Thomistic Predestination

[jbp]

So you don’t believe God is all knowing? Isn’t that dogma?

It does not detract from dogma. You can theoretically know everything now but the future is still indeterminate simply because of the math. The future has not happened yet. God does not know what will happen. He can’t. He mustn’t if free will is to exist. He can probably predict the future better than you can but that is different from knowing. He can plan the future, based on information in the now, or His now. But people plan for the future all the time too, the difference being, we have imperfect information. Knowing is used in the sense that regardless of the circumstances, it will happen before anything happens or exists. Knowing or planning SOME things in the future does not invalidate the concept of an indeterminate future/unknown future. Knowing that a 5 year old child (whether the child survives or not) will be 7 in two years or that Andromeda will collide with the Milky Way in 2 billion years does not invalidate the concept of an uncertain/indeterminate/unknown future.

Could God have created deterministically? Sure. He could have created a restricted creation where a set of initial values produce known outcomes regardless of, or even in spite of, an infinite time frame. But think of the implication of that: you would reduce Him to a sado-masochistic God. Think about it. Do you think that’s a good thing? The sado-masochists and a lot of atheists would be orgasmicly ecstatic if they ever heard you imply or hint that God would by consequence be a sado-masochistic deity.

No. He is not a sado-masochistic deity because He is the source of all goodness. If you maintain the assumption that God is good, then there are some things even God cannot do; He cannot do something evil. For example:

1. He can’t rape anyone. Whereas, all the ancient gods raped humankind without issue (many demigods were born this way), why did the Hebrew God ask for permission from the Virgin Mary first? (Gabriel announced the conception in the future tense when he was announcing God’s intention.) She could have said no. She had the free will to say no. If she said no, and she still got pregnant, then God would have committed rape. If you think committing rape is not evil, then ok, I’ll let it slide.
2. He cannot lie. The Lord’s enemy is Satan. Satan is the father of lies.
3. He cannot steal.
   etc.

If you believe that God is inherently good, then there are a lot of things even He cannot do. God cannot and will never do something evil. God is a reasonable God and therefore He is also bound by the rules He created in order to be consistently good.

 

[Skeptic92]

What is meant by Thomistic Predestination? There are a couple of senses of that term. You have predestination in the sense of the dogmatic declaration that man is saved only by means of grace, not by mans own power. The contrary to which is Pelagianism, and not a tenable position for a Catholic. You have the Thomistic notion of praemotio physica (physical premotion) vs the Molinist notion of scientia media (middle knowledge) in God. This is far more debated and is a matter which is open for debate amongst the experts (that is, Theologians).

The problem with debating matters of Thomistic Theology is that it presupposes and requires that you have an intimate knowledge of Scholastic, generically, and Thomistic, specifically, Philosophy and Theology. Also being aware of the debates and arguments presented in the schools when this argument was brought to the foreground. What are the Thomists arguing for, and stressing, when they assert praemotio physica? What are the Molinists reacting against in this development? What are they stressing? To ignore the debate and pretend that it is finished would be silly.

 

[littlestsouls2]

You didn’t concentrate hard enough on how the specific objection was answered by Aquinas. God desires all men to be saved, but He desires to have elect and reprobates MORE than that. Aquinas in the Summa approves of Augustine’s explanations of the “God desires all men to be saved” Bible quote. He NEVER says that God loves people personally. Instead, he says that God desires to give each person some good. Some He gives salvation to through efficacious grace, others he gives life on earth only (and then hell). All through free will of course, but we are like puppets to Aquinas, with God able to go one way or another

Aquinas shows elsewhere, such as in the quotes in mentioned earlier, that He loves souls personally. God did not create souls to be vessels of wrath; He created them for eternal life; but in light of their foreseen demerits, He willed to make them vessels of His wrath. This is how St. John Chyrsostom explains this passage, and I don’t see how St. Thomas is disagreeing with him.

