The problem of evil

[warpspeedpetey]

Hm. Ok, so you are saying that we, as humans, cannot judge anything that God does? I’m certainly not saying that he has to do what I want. ( 'Cause, you know, my husband could use a raise and I could use a maid. ) But I’m just wondering if you’re saying that we cannot say that anything that God did was either good or bad? That we just have to accept it and not think about what it means because he is God?

If that’s the case, I’m really going to have to think about what that means for my search. If I’m right in my restating of your claim, can you tell me why that is neccessary? I know it may sound obvious to you, but can you spell it out to me? If I’m wrong in my interpretation, would you mind clarifying for me? Thanks.

I am saying that your claim is impossible, illogical. You want a G-d that is accountable in some way to you. Whether you set a standard, withhold worship, or apply some other criteria. Such a being would necessarily be inferior to you in some way. Otherwise they would set all the standards and you would accept them. That is clearly no ones definition of G-d. Therefore your idea irrational, you are looking for something that you cannot find by definition. You said…

.I said that I don’t know that I have specific criteria, but that logic was where I was having trouble, not emotion.

So I explained it.

 

[Keeler]

Let me take a moment to rephrase this. I was throwing these up as rhetorical questions, but not stated correctly. Obviously you were not actually suggesting these things. You are correct in saying that evil is a conscious, willful decision (and therefore stemming from a person with the capacity of knowing right from wrong). Nevertheless, the point I was trying to make earlier is that bringing examples of what happens in nature among rain, plants and animals has no bearing in this discussion. When we use the term “evil” we are speaking about morality and it therefore beyond the scope of the law of nature. A lion eating a zebra is bad news for the zebra, but it is not a deprivation or perversion of what is, objectively, good. There is no morality involved here, it is simply a lion eating a zebra. We can look at this event as beneficial for the lion and not beneficial to the zebra, but it is not a matter of good & evil.

Thanks for the clarification. That is exactly what I had in mind.

As to my stance on evil having no true existence of its own (apart from the absence or perversion of that which is good), I have addressed this at the bottom of Post #28.

Yes, you did and I disagree. Precisely in accordance with the previous paragraph. Evil is much more than simply a “lack” of good. Evil is action, malevolent, purposeful action. The so-called lack (or privation of good) is not necessarily an action.

Life is colorful; it is not a simple black or white scenario. Using this as an analogy, I say that “good” is “white”, and “evil” is “black”, all the other colors are neutral. You said that “good” is “white” and everything else (the privation of white) is “evil”. There is more than ample free will if one can choose all the other colors, except “black”. Naturally, as all analogies, this one is imperfect, but I hope you see the point of it.

 

[paedagogo]

Let me take a moment to rephrase this. I was throwing these up as rhetorical questions, but not stated correctly. Obviously you were not actually suggesting these things. You are correct in saying that evil is a conscious, willful decision (and therefore stemming from a person with the capacity of knowing right from wrong). Nevertheless, the point I was trying to make earlier is that bringing examples of what happens in nature among rain, plants and animals has no bearing in this discussion. When we use the term “evil” we are speaking about morality and it therefore beyond the scope of the law of nature. A lion eating a zebra is bad news for the zebra, but it is not a deprivation or perversion of what is, objectively, good. There is no morality involved here, it is simply a lion eating a zebra. We can look at this event as beneficial for the lion and not beneficial to the zebra, but it is not a matter of good & evil.

As to my stance on evil having no true existence of its own (apart from the absence or perversion of that which is good), I have addressed this at the bottom of Post #28.

Now, wait a minute. We know that animals are capable of noble or “good” acts. The most recent example in the media was a dog in Japan trying to save its buddy. There are examples of dogs leaping through windows into flames to carry children out of fires, and so on. While some of these documented acts do not have clearly discernable motive, it seems that without anthropomorphizing things, it is also clear that some of them do have nobility.

You may reject this premise, but if it is true, that some animals are capable of good, then why would they not be capable of evil?

At the University of Illinois at Urbana Campaign, the chimp enclosure which housed the chimps learning human sign language was quite shoddy. One day, they received the funds to build a new luxurious shelter for the chimps. On moving day, the chimps were let loose in the play area of the new habitat. The oldest, and most communicative, chimp held back with one of the humans and watched through a glass observation window as the other chimps played in their new space. Then the old chimp signed the word, “thank you”.

 

[sadiebelle]

I am saying that your claim is impossible, illogical. You want a G-d that is accountable in some way to you. Whether you set a standard, withhold worship, or apply some other criteria. Such a being would necessarily be inferior to you in some way. Otherwise they would set all the standards and you would accept them. That is clearly no ones definition of G-d. Therefore your idea irrational, you are looking for something that you cannot find by definition. You said… So I explained it.

