Relativism actually don't contradict morality?

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Imagine it this way: you have a room full of economics experts at a meeting at the white house who are debating solutions to economics problems. Next door is a NASA meeting discussing the return to the moon. A few of the aeronautics scientists grow bored and wander into the economics meeting. What do they say that is of use to the meeting? “We can get to the moon but you can’t figure out how to reduce unemployment?”
The point is, when the president is allowed from the constitution to spend the tax payers money on bringing people to the moon, but is in doubt whether all that NASA math and science does add up to bringing people to the moon, it is at worst a small mistake if he just says “They are the experts, i trust them.” and spends the money.

If he doesn’t think the economics make much sense, it would be possibly a huge mistake if he just says “They are experts, i trust them.” and spends the money.

Because tax payers can expect that their money is spend wise and if there is doubt whether the money spend will have the intended effect, it should be at least carefully thought about, whether sucess is likely enough to try. With blindly trusting the NASA experts the president although having personally doubt does not fail there (except maybe for the size of the final sum, they know space travel but not efficient funding). With blindly trusting the economic experts although he has also personally doubt the president fails.

Therefore when listening to the experts of a field and basing our decisions on their advice, one should keep in mind that the reliability of experts differs. You shouldn’t just agree with the expert opinion if it is in a field, where even the experts have little reliable knowledge.

And you should not assume that the expert opinion in a unreliable field is close to objective truth. While doing the latter in some fields regarding their subject is acceptable (e.g. we can safely assume that for the current definitions of “sun”, “earth”, “center of mass”, “km” that it is close to objective truth that the earth is 150 million km away from the sun. But it would be stupid to safely assume that it is close to objective truth that x billion dollars of stimulus spending will end the recesssion - although there are experts claiming this, at best this is an educated guess.)
 
The point is, when the president is allowed from the constitution to spend the tax payers money on bringing people to the moon, but is in doubt whether all that NASA math and science does add up to bringing people to the moon, it is at worst a small mistake if he just says “They are the experts, i trust them.” and spends the money.

If he doesn’t think the economics make much sense, it would be possibly a huge mistake if he just says “They are experts, i trust them.” and spends the money.

Because tax payers can expect that their money is spend wise and if there is doubt whether the money spend will have the intended effect, it should be at least carefully thought about, whether sucess is likely enough to try. With blindly trusting the NASA experts the president although having personally doubt does not fail there (except maybe for the size of the final sum, they know space travel but not efficient funding). With blindly trusting the economic experts although he has also personally doubt the president fails.

Therefore when listening to the experts of a field and basing our decisions on their advice, one should keep in mind that the reliability of experts differs. You shouldn’t just agree with the expert opinion if it is in a field, where even the experts have little reliable knowledge.

And you should not assume that the expert opinion in a unreliable field is close to objective truth. While doing the latter in some fields regarding their subject is acceptable (e.g. we can safely assume that for the current definitions of “sun”, “earth”, “center of mass”, “km” that it is close to objective truth that the earth is 150 million km away from the sun. But it would be stupid to safely assume that it is close to objective truth that x billion dollars of stimulus spending will end the recesssion - although there are experts claiming this, at best this is an educated guess.)
All this is true but it still does not really matter for the team solving economics problems. Of course you should take expertise with a grain of salt when it is unreliable. But the reliability of one field does not influence another less reliable different field.

Insofar as the white house economics team is seeking to “solve” he economics problems (and I really didn’t mean to get into the debate of whether they should) their the additional information that over there the aeronautics is obtaining near certainty is useless information. It’s just an illustrative example, not a claim on who should be doing what.

To put it in terms of your new version of the example, taxpayers, too, are no wiser about economics by knowing the aeronautics is more reliable. Think about investing decisions, instead, if you prefer. You are trying to decide between stocks and bonds and there are opinions floating around about where the economy is headed. You need to decide, agnosticism is not a solution. Now I tell you that chemistry is a very certain field. How does that aid your indecision in investing?
 