If St. Thomas is really a “Thomist” in relation to sufficient grace, then I would be forced to agree with you. But I don’t think he is. I am convinced that Fr. William Most has directly refuted the notion that St. Thomas was a “Thomist” when it comes to sufficient grace, and I also believe that St. Alphonsus has shown the same, albeit indirectly and in much less detail.

There is not much more that I can contribute to this conversation, due to my limited knowledge on the topic. Thank you for the discussion. It is a very fascinating and important topic to me.

If you have not read Fr. William Most’s book, ‘Grace, Predestination and the Salvific Will,’ I highly recommend it!

 

[lmelahn]

We’ve already had this discussion before. Where did you get the idea that Banez did not believe in free will? Augustine, from whom Aquinas got his doctrines on this, said in his conversion that God had to push his will towards repentance. Also, the fundamental question is: if God can produce salvation infallibly, why doesn’t He save everyone. I’ve already quoted Aquinas on His answer

I am aware that Bañez believed in free will; however, it is difficult to construe praemotio physica as doing anything but constrain the will. I think that is an inconsistency in his theory.

God does produce salvation infallibly (the Beatific Vision is so compelling that the will cannot help but adhere to it, when we see it), but He pays us the courtesy of asking us first if we want it.

 

[lmelahn]

Well then Mary contradicted Aquinas:

Objection 3. Further, “There is no injustice in God” (Romans 9:14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.

Reply to Objection 3. The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God’s goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others… Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place.

See my previous thread on how to reconcile molinism with Romans 9

You are free to be a Molinist if you like, that is not an issue. I just happen to think there is a better theory.

I think that Aquinas himself provides part of the answer in this very passage:

That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (emphasis added).

God allows evils, so that other goods may happen. He does not positively will those evils. For example, He allowed our first parents to sin, He allowed the People of Israel to go into exile, and (above all) He allowed His own Son to be crucified. And among those evils he allows is that some people are reprobated.

Just because God rewards some persons and punishes others, it does not follow that He has determined the outcome beforehand.

(Incidentally, of course God knows what will happen beforehand–I am not challenging His omniscience. The question hinges on whether He positively wills such evil things to happen. I posit that He does not–and I think that St. Thomas agrees.)

 

[thinkandmull]

It does not detract from dogma. You can theoretically know everything now but the future is still indeterminate simply because of the math. The future has not happened yet. God does not know what will happen. He can’t. He mustn’t if free will is to exist. He can probably predict the future better than you can but that is different from knowing. He can plan the future, based on information in the now, or His now. But people plan for the future all the time too, the difference being, we have imperfect information. Knowing is used in the sense that regardless of the circumstances, it will happen before anything happens or exists. Knowing or planning SOME things in the future does not invalidate the concept of an indeterminate future/unknown future. Knowing that a 5 year old child (whether the child survives or not) will be 7 in two years or that Andromeda will collide with the Milky Way in 2 billion years does not invalidate the concept of an uncertain/indeterminate/unknown future.

Could God have created deterministically? Sure. He could have created a restricted creation where a set of initial values produce known outcomes regardless of, or even in spite of, an infinite time frame. But think of the implication of that: you would reduce Him to a sado-masochistic God. Think about it. Do you think that’s a good thing? The sado-masochists and a lot of atheists would be orgasmicly ecstatic if they ever heard you imply or hint that God would by consequence be a sado-masochistic deity.

No. He is not a sado-masochistic deity because He is the source of all goodness. If you maintain the assumption that God is good, then there are some things even God cannot do; He cannot do something evil. For example:

1. He can’t rape anyone. Whereas, all the ancient gods raped humankind without issue (many demigods were born this way), why did the Hebrew God ask for permission from the Virgin Mary first? (Gabriel announced the conception in the future tense when he was announcing God’s intention.) She could have said no. She had the free will to say no. If she said no, and she still got pregnant, then God would have committed rape. If you think committing rape is not evil, then ok, I’ll let it slide.
2. He cannot lie. The Lord’s enemy is Satan. Satan is the father of lies.
3. He cannot steal.
   etc.

