Kinda jumping in the middle of all this, so I ask forgiveness if I repeat things …
There is some major ambiguity that many here on this thread suffer with regard to the word “object.” I think it’s generally being used as “substance” in the Aristotelian sense, which is defined “that which exists in itself.” Substance is contrasted to “accident” which is “that which exists in a substance.” An example of a substance would be a tree, car, person, etc. An example of an accident would be purple, height, walking, etc.
Is this how you guys are using the word “object.” If so, I strongly recommend using the more traditional and less confusing term of “substance.” Because the word object is really a term used to describe a thing toward which something is directed. Purple can be an object of knowledge, but purple is not a substance.
Now is a good time to mention one of my favorite things:
Aristotle’s Ten Categories of Being
Substance
Quantity
Quality
Relation
Action
Passion (the receiving of an action, i.e. passivity)
Time
Place
Posture
Possession
Every kind of “being” (which is defined as “that which can exist”) can be classified under one or more of these categories. These categories can be called “forms of being.” The nine categories here after substance are accidents and thus cannot exist unless they exist in a substance. Some post-Aristotelian philosophers argue that only the first nine are valid, and others say only the first 8, or 6, or even first 4, saying that the extraneous ones can be derived from the valid ones. I like all ten personally.
We might as well delve into some clarification here, though I think that this whole subject belongs to a separate thread of its own. So I will be brief here. As a short remark, the word “object” in English certainly has something to do with the “subject - object” dichotomy. In English… but not necessarily on other languages.
I agree that “object” is something that exists whether it is perceived, understood, recognized by someone or not. There is at least one sub-category of objects, which are called
physical objects. Physical objects exist in space and time, and they are composed of matter-energy (which are interchangeable). It is pretty clear what we are talking about. These objects have
properties, which may or may not be present in any one object. Objects can be categorized into arbitrary
sets, based upon some attributes. It is obvious, that these categorization “boxes” are totally arbitrary. We can create (for example) the set of “round” objects, and the members can be “balls made out of rubber”, “balls made of clay”, planets or stars, all of which have an approximately “round shape”. We can also define some other categories, like “distance”, “before”, “after”, “in front of”, “behind”, etc… which descirbe the
relation between objects. One important feature or attribute of this existence is the possibility to
interact with other physical objects.
Are there other objects? Some philosophers argue that there are “abstract objects”, which do not exist as physical objects. They bring up examples as numbers, ideas, concepts. I find the term “object” unnecessary and confusing - and I prefer the term “concept”. The term “object” insinuates “objective” existence, apart from our perception. These philosophers argue that the “abstract objects” are not our “inventions”, rather they exist independetly from us, and they are merely “discovered”. Among the many problems that this concept creates, the foremost one is “existence”. What does it mean that “beauty” or “justice” or “distance” exists? They certainly do not exist as physical object. But we can agree that these “things” exist in a special manner - I prefer the term “conceptual existence”. One of the attributes that is missing from this “existence” is the ability to interact with either each other, or the physical reality. Example: to add two parts of conceptual hydrogen and one part of conceptual oxygen will not create a conceptual water molecule. In other words, concepts are inert. This is not a surprise, since action is composed of exchanging sub-atomic particles.
And there are some people, who insist on a third type os “existence”, which is not physical, but not merely conceptual, which “exists” apart from our perception, which is active - able to interact with physical objects. These “objects” do not reside in space and time, are not composed of matter-energy. The question arises, what does “existence” mean when applied to these “objects”? I have no idea, and the proponents cannot make it clear. Any and all “action” we are familiar with is an exchange of particles. This third type of hypothesized “thing” is not composed of particles, so its hypothesized “action” is not something we can even imagine. It is sheer magic.
And, of course, there is absolutely no
physical evidence for such an “existence”. The offered “conceptual arguments” all disregard the known facts of physics - just like the current “prime mover” idea disregards the principle of conservation of matter-energy-momentum.
You might have a point here. I must admit. I have no idea.
He did not. Back then space and time were thought to be absolute categories, the universe was thought to be giant “balloon” drifting in empty space. Only Einstein disposed of this Newtonian concept.
Back then people thought that energy - which is motion, and interchange of sub-atomic particles needed to be imposed from “above”. We are past that naive worldview. The Thomistic argument belongs to the other ideas of the past, which have been superceeded by current understanding. They have historical interest, they give us some insight into the thought-process of those times. But their relevance is exhausted by giving that “window” into the past.