I’m really trying not to be dense here, but I still don’t quite get what you’re saying. My claim is illogical? What claim did I make?

I really don’t want a God that is accountable to me. I was just wondering if, in your opinion, it is or isn’t ok to have an opinion on God’s decisions–positive or negative.

Are you saying that to have an opinion on God’s decsions, He would necessarily be inferior to me? Is that what you were refering to?

I’m sorry, but you lost me.

 

[sadiebelle]

You seem almost willing to agree with me that heaven and free will could make suffering worth it, except you ask “what about people who end up in hell, better no one should be happy then that they should be miserable?” I mentioned, and maybe should mention again C.S. Lewis’s Great divorce, where he deals with exactly this question. I think you should do a little light reading. Don’t worry about cramming alot of stuff in that you don’t have time for, but to get a decent book and read a chapter or two in the evening and think about it.

Anyway, Lewis’s answer is "it has a grand sound to say that you’ll accept no salvation that leaves even one soul outside… but watch that sophistry or you will make a dog in a manger the tyrant of the universe.

God gives everyone enough grace to be saved. He wills the salvation of everyone, but (that pesky free will thing) he can’t force anyone. (Peter Kreeft says that God is a gentleman). Hell is simply a matter of some people choosing to separate themselves from God. Some people will freely choose to reject him, and why should the self-chosen misery of those people prevent others from being happy? Why should hell be able to veto heaven?!?

Think about an example. You make a cake for your 6 children. They will all have to share the cake. But as you cut it into equal pieces, one of your kids says “no, I want the biggest piece.” Of course, you refuse, the must share and learn to love you and each other. But that one kid refuses to crush his own ego, and demands the biggest piece. When he can’t get it, he runs off to his room and sulks. What do you do now? Do you take the cake away. Do you say “well Johnny won’t have any, so no one else can.” Is it fair to let that one bratty kid have a veto on the happiness of the other 5. Would it have been better to no make the cake? To not have children? Hell does not get a veto on heaven. Those who choose to reject God do not get to prevent the saved from enjoying him.

sorry for the quick answer, I have to run out.

I don’t think that the cake example really makes sense. Because people are not just sulking in hell, are they? It is more than unpleasant, is it not? It is actual pain. Whether it is pain of separation from God or physical pain or both, it is still not the same as a kid sulking in their room. It’s more like my kid refuses to crush his ego and so then must live in the basement without me or my love for the rest of eternity. In that case, no. It is not worth my other children getting a piece of cake if that means that one of them will live in the basement forever. I wouldn’t make the cake.

Edited to add: I’ve read some CS Lewis before, but I will take your suggestion and do some more reading. It can only help.

 

[Keeler]

This is not a solution because there is no true freedom. It is still a type of enslavement. If a parent told his children they were free to go anywhere in the world they wanted, but kept them locked within the house, they are not truly free but enslaved. The promise of freedom is a lie.

You committed a “no true Scotsman” fallacy here. Our freedom to act is NEVER absolute. Using your analogy, we are always “kept” within the house (which is huge but limited!). We are always restricted by two factors, one is being the laws of nature, and the other is our disposition. We are unable to “lay on hands” and cure the sick. We are unable to “conjure” up food from thin air, and feed the hungry. But that does not mean that we are deprived of our freedom. We are also limited by our own internal value system. Some people have such a strong sense of right and wrong that they are literally unable to commit “evil” acts. Their internal disposition will prevent them even from pilfering a pencil from the office (which is not really “evil”).

Our freedom is limited, and will always remain limited. To say that our freedom is more “meaningful” if we can torture someone to death (as opposed to humanely put them to sleep) would be a ridiculous assertion.

Our relationship with God, as I have stated, is a relationship of love. When we choose to do good, we likewise choose to love God. When we choose to do evil, we likewise choose not to love God.

That is nonsense. Many people do good, virtuous acts, and that has nothing to do with God. They do them because they have a decent, good, benevolent disposition toward others. Other people do all sorts of horrible things, but that does not have to anything to with God either. To have “enough” freedom it is enough that we can choose to “worship” God or to choose “not worship” God. Whatever we do toward other human beings can be resticted without any bearing on our “relationship” with God.

God cannot prohibit our ability to choose evil without removing our freedom to love him or reject him. If God created us without the ability to perform evil acts then that would be the same thing as in my example from Post #11 of a man giving a woman a love potion. True love cannot result in such a situation because the lover robbed the beloved the freedom to accept or reject him. True love must be offered as a gift, it cannot be forced.