All this is true but it still does not really matter for the team solving economics problems. Of course you should take expertise with a grain of salt when it is unreliable. But the reliability of one field does not influence another less reliable different field.
You posted last page:
“That there is no uniform standard of evidence. That evidence-based inquiry is full of potential error beyond what we would find in the construction of mathematical proofs. That the standards of evidence are a function of human values. That in most cases we are entirely content to tentatively accept claims based on the best evidence available at the time.”

If we can compare the reliability of different fields there is a universal standard of evidence, being categorized in less and more reliable type of evidence.
And while most people might be content to accept the best evidence available, this is a least questionable if the best evidence is bad or unreliable evidence and more so if the entire field is plagued by unreliable evidence.

Regarding the investment decision this means that since a lot of investment advices aroung are based on very weak evidence even if the experts try hard, it influences the decision whether or not to invest at all.

Of course you are right in so far, that if you have to invest, you take the best evidence avaible. But even then the limited quality of evidence should mean you should be on the lookout for new more reliable evidence. So even then the quality of evidence in respect to the standard is relevant.
 
You posted last page:
“That there is no uniform standard of evidence. That evidence-based inquiry is full of potential error beyond what we would find in the construction of mathematical proofs. That the standards of evidence are a function of human values. That in most cases we are entirely content to tentatively accept claims based on the best evidence available at the time.”

If we can compare the reliability of different fields there is a universal standard of evidence, being categorized in less and more reliable type of evidence.
A comparison does not create a standard. We can compare the height of trees to the height of mountains on the moon but where is the standard in that?
And while most people might be content to accept the best evidence available, this is a least questionable if the best evidence is bad or unreliable evidence and more so if the entire field is plagued by unreliable evidence.
That’s life. But in spite of the fact that some fields are “plagued by unreliable evidence” we still seek the best answers available.
Regarding the investment decision this means that since a lot of investment advices aroung are based on very weak evidence even if the experts try hard, it influences the decision whether or not to invest at all.
Of course you are right in so far, that if you have to invest, you take the best evidence avaible. But even then the limited quality of evidence should mean you should be on the lookout for new more reliable evidence. So even then the quality of evidence in respect to the standard is relevant.
Of course. But that is true of all fields (except maybe math), even physics. As I noted above, the (possible) discovery that neutrinos can travel faster than light upsets the entire field of physics.

But notice that in investing you can’t afford to sit around and wait for better evidence. If you do so you are actually making an investment choice (e.g. leaving your cash in the bank account). The nature of investing precludes a time out while new evidence is gathered. And there is good reason to believe that there is no better evidence available in that field, that it will always be plagued by uncertainty.
 
Sorry I let this hang for a few days. If it’s alright with you, I’m going to ignore the other posts and just focus on the one you wrote in response to my last post.
I have gravitated toward one [moral system] that I think you will find is not too far different from your own position.
Since I’ve already said that I’m a moral nihilist, I’m not sure you are correct in your supposition.
Just to offer two possible answers to your question: consider the claims of Ayn Rand’s objectivism which is an objective theory of morality based on “reason” alone (she was a flaming atheist). And consider, alternatively, natural law which was perhaps best exemplified by Thomas Aquinas on the basis of observation and “reason”. I won’t defend their views, I just want to point to them as examples.
Right, and just to be clear, I’m not any more swayed by Rand’s moral system than I am by Aquinas’, but you already knew that.
In general, what I mean by “objective” is simply the negation relative or subjective, namely claims about what one ought to do that transcend the individual.
The term “objective” doesn’t mean like in physics where phenomenon can be observed and validated by experimentation.
Well, we’re going to run into problems right away, because I don’t accept the idea that “ought” statements exist independently of thinking human brains.
So, for example, we can consider the moral question: what ought I do when I get up in the morning? Maybe get dressed and eat breakfast? Maybe run out nude into the street and chase cars? Each choice has consequences and we can “reason” about those consequences in relation to our values, objectives, etc.
This is a perfect example. I don’t think that there is an “ought” in the situation. There are several things that we might want to do. There are likely consequences we can determine for each of those possibilities, and the likely consequences might be things that we want or don’t want, but that’s it.

As a moral nihilist, I decide to eat breakfast not because I “should” do that, but because I want to: I want to do it, and I want the likely consequences of doing it to occur.

