The Thomistic Cosmological Argument

[Spock]

i didnt say it was, i said it doesnt make sense to restrict it to SEM, yes i said SEM, time is the measure of change, its illusory, no us, no time., no change, no time. and i have my doubts about space.

Einstein would be surprised. As a matter of fact, it is not precise to speak about “time” **and **“space”, as if they would be two separate categories. The correct terminology is “spacetime”.

 

[Spock]

I read it, but I don’t see where it addresses my point. The acorn-oak tree analogy I gave should suffice to demonstrate the inadequacy of appealing to the necessity of the universe. This must be addressed if we are going to reject the God hypothesis.

Unfortunately your analogy is not applicable. It is true that spacetime is contingent upon matter-energy, but matter and energy are not contingent upon anything. See the principle of conservation of matter-energy-momentum.

That motion is inherently part of STEM isn’t at all in conflict with its being externally imposed. If we’re asking for the explanation of some thing, then it doesn’t make sense to merely point to a property of that thing, call it inherent, and conclude that that thing exists necessarily.

Suppose you look at a kid’s ball, which happens to be painted red. It is a valid question to ask: “where did the red color come from?”. Suppose you look at a ball made of red clay. It is not a valid question to ask: “where did the red color come from?”. It is inherent to the red clay. The ball of clay is “necessarily” red.

The question is whether or not the laws of nature exist by a necessity of their own nature. The idea that they are necessary runs into the two major problems I’ve already briefly touched upon. First, we can easily conceive of a possible world in which entirely different laws of nature exist. Secondly, the dynamism of each law requires that one be dependent on the other. If we stop there and claim that such an explanation is sufficient, then we are engaging in circular reasoning.

Except that at the “very end of the line” there are no explanations, things are simply are, what they are.

For example, the measurements of electromagnetism and gravity are each dependent on each other. Why is this so? If we explain this fact in terms of either electromagnetism or gravity, or both, then we’re basically saying that A because B, and B because A, which is clearly circular and doesn’t answer the question of why there is electromagnetism and gravity at all.

The same could be said for the question: “why is there something, rather than nothing?”. Irrelevant and unasnwerable question.

Well, I think this begs the question in favor of mind-body physicalism, which is a view I don’t agree with.

Easy to prove me wrong. Show an example where pure “will” has a physical effect.

Physical things, however, are finite by nature, and nothing finite is self-sufficient.

If this is a hypothesis, you should show some supporting evidence. If it is a dogma, we don’t have a lot to talk about.

 

[punkforchrist]

Spock:

Unfortunately your analogy is not applicable. It is true that spacetime is contingent upon matter-energy, but matter and energy are not contingent upon anything. See the principle of conservation of matter-energy-momentum.

First, the fact that matter and energy cannot be created/destroyed does not imply that it is self-sufficient. It is dependent on natural laws, which in turn are either dependent or self-existent (necessary).

Secondly, the principle of conservation is only applicable to a closed system. which is only an idealized state. There is no absolutely closed system in reality. An example is the Big Bang singularity, but I don’t want to focus too much on that.

Suppose you look at a kid’s ball, which happens to be painted red. It is a valid question to ask: “where did the red color come from?”. Suppose you look at a ball made of red clay. It is not a valid question to ask: “where did the red color come from?”. It is inherent to the red clay. The ball of clay is “necessarily” red.

I disagree. One could explain the redness of the clay by appealing to observations in geology.

Except that at the “very end of the line” there are no explanations, things are simply are, what they are.

Not according to the PSR. It’s not that there is no explanation, but rather that the explanation is found in the necessity of its own nature. I thought that’s what you were saying about STEM.

The same could be said for the question: “why is there something, rather than nothing?”. Irrelevant and unasnwerable question.

The entire argument hangs on why there is something rather than nothing.

Easy to prove me wrong. Show an example where pure “will” has a physical effect.

My immaterial mind causes the fingers on my hands to type.

If this is a hypothesis, you should show some supporting evidence. If it is a dogma, we don’t have a lot to talk about.

We can show inductively that finite things are dependent on something else. You and I are finite and dependent on the air we breathe. Given the finitude of the laws of nature (as is evidence by their limitations: electromagnetism and gravity limit each other), we can conclude that they are co-dependent. If you wish to stop the explanation there, then you’re left with circularity.

 

[punkforchrist]

I was thinking last night of some different ways that I could better explain what it is I’m trying say. Please forgive me if I use some different terms. I’ll explain them where they are introduced, and if you need any clarification, you can feel free to ask.

We are in agreement that there is a certain order to the things that are in motion. Heraclitus is famous for stating that all things are in flux (“you cannot step into the same river twice”), but he distinguished between this flux and the Logos (ordering principle) that gives order to it. If the Logos were changing, then it would be part of the flux and would not be what gives order to it, which is a contradiction. Hence, the Logos is changeless.

An example of this order we have already touched upon. Given the right conditions, acorns consistently produce oak trees, and oak trees consistently produce acorns. There is much regularity else, too. Electrons consistently repel each other, and the four main forces of nature (gravity, etc.) govern the uniformity of nature. If we say that Nature is changeless, then we are merely changing the referent from “Logos” to “Nature,” which is trivial.*

In any case, the fact that the Logos is changeless implies that it is not composed of any potentiality, in which case it must be Pure Act. If you accept the reasoning above (you may not), then our discussion should now be focused on whether Pure Act possesses certain divine attributes.

What do you think?

*In case anyone is wondering, I’m not endorsing pantheism.

 

[Spock]

First, the fact that matter and energy cannot be created/destroyed does not imply that it is self-sufficient.

Why not?

It is dependent on natural laws, which in turn are either dependent or self-existent (necessary).

No. The natural laws are the **properties **of matter-energy. They do not exist as independent entities.

Secondly, the principle of conservation is only applicable to a closed system. which is only an idealized state. There is no absolutely closed system in reality. An example is the Big Bang singularity, but I don’t want to focus too much on that.

What do you call a “closed system”? The Universe is closed, since it contains everything.