I did not reply to that part on purpose, I wanted to concentrate on the other parts. But since you mentioned it again, you consider it important, so I will reflect on it. You confuse “eros” with “agape” here. We can agree that “eros” - which is an emotion, cannot be forced. Agape is completely different issue - but that would lead too far from the topic.

In your example, there is no capacity for someone to be a true champion of virtue.

Sorry, this is another “no true Scotsman” fallacy. What you say is that to overcome difficulties is better than not to have them in the first place. Or that to be sick and recuperate is better than to be constantly healthy. Or to be half-starved and then being fed is better than to be properly fed all the time.

What you say is a variant of the “aus der Not eine Tugend machen” (to make a virtue out of necessity) which is the “sour grapes” syndrome. Who cares if in a world without the ability to create murders, tortures and genocides there would be no heroes either? The “would be victims” would certainly not miss them, would they?

I will agree that ultimately the problem of evil is a mystery, and only God fully understands what is going on here.

Well, not exactly. The “problem of evil” is an unsolvable problem - and to call it a “mystery” does not help. Your approach (the so-called free will defense) is but one of the attempts to solve it. There are quite a few other ones, equally unsatisfying.

 

[EricFilmer]

Yes, you did and I disagree. Precisely in accordance with the previous paragraph. Evil is much more than simply a “lack” of good. Evil is action, malevolent, purposeful action. The so-called lack (or privation of good) is not necessarily an action.

For every evil action performed, there is a good action that could have been done instead. In making the choice of evil over good, there is a deprivation or perversion of what is good.

Life is colorful; it is not a simple black or white scenario. Using this as an analogy, I say that “good” is “white”, and “evil” is “black”, all the other colors are neutral. You said that “good” is “white” and everything else (the privation of white) is “evil”. There is more than ample free will if one can choose all the other colors, except “black”. Naturally, as all analogies, this one is imperfect, but I hope you see the point of it.

This example doesn’t fit, because it allows a greater variety of what is being considered in morality. In morality there is good and evil. If one tries to envision more variation, one will end up with examples that do not actually involve morality (i.e., a “neutral” action rather than a good or evil one), or which simply address a person’s culpability (i.e., for example, it was an objectively evil action but there were circumstances that inhibited the person from realizing it). I never said that every action is done in the context of morality.

And let me also point out that instead of trying to illustrate your point in terms of color, you can easily prove your point (that evil is not simply the deprivation or perversion of good) by defining evil as a noun without referencing good (or a synonym of good). After all, if evil has a true existence of its own, then it has the characteristics of a noun. Moreover, if it has a true existence apart from goodness, then one should be able to define it apart from goodness.

 

[EricFilmer]

Now, wait a minute. We know that animals are capable of noble or “good” acts…

I used to work in an animal hospital and I am an animal lover, and I know there is an enormous ongoing debate as to whether or not animals act solely upon instinct. I think this is an interesting topic, but it is also getting off topic to the thread. As I stated in my earlier post, what is being addressed is the freedom of God and human freedom (and the morality of human freedom). What happens among plants and animals is part of the law of nature.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I’m really trying not to be dense here, but I still don’t quite get what you’re saying. My claim is illogical? What claim did I make?

"I would not want to worship God if I felt that he was… " various statements about trying to hold on to your faith, etc.

I really don’t want a God that is accountable to me.

You keep saying that, but it doesn’t agree with everything else you are saying. Just 2 posts ago saying that you want a G-d who is logical, moral, understandable, etc. Right? You want a “little g” god. Like a little statue, or maybe something like Gandalf. A wise old man that comforts you and makes you feel happy, explains things to you personally…What you have is a G-d who is necessarily the very act of existence itself, Actus Purus. Existence precedes logic. Our method of processing information cannot be applied to Him. In the end you have no way of setting any standard, or knowing if you are right…but you do have a feeling an emotion. that feeling alone is enough for most people to ignore the logic of the situation and insist on a little g god.

I was just wondering if, in your opinion, it is or isn’t ok to have an opinion on God’s decisions–positive or negative.

Are you saying that to have an opinion on God’s decsions, He would necessarily be inferior to me? Is that what you were refering to?

I’m sorry, but you lost me.

I am not talking about opinions, I am talking about setting standards.

 

[sadiebelle]

"I would not want to worship God if I felt that he was… " various statements about trying to hold on to your faith, etc.
You keep saying that, but it doesn’t agree with everything else you are saying. Just 2 posts ago saying that you want a G-d who is logical, moral, understandable, etc. Right? You want a “little g” god. Like a little statue, or maybe something like Gandalf. A wise old man that comforts you and makes you feel happy, explains things to you personally…What you have is a G-d who is necessarily the very act of existence itself, Actus Purus. Existence precedes logic. Our method of processing information cannot be applied to Him. In the end you have no way of setting any standard, or knowing if you are right…but you do have a feeling an emotion. that feeling alone is enough for most people to ignore the logic of the situation and insist on a little g god.I am not talking about opinions, I am talking about setting standards.