I don’t run naked in the streets because, primarily, I have no desire to do it whatsoever. And if I did have a desire to do it, I think it’s reasonable to suppose that my appraisal of the likely consequences of the action – consequences that I wouldn’t like – would deter me from doing it.

But that’s it: “ought” doesn’t enter the picture of my decision making in the slightest, and I honestly don’t see any grounds for supposing that “ought” has any objectively binding meaning for all people.
 
Sorry I let this hang for a few days. If it’s alright with you, I’m going to ignore the other posts and just focus on the one you wrote in response to my last post.
That’s fine.
Since I’ve already said that I’m a moral nihilist, I’m not sure you are correct in your supposition.
We’ll see.
Right, and just to be clear, I’m not any more swayed by Rand’s moral system than I am by Aquinas’, but you already knew that.
Yes, but to be fair I wanted to put them on the table as examples.
Well, we’re going to run into problems right away, because I don’t accept the idea that “ought” statements exist independently of thinking human brains.
This is the problem I pointed to earlier. You are trying to fit ought into the scientific mold of observation of the world and, finding the poor fit, rejecting objective morality. I am arguing for something more subtle.
This is a perfect example. I don’t think that there is an “ought” in the situation. There are several things that we might want to do. There are likely consequences we can determine for each of those possibilities, and the likely consequences might be things that we want or don’t want, but that’s it.
As a moral nihilist, I decide to eat breakfast not because I “should” do that, but because I want to: I want to do it, and I want the likely consequences of doing it to occur.
I don’t run naked in the streets because, primarily, I have no desire to do it whatsoever. And if I did have a desire to do it, I think it’s reasonable to suppose that my appraisal of the likely consequences of the action – consequences that I wouldn’t like – would deter me from doing it.
But that’s it: “ought” doesn’t enter the picture of my decision making in the slightest, and I honestly don’t see any grounds for supposing that “ought” has any objectively binding meaning for all people.
You are, essentially, reducing your choices to subjective wants. You, who earlier argued for the primacy of evidence and reason, are reluctant to apply those tools to your decision about what to do in the morning. (Presumably because you can’t fit ought into a scientific model.)

If moral nihilism were an accurate model of reality then there would be no point to giving or taking advice. Your father says to you: you ought to get out of bed and make something of yourself. Or your friend says, don’t go running naked through the streets, I tried it and didn’t like the consequences.

Even in the realm of ought, we can obtain useful advice from others precisely because there is a reality to ought that transcends our individual subjective experience.

(Things get way more complicated with social topics but I want to stick with this simple example because it demonstrates my point adequately.)
 
You are trying to fit ought into the scientific mold of observation of the world
No, I’m not. I’m looking for evidence that there is an “ought” independent of human minds.
If moral nihilism were an accurate model of reality then there would be no point to giving or taking advice. Your father says to you: you ought to get out of bed and make something of yourself. Or your friend says, don’t go running naked through the streets, I tried it and didn’t like the consequences.
You’re misunderstanding moral nihilism.

“Ought” obviously exists as a concept, but it exists only as a concept, and it has discernable meaning only given a context.

For example, there’s nothing inherently “wrong” about running in the streets naked. It’s just running in the streets naked. Now, your friend can certainly say, “You ought not run in the streets IF you don’t want to offend lots of people and, in all probability, have one of those people call the cops on you (who will toss you in prison and hit you with a penalty that will give you all kinds of major headaches).” [Frequently, in everyday speech, people leave off the clause beginning with “IF” and just let it be assumed]

However, if you don’t mind the likely consequences of your actions (or if you think you can somehow avoid those consequences), there’s no “ought” binding you from doing the action.

Now, given a broad base of shared desires – say, the desires of almost everyone to live in an orderly society – we can come up with a list of things that “ought not” be done IF we want to have such a society. And, in fact, that’s where most of the legal code comes from.

But what I’m describing above is not what most people mean when they say “morality.” When most people talk about “the difference between right and wrong,” their first assumption is that certain actions are just inherently right or wrong. I think most people, when talking about morality, would be reluctant to reduce the subject to a bunch of suggestions based on one’s likely reaction to likely outcomes of events.
 
