The problem of evil

[Keeler]

Satisfaction is subjective. My approach is satisfying to me, and you have not been able to refute the reasoning behind it.

Well, since you asserted that Mary, the saints and all the genuinely good people are “forced” by God to avoid evil, that they do not have “free will”, indeeed I am unable to “refute your reasoning”. Have fun, my friend.

 

[EricFilmer]

And that is the fallacy. You artifically restrict the concept of “free will” to a subset of it. You say that to have “true” free will it must incorporate the specific “freedom” to commit evil. That is the “no true Scotsman” fallacy.

Glancing over your latest response, it seems you’ve been doing some cherry picking. My challenge for you to give one example of an evil act that is not a deprivation or perversion of what is good was left on the tree. Moreover I see no response from you concerning my questions as to how it is possible to do good acts while at the same time not possible to do their evil counterparts. And there is also the stuff about whether or not it is possible for someone to be a champion if there is no great struggle to overcome. More cherries left on the tree.

Now, concerning your above statement, in Post #46 I said:
“My stance is that the specific freedom to do good or evil includes the actual ability to do evil. If you think that is a ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy then prove it by using my previous statements that demonstrate me doing it.” (emphasis added)

Of course, you elected not to quote anything from my past material. So where exactly did I say, “To have ‘true’ freewill it must incorporate the specific freedom to commit evil”? Where’s the actual quote of me doing this? You didn’t quote me for the simple fact I never said it.

I mentioned before that you were getting into the area of using straw man arguments. (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man). At this point it can objectively be demonstrated that you have. Observe:

My definition of freewill from Post #20:
“When the question of freewill comes up in a discussion about the problem of evil, we need to realize that the definition of freewill means the ability of a person to do whatever is possible for that person.”

My clarifications from Post #46 & 54:
“I never said that every action is done in the context of morality.”
“What I have been discussing in this thread is not the concept of absolute freedom or freedom in general, but specifically the freedom to do good or evil. “
“The topic at hand is the specific freedom to choose good or evil. If I am told that I have the freedom to do evil, but I am somehow prevented from doing an evil act, then I was not free to do it to begin with.”
“The possibility to do evil is a necessary consequence of our freedom to accept or reject God."

Based upon all this, I never said (as you claim): “To have ‘true’ freewill it must incorporate the specific ‘freedom’ to commit evil”, or anything like that. I never said that the inability to do evil negates the concept of freedom as a whole. That’s the straw man you set up.

And now let me address your comment that I am “artificially restricting the concept of freewill to a subset.” I have not restricted the concept of freewill to the subset of morality. What I have done is restricted the context of the discussion to this subset. In Post #54 I stated, “Once again you are trying to examine this topic in a broader category of human freedom. The topic at hand is the specific freedom to choose good or evil. If I am told that I have the freedom to do evil, but I am somehow prevented from doing an evil act, then I was not free to do it to begin with. It’s as simple as that.”

Moreover, this is not an “artificial” restriction. The thread is about morality, so what are being examined are actions that impact morality. My choice to either drink lemonade or a root beer involves human freedom but is irrelevant to the topic of morality. My choice to either buy lemonade or steal it, however, is relevant.

Sure thing. But from the ability to commit evil acts it does NOT logically follow that someone will actually commit that evil act.

So? Why does it have to logically follow that someone will commit an evil act in order for my premise to work? The fact remains that many people choose to commit evil acts. This thread is about the problem of the specific evil acts that take place in this world (i.e., actualized evil decisions), not the problem of potential evil acts (i.e., that haven’t happened yet, and may not happen). Moreover, as I have repeatedly stated, God gives people the freedom to accept or reject him, and it is by evil acts that people reject him. Otherwise it is the situation I illustrated previously with a love potion.

(Continued in my next post)

 

[EricFilmer]

(Continued…)

But you are NOT prevented by an external agency. Your internal disposition prevents you. You have the “locus of decision”.

The topic of this thread is why God permits evil rather than create a world where no evil is possible. Therefore, the only way for your premise to work is for God to program everyone’s internal disposition to prevent them from doing evil acts. In this case, the internal disposition is ultimately created and programed by God, and therefore its source is an external agency. God would be programing the locus of decision, and he would be programing it in a way that ruled out the possibility of the decision making process resulting in an evil action. In light of this, the internal disposition is not actually a solely internal phenomenon, but rather a channel for the directives of God.

EricFilmer;7728727:

No one is “literally” unable to commit an evil act, despite their disposition (assuming that they are capable of knowing right from wrong to begin with). You are suggesting that a person could have such a strong conscience that given the choice to do good or evil, his conscience forces him to reject doing the evil action. If that is the case then God (who works through the conscience) forces the person to always choose good, and hence the person was never truly free

to commit evil to begin with.

Yes, indeed. Some people are like that. And they still have all the freedom to actually commit good and evil acts, they simply exercise their freedom in the “correct” fashion.