I disagree. One could explain the redness of the clay by appealing to observations in geology.

The redness of the ball is sufficiently explained by the redness of the material it is made of. I was not talking about the “redness” of the clay.

Not according to the PSR. It’s not that there is no explanation, but rather that the explanation is found in the necessity of its own nature. I thought that’s what you were saying about STEM.

In order to avoid an ifinite regress the process must stop at the basic principles, which need no further explanation. I thought we went through this before.

The entire argument hangs on why there is something rather than nothing.

Not in the least. The question was (and still is) whether “movement” (which is an inherent physical property of matter-energy) is imposed from “outside” (as if there were an “outside”). So far you presented no reason to assume it.

My immaterial mind causes the fingers on my hands to type.

Since your mind is the product of your brain, it uses physical means (nerves) to move your fingers. Try to “think” about what you wish to post (“think” only, nothing else), and see if your thoughts will be reflected on the computer screen without using physical means.

We can show inductively that finite things are dependent on something else. You and I are finite and dependent on the air we breathe.

Not a good example. We are living beings - and only our current form is dependent on breathing. The material we are made of does not depend on it. What do the elementary particles (we are made of) “depend on”?

 

[Spock]

I was thinking last night of some different ways that I could better explain what it is I’m trying say. Please forgive me if I use some different terms. I’ll explain them where they are introduced, and if you need any clarification, you can feel free to ask.

We are in agreement that there is a certain order to the things that are in motion. Heraclitus is famous for stating that all things are in flux (“you cannot step into the same river twice”), but he distinguished between this flux and the Logos (ordering principle) that gives order to it. If the Logos were changing, then it would be part of the flux and would not be what gives order to it, which is a contradiction. Hence, the Logos is changeless.

An example of this order we have already touched upon. Given the right conditions, acorns consistently produce oak trees, and oak trees consistently produce acorns. There is much regularity else, too. Electrons consistently repel each other, and the four main forces of nature (gravity, etc.) govern the uniformity of nature. If we say that Nature is changeless, then we are merely changing the referent from “Logos” to “Nature,” which is trivial.*

Up until this point, apart from the archaic terminology, it is pretty good. One correction, though: “logos” is not “nature”, it is the** attributes of the physical world**. It would be incorrect to confuse a physical object with its properties. Of course the properties are “unchanging”, which is metaphysically called the “law of identity”, or “everything is itself”.

In any case, the fact that the Logos is changeless implies that it is not composed of any potentiality, in which case it must be Pure Act. If you accept the reasoning above (you may not), then our discussion should now be focused on whether Pure Act possesses certain divine attributes.

This is not acceptable. The properties of physical objects (which we call the laws of nature) need no “mystical” description, which you call “pure act”. They simply are what they are, the properties of matter-energy.

 

[Areopagite]

Physical objects exist in space and time, and they are composed of matter-energy (which are interchangeable). It is pretty clear what we are talking about. These objects have properties, which may or may not be present in any one object. Objects can be categorized into arbitrary sets, based upon some attributes.

This is exactly what Aristotle said, except the term was “substance” instead of “physical object” and “accident” instead of “property.” So, I agree with you.

We can create (for example) the set of “round” objects, and the members can be “balls made out of rubber”, “balls made of clay”, planets or stars, all of which have an approximately “round shape”. We can also define some other categories, like “distance”, “before”, “after”, “in front of”, “behind”, etc… which descirbe the relation between objects. One important feature or attribute of this existence is the possibility to interact with other physical objects.

In terms of Aristotle’s Ten Categories, roundness would fall under quality. “Distance” and “in front of” and “behind” would fall under relation and place. “Before” and “after” would fall under relation and time. “Interaction” would fall under action and passion. I think we’re on board here.

Are there other objects? Some philosophers argue that there are “abstract objects”, which do not exist as physical objects. They bring up examples as numbers, ideas, concepts. I find the term “object” unnecessary and confusing - and I prefer the term “concept”. The term “object” insinuates “objective” existence, apart from our perception. These philosophers argue that the “abstract objects” are not our “inventions”, rather they exist independetly from us, and they are merely “discovered”. Among the many problems that this concept creates, the foremost one is “existence”. What does it mean that “beauty” or “justice” or “distance” exists?

I agree that abstract objects/concepts are not physical.

You said, however, that many problems arise when one argues that abstract objects/concepts are not our inventions but rather exist independently from us. I think you are right … but there’s something else that needs to be said. Obviously, a concept or abstraction necessarily must exist in the mind and cannot exist in reality. However, I would say that even though the mind produces concepts, it does so by replicating the form of the object that it sees. The form of the object in reality must be the same form that ends up in the mind, otherwise, the mind by definition does not understand it (because the concept of the thing would not match the thing itself). Thus, when we perceive something, we look at the physical form of the thing, and then the mind creates a copy of that form in the intellect, but making it an abstract form and not a physical form. The mind does then invent concepts, but the concept is merely the abstract version of the form of the thing that it perceives.

Now, you seem to say that concepts can only be about non-substances (or, non-physical objects, as you say). But this, I think, is not true because you can have the concept of a horse, a person, a ball, a star, a rock, etc. You can understand these things abstractly, and thus concepts can be about substances.

I’m somewhat unclear whether you believe accidents (or, properties, as you say) are concepts or not. Or, whether they exist in reality and can be conceived of, or they are merely abstractions without existence in reality. This is because you said at one point that distance was a property (and you also said that a property may or may not be present in an object), but then later on you seem to say that “distance” just has conceptual existence, not physical existence. And yet, you said properties may be present in objects … but present just conceptually but not really? Thus, a round ball is merely round conceptually but, really, the ball is not round (same goes for “before” and “after” and “in front of” etc). I would think though, when you say that properties are present in objects, you mean they are actually present there in real way, independent of the mind.