No, I’m not. I’m looking for evidence that there is an “ought” independent of human minds. You’re misunderstanding moral nihilism. “Ought” obviously exists as a concept, but it exists only as a concept, and it has discernable meaning only given a context.
Ok, show me that there is relativity independent of human minds. All scientific theories are concepts of the human mind that are used to grapple with reality. Even a theory-less recitation of previous facts is a human concept. You are too hung up on the nature of human inquiry.
For example, there’s nothing inherently “wrong” about running in the streets naked. It’s just running in the streets naked. Now, your friend can certainly say, “You ought not run in the streets IF you don’t want to offend lots of people and, in all probability, have one of those people call the cops on you (who will toss you in prison and hit you with a penalty that will give you all kinds of major headaches).” [Frequently, in everyday speech, people leave off the clause beginning with “IF” and just let it be assumed]
Here you are making the mistake of attributing the wrongness of running in the streets naked with the running in the streets. My point is far simpler.

The very fact that you and your friend can share this moral observation is proof that it exists independently of you each separately. There is a transcendent truth to the claim that it is wrong to run naked through the streets. (The details of why are irrelevant.)

Saying that running through the streets naked is just running through the streets naked is an abdication of reason, a disregard for the blindingly obvious fact that it is good advice from one person to another.
However, if you don’t mind the likely consequences of your actions (or if you think you can somehow avoid those consequences), there’s no “ought” binding you from doing the action. Now, given a broad base of shared desires – say, the desires of almost everyone to live in an orderly society – we can come up with a list of things that “ought not” be done IF we want to have such a society. And, in fact, that’s where most of the legal code comes from.
Consequentialism is but one approach to moral reasoning but let’s stick with it for the moment. You are correct, here, that for the proscription to hold one must share a compatible view toward the consequences. The obvious question is, don’t we?

Let us reconsider something that came up earlier, the claim that you ought to believe what is true and reject what is false. While this is not universally held in practice, it’s pretty hard to find anyone who would deny it and usually it is breached at the margins. Similarly, as Rand pointed out, we generally share a desire to survive and flourish,suicides and cigarette smoking being the obvious exceptions. And, as Thomas Aquinas points out, the very nature and fabric of the reality around us influences which choices good or ill.
But what I’m describing above is not what most people mean when they say “morality.” When most people talk about “the difference between right and wrong,” their first assumption is that certain actions are just inherently right or wrong. I think most people, when talking about morality, would be reluctant to reduce the subject to a bunch of suggestions based on one’s likely reaction to likely outcomes of events.
As I noted before, there are many theories of morality. I’m showing you one that I think you will appreciate.

The very fact that it is possible for one person to give good, valuable advice to another is a refutation of moral nihilism.
 
following the morality developed(or conscience, or the 'general morality" where we consider genocide and rape as wrong") what to do has always been defined “right”, it is meaningless to define a new “right”, in other word those who ask for a true “right” and “Wrong” or define otherwise are simply being ridiculous. and that there ISN’T really an absolute truth ,yet pro-relativism people can still hold on to values and morality using this argument.
OK, but what about those who’ve thought genocide and rape are right?
 
The very fact that it is possible for one person to give good, valuable advice to another is a refutation of moral nihilism.
Again, you don’t understand moral nihilism. Under moral nihilism, there is absolutely nothing preventing an individual from giving another individual information that that individual can then use to inform the decisions that he makes based on his desires.

The fact that people might frame this information-giving in “moral” terms doesn’t change the fact that it’s just an exchange of information, information that one can use when measuring likely outcomes against desires.

I think you and I agree on a lot of points, but we are using different words to express similar ideas, which makes talking much more frustrating than it has to be.
 
OK, but what about those who’ve thought genocide and rape are right?
Well, what about them? The few people who think like this and attempt to put it into practice are usually stopped by the 99% of people who have a strong antipathy toward both genocide and rape.

Again, in a world where moral nihilism is true – that is, where moral claims have no truth value – people still have values. People still, for example, value living in a world where people don’t have to worry about being raped all the time, and they value punishing people who hold different values and actually try to rape other people. People can even call their values “objectively, morally true,” but they’re not: they’re subjective value judgments.
 