If you believe that God is inherently good, then there are a lot of things even He cannot do. God cannot and will never do something evil. God is a reasonable God and therefore He is also bound by the rules He created in order to be consistently good.

I don’t know what I means to say that God can’t steal, but I agree with Aquinas when he says that God sees the whole future as if in a single glance

 

[thinkandmull]

Aquinas shows elsewhere, such as in the quotes in mentioned earlier, that He loves souls personally. God did not create souls to be vessels of wrath; He created them for eternal life; but in light of their foreseen demerits, He willed to make them vessels of His wrath. This is how St. John Chyrsostom explains this passage, and I don’t see how St. Thomas is disagreeing with him.

If St. Thomas is really a “Thomist” in relation to sufficient grace, then I would be forced to agree with you. But I don’t think he is. I am convinced that Fr. William Most has directly refuted the notion that St. Thomas was a “Thomist” when it comes to sufficient grace, and I also believe that St. Alphonsus has shown the same, albeit indirectly and in much less detail.

There is not much more that I can contribute to this conversation, due to my limited knowledge on the topic. Thank you for the discussion. It is a very fascinating and important topic to me.

If you have not read Fr. William Most’s book, ‘Grace, Predestination and the Salvific Will,’ I highly recommend it!

Where does Aquinas say that God loves us personally?

 

[thinkandmull]

You are free to be a Molinist if you like, that is not an issue. I just happen to think there is a better theory.

I think that Aquinas himself provides part of the answer in this very passage:

God allows evils, so that other goods may happen. He does not positively will those evils. For example, He allowed our first parents to sin, He allowed the People of Israel to go into exile, and (above all) He allowed His own Son to be crucified. And among those evils he allows is that some people are reprobated.

Just because God rewards some persons and punishes others, it does not follow that He has determined the outcome beforehand.

(Incidentally, of course God knows what will happen beforehand–I am not challenging His omniscience. The question hinges on whether He positively wills such evil things to happen. I posit that He does not–and I think that St. Thomas agrees.)

I remember reading in his treatise on predestination that “God neither desires good nor evil to be done”. It was a strange statement, but I have the number of the pg he said it on in a notebook buried somewhere in my room. But I will find it someday. Until then, again,

Objection 3. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men** by predestinating and reprobating**, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.

Reply to Objection 3. Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others… Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place.

Also read there how he quotes Romans IN ACCORD WITH SCHOLASTIC THOMISM. I am not sure in Banez and Aquinas differed on how the efficacious grace works (Augustine said it pushes the will), but I’m am clearly right that Aquinas believed it is better for some to be damned than saved

 

[lmelahn]

I remember reading in his treatise on predestination that “God neither desires good nor evil to be done”. It was a strange statement, but I have the number of the pg he said it on in a notebook buried somewhere in my room. But I will find it someday. Until then, again,

Objection 3. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men** by predestinating and reprobating**, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.

Reply to Objection 3. Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others… Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place.

Also read there how he quotes Romans IN ACCORD WITH SCHOLASTIC THOMISM. I am not sure in Banez and Aquinas differed on how the efficacious grace works (Augustine said it pushes the will), but I’m am clearly right that Aquinas believed it is better for some to be damned than saved

They all agree (Augustine, Aquinas, and Bañez) in that grace affects the will. The difference is in how they conceive the will. For Aquinas, it flows from the person, like water from a fountain. Therefore it mediates between the substance (i.e., the person) and his actions. It is sort of like a reservoir from which actions can flow. Thus, for Aquinas, grace (so to speak) fills up the reservoir so that the person can act. But the person is free to close off the valve if he wants to. (Have a look at I, q. 77, especially a. 6, regarding how the “powers”–i.e., the intellect and the will–flow from the soul itself. I think is this is the key passage to understanding Aquinas on this point.)