I would say this, though, when accidents (properties) are spoken of as nouns, not as adjectives, adverbs, or verbs, then I would say they do have a kind of heightened abstract nature and greater detachment from reality (though not completely detached). Accidents, as said before, need to exist in a substance (a physical object) … they can’t exist by themselves. That is why they are usually in non-noun forms when spoken of. However, when spoken of as a noun, we consider the accident apart from any particular substance. For example, the word “roundness.” Here, the form of “round” is not tied to any particular substance but considered by itself. Accidents in this consideration can only exist like that (by itself) in the mind and not in actual reality. However, accidents in non-noun consideration (the better term is “Attributive” rather than “Substantive” form) can be said to exist in reality no problem. And, in a sense, I think it’s fair to say that distance (an accident mentioned in substantive form) can exist in reality as long as it is in/pertain to substances and not by itself in reality.

I would say then that “distance” exists in reality. For what is distance except the amount of space between two things … would you say that space doesn’t actually exist? Is space just a concept too? Space is both a concept and an actually existing real thing. Same thing with the concept of “amount” … I think this (more generally called Quantity) exists in reality. Things can vary in size in a real way, and this is only accomplished if quantity is also real. Otherwise, what is the real reason why they would vary in size?

I would also say that Justice is real (but this is a long and complicated discussion). Justice, though not a substance, would be an accident, perhaps of quality because it is a virtue, and virtues fall under quality (if I’m not mistaken). If not, justice could never really be done. But maybe some people are okay with that.

As for “beauty” this is a controversial one. Is beauty objective? I think it has an objective and subjective element … but I’m not even going to go there … such discussion always ends in bloodshed (which can be a good thing … but not now).

I’m going to stop there for now, but there is a couple more things to be said. Hope that this has been relatively intelligible.

 

[TheWhim]

1. The series cannot proceed to infinity.

Ah, a short time ago there was a similar debate launched by MindOverMatter. ‘Metaphysical dependence’, as employed here, is quite a hazy, fancyful term. There is no reason why there should be a first cause at all. Only when one invents the term ‘intermediate causes’ and, by doing so, makes all the infinite causes that constantly add up to one another somehow appear deficient. By calling something intermediate one suggests a beginning and an end. Once the concept of intermediate causes is introduced one arrives quite naturally at a first cause. Since all the foregoing causes are only intermediate their has to be a first cause, hasn’t it? Therefore the first step to take the higher road is to reject the term ‘intermediate causes’: it’s too rich in connotations; it has the wrong atmosphere.

Just make a little thought play: Imagine everything that is dependent on something else; and this something else again depends on something else; just down to infinity. I was born by my parents, my parents were born by my grandparents… There’s no problem in doing so.

What punkforChrist is telling us is this: What is now is not necessarily so. We are dependent(contingent). But everything that is contingent could also not be, since it doesn’t exist necessarily. We are not ultimately explained. We know that we are and how we came to be so through the long chain of dependency. But why we are at all, since we also couldn’t be, we cannot say. So the question runs: why is there anything if there could also be nothing?Just to say: well, there is something and we should leave it by that: is obviously not an ultimate explanation. However, if we claim that God, a necessary being, exists, who has willed the universe(the contingent chain, the dependency-chain) into being, then we have such an ultimate explanation and the question why there is anything instead of nothing, as could well be, is easy to answer: because God has willed it so.

Why is there anything instead of nothing? This is not only a part of what punkforChrist says to us. It’s everything he says to us, once his argument is stripped of its irrelevant language barriers(Thomistic philosophical notions, etc.). Therefore, punkforChrist is, first of all, posing a riddle instead of offering an argument. But secondly, he also offers this argument in arguing for the principle of sufficient reason(ultimate explanation).

I’m sorry for the interruption. But I thought it nice to clarify matters. It always throws me into an anguished state of mind when I see how simple questions are worded as complex essays by the power of philosophical systems that merely rely on language without displaying further insight in content. No disrespectful jugdments intended. Just sharing my all too personal feelings.

 

[Areopagite]

What punkforChrist is telling us is this: What is now is not necessarily so. We are dependent(contingent). But everything that is contingent could also not be, since it doesn’t exist necessarily. We are not ultimately explained. We know that we are and how we came to be so through the long chain of dependency. But why we are at all, since we also couldn’t be, we cannot say. So the question runs: why is there anything if there could also be nothing?Just to say: well, there is something and we should leave it by that: is obviously not an ultimate explanation. However, if we claim that God, a necessary being, exists, who has willed the universe(the contingent chain, the dependency-chain) into being, then we have such an ultimate explanation and the question why there is anything instead of nothing, as could well be, is easy to answer: because God has willed it so.

Very good. I agree. Well put.

Ah, a short time ago there was a similar debate launched by MindOverMatter. ‘Metaphysical dependence’, as employed here, is quite a hazy, fancyful term.

Metaphysical dependence is hazy for those who don’t understand it. And that’s most of us, of course. I hope you’re not saying though that it’s a false concept or something.

Why is there anything instead of nothing? This is not only a part of what punkforChrist says to us. It’s everything he says to us, once his argument is stripped of its irrelevant language barriers(Thomistic philosophical notions, etc.). Therefore, punkforChrist is, first of all, posing a riddle instead of offering an argument. But secondly, he also offers this argument in arguing for the principle of sufficient reason(ultimate explanation).

I’m sorry for the interruption. But I thought it nice to clarify matters. It always throws me into an anguished state of mind when I see how simple questions are worded as complex essays by the power of philosophical systems that merely rely on language without displaying further insight in content. No disrespectful jugdments intended. Just sharing my all too personal feelings.

I know Thomism might not be your cup of tea (perhaps you’re more of a Platonist than a Aristotelian), but I just want to say that some people are actually assisted in their thinking with Thomistic distinctions. Before I was introduced to Thomism, life was very confusing for me, and answers to philosophical questions seemed impossible. But some people are merely confused by it. Frankly, I’m confused without out it. This is because oftentimes, simplistic arguments and generalizations leave me with more questions … only answered in a clear and systematic and oftentimes necessarily complex way. But that’s just me (sometimes), though the answer you gave here was very well digested, so I am not putting down simplistic argumentation. Both are necessary. Both can shed light on the truth. That’s what I think.