I just came up with a pro-relativism arguments:

according to richard dawkins morality is evolved, so maybe “right” and “Wrong” in our conscience is just a sense that was also evolved based on the morality that human develop? which is in fact consistent with relativism is that there is no absolute truth. And “right” and “wrong” has always been a definition we given to the morality evolved within humanity?
Firstly, you did not come up with a pro-relativism argument. You came up with an assumption not an argument.

First assumption: Dawkins is the authority on morality
Second assumption: Morality is a product of evolution

You cannot assume your arguments.

You need to prove that: Dawkins is indeed the prime authority when it comes to the nature of morality. Secondly, that his conclusion that morality is a by product of evolution is correct.

I tell you know, you will not be able to prove either.
is this case there will be no point in talking about morally right and wrong as it has been defined and it always is. and it doesn’t collide with relativism. (as morally right and wrong apart from “truth”)
If such is the case then you would not object if someone stronger than you should come to your house, sexually molest you and torture your family, becuase these people have concluded that since if it feels good do it, so they did what to them felt good.
just as an the EM wave with wavelength between 620–750 nm is defined as red. its is meaningless to define well how do you know if that is “red” or asking questions such as what is true “Red” or are there REAL “red”.
So you think good and evil is reduceable to the whether a certain shade of colour is really the shade we are speaking of? :eek:

That is probably one of the more stupid statements that have been brandished about int htis forums?
following the morality developed(or conscience, or the 'general morality" where we consider genocide and rape as wrong") what to do has always been defined “right”, it is meaningless to define a new “right”, in other word those who ask for a true “right” and “Wrong” or define otherwise are simply being ridiculous. and that there ISN’T really an absolute truth ,yet pro-relativism people can still hold on to values and morality using this argument.
You’ve taken your assumption as a spring board for other conclusions when you still have yet to prove your assumption.

Like Dawkins whom you idolize, you are short on reason and logic.
Do we (catholics, which I assume to be pro-absolute truth people) have any counter-arguments against this? I would like to hear some as I can’t think of any yet.
We do. But before I state any, you need to state an actual argument not just an assumption.
 
but what if morality itself is a human development and right has always been defined as following this moral?
Aah, finally, you realize that it is a WHAT IF.

Well you cannot argue from a WHAT IF.
 
OK, but what about those who’ve thought genocide and rape are right?
The OP states that “it is meaningless to define a new “right”, in other word those who ask for a true “right” and “Wrong” or define otherwise are simply being ridiculous.”, apparently maintaining that the commonly held anti-rape and genocide attitude is sort of undeniably right.

But, when a whole society begins an ethnic cleansing and determines that their enemy does, indeed, deserve to be raped and killed, then the rules have changed, a new right has been defined, people do have to worry about being raped or killed.

And the fact that otherwise “99% of people” (or some such majority) “have a strong antipathy toward both genocide and rape.”, should suggest that, while morality can be denied or overridden, there is nonetheless such thing as an objective morality, a “natural law”, acts that we recognize as just plain evil.
 
I think you and I agree on a lot of points, but we are using different words to express similar ideas, which makes talking much more frustrating than it has to be.
This is partly true but words are important, as are human concepts

I note that you again brushed past my critical point that calling morality a human concept does not distinguish it from science. Is science not “just” the giving of information and models about observed phenomena?
Again, you don’t understand moral nihilism. Under moral nihilism, there is absolutely nothing preventing an individual from giving another individual information that that individual can then use to inform the decisions that he makes based on his desires.
This is a crucial point which renders moral nihilism impotent. In this case we are talking about moral information, information about what you ought to do. The claim of moral nihilism is that there is no such information.

If you concede that one person can give moral information to another and that this second person can use that information, value it, then you are no longer in the realm of moral nihilism. You are in the realm of moral meaning and substance.