I’m sorry if you don’t believe me, but I’m just going to have to accept that, I guess.

I don’t want a god. I want God. I just want to be able to know that the God that I am worshiping is good. I don’t think that wanting that is wrong. Right now, I’m just not sure about the goodness of God.

I know that you said that in the end, we have no way of knowing, but that goes against so much of what I’ve always been told–that the proof of God is everywhere. If that is the case, that we cannot know if God is good, I have a real problem with that. I want to know that what I believe is true. I’m really trying to reconcile my desire to believe that I am worshiping a good God and your idea that we can’t know.

Maybe a feeling is enough for most people to ignore logic. I think that you are right in your assessment. But feelings can be wrong. And again, when it comes to worshiping a being, I want to make sure that it goes beyond a fallible feeling, but is backed up by proof.

Again, thank you so much for giving me so much to think about.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Right now, I’m just not sure about the goodness of God.

Wanting to understand isn’t wrong in and of itself, no one said that.

I know that you said that in the end, we have no way of knowing, but that goes against so much of what I’ve always been told–that the proof of God is everywhere.
backed up by proof.

I never said that we have no way of knowing if G-d is good, where did that come from? Do you mean the proof of G-ds existence or Omnibenevolence? We know the G-d is omnibenevolent as a matter of reason. Not because He meets some particular standard of ours. Do you mean proof as in epistemological certainty, or just something that satisfies your desire to know?

 

[danserr]

I don’t think that the cake example really makes sense. Because people are not just sulking in hell, are they? It is more than unpleasant, is it not? It is actual pain. Whether it is pain of separation from God or physical pain or both, it is still not the same as a kid sulking in their room. It’s more like my kid refuses to crush his ego and so then must live in the basement without me or my love for the rest of eternity. In that case, no. It is not worth my other children getting a piece of cake if that means that one of them will live in the basement forever. I wouldn’t make the cake.

Edited to add: I’ve read some CS Lewis before, but I will take your suggestion and do some more reading. It can only help.

But where is your compassion then for your good children? The badly behaved child suffers only the result of his own selfishness. Is it right that in the end, that should cause the good children to suffer as well? Where is your love for them? Or justice? I know we are using a small example of something that happens on a grander scale, but the principles are the same. Why should the good children suffer, or not be able to enjoy some good thing because of the bad behavior of one? Here, I just can’t agree with you. It seems so wrong and unjust to me that the self-willed misery of even one person should be able to prevent the joy of all the rest.

Hell is precisely like the kid sulking in his room. It is a self chosen misery.
The point is that the pain is self-chosen! It is separation from God, not physical pain. Hell is every mind shut up on itself. Hell is not roasting over a fiery grill while demons in red tights poke you with pitchforks, rather, hell is a self-willed separation from God. God is the source of all goodness, happiness, and joy. And in the end, some people (probably) will reject Him. Imagine Hitler. Suppose (we don’t know, of course), that in the end, confronted with God and the enormity of his crimes, refuses to repent. Then, rather than be sorry, he willfully separates himself from God; and that mind, shut up forever with its own hatred and bitterness is hell. How could it not be? Now is it really right that his refusal to enter heaven should prevent others (his innocent victims) from enjoying heaven? Should Hitler have veto power over their eternal happiness!?! I just find this thought intolerable.

I know that it sounds wonderfully compassionate to say that you would rather not have eternal joy or even exist at all, if even one person were left outside. But think what lies behind that: the demand of the loveless and self-imprisoned that they should blackmail the universe. That until they can have happiness on their own terms, that no one else should be able to taste joy. The demand that hell veto heaven! Could a good, loving God allow this? I just don’t see how. God has done everything he could. He created man out of pure love, not for God’s sake, but for man’s. When man sinned, God was tortured, suffered, and died to save man, somehow opening the gates of heaven thereby. And he would give people as many chances as it would take to accept him. But he cannot force anyone. And He cannot allow hell to veto heaven, nor can he allow those who reject him to infect the joy of those who accept him. If he did that, then he would not be good. And if He were not Good, then He would not be God.

I’m glad you’ll look into some reading. A message board is a good place to pick up a few new ideas and suggestions, but to really deal with a question like this requires some more ideas, thought, and reflection.

 

[Keeler]

For every evil action performed, there is a good action that could have been done instead.

There could have been MANY other actions performed, some good, some better, some neutral, etc. That is the point.

This example doesn’t fit, because it allows a greater variety of what is being considered in morality. In morality there is good and evil.

