, which would negate a free choice. Thus, if my observation of how my will works is accurate, then my decisions are determined by the chain of events which come to involve my will.

Motives come to appear best based on the disposition of the person analyzing the motives. Thus, an immoral person is predisposed to consider evil motives as appearing more good, than as a moral person would consider. But predisposition comes either from factors outside a person’s actions, or from the actions of that person, which if the actions are not free, then the disposition of the person is outside that person’s responsibility.**

That would not be accurate with respect to Aquinas’ treatment of causation, unless Aquinas is incorrect about his own system. It isn’t true of most counterfactual theories of causation, where it is defined as “but for X occurring, Y would not have occurred.” The nature of the cause as mechanistic or voluntary is not part of the definition. So the objection you have to voluntary causes isn’t one that entails logical contradiction.

Again, the way motives appear to cause the movement of the will contradicts the existence of a voluntary cause.

 

[davidv]

Yes there is. The will is dependent upon the desirability of the motives presented to it.

This is a contradiction to what you posted in post #97.

If the will can exist without a motive then it is not dependent on a motive. The act of the will can be dependent on a motive.

A. Will
B. Act of will

A does not equal B

 

[blase6]

This is a contradiction to what you posted in post #97.

If the will can exist without a motive then it is not dependent on a motive. The act of the will can be dependent on a motive.

A. Will
B. Act of will

A does not equal B

No, it does not. I said that the will is merely the capacity to consider motives. I never said it was not dependent upon motives to act.

 

[davidv]

No, it does not. I said that the will is merely the capacity to consider motives. I never said it was not dependent upon motives to act.

Could you please repeat that without using the double negative? I don’t think I know what you mean.

 

[blase6]

Could you please repeat that without using the double negative? I don’t think I know what you mean.

The will requires at least one motive (in theory; in reality, there are countless) to act.

 

[davidv]

The will requires at least one motive (in theory; in reality, there are countless) to act.

True. So why is that a violation of causality? And why is the act of the will controlled by the motives? And how does this make in not free?

 

[blase6]

True. So why is that a violation of causality? And why is the act of the will controlled by the motives? And how does this make in not free?

Causality basically involves a precedent action necessitating a subsequent action. (You turn on the faucet, so water comes out, assuming everything else is in place for that to happen.) This is always deterministic, unless you accept the thought that indeterminate events happen, in which case they are determined by chance.

Since the will is seen to always choose the motive which appears best, then the way motives arise and present themselves to the will determine its decision. According to this, a person would choose to accept or reject God based on how God arranged the events in their live to motivate them to a decision.

The only conceivable alternative for the operation of the will, which would not violate causality, would be an indeterminate will. This would involve randomness to some extent, and one’s actions could not be considered free, if they were ultimately random.

Thus, the only way free will could exist would be if a contradiction of causality was possible. (Contradictions are impossible)

A similar thought to what I am saying is here.

 

[davidv]

Causality basically involves a precedent action necessitating a subsequent action. (You turn on the faucet, so water comes out, assuming everything else is in place for that to happen.) This is always deterministic, unless you accept the thought that indeterminate events happen, in which case they are determined by chance.

Since the will is seen to always choose the motive which appears best, then the way motives arise and present themselves to the will determine its decision. According to this, a person would choose to accept or reject God based on how God arranged the events in their live to motivate them to a decision.

The only conceivable alternative for the operation of the will, which would not violate causality, would be an indeterminate will. This would involve randomness to some extent, and one’s actions could not be considered free, if they were ultimately random.

Thus, the only way free will could exist would be if a contradiction of causality was possible. (Contradictions are impossible)

A similar thought to what I am saying is here.

Nothing you state above demonstrates the truthfulness of the claim made in bold.

As you indicated earlier, many motives are at work in a person. Is there ever a time when those motives are in perfect alignment to the same choice? Based on my personal experience this is not possible. That means that a motive is not the same class of cause as that of turning a faucet. Any individual motive does not necessitate an action. The freedom of the will is the ability to govern which motive to select from the many.

 

[blase6]

Nothing you state above demonstrates the truthfulness of the claim made in bold.

As you indicated earlier, many motives are at work in a person. Is there ever a time when those motives are in perfect alignment to the same choice? Based on my personal experience this is not possible. That means that a motive is not the same class of cause as that of turning a faucet. Any individual motive does not necessitate an action. The freedom of the will is the ability to govern which motive to select from the many.

I will have to say it once again. The motive that appears best over other motives, will be the one chosen. They do not all have to “point to the same action”.