If I claimed that science was bunk and that there was no meaning to scientific theory but conceded that one person could give another a model for acuratley predicting physical phenomena you’d rightly call me daft.
The fact that people might frame this information-giving in “moral” terms doesn’t change the fact that it’s just an exchange of information, information that one can use when measuring likely outcomes against desires.
You resort to that phrase a lot. The fact that people can “frame” the giving of information about what one ought to do, i.e. moral information, is all that matters here. We can build an entire moral theory on such information giving. The Ten Commandments is “just” God giving mankind information (albeit with much flash and fanfare). Jesus “just” told his disciples to love one another.

I did tell you this would be simple.

Things get more complicated when we deal with other aspects of morality but I am focusing here on very simple examples to show that moral nihilism is a valueless concept easily contradicted by reality.
 
If you concede that one person can give moral information to another and that this second person can use that information, value it, then you are no longer in the realm of moral nihilism. You are in the realm of moral meaning and substance.
Alright, I am going to have to spell this out for you.

Under moral nihilism, the sentence “It’s wrong to run naked in the streets” has no truth value. Running in the streets is neither “wrong” nor “right” in and of itself.

Under moral nihilism, the sentence “You ought not run naked in the streets” has no truth value. Running in the streets might be something you want to do, and it might be something you don’t want to do, but there is no “ought” compelling you not to do it.

Under moral nihilism, the sentence “You ought not run naked in the streets IF you don’t want to be arrested” DOES have a truth value, and it’s a true sentence. It’s a fact that IF you don’t want consequence X, it’s a pretty smart idea to avoid action Y that is extremely likely to lead to consequence X – but not because it’s “wrong” to do Y…merely because Y yields will likely yield a result one doesn’t like.

The mere fact that we can convey a sentence like my last example to one another does nothing to demonstrate that morality exists.

I’ll answer the rest of your questions if you’d like, but I really don’t think it’s going to do you any good.
 
Alright, I am going to have to spell this out for you.

Under moral nihilism, the sentence “It’s wrong to run naked in the streets” has no truth value. Running in the streets is neither “wrong” nor “right” in and of itself.

Under moral nihilism, the sentence “You ought not run naked in the streets” has no truth value. Running in the streets might be something you want to do, and it might be something you don’t want to do, but there is no “ought” compelling you not to do it.

Under moral nihilism, the sentence “You ought not run naked in the streets IF you don’t want to be arrested” DOES have a truth value, and it’s a true sentence. It’s a fact that IF you don’t want consequence X, it’s a pretty smart idea to avoid action Y that is extremely likely to lead to consequence X – but not because it’s “wrong” to do Y…merely because Y yields will likely yield a result one doesn’t like.
I’m sure you think you’re being crystal clear hear but what you are not considering is the nature of truth. What does it mean to say a statement does or does not have a “truth value”? Philosophers have offered various answers to this question but I tend to prefer pragmatism as a test of truth. Something is true if it it aids in your understanding of, or interaction with, the world. Thus, for example, the theory of relativity has truth value because it allows one to predict physics.

As we previously discussed, the statement “you ought not run naked in the streets” does have truth value. It is a useful representation of what one ought or ought not do. The elaboration “IF you don’t want to be arrested” is merely an explanation. But the truth of the claim does not rest on the explanation. Explanations are nice to have but not essential. And there may be other unforeseen consequences that give it truth value. A woman who runs naked through the streets might be raped, for example. The claim is useful even without all the conceivable explanations for it.

Now you might be thinking that perhaps ether are some people who are perfectly content to run through the streets naked and get arrested and, for them, the statement “you ought not run naked in the streets” has no truth value. But this is absurd. At a minimum, for those who don’t want to be arrested, the statement has truth value. And even for those who claim to desire to be arrested this is not the end of the matter for we have to wonder at the mental competence of someone who thinks its a good idea to be arrested for running naked through the streets. Even if you managed got come up with a viable example of someone who had a good reason to be arrested for running naked through the streets the, at a minimum, near universality of the statement gives it “truth value”. It is still useful advice.