And neutrality, also many levels of good and not so good actions.

If one tries to envision more variation, one will end up with examples that do not actually involve morality (i.e., a “neutral” action rather than a good or evil one), or which simply address a person’s culpability (i.e., for example, it was an objectively evil action but there were circumstances that inhibited the person from realizing it). I never said that every action is done in the context of morality.

But that is exactly what you did, when you said that evil is a lack of or privation of “good”.

And let me also point out that instead of trying to illustrate your point in terms of color, you can easily prove your point (that evil is not simply the deprivation or perversion of good) by defining evil as a noun without referencing good (or a synonym of good). After all, if evil has a true existence of its own, then it has the characteristics of a noun. Moreover, if it has a true existence apart from goodness, then one should be able to define it apart from goodness.

“Evil” is still not a “thing” which has ontological existence. Evil is an adjective to describe a deliberate, volitional and malevolent action, or to cause unnecessary pain and suffering. When we say that “evil exists”, it is just a short phrase, which means that evil actions happen.

However, none of these are important. You said that the existence of free will is sufficient explanation for the existence of evil actions. It is not true. The existence of free will leads to the logical existence of the potentiality of evil but not to the actuality of it.

There were many attempts to reconcile evil, pain and suffering with the assumption of a benevolent God. None of them work. The “problem of evil” is the final thorn in the side of Christianity.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

There were many attempts to reconcile evil, pain and suffering with the assumption of a benevolent God. None of them work. The “problem of evil” is the final thorn in the side of Christianity.

1. The ability to freely express our wills is the reason for evil. It is no more complicated than that. Any restriction on our will that effectively prevents an evil act means our will is no longer free.
2. There is no such thing as the Problem of Evil. People just insist on making unknowable judgments because it it makes them feel better. People think with their emotions. Shown here forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=367987 You can review the thread for more information.

Working assumptions
Info-gap decision theory employs three simple constructs to capture the uncertainty associated with decision problems:

1.A parameter whose true value is subject to severe uncertainty.
2.A region of uncertainty where the true value of lies.
3.An estimate of the true value of .
It should be pointed out, though, that as such these constructs are generic, meaning that they can be employed to model situations where the uncertainty is not severe but mild, indeed very mild. So it is vital to be clear that to give apt expression to the severity of the uncertainty, in the Info-Gap framework these three constructs are given specific meaning.

Working Assumptions
1.The region of uncertainty is relatively large.
In fact, Ben-Haim (2006, p. 210) indicates that in the context of info-gap decision theory most of the commonly encountered regions of uncertainty are unbounded.
2.The estimate is a poor approximation of the true value of .
That is, the estimate is a poor indication of the true value of (Ben-Haim, 2006, p. 280) and is likely to be substantially wrong (Ben-Haim, 2006, p. 281).
In the picture represents the true (unknown) value of .

The point to note here is that conditions of severe uncertainty entail that the estimate can – relatively speaking – be very distant from the true value . This is particularly pertinent for methodologies, like info-gap, that seek robustness to uncertainty. Indeed, assuming otherwise would – methodologically speaking – be tantamount to engaging in wishful thinking .

 

[EricFilmer]

You committed a “no true Scotsman” fallacy here.

No, I did not using the “no true Scotsman fallacy” because I am not talking about freedom in general but the specific freedom to do good or evil. Therefore, my stance is that the specific freedom to do good or evil includes the actual ability to do evil. If you think that is a “no true Scotsman” fallacy then prove it by using my previous statements that demonstrate me doing it. I will ask the same consideration whenever you believe I have committed a fallacy.

Our freedom to act is NEVER absolute. Using your analogy, we are always “kept” within the house (which is huge but limited!). We are always restricted by two factors, one is being the laws of nature, and the other is our disposition. We are unable to “lay on hands” and cure the sick. We are unable to “conjure” up food from thin air, and feed the hungry. But that does not mean that we are deprived of our freedom.

Once again you are trying to examine this topic in a broader category of human freedom. The topic at hand is the specific freedom to choose good or evil. If I am told that I have the freedom to do evil, but I am somehow prevented from doing an evil act, then I was not free to do it to begin with. It’s as simple as that.

We are also limited by our own internal value system. Some people have such a strong sense of right and wrong that they are literally unable to commit “evil” acts. Their internal disposition will prevent them even from pilfering a pencil from the office (which is not really “evil”).

No one is “literally” unable to commit an evil act, despite their disposition (assuming that they are capable of knowing right from wrong to begin with). You are suggesting that a person could have such a strong conscience that given the choice to do good or evil, his conscience forces him to reject doing the evil action. If that is the case then God (who works through the conscience) forces the person to always choose good, and hence the person was never truly free to commit evil to begin with.