I agree. People have the freedom to choose good or evil. A saint is someone who lives a life of heroic virtue, meaning that they struggled against the temptation to sin (as all people do) but, generally speaking, make righteous choices over sinful (evil) ones. Saints in general may have sinned here and there (even perhaps greatly so on occasion), but overall they lived in a righteous manner. That is what I clearly articulated previously in Posts #4, 28 & 56. The role of the conscience (in the context of morality) is to guide people during the decision making process to select right over wrong. But the conscience does not outright prevent an evil choice from being made.

If you deny this, if you say that they are “forced” by God, then there is nothing else to talk about. If you maintain this, then you say that Mary had no free will, that the saints had no free will, that all the genuinely good people have no free will, because God “forces” them to obey their conscience.

Well, since you asserted that Mary, the saints and all the genuinely good people are “forced” by God to avoid evil, that they do not have “free will”, indeeed I am unable to “refute your reasoning”. Have fun, my friend.

I am not exactly sure what you are trying to say here. This whole part of the discussion stems from what you presented in Post #21. In giving an example of a world where there is freewill but no evil actions, you submitted the following:

“2) Also they could have been created with the freedom to perform evil acts, if they wanted to, but they would not want to do so. Just look at those people who are “saints” (or simply very good people), who may not be “perfect”, but who would never want (or wish or will) to perform “evil” acts - even though they could imagine them and would be physically able to perform them. Catholics explicitly assert that Mary was fully human with free will and never performed an “evil” act. Therefore there is no logical contradiction between being human, having free will and not performing evil actions.”

Sure, there is no contradiction. Otherwise, one could say that Adam and Eve were not human until they broke God’s commandment. But it is not enough for you to suggest that such a reality could exist and leave it at that. You have to demonstrate how God could go about enacting it and maintaining it. After all, the whole theme of the thread is the possibility of criticizing God for permitting evil by demonstrating a viable alternate way he could have done things.

Along those lines, my question to you is how could each and every person in the world be able to imagine evil, have the ability to do evil, and yet “never want (or wish or will) to perform evil acts”? Remember, you are giving an example where evil is possible and yet flat out does not occur. For this to happen, it has to be an aspect of how God creates people. This example represents God giving people the freewill to do evil, but at the same time not allowing them the will to do evil. After all, you said they “would never want (or wish or will) to perform evil acts” (emphasis added). How can someone have the freewill to do evil but not the will to do evil? That is not a rhetorical question, so I’d like an answer (assuming that it is still your position that your suggested alternative world is a viable possibility).

I maintain that such a world you suggest is not possible. If God gives us the freewill to do evil but without the will to do evil, then there was no freewill to do evil to begin with. And yet in the above quotes you say that my position somehow results in Mary and the saints being forced by God to obey their consciences. How about working that one out for me again?

(Continued in my next post…)

 

[EricFilmer]

(Continued…)

Sorry, my friend, that is complete nonsense. (And you keep committing the “no true Scotsman” fallacy over and over again. Look at the highlighted “truly free” above.)

Ok, I’m looking. Here was my statement from Post #54 in full, with your highlights:
“No one is ‘literally’ unable to commit an evil act, despite their disposition (assuming that they are capable of knowing right from wrong to begin with). You are suggesting that a person could have such a strong conscience that given the choice to do good or evil, his conscience forces him to reject doing the evil action. If that is the case then God (who works through the conscience) forces the person to always choose good, and hence the person was never truly free to commit evil to begin with.”

I clearly said, “…never truly free to commit evil to begin with.” I did not say that such a person has no freedom, period. At this point, it would be helpful to display what the classic “no true Scotsman” fallacy actually is:

Person A’s Proposition: “All Scotsmen like haggis.”
Person B’s Rebuttal: “My uncle is a Scotsman, and he doesn’t like haggis.”
Person A’s Defense of Proposition Against Rebuttal: “Well, all true Scotsmen like haggis.”

Person B’s rebuttal demonstrates that the proposition is contradictory (i.e., the proposition that all Scotsmen like haggis contradicts the reality of there being at least one who does not). Person A then redefines his proposition in a way that attempts to dismiss the rebuttal as being inapplicable (i.e., the uncle in question is not a “true” Scotsman, so his dislikes cannot be used to invalidate the proposition). The rebuttal, however, is not actually refuted because Person A simply redefined the proposition to exclude the case submitted by Person B.

Now, seeing as you keep bring up the “no true Scotsman” fallacy, my challenge to you is to use the “no true Scotsman” formula (as presented above) with the statements that I actually made.