More generally, recall that we already discussed that in the transition from math to science we contented ourselves with tentative “truth value”. As far as I know, the statement “you ought not run naked through the streets” is true. Now maybe someday someone will discover some situation where it is a good idea and I will need to amend or refine that claim. The mere possibility that it might not hold true always and forever does not mean it has no “truth value”.
The mere fact that we can convey a sentence like my last example to one another does nothing to demonstrate that morality exists.
No, it is not the conveyances of a statement but, as you say, the “truth value” of it that demonstrates that morality exists. The statement “you ought not run naked through the streets” is useful advice and, therefore, it has truth value.
I’ll answer the rest of your questions if you’d like, but I really don’t think it’s going to do you any good.
It might, though, do you some good. You seem to have developed a list of objections to morality that, it turns out, apply to the pursuit of knowledge, generally. For example, you objected that morality was a mental construct but I showed you that scientific theories are also mental constructs.
 
I feel like I’ve just been stomping on your arguments and you have not really offered any coherent defense of them. Nevertheless, I did say I was sympathetic to moral nihilism, though I think it is mistaken. I have been refuting moral nihilism with a simple morality as friendly advice argument. And certainly that is a true and correct refutation.

But I think you might appreciate the argument better if I showed you why I am sympathetic to moral nihilism. I will argue for moral skepticism.

In a world where such advice exists and is valued you will naturally encounter those who will seek to abuse trust to advance their own interests. Thus you will encounter those who say, “you ought to give me all your money.”

Additionally, consider, for example, these four statements:
  1. You ought not do that.
  2. You must not do that.
  3. If you do that I’ll beat the tar out of you.
  4. Let’s agree that you won’t do that.
They are all moral statements of one sort or another. I have been focusing on moral statements of the first kind where the speaker is offering friendly advice to the listener about what he ought or ought not do.

In the second we have a statement in the form of a command implicitly invoking some sort of authority. This is the common form of law.

And moral claims of the law are often backed by force, as in the third statement.

The fourth statement is a claim that becomes true through agreement, e.g. a contract. Implicit here is that you ought to keep your word and honor your agreements.

As I said earlier, morality is a complex subject. But moral nihilism is an abdication of reason. Better to grapple with the complexity as best we can.
 
You appear to be completely and totally misunderstanding my argument, so I’m going to try to explain it in a different way.

I am in 100% agreement with you that what you seem to be calling “morality” – that is, people giving others advice based on the likely consequences of their actions – exists. I have been in 100% agreement with you on this point from the very beginning, from before the beginning.

I slightly quibble with your claim that “ought” statements – unqualified with IF clauses – have “truth value” because I argue that they have truth value only insofar as they are understood to be linguistic shortcuts for statements that do have truth values. For example, when you say, “You ought not run naked in the streets,” we share enough cultural and contextual points in common that we both understand you to mean “You shouldn’t do this IF you don’t want bad consequences.” We both are perfectly aware that you’re not saying that the act of running naked in the streets is some inherently evil thing, and we both understand that you’re not saying that if I went to a Ghost Town – with no humans around for miles – and decided to run naked in the streets, it would still be “bad.” We’re both aware that you’re speaking in a context and that your phrase is a linguistic shortcut for a phrase that indeed has a truth value.

And, incidentally, the statement “You should not run naked in the streets IF you want to avoid being arrested” is a true sentence that is true for everybody (as are all true statements). Even if someone didn’t want to avoid being arrested, it would still be true that IF he did want to avoid it, he shouldn’t run in the streets.

With that little quibble out of the way, we are in total agreement on this point. This kind of “morality” – thought up by human beings and existing only in the context of human society – certainly exists.

The problem is that I am not using the word “morality” to refer to this phenomenon.

When I say that morality doesn’t exist, the morality I’m talking about is the idea of an eternal, unchanging set of rules – decided by some consciousness other than human – that is binding on all people and makes certain actions inherently “wrong”, regardless of their consequences.

There aren’t many religious folks who would say that murder is wrong “if and only if you want to avoid being caught.” They say that it’s just plain wrong. Always is, always was, doesn’t matter if you want to be caught or not.

To pick a weirder religious rule, there are plenty of religious folks who say that masturbation is always wrong, that it’s an “inherently sinful” act. There are no conditions attached to it – it’s just always wrong, these people say, plain and simple.