 

[punkforchrist]

Spock:

Why not?

Well, you made a positive assertion about the principle of conservation and its being self-sufficient, so I’m thinking I have less of a burden of proof on this point. What’s the connection?

No. The natural laws are the properties of matter-energy. They do not exist as independent entities.

The laws of nature are indeed inherently part of the physical universe, but we can still reasonably ask why these particular laws of nature hold, and not others.

What do you call a “closed system”? The Universe is closed, since it contains everything.

A closed system is a state of affairs in which nothing external can bring about an effect. The universe is defined as the totality of physical space, time, matter and energy. Only if one is a physicalist would this constitute “everything”.

The redness of the ball is sufficiently explained by the redness of the material it is made of. I was not talking about the “redness” of the clay.

As I mentioned earlier, an appeal to its material does count as an explanation, but its only a partial explanation. Aristotle himself lists four different types of causes: material cause (which is kind of explanation alluded to above), efficient cause, formal cause, and final cause.

In order to avoid an ifinite regress the process must stop at the basic principles, which need no further explanation. I thought we went through this before.

I don’t recall agreeing to that. I don’t believe that any thing can be a brute fact. This doesn’t mean that there has to be an infinite regress, since whatever is most basic may still have an explanation; it’s just that the explanation isn’t found in anything external to it.

Not in the least. The question was (and still is) whether “movement” (which is an inherent physical property of matter-energy) is imposed from “outside” (as if there were an “outside”). So far you presented no reason to assume it.

I haven’t presented any reason? Or, I haven’t presented any reason you agree with?

My immaterial mind causes the fingers on my hands to type.
Since your mind is the product of your brain, it uses physical means (nerves) to move your fingers. Try to “think” about what you wish to post (“think” only, nothing else), and see if your thoughts will be reflected on the computer screen without using physical means.

The mind causes the brain to stimulate certain nerves, which result in typing. This isn’t telekinesis, since the mind and the brain have a relation that the mind and the keyboard do not share.

Not a good example. We are living beings - and only our current form is dependent on breathing. The material we are made of does not depend on it. What do the elementary particles (we are made of) “depend on”?

The Logos.

Up until this point, apart from the archaic terminology, it is pretty good. One correction, though: “logos” is not “nature”, it is the attributes of the physical world.

Have you ever seen the Logos?

By the way, I agree that “Logos” and “Nature” aren’t synonymous. Some, like Spinoza, contend that they are, however.

This is not acceptable. The properties of physical objects (which we call the laws of nature) need no “mystical” description, which you call “pure act”. They simply are what they are, the properties of matter-energy.

Where does the proof from Logos to Pure Act go wrong?

1. Everything that changes is composed of potentiality.
2. The Logos is changeless.
3. Therefore, the Logos is not composed of potentiality.

(3) is synonymous with “the Logos is Pure Act.”

 

[warpspeedpetey]

And what does one assume when they begin theology?

the same thing that is presumed when they talk about the omnimax attributes. that they apply to something, G-d. your just raising yet another excuse not to do your research.

Rubbish! (You wanted to hear me say that, right?)

no, i just expected it.

Let’s take a look at the Epicureans, for example.

there are huge holes in their ideas, such as what is evil that doesnt cause pain? can pain be mitigated by medecine and therefore lose its identity as evil? what about masochists, they enjoy pain, are they then evil? that doesnt seem very subjective to me, but let me point out that the epicurians philosophy has nothing to do with the omnimax qualities. i suppose some satanists think evil is good because they enjoy the freedom they associate with those acts, but in the end your just talking about hedonists, little more morally sophisticated than a bonobo. when the viagra, the coke, and the flesh fail, a hedonist is a sad sack. what then is their life for? nothing, their morality doesnt even outlast the flesh, im not impressed with those drunkards, ive been down the path of excess, somewhere on the horizon i see the palace of wisdom.

and yes i am aware of other ethic systems, however metaphysics supersedes ethics in that once you know there is a G-d then you no longer have a choice of ethic systems. what does it matter if you choose an ethics system only to find out it was the wrong one? shouldnt one first know if there is a G-d and therefore an ethics system by which you are expected to behave? and no, there is nothing outside the Church, at least nothing that matters to me in the light of G-ds existence.

How is this relevant?

you just keep refering to subjective ethics as that has something to do with the omnimax qualities. in the end G-d weights qualities. so no matter what people subjectively think, G-d has told us what qualities we are to weight. the only way around it is to say that G-d doesnt exist, but as you can see here, that isnt so easy an argument to make.

This is a very timely confession of yours. QUOTE]

sure, ill shortform it for you, even though you havent offered a geometrical or syllogistic argument apparently you expect one from me.

platinga, s5, copleston, done. now if you ever bothered to do research, that would make sense, now im just taking advantage of your general disinclination to work.

if you dont like that there are a number of other arguments.

I’ll read it after I get home from school, where they’ll be finishing up the indoctrination process. The teachers say I’ll be a full-fledged atheistic communist in no time!

oh, so now you dont want to deal with “indoctrination”, yeah…i didnt think so.

A void is an empty space. Now, we can say that the size of a space is defined by certain boundaries; the void only lasts as long as the emptiness. In this hypothetical reality, there are no objects to interrupt that emptiness. The emptiness is infinite. This, by definition, would be a void.

…And despite what you say, voids are not objects. In our language, the word is used as a noun, but that’s just a limitation of language.

so, its not an object, but its not “nothing” so whats this strange new mode of existence that you propose? oh wait your just chaning nouns now. same mistake you just made woith the word void

And I know that you know all of this, you’re simply evading the question. How did you put it when you were talking with wanstronian? Oh yeah: DODGE!!!

actually, i dont know this, youre now just replacing the word void with the words “empty space” thats the third time youve made the same error, dont feel bad, most people cant concieve of nothing, without making it something, it takes a while to grasp the idea that nothing literally cant be something. so its not a dodge its just you repeating the same mistake. btw, your refutation seems to be “…And despite what you say, voids are not objects.” thats not su much a refutation as a “nuh huh!”