Here’s how the formula will look:

My Proposition: (Fill in the blank here with an actual quote from me that sets up what you feel led to a ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy. And notice that I want to see an actual quote, not your interpretation of what I said)

Your Rebuttal: (You need to fill in this part also; give a quote or an accurate paraphrase from a past post of yours; and notice that I want to see what you actually said, not what you wish you had said)

My Defense Against the Rebuttal, as paraphrased from my statement from Post #54 wherein you said the fallacy happened): “If a person’s conscience (which comes from God) is so strong that, when the choice between doing good or evil arises, the conscience forces him to always choose good, he was never truly free to commit evil to begin with.”

So I will now leave you to fill in the blanks. But I have a suspicion that this will end up being another cherry left on the tree.

 

[grannymh]

My definition of freewill from Post #20:
“When the question of freewill comes up in a discussion about the problem of evil, we need to realize that the definition of freewill means the ability of a person to do whatever is possible for that person.”

May I point out that free will is in regard to choice and not necessarily doing whatever is possible for that person.

Basically the nature of our will is to seek the ultimate good which is God. We have the ability to choose to be good in that the actions we choose are good ones. Some of the actions we choose may not be possible for us to actually do, for example we may get sick on Sunday. The fact that we could not get to the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass did not change our ability (free will) to choose to do so. Even though Mass was not a possibility, we still can choose the good of being in God’s presence.

Due to our flawed nature and the deceit of Satan, our will often chooses to seek a lesser good such as a material object which may be neutral or an action which is sinful. We may think about all the good things such as personal pleasure of a sinful act and choose to do so. Our reasoning is flawed most likely because we prefer it that way.

At the moment of Original Sin, Satan gained access to the world including us. We need to face the fact that our wounded (not destroyed) human nature puts us in a position of battle with Satan. We are inclined, (not destined) to the evil choices presented by Satan as good stuff. We may even enjoy our flawed reasoning.

The whole of our history has been a story of combat with the power of evil, Satan. Jesus walking in human shoes battled Satan during the time in the desert. Jesus’ gift of Himself present in the Catholic Eucharist is His way of being with us when we face Satan in our desert. The Seven Sacraments provide the help and strength which our will needs to remain with God and win the battle over evil.

We constantly need to use our free will to choose God as we choose to do or not to do a particular action. Our free will is the guarantee that we have the ability to defeat whatever evil comes our way.

Blessings,
granny

“Amen, I say to you, today you will be with Me in Paradise.”
Luke 23: 33-43

 

[EricFilmer]

EricFilmer;7732111:

My definition of freewill from Post #20:

“When the question of freewill comes up in a discussion about the problem of evil, we need to realize that the definition of freewill means the ability of a person to do whatever is possible for that person.”

May I point out that free will is in regard to choice and not necessarily doing whatever is possible for that person…

Thanks Granny, I appreciate your (name removed by moderator)ut and am in complete agreement. I made my initial definition of freewill (which you presented above) as more of a statement about God’s omnipotence (please refer to
Post #20 to see what I mean). I resubmitted this same statement in a post today to show keeler what I have actually said on the topic of freewill in this thread (be it God’s freewill or ours), rather than his misinterpretations of what I said.

In any event, freewill is rooted in choice, as you pointed out, and in my various posts herein I think I have covered the aspect of choice fairly well. Keep up the good work

 

[Keeler]

I gave you a polite farewell, but you keep on. Oh well.

The topic of this thread is why God permits evil rather than create a world where no evil is possible.

Gimme a break. They are one and the same. If God is omnipotent, then he could have created a world without evil, as long as that world is not logically contradictory. For the “free will defense” to work, you must prove that the existence of “true” free will (to use your terminology) will always, without exception lead to the existence of “evil actions”. That it is logically impossible to have “true” free will without “evil acts”.

Therefore, the only way for your premise to work is for God to program everyone’s internal disposition to prevent them from doing evil acts. In this case, the internal disposition is ultimately created and programed by God, and therefore its source is an external agency. God would be programing the locus of decision, and he would be programing it in a way that ruled out the possibility of the decision making process resulting in an evil action. In light of this, the internal disposition is not actually a solely internal phenomenon, but rather a channel for the directives of God.

Nonsense. Our disposition is partially determined by our genetic heritage and partially by our upbringing (nature and nurture). And our disposition does not fully determine our actions, it merely influences them (very strongly).

But, if what you say were true, then every “disposition” would be hard wired and programmed by God, therefore there would be no free will at all.

And no, I am not interested in replying to every sentence.

 

[paedagogo]

(Continued…)

According to the Bible, the whole reason for our existence is to love God and neighbor. Moreover, we are taught that how we treat one another directly impacts on our relationship with God. Many times in the Old Testament the prophets criticized people because they chose to worship God (offering sacrifices, observing the Sabbath regulations, etc.) while mistreating their neighbor. This same sentiment is also expressed multiple times in the New Testament. Going back to your suggestion, the choice to simply worship God does not count as the sole means by which one accepts God. A person can chose to worship God but end up rejecting God in how he treats others. What we do toward other human beings has a bearing on our relationship with God because that is precisely how he set it up. You can submit that God could have done things differently but that has little to do with the topic at hand. This is an examination of how things are, not a theoretical alternate reality.