Going back to what you said earlier, I agree that our freedom is never absolute (nor have I ever indicated otherwise). God, civil authorities, parents, school principals, etc. place boundaries, and whereas these boundaries limit freedom, they do not outright deny all freedom. But yet again, I point out that what I have been discussing in this thread is not the concept of absolute freedom or freedom in general, but specifically the freedom to do good or evil.

Our freedom is limited, and will always remain limited. To say that our freedom is more “meaningful” if we can torture someone to death (as opposed to humanely put them to sleep) would be a ridiculous assertion.

I never spoke of the freedom to do evil as being “meaningful.” The possibility to do evil is a necessary consequence of our freedom to accept or reject God. And, as I have also stated, the possibility to do great acts of evil likewise allow the possibility to do great acts of virtue. God intends for this to be a moral universe where people can become true champions of virtue.

That is nonsense. Many people do good, virtuous acts, and that has nothing to do with God. They do them because they have a decent, good, benevolent disposition toward others. Other people do all sorts of horrible things, but that does not have to anything to with God either.

Ultimately virtuous actions have everything to do with God, because he is the personification of goodness and it is from God that all inspiration to do good originates, whether the individual recognizes this or not. Likewise, a person who commits evil actions rejects God, whether the individual recognizes this or not. But in any event, here you are confusing the direct motive for an action with what that action represents in terms of objective morality. I am not discussing the motives for actions to do good or evil, but rather I am discussing the freedom to do those actions.

(Continued in my next post…)

 

[EricFilmer]

(Continued…)

To have “enough” freedom it is enough that we can choose to “worship” God or to choose “not worship” God. Whatever we do toward other human beings can be resticted without any bearing on our “relationship” with God.

According to the Bible, the whole reason for our existence is to love God and neighbor. Moreover, we are taught that how we treat one another directly impacts on our relationship with God. Many times in the Old Testament the prophets criticized people because they chose to worship God (offering sacrifices, observing the Sabbath regulations, etc.) while mistreating their neighbor. This same sentiment is also expressed multiple times in the New Testament. Going back to your suggestion, the choice to simply worship God does not count as the sole means by which one accepts God. A person can chose to worship God but end up rejecting God in how he treats others. What we do toward other human beings has a bearing on our relationship with God because that is precisely how he set it up. You can submit that God could have done things differently but that has little to do with the topic at hand. This is an examination of how things are, not a theoretical alternate reality.

Furthermore, your example does not take into account that God is the personification of goodness. Goodness = God-ness. Evil is contrary to goodness and therefore contrary to God. How can a person commit evil against his neighbor and this not be, at the same time, a rejection of God?

I did not reply to that part on purpose, I wanted to concentrate on the other parts. But since you mentioned it again, you consider it important, so I will reflect on it. You confuse “eros” with “agape” here. We can agree that “eros” - which is an emotion, cannot be forced. Agape is completely different issue - but that would lead too far from the topic.

My love potion example works either way. For example, let us say that the man gives the woman an eros AND agape potion. The ensuing spell causes her to have emotional love for the man (eros) as well as the desire to be charitable to him, make sacrifices for him, and to be more concerned for him than for herself (agape). The spell compels both feelings (amorous love and desire) and action (charitable acts). The same question is at hand: in his relationship with this woman, does the man have what we consider true love? My position is that he does not. No matter how we want to define what aspects of love are present in the example’s relationship, there is no true love because these aspects were forced.

Sorry, this is another “no true Scotsman” fallacy.

Keeler, at this point I think you could use a little refresher as to what a “no true Scotsman” fallacy actually is: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_true_Scotsman
It seems like every time I use the word “true” you want to simply accuse me of utilizing a “no true Scotsman” fallacy without demonstrating exactly how I did this. I was responding to your example of a world in which people have the ability to do evil (and imagine it) but are somehow infused with a kind of righteous inclination that, in essence, prevents them from doing it. On one hand, this could still be argued as God preventing someone from choosing to do evil. But in my initial response, I stated that your example does not allow one to be a “true champion of virtue” because there is no real temptation to do evil. What does it mean to be what people consider to be a “true champion?” It means triumphing after a great struggle. In your example there is no great struggle, no great temptation, and therefore no great victory. It does not require a “true champion” to win an easy battle. That was my point. Simply ignoring my rationale and trying to dismiss my position with an inapplicable fallacy accusation does not cut it. If you want to properly refute my position, you need to demonstrate how someone within the confines of your example can be a “true champion of virtue.” So far, you haven’t done that. And if it is your position that the world does not need such true champions, then all that amounts to is you criticizing God for not making the kind of world you prefer rather than the one he actually made.