I repeat: those countries failed for reasons other than communism, even if we assume that communism was a contributing factor. Capitalism doesn’t seem to be doing so well, either. It just took longer to fall.

thats funny then that they all failed for the same economic reasons, dealt with dissent the same way, and had the same end results, even though they were attempted across a number of cultures, languages, geographies, and peoples. when the whole class shows up with redspots, its a good indication that each of the kids has the measles. it doesnt seem to matter if they are short or tall, smart or dumb, live in one neighbor hood or another.

see, even that argument falls apart under the evidence. you just werent alive to see it, but i was, as were many here. we know it from experience, youve simply read it in a book or had someone tell you such things.

Of course we indoctrinate our kids.

i havent the foggiest what Jesus camp is, but if it isnt Cathoic. it isnt Christain. i couldnt care less what heretics do. from our viewpoint the indoctrination that homosexuality is ok, is an evil. after all until 1980 or so it was a mental disorder in the dvsm, lobbying by homosexuals changed that. its not like it suddenly wasnt a disease, it was defined out of the dvsm. so you think homosexuality is ok, most of us old enough to remember when it wasnt, still dont think it is. what if robbers or killers had a lobby? could we make their action ok by simply erasing it fromn the law books? no of course not. so much of your thinking is grounded in the liberal indoctrination you have recieved. as you say about the Church, there is more out there bud.

Anyway, my teachers discourage my attitude toward life, and they certainly don’t want their students to be communists or atheists. They want mindless puppets, not analytical cynics. So saying that every political and ethical thought I’ve had was force-fed to me is absurd.

some may not, but others do. you dont have the experience to know thwe difference, you werent even born when communism fell, but i was your age, just out on my own, just starting college, and i remember the first russians i met, they didnt have anything nice to say about communism ata ll.

by the way, why do tyou think your an “analytical cynic”? do you believe that all people are motivated by selfishness? i thought you were a skeptic, one who doubts things until shown otherwise? maybe your both?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Einstein would be surprised. As a matter of fact, it is not precise to speak about “time” **and **“space”, as if they would be two separate categories. The correct terminology is “spacetime”.

how does this make time anything other than a subjective measure of change? einstein knew that time was mutable, he proved it after all. i think he would have gotten it on a philosophical level. maybe not. but appealing to authority isnt going to work here, i still need a reason that what we have isnt really SEM. given lagrangian values, i wonder if a case might be made that what we actually have is just EM. and given that matter reduces to energy, maybe we just have E. what about that? E is just potential, the ability to be, so maybe all we have is existence itself…wait, did i just back my way into G-d as the maximal state of being? i dont know, the weak link in this train of thought is space not existing, i should do some more research on lagrangian values…

yeah, i know stream of conciousness, but hey, i admit it is speculatory at this point.

 

[Spock]

This is exactly what Aristotle said, except the term was “substance” instead of “physical object” and “accident” instead of “property.” So, I agree with you.

In terms of Aristotle’s Ten Categories, roundness would fall under quality. “Distance” and “in front of” and “behind” would fall under relation and place. “Before” and “after” would fall under relation and time. “Interaction” would fall under action and passion. I think we’re on board here.

I agree that abstract objects/concepts are not physical.

You said, however, that many problems arise when one argues that abstract objects/concepts are not our inventions but rather exist independently from us. I think you are right … but there’s something else that needs to be said. Obviously, a concept or abstraction necessarily must exist in the mind and cannot exist in reality. However, I would say that even though the mind produces concepts, it does so by replicating the form of the object that it sees. The form of the object in reality must be the same form that ends up in the mind, otherwise, the mind by definition does not understand it (because the concept of the thing would not match the thing itself). Thus, when we perceive something, we look at the physical form of the thing, and then the mind creates a copy of that form in the intellect, but making it an abstract form and not a physical form. The mind does then invent concepts, but the concept is merely the abstract version of the form of the thing that it perceives.

Everything is perfectly said, and I agree. The two terminologies can be “translated” into each other.

Now, you seem to say that concepts can only be about non-substances (or, non-physical objects, as you say). But this, I think, is not true because you can have the concept of a horse, a person, a ball, a star, a rock, etc. You can understand these things abstractly, and thus concepts can be about substances.

Yes, of course. Concepts can be about anything, the “distillation” of a physical object, the properties (or attributes) of physical objects, the relationships between physical objects, and totally imaginary “objects”, like fairies, or Hamlet.

I’m somewhat unclear whether you believe accidents (or, properties, as you say) are concepts or not. Or, whether they exist in reality and can be conceived of, or they are merely abstractions without existence in reality. This is because you said at one point that distance was a property (and you also said that a property may or may not be present in an object), but then later on you seem to say that “distance” just has conceptual existence, not physical existence. And yet, you said properties may be present in objects … but present just conceptually but not really?

Thus, a round ball is merely round conceptually but, really, the ball is not round (same goes for “before” and “after” and “in front of” etc). I would think though, when you say that properties are present in objects, you mean they are actually present there in real way, independent of the mind.

Well, we ran into the limitations of the language. Unfortuantely there is only one word: “existence”. I would suggest to “make up” different words to describe the the different types of existence.

Let p-existence denote physical existence, the objects which are made of matter-energy, and reside it spacetime.
Let a-existence designate the attributes (or properties) of p-existence. These “thingies” do not exist as “tangible” physical objects, they describe the attributes or properties of physical objects. The attributes are physical objects themselves, they are way how physical objects are. (Language is sometimes so inadequate.)
Let r-existence describe the relationships between p-existing objects.
Let c-existence be the word for concepts, whether these concepts are about physical objects, their attributes, their relationships or even other concepts.
And finally, let x-existence describe the hypotherical existence of “supernatural” or “transcendent” entites.

With these categories we can distinguish among the different types of existence.

