**The Necessary Reality Argument**

[mkoopman]

This is the they would be out of a job card trick to keep physicist salaries high.
The philosophy expressed is principally Thomist. The vernacular chosen would need to be subjected to analysis against Aquinas to be certain it is contained within Thomas’ work. It is certainly not comprehensive of Thomist philosophy by any stretch of the imagination. The sophist tweets in the thread regarding Platonist atomicity are warm bits of dribble exuded from the Thomist core. Arguments are the only differential for the conceptualization of choice. It is really a matter of belief or in this crucial matter, opinion. However, either the platonist or thomistic core is significantly better than stating because gravity the selden perturbation wave is breaking. Hey, if you smelt the singularity than you are causally significant to the singularity. All is passing of wind.

 

[mkoopman]

The penultimate gimmee. The singularity hole before moving to the next tee.
You do not seem to be familiar with how precedence transcends reality. Probably a citizen, but even citizens can be stoned when they walk you down the street.
That is causality implies that existence would not be absurdity but stick your head in “gravity,” it’s the absurdity law.

 

[mkoopman]

You missed philosophy 102. You appear to have been granted a passing grade for 101.
The death culture has always existed. It has to due with alleys in Harlem. Do drop in when you start to follow the card game. Yiu make a great shill.

 

[mkoopman]

The laws of physics evolute. How is this different than evaluation of them by grain size? What continuum contains the premise for the stages of the origins of space-time, what a concept, besides reality?

 

[RedFan]

Very well… Then I think your premise 4 is too stringent, too limiting… And not properly justified. Seems to just be an assertion custom made to reach the end result.

I have a different view of the infirmity in IWantGod’s argument. I actually have no problem with #4 because it is, at bottom, just a definition; we can re-write your #4 thus: “That which is necessarily existent is pure-existence, meaning it does not come into existence.” This would be no more than a definition of “necessary existence.”

But how do we know there is a Being whose existence is necessary? That depends on whether #7 is true. I don’t agree that such a necessary Being “must be the cause of any reality that is not necessary” (emphasis mine). Many contingent things are causes of other contingent things. (And this is so regardless of whether “out of absolutely nothing comes nothing,” so I think IWantGod’s use of “since” in #7 is wrongheaded – but that is a topic for another day.)

Precisely because many contingent things are the causes of other contingent things, we need another step, missing from IWantGod’s argument and indeed from every cosmological argument since Aquinas, to disprove an infinite regression of contingent causes. Let me try to recast the argument this way:

Everything is either necessary or contingent. Any contingent thing – any thing whose existence is not logically necessary – has a cause. Let W be the sum total of all things that exist or have ever existed in the world. Since W is contingent, i.e. is not logically necessary, there are causes which sufficiently explain W. Let C be the sum total of all such causes of W. The components of C itself must be either necessary or contingent. Since contingent causes cannot explain themselves, either W is without explanation or there must be at least one necessary cause within C.

Most atheists (or, for that matter, theists) who reject cosmological arguments for the existence of God challenge that “there must be at least one necessary cause within C” on grounds of the possibility of an infinite regression of contingent causes. It needs to be addressed and countered more robustly than IWantGod has done thus far.

[Another possible beef with this argument is that it automatically discounts the possibility that “W is without explanation” as a logical alternative. But I really would need a separate post to give this the attention it deserves . . .]

 

[IWantGod]

Most atheists (or, for that matter, theists) who reject cosmological arguments for the existence of God challenge that “there must be at least one necessary cause within C” on grounds of the possibility of an infinite regression of contingent causes. It needs to be addressed and countered more robustly than IWantGod has done thus far.

Your post was very well written. Thanks for the (name removed by moderator)ut.

I think the only assumption i may have made in the OP is that people would already see that an existentially dependent being can never be considered the reason for the act of existence in general. And thus i put most of my effort into explaining why physical reality is not necessary.

However i do address your concern in the following quote, although not as well written as yours.

In an intermediary sense this can be said to be true in a sense, but a necessary being still has to exist, otherwise no unnecessary being can exist. it is irrelevant how many dependent beings you line up together because none of their natures exist because of their nature. Thus existence cannot be said to originate with them.