Furthermore, your example does not take into account that God is the personification of goodness. Goodness = God-ness. Evil is contrary to goodness and therefore contrary to God. How can a person commit evil against his neighbor and this not be, at the same time, a rejection of God?

My love potion example works either way. For example, let us say that the man gives the woman an eros AND agape potion. The ensuing spell causes her to have emotional love for the man (eros) as well as the desire to be charitable to him, make sacrifices for him, and to be more concerned for him than for herself (agape). The spell compels both feelings (amorous love and desire) and action (charitable acts). The same question is at hand: in his relationship with this woman, does the man have what we consider true love? My position is that he does not. No matter how we want to define what aspects of love are present in the example’s relationship, there is no true love because these aspects were forced.

Keeler, at this point I think you could use a little refresher as to what a “no true Scotsman” fallacy actually is: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_true_Scotsman
It seems like every time I use the word “true” you want to simply accuse me of utilizing a “no true Scotsman” fallacy without demonstrating exactly how I did this. I was responding to your example of a world in which people have the ability to do evil (and imagine it) but are somehow infused with a kind of righteous inclination that, in essence, prevents them from doing it. On one hand, this could still be argued as God preventing someone from choosing to do evil. But in my initial response, I stated that your example does not allow one to be a “true champion of virtue” because there is no real temptation to do evil. What does it mean to be what people consider to be a “true champion?” It means triumphing after a great struggle. In your example there is no great struggle, no great temptation, and therefore no great victory. It does not require a “true champion” to win an easy battle. That was my point. Simply ignoring my rationale and trying to dismiss my position with an inapplicable fallacy accusation does not cut it. If you want to properly refute my position, you need to demonstrate how someone within the confines of your example can be a “true champion of virtue.” So far, you haven’t done that. And if it is your position that the world does not need such true champions, then all that amounts to is you criticizing God for not making the kind of world you prefer rather than the one he actually made.

(Continued in my next post)

I can’t say that I think of God as the personification of anything, except when Jesus was on Earth. How can you say that God is attributed goodness as a human quality? Is it not the other way around?

 

[EricFilmer]

I gave you a polite farewell, but you keep on. Oh well.

In this thread you claimed four times that I committed the “no true Scotsman” fallacy without once demonstrating this to be so. Did you seriously think that I wouldn’t challenge you to back up your accusation? And at this point it is painfully obvious that you can neither back it up nor are you willing to admit it. You might want to ponder what that says about your level of intellectual honesty.

And incidentally, a farewell that follows on the heels of denouncing my position as “complete nonsense” along with once more erroneously labeling it as a fallacy is hardly a polite one.

Gimme a break. They are one and the same. If God is omnipotent, then he could have created a world without evil, as long as that world is not logically contradictory.

As I repeatedly stated before, the reason God created this world was for love, including the possibility for people to accept or reject him in the context of a loving relationship. It is by evil action that we reject him. Therefore, it most certainly is a logical contradiction to suggest that people can be free to accept or reject God without the actual ability to reject him. So neither here nor anywhere else in this thread have you conclusively demonstrated how God could have done otherwise. I refuted your earlier submitted examples, and you have not been able to defend your positions.

For the “free will defense” to work, you must prove that the existence of “true” free will (to use your terminology) will always, without exception lead to the existence of “evil actions”.

You bring this up over and over without once giving any coherent explanation as to why. Seeing as you keep saying this, one would think that by now you could give at least one clear example to illustrate your point. So I will simply say that the freewill defense does not present a case that necessarily leads, without exception, to the existence of evil actions. If you continue to claim otherwise then prove it, and that means bringing to the discussion something other than your unsubstantiated opinions.

Also, for the “umpteenth” time, let me state that the topic of this discussion is as follows: the freedom to do good or evil must include the ability to actually do evil. To say that a person is free to do evil, but is somehow prevented each time he attempts to do evil means that he was not truly free to begin with. It seems that every time the word “truly” or “true” pops up, that’s your cue to toss out the “no true Scotsman” accusation, and each time you demonstrate that you don’t “truly” know what the “no true Scotsman” fallacy actually is. When I use the word “truly” or “true” in this thread, it is in the context of whether or not a proposition contains an inherent contradiction. Consider the scenario at hand: A person is told that he is free to either do good or evil, but, when choosing evil he is prevented from actually doing it. This scenario contains a contradiction, because he is told that he is free to do evil, when in fact he is not. Therefore, he is “not truly free” to do evil. How on earth this is so hard to grasp this is beyond me.

(Continued in my next post)

 

[EricFilmer]

(Continued…)

That it is logically impossible to have “true” free will without “evil acts”.