I would say this, though, when accidents (properties) are spoken of as nouns, not as adjectives, adverbs, or verbs, then I would say they do have a kind of heightened abstract nature and greater detachment from reality (though not completely detached). Accidents, as said before, need to exist in a substance (a physical object) … they can’t exist by themselves. That is why they are usually in non-noun forms when spoken of. However, when spoken of as a noun, we consider the accident apart from any particular substance. For example, the word “roundness.” Here, the form of “round” is not tied to any particular substance but considered by itself. Accidents in this consideration can only exist like that (by itself) in the mind and not in actual reality. However, accidents in non-noun consideration (the better term is “Attributive” rather than “Substantive” form) can be said to exist in reality no problem. And, in a sense, I think it’s fair to say that distance (an accident mentioned in substantive form) can exist in reality as long as it is in/pertain to substances and not by itself in reality.

I would say then that “distance” exists in reality. For what is distance except the amount of space between two things … would you say that space doesn’t actually exist? Is space just a concept too? Space is both a concept and an actually existing real thing. Same thing with the concept of “amount” … I think this (more generally called Quantity) exists in reality. Things can vary in size in a real way, and this is only accomplished if quantity is also real. Otherwise, what is the real reason why they would vary in size?

I hope the suggestion presented above will clarify what we mean here.

Now to return to the Thomistic argument. “Motion” would be an attribute of the physical universe. It is the inherent part of p-existence. Therefore it cannot be meaningfully asked: “where does motion come from?”, or “was motion imposed from above?”. One cannot ask “why is there a distance (r-existence)?”

 

[Spock]

What punkforChrist is telling us is this: What is now is not necessarily so. We are dependent(contingent). But everything that is contingent could also not be, since it doesn’t exist necessarily. We are not ultimately explained. We know that we are and how we came to be so through the long chain of dependency. But why we are at all, since we also couldn’t be, we cannot say. So the question runs: why is there anything if there could also be nothing?Just to say: well, there is something and we should leave it by that: is obviously not an ultimate explanation. However, if we claim that God, a necessary being, exists, who has willed the universe(the contingent chain, the dependency-chain) into being, then we have such an ultimate explanation and the question why there is anything instead of nothing, as could well be, is easy to answer: because God has willed it so.

Which is no explanation at all. It is an arbitrary stopping point. One could surmise that God is also contingent upon a super-God, who is also contingent upon a hyper-God, and so on… If we wish to stop somewhere and avoid the infinite regress, we can stop right at the p-existence, and leave it at that. P-existence is self-explanatory, it needs no further “justification”, just like God’s x-existence is supposed to be.

The objection about contingent and necessary existence is an artificial and meaningless dichotomy. In relation to my parents my existence is contingent. In relation to my child, my existence is necessary. We can say that since “something exists”, therefore something must exist - which is pretty tautological.

There is another problem, hidden in the discussion. To say that the universe (the set of p-existing objects) is contingent, because all its constituent elements (p-existing objects) are contingent would evoke the fallacy of composition.

Why is there anything instead of nothing? This is not only a part of what punkforChrist says to us. It’s everything he says to us, once his argument is stripped of its irrelevant language barriers(Thomistic philosophical notions, etc.). Therefore, punkforChrist is, first of all, posing a riddle instead of offering an argument. But secondly, he also offers this argument in arguing for the principle of sufficient reason(ultimate explanation).

The PSR is just another nice idea. But it either leads to infinity, or there is some stopping point, which remains “ultimately” unexplained.

 

[TheWhim]

It’s good to see we’ve finally arrived at the basic principles of this debate.

First of all, I strongly recommend you to scrutinize closely the following answer by Craig: reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5847
I recommend everyone to do the same who still feels confused as to what is actually discussed in this thread and who wants to get an easy-to-read overview of the question.

One could surmise that God is also contingent upon a super-God, who is also contingent upon a hyper-God, and so on…

Hardly so. The very notion of God implies that there can be no hyper-God. If God is everything, so to say, how can there be more than everything? PunkforChrist has offered an argument why the efficient cause of the universe, which is pure actuality, has all the properties entailed by the notion of God(post #49). You should rather attack him on those grounds. For my part, I can only say it makes perfect sense why there cannot be anything more actual than pure actuality. There is no regress to the hyper-God.

If we wish to stop somewhere and avoid the infinite regress, we can stop right at the p-existence, and leave it at that. P-existence is self-explanatory, it needs no further “justification”, just like God’s x-existence is supposed to be.

The difference being that p-existence is not necessary, while x-existence is. I cannot help thinking that to assume that p-existence is necessary is a wildly irrational claim. Let’s quote from Craig:
“Now this would be a very radical step for the atheist to take, and I can’t think of any contemporary atheist who has in fact adopted this line. A few years ago at a Philosophy of Time conference at City College in Santa Barbara, it seemed to me that Professor Adolf Grünbaum, a vociferous atheistic philosopher of science from the University of Pittsburgh, was flirting with this idea. But when I raised the question from the floor whether he thought the universe existed necessarily, he was quite indignant at the suggestion. “Of course not!” he snapped and went on to say that the universe just exists without any explanation.”

The objection about contingent and necessary existence is an artificial and meaningless dichotomy. In relation to my parents my existence is contingent. In relation to my child, my existence is necessary.

In relation to, but not in itself. In yourself you’re not necessarily existent(well, I hope you’ll agree with that one). And thus the difference is not meaningless. You could also not be. You could be entirely different. Because you are contingent. Think of something that could not not be and that couldn’t be different. That’s what’s called a necessary being.

We can say that since “something exists”, therefore something must exist - which is pretty tautological.

Yeah, you said so before. But punkforChrists argument does not say so. The real state of affairs is quite different. What punkforChrist says is this: something exists(contingently), therefore something exists necessarily. - Obviously this is not tautological.

To say that the universe (the set of p-existing objects) is contingent, because all its constituent elements (p-existing objects) are contingent would evoke the fallacy of composition.

Ew, it does not. I quote now from Craig:
“Sometimes atheists will respond to premise 1[everything has an explanation] by saying that it is true of everything in the universe but not of the universe itself. But this response commits what has been aptly called “the taxicab fallacy.” For as the nineteenth century atheist philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer quipped, premise 1 can’t be dismissed like a hack once you’ve arrived at your desired destination!”