(Continued in my next post)

 

[EricFilmer]

(Continued…)

What you say is that to overcome difficulties is better than not to have them in the first place.

I have indicated that the presence of evil in the universe is realistic, but I never said that it was “better”. It would have been “better” if Adam and Eve, or anyone else for that matter, had never sinned. But it happened, so I am simply examining the reality of the situation, and what do we do because sin has, indeed, happened. You are the one who has injected the term “better” into this conversation and ascribed it to my position, not me. Careful keeler, you are dancing pretty close to making a strawman argument here.

Or that to be sick and recuperate is better than to be constantly healthy. Or to be half-starved and then being fed is better than to be properly fed all the time.

What you say is a variant of the “aus der Not eine Tugend machen” (to make a virtue out of necessity) which is the “sour grapes” syndrome.

The proverb you mentioned means to make the best of a difficult or unsatisfactory situation, or to do an unpleasant task in a cheerful or willing fashion (and therefore change ones perspective of the task from unpleasant to pleasant). If I were to do that in the context of this discussion, I would be saying something like this: “Evil is a necessary part of life, so I might as well endure it by changing my perspective and say that it is not really evil, but rather good.” But, of course, I never said such a thing. My stance is that the existence of evil in life is not a necessary condition of freewill, but only the possibility of doing evil (and you pretty much said the same thing in Post #21). Evil is not good, nor should it be tolerated. The means by which evil is overcome is to practice virtue in opposition to it. Therefore, evil is bad, virtue (its opposite) is good. In light of what I have stated, I am not “making a virtue out of necessity” here. Evil is neither a necessity nor a virtue. The proverb does not apply here.

Who cares if in a world without the ability to create murders, tortures and genocides there would be no heroes either? The “would be victims” would certainly not miss them, would they?

And how realistic is such a world you envision? How can it be possible to help someone with surgery without it also being possible to use those same methods in a perverse way to inflict torture? How can it be possible to feed people without it also being possible to starve them? How can it be possible to console a crying child who has skinned his knee without it also being possible to ignore him and make him feel neglected and unloved? How can it be possible to give shelter to a family who lost their house in a fire without it also being possible to let them live in the streets? How can it be possible to give a million dollars to charity without it also being possible to keep the money for selfish indulgences? How does God allow all these good examples and at the same time prevent all the bad counterparts unless intervenes in each and every moral situation and prevents a person from doing an evil action. That would be a violation of human freedom.

God created us to not only live virtuous lives, but lives of heroic virtue. The greater the reality of hate, the greater the act of love which overcomes it. The greater the temptation and opportunity to commit gluttony, the greater the act of temperance which overcomes it. And so on and so on. In the current state of affairs in our world, there is the opportunity for people to be true champions of virtue, and moral victories can indeed be victories in every sense of the word. A man may want his teenage son to be a great football player, but if his son only plays football against kindergartners then his successes would hardly be considered “great victories.” God doesn’t just want us to love, but to love powerfully.

Well, not exactly. The “problem of evil” is an unsolvable problem - and to call it a “mystery” does not help.

Calling it a mystery is just an acknowledgement of the reality of the situation at hand. I am formulating theories based on the outlook of an eternal divine being. I am trying to envision how the Creator sees and interacts with creation. Obviously, I am missing the big picture, and only God can see the big picture. Because God is ultimately mysterious, the question at hand is ultimately a mystery. And yes, by calling the problem of evil a mystery I admit that from the human perspective it is unsolvable (and that only God solves it). But I am not trying to solve the problem, only show that the problem is rooted in freewill. There is no mystery in demonstrating the connection between evil and freewill.

Your approach (the so-called free will defense) is but one of the attempts to solve it. There are quite a few other ones, equally unsatisfying.

Satisfaction is subjective. My approach is satisfying to me, and you have not been able to refute the reasoning behind it. All you can say at this point is that my position is unsatisfying to you. Although I welcome your (name removed by moderator)ut, pardon me by pointing out that I am mostly concerned with whether or not my position is satisfying to sadiebelle, seeing as it is her thread and I am trying to address her concerns. If she finds my (name removed by moderator)ut helpful then that is what I’m shooting for. If she finds it lacking, she is free to address it and I will respond accordingly. It seems like you are trying to highjack this thread into your own personal philosophical debate rather than just start a new thread.

 

[EricFilmer]

There could have been MANY other actions performed, some good, some better, some neutral, etc. That is the point.

This comes under our disagreement over whether or not an evil action is the deprivation or perversion of what is good. I will address this further a little later in this post.

And neutrality, also many levels of good and not so good actions.

Topic: Freedom to do good or evil.