Did I ever say this? Nope. Did any other proponent of the freewill explanation ever say this? Not that I’m aware of. Quite frankly, I think it is incredible that you have decided to once more committed a straw man fallacy. And not only this, you did the exact same one I detailed yesterday in Post #61! This now makes at least two, and possibly as many as four, straw man arguments you’ve done in a single thread.
Out of curiosity, what’s your record?

Nonsense. Our disposition is partially determined by our genetic heritage and partially by our upbringing (nature and nurture). And our disposition does not fully determine our actions, it merely influences them (very strongly).

Our genetic heritage is created by God.
Nature and our capacity to nurture are created by God.
This is why I stated that our disposition to do good ultimately has its source in God.

But, if what you say were true, then every “disposition” would be hard wired and programmed by God, therefore there would be no free will at all.

Our use of the term “disposition” was specifically the role of the conscience. In other words, the disposition to choose right over wrong. But that is not the only disposition that confronts people. There is also, for example, concupiscence, which means that we are susceptible to the temptation to commit evil. Many sins, after all, have a sensual allurement to them. So there are two dispositions in opposition with each other. One is from God (the conscience) and the other arises from our fallen human nature (concupiscence). So contrary to your above statement, every disposition is not hard wired and programmed by God.

Both dispositions guide our decision-making process, but neither can force compliance. And let me also point out that you have not given an adequate explanation as to why having a God-given conscience results in the loss of freewill. In your above statement you said that such would be the case without saying why.

And no, I am not interested in replying to every sentence.

Now that’s what I call an understatement!

Here is a list of some of the questions and challenges that you have not been interested in answering. Anyone reading this thread can judge for themselves how much of a bearing these have had on our debate, and/or whether or not they were worth responding to:

Post #54: “If you think that is a “no true Scotsman” fallacy then prove it by using my previous statements that demonstrate me doing it.”

Post #55: “Goodness = God-ness. Evil is contrary to goodness and therefore contrary to God. How can a person commit evil against his neighbor and this not be, at the same time, a rejection of God?”

Post #55: “If you want to properly refute my position, you need to demonstrate how someone within the confines of your example can be a ‘true champion of virtue.’ So far, you haven’t done that.”

Post #56:: “How can it be possible to help someone with surgery without it also being possible to use those same methods in a perverse way to inflict torture?” (etc.)

Post #57: “I challenge you to give me one example of an evil action that is not a deprivation or perversion of that which is good.”

Post #61: “So where exactly did I say, ‘To have ‘true’ freewill it must incorporate the specific freedom to commit evil’?”

Post #61: “Why does it have to logically follow that someone will commit an evil act in order for my premise to work?”

Post #62: “…you said they ’would never want (or wish or will) to perform evil acts’ (emphasis added). How can someone have the freewill to do evil but not the will to do evil? That is not a rhetorical question, so I’d like an answer.”

Post #62: “…you say that my position somehow results in Mary and the saints being forced by God to obey their consciences. How about working that one out for me again?”

Post #63: “…my challenge to you is to use the ‘no true Scotsman’ formula (as presented above) with the statements that I actually made.

And so you claim that you’re simply just “not interested” in responding to these questions.
Well, suffice to say I can easily envision another possible reason that explains your lack of response.

 

[Keeler]

Also, for the “umpteenth” time, let me state that the topic of this discussion is as follows: the freedom to do good or evil must include the ability to actually do evil.

No, it is already incorrect. The topic is: “how can we reconcile God’s alleged omniscience, omnipotence and benevolence with the existence of evil?”. That is the topic. You used the so-called free will defense (which is just one of the attempts). The free will defense says that it is logically impossible to have a state of affairs where moral agents have the ability to choose either good or evil, and they will always choose good. And that is what you (or anyone else) cannot prove. Even Plantinga, who is the foremost advocate of the free will defense admits that it has problems.

It is correct to observe that the existence of free will does lead logically and inevitably to the potentiality of evil. But the potentiality of evil does not lead to the actuality of evil. If you cannot understand this distinction, there is nothing else to talk about.

For the “free will defense” to work, you must prove that the existence of “true” free will (to use your terminology) will always, without exception lead to the existence of “evil actions”.

Because it is obvious. It is you who do not understand the “free will defense”. It means that the existence of “free will” is the necessary and sufficient cause and explanation for the existence of “evil” actions (not just the possibility of them).

To say that a person is free to do evil, but is somehow prevented each time he attempts to do evil means that he was not truly free to begin with.

This is again your misunderstanding. I did bring up the examples of Mary, the saints and the genuinely good people who are NOT prevented from choosing evil but simply do not “wish”, “want”, “choose”, “will” (these are all synonyms!) to do it. Are they “prevented” from doing so?

Consider the scenario at hand: A person is told that he is free to either do good or evil, but, when choosing evil he is prevented from actually doing it. This scenario contains a contradiction, because he is told that he is free to do evil, when in fact he is not. Therefore, he is “not truly free” to do evil. How on earth this is so hard to grasp this is beyond me.