The PSR is just another nice idea.

It’s not just a nice idea, it’s the very basis of science. No scientific mind can argue against PSR. Imagine how far we would have come with science if people would have thought: ‘well, the rain only falls by chance, earthquakes only happen by whim, fire burns when it feels like it, everything is quite unexplicable, there’s no explanation, no sufficient reason to it’. Welcome to the stone age - no, not the stone age. Far, far, infinitely far worse.

But it either leads to infinity, or there is some stopping point, which remains “ultimately” unexplained.

Here’s your hyper-God again. But the stopping point(God) does not remain unexplained, as has been said above. There is no hyper-God just as there is no more-than-everything or no more-actual-than-pure-actuality or no more-necessary-than-necessity.

 

[punkforchrist]

TheWhim:

First of all, I strongly recommend you to scrutinize closely the following answer by Craig: reasonablefaith.org/site/…rticle&id=5847
I recommend everyone to do the same who still feels confused as to what is actually discussed in this thread and who wants to get an easy-to-read overview of the question.

I second your recommendation. Craig is basically the Ronald Regan (“Great Communicator”) of Christian philosophy, and this article is a case-in-point. It’s technically an overview and defense of the Leibnizian version of the cosmological argument (LCA), but the LCA often overlaps with the TCA.

 

[Spock]

First of all, I strongly recommend you to scrutinize closely the following answer by Craig: reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5847
I recommend everyone to do the same who still feels confused as to what is actually discussed in this thread and who wants to get an easy-to-read overview of the question.

Well, I read it. Here comes a short criticism.

There are three premises in the argument:

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence (either in the
   necessity of its own nature or in an external cause).
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3. The universe exists.
   This should be a joke. Premise 2) should read (if the author would be logically honest):
   2’. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is either that the Universe is self-sufficient or the explanation is some external factor.

To drag in God and put it into the premises is a **serious **logical error. Now, the known physical principle is the conservation of matter-energy-momentum, which says that matter/energy/momentum cannot be created or destroyed. Therefore matter/energy/momentum exists in a non-creatable and non-destructible manner, which means that it cannot non-exist, therefore it necessarily exists. Therefore the universe necessarily exists. What is the alternative? That the universe “might not exist”? That would be equivalent to say that “nothing” exists - which is nonsense. The existence of the universe is a physical necessity - again following from the principle of conservation of matter/energy/momentum.

Hardly so. The very notion of God implies that there can be no hyper-God. If God is everything, so to say, how can there be more than everything? PunkforChrist has offered an argument why the efficient cause of the universe, which is pure actuality, has all the properties entailed by the notion of God(post #49). You should rather attack him on those grounds. For my part, I can only say it makes perfect sense why there cannot be anything more actual than pure actuality. There is no regress to the hyper-God.

Arbitrary. Either the PSR is universal, and then applies to God, too, or the PSR is not universal, and then it is perfectly satisfactory that the matter/energy/momentum is the stopping point, where there is no need for further PSR - and the reason being again is the principle of conservation of matter/energy/momentum.

The difference being that p-existence is not necessary, while x-existence is.

Nice assertion. Evidence or proof?

I cannot help thinking that to assume that p-existence is necessary is a wildly irrational claim. Let’s quote from Craig:
“Now this would be a very radical step for the atheist to take, and I can’t think of any contemporary atheist who has in fact adopted this line. A few years ago at a Philosophy of Time conference at City College in Santa Barbara, it seemed to me that Professor Adolf Grünbaum, a vociferous atheistic philosopher of science from the University of Pittsburgh, was flirting with this idea. But when I raised the question from the floor whether he thought the universe existed necessarily, he was quite indignant at the suggestion. “Of course not!” he snapped and went on to say that the universe just exists without any explanation.”

The philospher in the quotation made an error. (It happens). He should have answered that the universe necessarily exists, its existence is a physical necessity - stemming (again) from the conservation of matter/energy/momentum. (I am tired to type it out so many times, so I will abbreviate it to PoCoMEM).

In relation to, but not in itself. In yourself you’re not necessarily existent(well, I hope you’ll agree with that one). And thus the difference is not meaningless. You could also not be. You could be entirely different. Because you are contingent. Think of something that could not not be and that couldn’t be different. That’s what’s called a necessary being.

What do the elementary particles “depend on”? The atoms I am made of are not contingent on anything. By the way to say that the atoms are composed of sub-atomic particles is not dependency! The term “being” is loaded, it already presumes something “conscious”. The term “entity” would be much better. And the necessary entity, which cannot non-exist, is the physical universe - based upon PoCoMEM.

Yeah, you said so before. But punkforChrists argument does not say so. The real state of affairs is quite different. What punkforChrist says is this: something exists(contingently), therefore something exists necessarily. - Obviously this is not tautological.

The phrase I used “must exist” which is equivalent to “necessarily exist”.

Ew, it does not. I quote now from Craig:
"Sometimes atheists will respond to premise 1[everything has an explanation] by saying that it is true of everything in the universe but not of the universe itself.

Craig commits the fallacy of composition. Example 1: “all the tiles of the floor are white, therefore the floor is white” - a correct generalization. Example 2: “all the tiles of the floor are square, therefore the the floor is square” - in an incorrect generalization. To assume that all members in a set have a property “P”, therefore the set itself also has the property “P” is the fallacy of composition. The set may or may not have the property. In this case it is not proven, hence the fallacy. Besides, matter/energy/momentum are not dependent on anything.

It’s not just a nice idea, it’s the very basis of science.?

All scientists understand the necessity of basic principles. Only a pseudo-scientist would assume that “everything” can be reduced to something more basic - which is what explanation means.

Here’s your hyper-God again. But the stopping point(God) does not remain unexplained, as has been said above. There is no hyper-God just as there is no more-than-everything or no more-actual-than-pure-actuality or no more-necessary-than-necessity.