NOT the Topic: Freedom to do neutral actions. Freedom to choose good actions over not so good actions.

But that is exactly what you did, when you said that evil is a lack of or privation of “good”.

Explain how.

“Evil” is still not a “thing” which has ontological existence. Evil is an adjective to describe a deliberate, volitional and malevolent action, or to cause unnecessary pain and suffering. When we say that “evil exists”, it is just a short phrase, which means that evil actions happen.

We both agree that evil has no ontological existence, and that it results from action (although from a Catholic perspective it would also include certain inaction, such as the failure to do good in specific circumstances). What we have been disagreeing on is whether or not the existence of evil is the deprivation or perversion of that which is good. Therefore, I challenge you to give me one example of an evil action that is not a deprivation or perversion of that which is good.

However, none of these are important. You said that the existence of free will is sufficient explanation for the existence of evil actions. It is not true. The existence of free will leads to the logical existence of the potentiality of evil but not to the actuality of it.

The actuality of evil obviously results from someone acting upon the potential. Such a person has the knowledge of right from wrong, and the freedom to choose either right or wrong. If he chooses wrong, there is evil. If he is prevented from actualizing the potential to do evil then there was no freedom to choose to do it in the first place. I fail to see why this is so hard to grasp.

There were many attempts to reconcile evil, pain and suffering with the assumption of a benevolent God. None of them work. The “problem of evil” is the final thorn in the side of Christianity.

And yet each time you submitted an example of what God could have done otherwise, it ended up with people being robbed of their freedom to do good or evil, and consequently to accept or reject God. Your idea of a benevolent God is one who forces his will upon people, for the sake of their own good, even though that makes a true loving relationship impossible.

 

[grannymh]

This is very hard for me to swallow. I think that all questions are worth asking and answering. I can tolerate my ignorance about things, certainly, but I don’t think that I should embrace ignorance, you know? I certainly don’t think that I must embrace my ignorance to follow Him to eternal life.

My sentence was “Sometimes, we need to tolerate our own ignorance in order to truly follow Him into eternal life.” Tolerate means to allow something without prohibiting or opposing – to put up with something, endure.

To tolerate our own ignorance is not meant to embrace ignorance for its own sake. Rather it invites one to let loose of the concept that a Catholic must know and must completely understand every single mystery of Catholicism.

When we are able to tolerate our own particular ignorance, then we can understand the meaning of Catholic mystery. The word mystery simply means that which is really there but cannot be easily understood. When we are able to tolerate our own particular ignorance, then we can truly say “Jesus, I trust in You.”

Questions are always worth asking. In reality, there are very few Catholic questions which do not contain a somewhat understandable answer. The trick is not to set a time limit for the completely understandable answer according to one’s own specifications. We need to try patiently trusting God and tolerating the length of time from here to our death. We need to follow Jesus without giving Him demands for easing our thirst for the “complete knowledge” which comes after our death. This is when we hopefully will be in the presence of the “Beatific Vision” the eternal and direct visual perception of God as He is.

Blessings,
granny

The quest for truth needs Catholicism

 

[Keeler]

No, I did not using the “no true Scotsman fallacy” because I am not talking about freedom in general but the specific freedom to do good or evil.

And that is the fallacy. You artifically restrict the concept of “free will” to a subset of it. You say that to have “true” free will it must incorporate the specific “freedom” to commit evil. That is the “no true Scotsman” fallacy.

Therefore, my stance is that the specific freedom to do good or evil includes the actual ability to do evil.

Sure thing. But from the ability to commit evil acts it does NOT logically follow that someone will actually commit that evil act.

If I am told that I have the freedom to do evil, but I am somehow prevented from doing an evil act, then I was not free to do it to begin with. It’s as simple as that.

But you are NOT prevented by an external agency. Your internal disposition prevents you. You have the “locus of decision”.

No one is “literally” unable to commit an evil act, despite their disposition (assuming that they are capable of knowing right from wrong to begin with). You are suggesting that a person could have such a strong conscience that given the choice to do good or evil, his conscience forces him to reject doing the evil action. If that is the case then God (who works through the conscience) forces the person to always choose good, and hence the person was never truly free to commit evil to begin with.

Yes, indeed. Some people are like that. And they still have all the freedom to actually commit good and evil acts, they simply exercise their freedom in the “correct” fashion. If you deny this, if you say that they are “forced” by God, then there is nothing else to talk about. If you maintain this, then you say that Mary had no free will, that the saints had no free will, that all the genuinely good people have no free will, because God “forces” them to obey their conscience.

Sorry, my friend, that is complete nonsense. (And you keep committing the “no true Scotsman” fallacy over and over again. Look at the highlighted “truly free” above.)