For Bañez, the will is more like one of the bricks that make up a building (along with the intellect, each of the accidents, and even the substance itself). It doesn’t really have any intrinsic power to do anything. The best it can do is dispose itself to act, and God then produces the action. Hence, grace disposes the will, and the God then takes care of producing the action.

As regards the passage you quoted, I appreciate that God manifests His goodness through mercy in the case of the predestined and justice in the case of the reprobate. Since Aquinas makes it very clear that he only wills moral evil indirectly (“per accidens”), I don’t think it follows, even from this passage, that God arbitrarily chooses who will be saved and damned. (See I, q. 49, a. 2.)

It is like what I said in the previous post: it was better, in a way, that Adam sinned, because it was the occasion for God to provide a Savior even more wonderful than was originally planned. (“O felix culpa,” as we say on the Easter Vigil.) But it is going too far to say that God actually wanted Adam to sin.

What do you think of the following passage (from the question on predestination)?

Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered—namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence (I. q, 23, a. 8, corpus).

I am interested mostly in the statement in bold: because, clearly, among the secondary causes are the acts of the will of the persons in question. God knows beforehand who will be saved (predestination as “ordination,” which as Aquinas explains above, is a ratio or knowledge in the Divine Mind), but it is brought about by secondary causes.

 

[thinkandmull]

You still didn’t read that article I sighted properly. Nobody is denying that humans have free will, but the question is whether God’s grace infallibly brings about its result, and Thomas says yes… SO EVERYONE SHOULD BE SAVED? Not according to Aquinas. This has nothing to do with whether (if even) there are tiny differences in expression between Aquinas and Banez on how efficacious grace works. Did you notice Aquinas’s response in to THIS objection: **Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits. ** And the article is about whether foreknowledge is the cause of predestination. For Aquinas, the secondary flow from the first, because predestination IS PROVIDENCE. And yet, not everyone is saved, because Aquinas believed that Romans 9 had to be interpreted to mean that it is better for there to be a ratio of the glorified and the burning than everyone loving God in Heaven.

 

[TomD123]

A couple of points now that I am returning to this thread after watching it progress a bit:

(1) It is often debated to what extent St. Thomas taught “thomism” as understood by Banez. It seems that this thread has gotten into that debate a bit. My own take is the evidence favors St. Thomas did teach unconditional election and predestination prior to the consideration of merits. The evidence seems quite strong. But that is not the point of this thread.

(2) To the one commentator who suggested God does not know the future: I do not think this is in accord with Christian doctrine. Scripture indicates that God does know the future with certainty. And if God did not, He would change as the future happens. One could opt for one a number of positions as to how God knows future contingents (obviously that which is true of the future by necessity God can know…even we can at least in principle)*

(3) My original question is how can the love of God be reconciled with a thomistic understanding of predestination. By “thomistic” I mean predestination prior to the consideration of merits along with the intrinsic efficacy of grace. Molinists always deny the latter. The congruists accept the former and I think they have the same problem: how can we say God is a God of perfect love if He does not offer efficacious grace to all?

*As for a side commentary on how I think God can know the future, see my next post as I think it is important

 

[TomD123]

*Anyway,
There seems to be three main ways in which God can know the future:

(1) God knows the future as its cause. That is, He knows what contingent things will happen in the future because He causes them to be. God knows the future because He knows what He wills to happen, including the free-choices of man. This is the picture painted by Boethius and it seems as though St. Thomas more or less follows. God predestines the free-choices of man. At least the dominicans thought so.

(2) God knows the future by middle knowledge. This is Molina’s position and a very popular one. God knows what would happen in a given circumstance. God chooses to actualize such a situation. Thus by a combo of His middle knowledge and causality, He knows the future

(3) God knows the future purely by a knowledge of vision .That is, God knows the future by “watching it happen” so to speak. Now, if the future hasn’t happened yet, how can God know it? It seems like the only answer is that the future exists just as the present does. It is only because we are temporal and finite that we percieve an absolute “now” but to God, all of time is equally present and therefore God sees the future from all eternity as it actually exists.