To say that God is self-suffient is just an arbitrary assertion - supported by nothing. To say that STEM is self-sufficient is supported by the PoCoMEM.

 

[JDaniel]

It is amazing to me how much can be said about a subject by people who know nothing about that subject. Everyone is going on and on about “motion”, “Prime Mover”, “First Cause”, “STEM”, “being” etc. and everyone is talking past each other.

Here is the problem that I see with the wording of many of your propositions: the preparation for a proof of a Prime Mover is based upon two parts. First, “Whatever is moved is moved by something other than itself.”. Second, "Among movers essentially subordinated to each other there is no infinite series."

The problems many iterations herein have is that you are not specifying a series of movers that are essentially subordinated to each other. Nor are you specifying that the series must act as a whole. These are integral to Aquinas’s arguments. In an accidentally subordinated series of movers there can be an infinite regress (although there is not – at this point in time - an actually infinite regress). In an essentially subordinated series of movers, such as a nail driven into a piece of wood by a hammer, and a hand, and an arm, and a shoulder, etc., all act as a “whole” and move in unison. It is obvious that there must be a Prime Mover; that there cannot be an infinite series of movers.

Consider the above example. In the diving of a nail into wood, there is only an accidental subordination of the hammer’s motion with the hammer’s maker. In fact, as has been said slightly differently herein, the maker of the hammer may even be dead. However, there is an essential subordination of the hammer to the hand that is here and now swinging it, then the hand to the arm here and now moving the hand, etc. Thus, if there is no actual infinity in the series of causes here and now operating in such motions as the driving of a nail, or, the blowing of a leaf, then the series of movers, being finite, in actuality, must come to an end. This means that there must be a Prime Mover

So, in summary, if we think about motion and mobile being, there are two kinds of motion AND we are constantly confusing them. Clearly, there exists essentially subordinated motion AND accidentally subordinated motion. Clearly they are not the same. Clearly, if these are not recognized it is the fault of the viewer, not the fault of nature, or reality.

Clearly, when we (including Aquinas) are (or were) talking about motion and mobile being, in reference to a Prime Mover, we are not talking about an accidentally subordinated series of movers as that would make no sense. And, while there may be a more or less relevant relationship between accidentally subordinated movers, the effect may or may not occur, or have occurred. We can speak of my parents, then my grandparents, then my great-grandparents, then my great-great-grandparents, etc., etc., but despite that they exist, or have existed, my existence is unassured. Thus, the effect(s) of an accidentally subordinated series of motions is quite relative in nature.

On the other hand, if my muscles move my shoulder, and my shoulder moves my arm, and my arm moves my hand, and my hand moves a hammer and the hammer moves a nail, the result (effect) is not relative. This conclusion is no different today than it was in Aquinas’s time. So, what did he not understand?

Time, for Aquinas, was simply the measure of motion. What did he not understand? The world and the universe consists of mobile beings. It is sensible and necessary (if we are to understand them) to define both “motion” and “mobile being”. “Motion” is defined as the act of the potential precisely as potential. What else could it be and not beg the question? “Mobile being” is that which is and moves - in fact, all physical being is mobile being.

Now, in STEM, we can do away with time in two ways. First, immobilize all mobile beings. No mobile beings, no time. Second, destroy all clocks. Period.

In STEM, we can do away with space. Simply move all mobile beings into contiguity. (Obviously, this may not be as “simple” as I postulated, but, it is a possible universe.) Second, reduce the multiplicity to a singularity. Space is relative. It is the relationship between two or more objects.

Matter could be done away with by making energy non-transformable. And, of course, there would be no such thing as “energy” - except in the form of perpetual potential energy - if we did away with ALL mobile being.

The fact that mobile being exists, and, the fact that there is space between the mobile beings of this universe is more of a “why” of motion than the mere description of kinetic energy, atoms, electrons, bosons, muons, etc., which are the “how” of motion at the quantum level.

However, we sill have the reality of a Prime Mover.

In this thread I see a mixing of Prime Mover, First Cause and Necessary Cause, back and forth, from argument to argument. We must take care not to confuse these terms (and defiitions) with each other, or, we will all be in a blurr of semantics without the possibility of any Truth coming forth.

Primary Motion (the Prime Mover) is, nonetheless, a different argument from the other two. It derives from the real relationship between the movers in the series which makes them simultaneous movers. First Cause is different from the other two in that it speaks to an external Efficiency that if essentially subordinated cannot regress infinitely. And, thirdly, Necessary cause, is a matter of real necessity vs. merely contingency in the real world of mobile beings. When we investigate any and all mobile being, we discover that there is nothing that exists - except God - in and of itself. All mobile being is dependent upon something else for not only its ability to interact with other mobile beings, but also, its existence, and this cannot regress infinitely.

jd

 

[JDaniel]

Unfortunately your analogy is not applicable. It is true that spacetime is contingent upon matter-energy, but matter and energy are not contingent upon anything. See the principle of conservation of matter-energy-momentum.

Of course they are. Matter is directly dependent upon energy and the ability of energy to transmutate into a solid. Kinetic energy is directly dependent upon potential energy being turned loose by some efficient cause possibility. And, “momentum” begs the question and simply re-uses “motion”. Moreover, momentum MUST be “conditionally” defined, thus it cannot be a principle, since there is nowhere in the universe where it can be truly tested - at least at this point in the history of man. A “principle” is that from which anything is derived in any manner whatsoever AND is itself underived.

Suppose you look at a kid’s ball, which happens to be painted red. It is a valid question to ask: “where did the red color come from?”. Suppose you look at a ball made of red clay. It is not a valid question to ask: “where did the red color come from?”. It is inherent to the red clay. The ball of clay is “necessarily” red.

ga.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/soils/red.html

The red of “red clay” is absolutely dependent, and thus, completely not in and of itself underived or necessary.

jd

 

[JDaniel]

Easy to prove me wrong. Show an example where pure “will” has a physical effect.

There are plenty of news articles that describe a small woman who lifts the end, or corner, of a 2,000 plus pound car so that a child might be removed from beneath it.

jd