In other-words a thing is either dependent or necessary. You cannot have a being that just exists for no reason, neither existing because of its nature or because of the necessary nature of another being. Intermediary causes are irrelevant.

Those who argue for an infinite regress are trying to present it as one big efficient cuase for the existence of dependent beings, but it doesn’t make sense.

To put it another way, it may be possible for there to be an infinite regress of physical events or cause and effect relationships. But every single cause in that regress is in fact an effect. None of them, infinite or otherwise, explains the “existence” of the actual regress because none of the effects actually cause the regress. Therefore a necessary being that is not a part of that physical continuum must exist not temporally but simultaneously with it as its existential cause .

Existence does not actually come those effects, numerous as they may be, but rather existence is given to those effects.

 

[RedFan]

But every single cause in that regress is in fact an effect. None of them, infinite or otherwise, explains the “existence” of the actual regress.

I’m not seeing it, my friend. Cosmological proofs usually amount to this: you designate a bottom turtle, give it a capital “T” and declare that it’s flying. I think you are going to end up there as well unless you can defend the notion that a series of causes requires an independent cause (a) of the series itself, (b) outside of the series. It is far from self-evident.

I understand where you are going with the notion of “existential cause,” but I have never been able to make that work in this context. I’m far from saying that “existence” is an attribute of a “thing” – or of a “relation” between things (i.e., of an efficient “cause.”)

 

[IWantGod]

I’m not seeing it, my friend. Cosmological proofs usually amount to this: you designate a bottom turtle, give it a capital “T” and declare that it’s flying. I think you are going to end up there as well unless you can defend the notion that a series of causes requires an independent cause (a) of the series itself, (b) outside of the series. It is far from self-evident.

It needs a necessary being as its cause because existence does not originate with any dependent being. None of the effects in the regress are the cause of the regress. Its incoherent.

If something exists rather than nothing, one cannot find the reason for that existence in an infinite regress of dependencies. You have simply removed the existential cause and then claimed that because these dependencies regress infinitely that it does not need an existential cause. What you have left is something essentially existing for no reason because none of the effects are a sufficient cause for the ‘existence’ of the effects…

Its absurd.

 

[IWantGod]

I understand where you are going with the notion of “existential cause,” but I have never been able to make that work in this context. I’m far from saying that “existence” is an attribute of a “thing” – or of a “relation” between things (i.e., of an efficient “cause.”)

Well to avoid semantics let me put it another way.

A thing either exists because of its own nature, or it exists because of some other beings nature. These are the only two possibilities.

If a group of dependent physical beings infinitely regress, then by definition of them being dependent means that none of them exist because of their physical nature. and if there is not an efficient cause for the existence of their physical nature this would mean the regress would exist for no reason because you never get to an explanation of why physical nature exists in the first place becuase none of the effects have the explanation., which is absurd.

This may not be clear to you, but it is to me, and we will have to agree to disagree…

 

[IWantGod]

I’ve been trying to keep an eye on the discussion, and I just wanted to throw a thought out on the idea of an infinite regression of causes. Such arguments for the existence of a first cause are based upon the assumption that time and causation are linear in nature

It does not have to be linear. There just has to be an infinite number of dependent events and i am arguing that such an idea cannot be an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing even if its true that there is an infinite number of something. .It is not a sufficient metaphysical argument.

 

[IWantGod]

When you think of a series of events, it begins somewhere in the past, progresses forward to the present, and then continues on into the future. But what if it begins in the present and radiates outward, creating the past as well as the future.

That would be a potentially infinite past and future, both having their beginning in the present. An infinite regress would involve an actual infinite.

 

[ratio1]

there would be no problem with an infinite future nor an infinite past, both would make perfect sense.

I tried to make this very same point earlier on but looks like you have made it more clearly. Thanks!

 

[mkoopman]

You missed ground hog day with this response. Perhaps your Pi tape for linear measure on your radial dial is stretched out a bit like a rubber and a fast ball. No, wait a curve, wrong again, a slider.
I think the tell tale radial signs say, “Swing, Carl.” Not meaning to be alienating by wearing my aluminum hat.