 

[belorg]

*Anyway,
There seems to be three main ways in which God can know the future:

(1) God knows the future as its cause. That is, He knows what contingent things will happen in the future because He causes them to be. God knows the future because He knows what He wills to happen, including the free-choices of man. This is the picture painted by Boethius and it seems as though St. Thomas more or less follows. God predestines the free-choices of man. At least the dominicans thought so.

(2) God knows the future by middle knowledge. This is Molina’s position and a very popular one. God knows what would happen in a given circumstance. God chooses to actualize such a situation. Thus by a combo of His middle knowledge and causality, He knows the future

(3) God knows the future purely by a knowledge of vision .That is, God knows the future by “watching it happen” so to speak. Now, if the future hasn’t happened yet, how can God know it? It seems like the only answer is that the future exists just as the present does. It is only because we are temporal and finite that we percieve an absolute “now” but to God, all of time is equally present and therefore God sees the future from all eternity as it actually exists.

And all three positions pose major problems.
On the first one, it is clear that human beings are not responsible for their actions and choices.
On the second one, this is less clear. But if you take a closer look at it, Molina’s position entails that, ‘before’ God actualizes a perosn X, there is already a truth about this person X , namely that X will do A in situation S, which, since person X doesn’t exist yet, X cannot be responsible for.
The third option logically entails the first one if God is the creator of everything.
If there are such things as secondary causes, we are stull stuck with a form of determinism.

 

[lmelahn]

A couple of points now that I am returning to this thread after watching it progress a bit:

(1) It is often debated to what extent St. Thomas taught “thomism” as understood by Banez. It seems that this thread has gotten into that debate a bit. My own take is the evidence favors St. Thomas did teach unconditional election and predestination prior to the consideration of merits. The evidence seems quite strong. But that is not the point of this thread.

Just to throw in my two cents (and pace my friendly adversary thinkandmull ):

Bañez was fundamentally using the metaphysical system made by Thomas de Vio (Cajetan), and I think it can be convincingly demonstrated that Cajetan’s system differs considerably from Aquinas’. In particular, Cajetan has a view of action (including human action) that is nearly Occasionalist: it is not produced, or emanated by the substance (as Thomas thought), but is practically created directly by God.

It is natural, therefore, that Bañez should think that praemotio physica should completely determine our actions. (Since God’s actions are infallible, and God creates our actions, it follows that He creates the actions He wants and not others.)

Once we realize that for Aquinas praemotio does not completely determine our actions (because they emanate from the supposit or person—actiones sunt suppositorum, as the saying goes), I think we see that the question of whether predistination is post or ante praevisa merita is moot. (Which would explain why St. Thomas is silent on this issue.)

(2) To the one commentator who suggested God does not know the future: I do not think this is in accord with Christian doctrine. Scripture indicates that God does know the future with certainty. And if God did not, He would change as the future happens. One could opt for one a number of positions as to how God knows future contingents (obviously that which is true of the future by necessity God can know…even we can at least in principle)*

(3) My original question is how can the love of God be reconciled with a thomistic understanding of predestination. By “thomistic” I mean predestination prior to the consideration of merits along with the intrinsic efficacy of grace. Molinists always deny the latter. The congruists accept the former and I think they have the same problem: how can we say God is a God of perfect love if He does not offer efficacious grace to all?

Ah, I see. Then I think the answer is simple: it can’t. In my opinion, for all of Bañez’ protestations that he believes in the freedom of the will, his theory does not leave a lot of room for that freedom to operate. In his system, especially given his theory of predestination ante praevisa merita, grace certainly seems to have the effect of restricting the will’s freedom of action. That is not (it seems to me) congruous with the fact that God is Love. Receiving grace should increase our freedom, not limit it.