When I say I’m a moral nihilist, I’m disputing the claim that “You ought not masturbate” or “You ought not kill people” are eternally existing rules – originating outside of human consciousness – that are binding on people and make these actions inherently wrong, regardless of context.

That’s why your analogy to science doesn’t apply in this situation: of course science is an idea – just as much as morality is an idea – but nobody claims that science is some eternally existing set of procedures dreamt up by something other than human.

Sheesh. If you actually read what I wrote and didn’t spend all of your time smugly pretending that you’re “stomping” my arguments by virtue of waving your hands in displays of sophistry, maybe you would have realized what I was saying five posts ago.
 
You appear to be completely and totally misunderstanding my argument, so I’m going to try to explain it in a different way.

I am in 100% agreement with you that what you seem to be calling “morality” – that is, people giving others advice based on the likely consequences of their actions – exists. I have been in 100% agreement with you on this point from the very beginning, from before the beginning.

I slightly quibble with your claim that “ought” statements – unqualified with IF clauses – have “truth value” because I argue that they have truth value only insofar as they are understood to be linguistic shortcuts for statements that do have truth values. For example, when you say, “You ought not run naked in the streets,” we share enough cultural and contextual points in common that we both understand you to mean “You shouldn’t do this IF you don’t want bad consequences.” We both are perfectly aware that you’re not saying that the act of running naked in the streets is some inherently evil thing, and we both understand that you’re not saying that if I went to a Ghost Town – with no humans around for miles – and decided to run naked in the streets, it would still be “bad.” We’re both aware that you’re speaking in a context and that your phrase is a linguistic shortcut for a phrase that indeed has a truth value.

And, incidentally, the statement “You should not run naked in the streets IF you want to avoid being arrested” is a true sentence that is true for everybody (as are all true statements). Even if someone didn’t want to avoid being arrested, it would still be true that IF he did want to avoid it, he shouldn’t run in the streets.

With that little quibble out of the way, we are in total agreement on this point. This kind of “morality” – thought up by human beings and existing only in the context of human society – certainly exists.

The problem is that I am not using the word “morality” to refer to this phenomenon.
Whether or not you call it morality, and where you attribute it, is not relevant. As I noted previously, I could reject the term “science” and give an explanation for scientific discovery that is “science”-less. And, again as I noted previously, scientific theories also exist only in the context of human society as mental constructs. These are the previous points that you discarded and now I raise them again in response to the above.
When I say that morality doesn’t exist, the morality I’m talking about is the idea of an eternal, unchanging set of rules – decided by some consciousness other than human – that is binding on all people and makes certain actions inherently “wrong”, regardless of their consequences.
This is a very narrow definition of morality. This is not, for example, how Ayn Rand, a flaming atheist, would define it. Nor is this how Plato and Aristotle would define it. Indeed, it’s debatable if this is even an accurate description of orthodox Christian understanding of morality.
There aren’t many religious folks who would say that murder is wrong “if and only if you want to avoid being caught.” They say that it’s just plain wrong. Always is, always was, doesn’t matter if you want to be caught or not.
To pick a weirder religious rule, there are plenty of religious folks who say that masturbation is always wrong, that it’s an “inherently sinful” act. There are no conditions attached to it – it’s just always wrong, these people say, plain and simple.
When I say I’m a moral nihilist, I’m disputing the claim that “You ought not masturbate” or “You ought not kill people” are eternally existing rules – originating outside of human consciousness – that are binding on people and make these actions inherently wrong, regardless of context.
That’s why your analogy to science doesn’t apply in this situation: of course science is an idea – just as much as morality is an idea – but nobody claims that science is some eternally existing set of procedures dreamt up by something other than human.
Sheesh. If you actually read what I wrote and didn’t spend all of your time smugly pretending that you’re “stomping” my arguments by virtue of waving your hands in displays of sophistry, maybe you would have realized what I was saying five posts ago.
It seems to me that you are confusing moral nihilism and atheism. If you want to talk about your atheism, that really deserves another thread. I’ve focused here on refuting your arguments against objective morality by showing that “ought” statements do have truth value.

Whether or not you accept the existence of God and divine moral law, morality can be objectively true.
 
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