 

[AlNg]

as far as we know, the laws of physics have not changed at all.

Can anyone tell us then what are the unchangeable laws of physics?

 

[AlNg]

What we need to determine now is…what are the necessary attributes of #3?

Why do we need to determine that?

 

[AlNg]

existence does not originate with any dependent being.

You are assuming that existence needs an origination.

 

[Hugh_Farey]

Laws of physics. We could start with E=mc^2, or even F=G(m1m2)/d^2. To within their limits, these, and dozens of others, do not appear to have changed for fifteen billion years or so, and are apparently applicable all across the universe.

AlNg (and lisaandlena). I think the premise of this argument is that existence (in the sense of realisation) does need an origination. The premise is certainly disputable, and is disputed, but for the purposes of discussion of IwantGod’s original 9 point QED, it must be assumed. If it is assumed, then I think IwantGod’s conclusion of a timeless non-physical ‘actuality’ which results in realised, physical space-time is justified.

 

[pocaracas]

pocaracas:

Very well… Then I think your premise 4 is too stringent, too limiting… And not properly justified. Seems to just be an assertion custom made to reach the end result.

I have a different view of the infirmity in IWantGod’s argument. I actually have no problem with #4 because it is, at bottom, just a definition; we can re-write your #4 thus: “That which is necessarily existent is pure-existence, meaning it does not come into existence.” This would be no more than a definition of “necessary existence.”

It would…
One could argue that this pure-existence doesn’t exist in the absence of any other form of existence, but yeah… let’s leave it for some other day…

Still, he then goes on with something more.

That which is necessarily actual is pure-actuality, meaning it does not lack any realization. It is not in a state of becoming. It does not begin to exist. It cannot become more than what it essentially is because what it is by nature is necessarily actual. It is the source of all reality. In other-words it is already everything it could possibly be. Thus it does not change. If it could change it would mean that its being lacked some potential realization, which would mean a part of its being is not necessary or fully realized, which would contradict the fact that its nature is necessarily actual.

See the sentence I bolded in the original?
A premise that contains the result? Maybe IWantGod can rephrase this to avoid such circularity. The way I see it he is defining what you called “pure-existence” and he called “pure-actuality” as the source of all reality.

But how do we know there is a Being whose existence is necessary? That depends on whether #7 is true.

I’d say they all need to be true! And true beyond a doubt.

I commend you on that argument to avoid infinite regression… but

[Another possible beef with this argument is that it automatically discounts the possibility that “W is without explanation” as a logical alternative. But I really would need a separate post to give this the attention it deserves . . .]

Yeah… this is where the randomness and uncertainty from quantum foam can poke their heads and give you a headache.
I feel lucky to live in a time when better minds than my own have discovered(?) and expanded on what we know about the nature of reality.
50 years ago, I wouldn’t be able to come up with a way in which this beef could be reasonable.

 

[AlNg]

Laws of physics. We could start with E=mc^2, or even F=G(m1m2)/d^2. To within their limits, these, and dozens of others, do not appear to have changed for fifteen billion years or so, and are apparently applicable all across the universe.

No. they are not applicable to black holes. You did say within limitations, so I am sure you know that both of these equations have serious limitations and are not applicable all across the universe. First of all consider the equation E = mc^2. The photon has energy but no mass and the equation thus predicts that the energy of the photon should be zero. Further at the time of the BB, it is not clear that c was a constant and so this equation may not have held then. Secondly consider the equation F=G(m1m2)/d^2. It is not quite right because if you take two really distant galaxies then one may not feel the other’s gravitational pull yet because the force of gravity travels at the speed of light. Further the photon has no mass (i.e. m=0) so if you put m=0 into the equation it means that there is no force between the photon and the planet Mercury. But it has been shown that Mercury can bend light rays.
These two equations are rough descriptions of certain physical situations but they are not absolute laws which always hold everywhere.

 

[AlNg]

I think the premise of this argument is that existence (in the sense of realisation) does need an origination. …it must be assumed.

You are assuming what has to be proven.

A premise that contains the result?

That is what I think also.