How difficult is it to understand that the person is NOT prevented by external agents or sources??? If I have the opportunity to pocket a 100 bucks due to the error of a cashier and choose to give the money back, am I “prevented” from committing evil? Not at all. I have the opportunity to take the money, I contemplate for a very short time, and I choose to give it back. My conscience - which stems from my upbringing and my nature (not God!) - is the factor which “compels” me to give it back.

 

[grannymh]

If the problem of evil refers to “sinful” actions committed by an individual, one needs to consider the quality of the deliberate action. Any action in itself exists. It is the relationship of the action to “goodness” which determines the quality of the action which can be either good or evil. When there is a negative relationship between the action and “goodness”, then the action lacks the quality of goodness. This lack of the quality of goodness or this negative relationship determines what is evil.

There is a good or evil quality to each action that exists. The moral quality, good or evil, is something beyond the action.This quality concerns the action’s relation to goodness. An action is good when it has the quality of moral goodness. An action is evil when it lacks the quality of moral goodness.

 

[EricFilmer]

I can’t say that I think of God as the personification of anything, except when Jesus was on Earth. How can you say that God is attributed goodness as a human quality? Is it not the other way around?

Here is my line of thinking in this regard. When we consider the virtues (goodness, love, truth, etc.), they originate from God. Therefore, ultimately they are not simply concepts but rather a person. I don’t say that God is attributed goodness as a human quality, but rather that goodness is simply another way of saying “God-ness” (which is where the word goodness comes from; for example, the term “thank goodness” is a euphemism for “thank God”: dictionary.reference.com/browse/goodness).

 

[danserr]

Because it is obvious. It is you who do not understand the “free will defense”. It means that the existence of “free will” is the necessary and sufficient cause and explanation for the existence of “evil” actions (not just the possibility of them).

The free will defense still works even if free will does not necessarily entail the existence of evil, ie. if there is a possible world where creatures are free, but don’t commit evil.

Why? Because while there may be such a possible word like that, there may not be a *feasible * world where free will exists without moral evil. That is to such, such a world may have overriding drawbacks (such as a very small number of people, for instance), that would cause God to not actualize that world.

 

[EricFilmer]

No, it is already incorrect. The topic is: “how can we reconcile God’s alleged omniscience, omnipotence and benevolence with the existence of evil?”. That is the topic.

Yes, that’s the topic of the thread and it is the general context of our discussion, but not the specific topic herein. You decided to debate me on my explanation of how the power and benevolence of God can be reconciled with the existence of evil. The foundation of my explanation, as expressed in Post #4 (the post that you quoted when you joined this thread) is as follows:

“God intends that this universe be a moral universe. It is a place where he guides, nourishes and empowers people to be champions of virtue. It is through grappling with the temptation to sin, and choosing not to, that a person grows in virtue. No one can be a great saint unless there is the possibility of being a great sinner instead. And whereas there are those who use their freewill to make righteous choices and become champions of virtue, there are those who use their freewill to make evil choices. If God prevents them from sinning then human freedom does not truly exist. And God cannot love people and at the same time rob them of their freedom. After all, forcing people to do ones will is a violation of the whole concept of love.”

In terms of my statement about being truly free, I clarified this several times in this thread as follows: Having the freedom to do good or evil must include the actual ability to choose and do evil. If a person is prevented from choosing and doing evil then he was not actually free to do to begin with. Moreover, within a loving relationship the beloved must be free to accept or reject the lover. God created us to be in a loving relationship with him, and it is by evil action that we reject him. Therefore the we must be free to choose to do good or evil, and likewise free to act on our choices in terms of good or evil.

This material, therefore, is the topic of our discussion because it is what you are intending to refute.

You used the so-called free will defense (which is just one of the attempts). The free will defense says that it is logically impossible to have a state of affairs where moral agents have the ability to choose either good or evil, and they will always choose good. And that is what you (or anyone else) cannot prove. Even Plantinga, who is the foremost advocate of the free will defense admits that it has problems.

There is no “the” free will defense because there are many different ones out there (as a simple Google search of the term “free will defense” demonstrates). You seem to be suggesting that Plantinga’s argument is likewise mine. Therefore, I ask you to read Plantinga’s and compare and contrast with mine (as articulated in the above purple text).

You will also notice that among philosophers there is hardly a consensus regarding Plantinga’s position. Some say that it sufficiently and satisfactorily addresses the problem of evil, some say it doesn’t. So whether or not Plantinga’s defense fails depends on whom one asks, or whose critique one wants to adopt. But I am not trying to defend Plantinga’s position but rather my own. In Post #18 you were responding to my position, and yet you have consistently been addressing your critiques to other philosophical material, not mine. Therefore, if it is your intention to attempt to refute my material then stick to the comments I made here in this thread. And if you think my defense is the same as Plantinga’s then explain why.