 

[davidv]

I will have to say it once again. The motive that appears best over other motives, will be the one chosen. They do not all have to “point to the same action”.

Repetition does not make it more believable, nor does it support the claim that the “best” motive necessitates that the best choice be selected. In fact, it is sin, that demonstrates the often we don’t chose the best choice. Sin indicates a choice contrary to the best choice, the selection of a lesser good than the greatest good.

 

[blase6]

Repetition does not make it more believable, nor does it support the claim that the “best” motive necessitates that the best choice be selected. In fact, it is sin, that demonstrates the often we don’t chose the best choice. Sin indicates a choice contrary to the best choice, the selection of a lesser good than the greatest good.

Either you don’t understand what I am saying, or you simply won’t accept that my premise is correct. I have already said that the “best choice” does not have to be actually good. It only has to appear good. A person cannot choose what is entirely undesirable. There has to be a factor of being desirable in any action to pursue it. Thus sin has to appear good to be chosen.

If you won’t believe me, then I am not going to get anywhere arguing with you.

 

[davidv]

Either you don’t understand what I am saying, or you simply won’t accept that my premise is correct. I have already said that the “best choice” does not have to be actually good. It only has to appear good. A person cannot choose what is entirely undesirable. There has to be a factor of being desirable in any action to pursue it. Thus sin has to appear good to be chosen.

If you won’t believe me, then I am not going to get anywhere arguing with you.

1. I apparently don’t always understand you. For one it is often not clear what you mean by causality and don’t seem distinguish between necessary ingredients and causes.
2. I reject your claim that free will violates causality based on my knowledge and the flaws in you logic defending the claim.

 

[blase6]

1. I apparently don’t always understand you. For one it is often not clear what you mean by causality and don’t seem distinguish between necessary ingredients and causes.
2. I reject your claim that free will violates causality based on my knowledge and the flaws in you logic defending the claim.

Causality: the chain of events which produces an outcome.

I don’t know what you mean by “necessary ingredients”.

 

[davidv]

Causality: the chain of events which produces an outcome.

I don’t know what you mean by “necessary ingredients”.

Examples of necessary ingredients.
A. fuel
B. oxygen

A and B are necessary ingredients, but not the cause of fire.

Neither are in the chain of events, because they are not events.

 

[blase6]

Examples of necessary ingredients.
A. fuel
B. oxygen

A and B are necessary ingredients, but not the cause of fire.

Neither are in the chain of events, because they are not events.

It’s not as simple as you would like it to be.

Yes, oxygen and fuel by themselves do not necessitate a fire, because they are stable by themselves. But the movement/reaction of those ingredients necessitates the production of fire. This is a physical chain of events which is determinant. With the situation as it is, the fuel/oxygen do cause the fire, because they result in a chain of events which produces a fire.

In the same way, a person’s actions are determined by the motives which arise for that person to consider. The motive which appears more desirable than the others is chosen, by necessity.

 

[tdgesq]

The motive which appears more desirable than the others is chosen, by necessity.

You haven’t addressed the situation where all motives (reasons) appear equally desirable (leading to the good), as often happens.

 

[blase6]

You haven’t addressed the situation where all motives (reasons) appear equally desirable (leading to the good), as often happens.

I am not convinced that such a situation can happen. There will always be some aspect of one motive determining why it is chosen.

 

[NeuralMonk]

Either you don’t understand what I am saying, or you simply won’t accept that my premise is correct.

I vote for the later.

the will is seen to always choose the motive which appears best.

I have seen a common thread where you make a statement as fact, assuming the reader must agree with you because you state it. Most of the time “the will” chooses what is convenient, not what is best. Especially in the western culture, where sociologically we are hedonistic in our pursuits.

Causality basically involves a precedent action necessitating a subsequent action. (You turn on the faucet, so water comes out, assuming everything else is in place for that to happen.) This is always deterministic, unless you accept the thought that indeterminate events happen, in which case they are determined by chance.

No, no, no. Determinism is NOT a fact in evidence with Causality, the arguments is far beyond that point. Just by saying you can have A or C but not both ignores the B. Even if by definition A and C are opposite, does not indicate that a middle position B does not exist.

In this case, you ignore the creative. Free will is the creative you ignore, and it is neither determined nor random.

If you won’t believe me, then I am not going to get anywhere arguing with you.

And in this we see the need to argue. It is not the best you seek, but the conversion of others to your viewpoint.

I choose not to believe you. Not because it was determined, not because it is random, but because I choose.

Determinism is not just. Random is not just. Free will is just. And no, justice is not a determined or random concept.