(Continued in my next post)

 

[EricFilmer]

(Continued…)

It is correct to observe that the existence of free will does lead logically and inevitably to the potentiality of evil. But the potentiality of evil does not lead to the actuality of evil. If you cannot understand this distinction, there is nothing else to talk about. Because it is obvious.

There is plenty to talk about. Namely, you can demonstrate through an example how this critique applies to what I stated in Post #4 (or anything else I presented in this thread). I noticed that you gave an example regarding $100 received through a cashier error. It is a useful example for the topic at hand and we can use that as a starting point (I will get to that shortly in another post). As to your example involving the saints, you did not actually apply it to my material. You said that my stance somehow ends up forcing the saints to choose good over evil, but you did not clearly demonstrate how you reached that conclusion. But more on the saints in a moment.

It is you who do not understand the “free will defense”. It means that the existence of “free will” is the necessary and sufficient cause and explanation for the existence of “evil” actions (not just the possibility of them).

As I stated before, there is no ”the” free will defense. And the only free will defense I need to understand for the sake of this discussion is the one I brought up. The particular free will position that I am using is the one presented by Archbishop Fulton Sheen in his book God’s World and Our Place in it (originally published under the title The Moral Universe). Sheen did not actually come up with this concept all on his own, but I base my stance on how he articulated it. So this is one free will defense that I, at least, understand quite well. Instead of telling me what your understanding of the free will defense is, address the one I have been using, as reiterated in purple text in my last post.

This is again your misunderstanding. I did bring up the examples of Mary, the saints and the genuinely good people who are NOT prevented from choosing evil but simply do not “wish”, “want”, “choose”, “will” (these are all synonyms!) to do it. Are they “prevented” from doing so?

Yes, you brought up this example and I addressed it in Post #62. Apparently we just have two different explanations as to why a saint acts righteously. Your definition is one who simply does not “wish”, “want”, “choose” or “will.” In using statements like “wish” and “want” you seem to be ignoring the concept of concupiscence and the temptation to do evil. St. Francis of Assisi, for example, once felt the temptation to commit fornication, so in that sense he wanted to do it. He made the choice to instead throw himself into a snow bank (in other words, the same idea as “taking a cold shower”). So he also wanted to act righteously. In this case, St. Francis had the desire to commit sin and the desire to obey God’s law, so it was the struggle between conscience and concupiscence, with the actual choice being left to St. Francis (and he chose snow over sex). If I say that St. Francis had free will, how does that somehow equate to saying that in this example he was “prevented” from committing fornication? But for the sake of convenience, I suggest instead of delving further into this saint example we elaborate on your “What to Do with the Money?” example (seeing as it is also applicable to the saints). My next post will be exclusively devoted to examining that example.

How difficult is it to understand that the person is NOT prevented by external agents or sources???

And where have I said otherwise? Preventing an action is a violation of free will. Once again, are we talking about my free will defense here or that of someone else?

(Continued in my next post)

 

[EricFilmer]

(Continued…)

If I have the opportunity to pocket a 100 bucks due to the error of a cashier and choose to give the money back, am I “prevented” from committing evil? Not at all. I have the opportunity to take the money, I contemplate for a very short time, and I choose to give it back. My conscience - which stems from my upbringing and my nature (not God!) - is the factor which “compels” me to give it back.

I disagree that your conscience stems from your own nature rather than God. But debate on that may start to go off-topic. Suffice to say, your example includes the same basic elements I described in my example of St. Francis from my last post. Here are your statements and my elaboration on them:

“I have the opportunity to take the money”: In this life we are presented with situations to make moral choices.

“I contemplate for a very short time”: Because this is a situation involving a moral choice, what you are contemplating is to either do good or do evil.

“My conscience - which stems from my upbringing and my nature (not God!) - is the factor which ‘compels’ me to give it back”: Let us contemplate exactly what is going on here (and at this time I am using what C.S. Lewis brought up in Mere Christianity). There are two fundamental choices here. One choice is to keep the money (and money, of course, is an important commodity in our society). The opposing choice is to return the money (and this choice arises from the fact that even though it was given to you by mistake, objectively speaking you were not entitled to it, nor was it the cashier’s intention to give it to you). The role of the conscience represents a guiding factor when these two choices are contemplated. It points out, for example, that it is wrong to profit from another’s mistakes. It points out that the cashier in question could lose her job when her register comes up $100 short at the end of the day. It points out that if the situation were reversed, and we were cashiers who accidentally handed out $100 in change, we would want the beneficiary of this mistake to return the money. So your conscience tells you to return the money but it is important to also recognize that at the same time your concupiscence (i.e., the susceptibility to being tempted by sin) is telling you things like, “Keep the money for yourself! Think of the stuff you could purchase! A hundred bucks buys a lot of beer, dude!” Ok, moving on…

“and I choose to give it back.” Neither the conscience nor concupiscence forced compliance. As you stated before, your conscience “compelled” you. But you could have acted otherwise, and I think many other people in the same situation would have acted otherwise. You chose to act on the impulse of your conscience rather than the impulse of concupiscence.

Generally speaking, it seems we are both in agreement over at least the basic elements of the decision-making process of your example. There is the opportunity to do good or to do evil, and you chose to do good. You were not forced to do good. What I am not clear on is the purpose this example is intended to serve in the discussion at hand. If it is supposed to be a refutation of another free will defense out there then that is one thing. If this is supposed to be a refutation of free will defense I used then that is another.

Can what I stated in this thread (as reiterated in the purple text in Post #74 ) be true and my elaboration on the “What to Do with the Money?” example also be true (i.e., the “What to Do with the Money?” example falls within the confines of my conception of free will)? If so, then the “What to Do with the Money?” example does not refute my free will defense. If the “What to Do with the Money?” example is true, and it demonstrates that my free will conception cannot also be true, then explain how (and do so by demonstrating the logical contradiction).

 

[grannymh]

The first problem of evil is that it resides in the nature of Satan who is not a part of God.
The second problem of evil is that it is a description of a particular human action which lacks the quality of goodness or is in a negative position in relationship to God.

Neither problem impinges on the nature of God.

 

[Keeler]

The free will defense still works even if free will does not necessarily entail the existence of evil, ie. if there is a possible world where creatures are free, but don’t commit evil.

Why? Because while there may be such a possible word like that, there may not be a *feasible * world where free will exists without moral evil. That is to such, such a world may have overriding drawbacks (such as a very small number of people, for instance), that would cause God to not actualize that world.

Two problems here. You say that “having too few people” would be a drawback. On what grounds do you say this? Do you really think that God is interested in some kind of a “numbers game”?

But the more serious problem is that there is no logical necessity of having “only a few people”. Do you think that there is a special number “X”, so that with “X” number of people you can have an “evil-free” world, but having “X+1” people in a world evil will necessarily “creep in”? As a matter of fact, you can have as many people in these “evil-free” worlds as you want to. There is no upper limit to the number of people in these “evil-free” worlds.

By the way, what is the difference (in your opinion) between a “possible” world and a “feasible” world? God’s omnipotence is usually understood that God can create anything and everything as long as that world does not contain a logical contradiction. And since there is no logical contradiction between having “free will” without actual “evil”, and there is no upper limit to the number of people in such a world, God can actualize (or instantiate) such a world.

 

[Keeler]

“I have the opportunity to take the money”: In this life we are presented with situations to make moral choices.

“I contemplate for a very short time”: Because this is a situation involving a moral choice, what you are contemplating is to either do good or do evil.

“My conscience - which stems from my upbringing and my nature (not God!) - is the factor which ‘compels’ me to give it back”: Let us contemplate exactly what is going on here (and at this time I am using what C.S. Lewis brought up in Mere Christianity). There are two fundamental choices here. One choice is to keep the money (and money, of course, is an important commodity in our society). The opposing choice is to return the money (and this choice arises from the fact that even though it was given to you by mistake, objectively speaking you were not entitled to it, nor was it the cashier’s intention to give it to you). The role of the conscience represents a guiding factor when these two choices are contemplated. It points out, for example, that it is wrong to profit from another’s mistakes. It points out that the cashier in question could lose her job when her register comes up $100 short at the end of the day. It points out that if the situation were reversed, and we were cashiers who accidentally handed out $100 in change, we would want the beneficiary of this mistake to return the money. So your conscience tells you to return the money but it is important to also recognize that at the same time your concupiscence (i.e., the susceptibility to being tempted by sin) is telling you things like, “Keep the money for yourself! Think of the stuff you could purchase! A hundred bucks buys a lot of beer, dude!” Ok, moving on…

“and I choose to give it back.” Neither the conscience nor concupiscence forced compliance. As you stated before, your conscience “compelled” you. But you could have acted otherwise, and I think many other people in the same situation would have acted otherwise. You chose to act on the impulse of your conscience rather than the impulse of concupiscence.

Generally speaking, it seems we are both in agreement over at least the basic elements of the decision-making process of your example. There is the opportunity to do good or to do evil, and you chose to do good. You were not forced to do good. What I am not clear on is the purpose this example is intended to serve in the discussion at hand. If it is supposed to be a refutation of another free will defense out there then that is one thing. If this is supposed to be a refutation of free will defense I used then that is another.

You said that if everyone would always choose to do “good” (as I did in the simple example above), that would mean that God “forced” them to choose “good” by instilling a proper disposition in them. That is what I dispute. We seem to agree that my choosing good was not “forced” by my upbringing, in other words, I had free will in deciding either way. If God would instill a proper disposition in every human being, he would not “force” anyone, but he would “nudge” everyone. Do you see the difference?