I don’t think much of Luis de Molina’s theory of predestination post praevisa merita, for the reasons I stated, or of scientia media (more on that, if I have time, in answer to your second post), but his idea of “sufficient” grace more or less has it right. God wills all men to be saved (1 Tim 2:4), and so the “sufficient” grace only becomes “efficacious” when we put it into practice.

(My only issue with this terminology is that calling the grace given to a reprobated soul “sufficient but not efficacious” makes it sound as if God fired a round and missed. In reality, all graces are perfectly infallible—that is, they unfailingly produce their effect. Their immediate effect, however, is not salvation or damnation, but a power given to the person that permits him to do certain actions: namely, to seek baptism, repent, or what have you.)

 

[lmelahn]

*Anyway,
There seems to be three main ways in which God can know the future:

(1) God knows the future as its cause. That is, He knows what contingent things will happen in the future because He causes them to be. God knows the future because He knows what He wills to happen, including the free-choices of man. This is the picture painted by Boethius and it seems as though St. Thomas more or less follows. God predestines the free-choices of man. At least the dominicans thought so.

(2) God knows the future by middle knowledge. This is Molina’s position and a very popular one. God knows what would happen in a given circumstance. God chooses to actualize such a situation. Thus by a combo of His middle knowledge and causality, He knows the future

(3) God knows the future purely by a knowledge of vision .That is, God knows the future by “watching it happen” so to speak. Now, if the future hasn’t happened yet, how can God know it? It seems like the only answer is that the future exists just as the present does. It is only because we are temporal and finite that we percieve an absolute “now” but to God, all of time is equally present and therefore God sees the future from all eternity as it actually exists.

OK. I will attempt to make a critique of de Molina’s scientia media.

The problem is that de Molina, basically, had a slightly anthropomorphic understanding of how God knows things.

(For a good overview of how Thomas understands God’s knowledge, I recommend Quaestio 2 of De veritate, which is more complete than the treatment in the Summa, especially Article 12—although I recommend reading the whole question in order to understand his thought completely.)

We have to keep in mind that God sees all actual beings in an eternal present: whether those be past, present or future beings. He knows them, because He creates them and (in the very same act) maintains them in existence. He also knows them inasmuch as He is their “model” or Divine Idea and inasmuch as He is their ultimate end. (Note that these are the three types of “extrinsic” causes that Aquinas speaks about: efficient, exemplary, and final.)

Hence, there is no distinction, in Thomas’ thought between (1) and (3): He knows His creatures as their Cause, and He sees them as He creates them and maintains them in being. Any creature exists, has existed, or will exist, is known to God by scientia visionis. Whether those future beings are contingent or not is beside the point: God already sees them in act.

De Molina, in essence, had at the back of his mind that God does not yet “see” the future beings because they don’t exist yet. In essence God has to “deduce” what will happen in the future (so to speak), as if He has a discursive intellect like man’s. Hence, de Molina has no problem assigning knowledge of necessary future things to the knowledge of vision. For future contingents, however, God cannot make this “deduction,” and so it must be a different kind of knowledge. However, it cannot be the other alternative—knowledge of simple intelligence—because that has to do with things that God will never create. Hence (since God is omnipotent), He must have a third kind of knowledge in the middle: “middle knowledge.”

In reply, although it is true that future beings don’t exist yet, God sees all of history in His eternal present. “Future” is a category that applies only to creatures, not the Creator. There is no need, therefore, for a scientia media. God sees all future beings with His knowledge of vision.

 

[lmelahn]

You still didn’t read that article I sighted properly. Nobody is denying that humans have free will, but the question is whether God’s grace infallibly brings about its result, and Thomas says yes… SO EVERYONE SHOULD BE SAVED? Not according to Aquinas. This has nothing to do with whether (if even) there are tiny differences in expression between Aquinas and Banez on how efficacious grace works. Did you notice Aquinas’s response in to THIS objection: Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits. And the article is about whether foreknowledge is the cause of predestination. For Aquinas, the secondary flow from the first, because predestination IS PROVIDENCE. And yet, not everyone is saved, because Aquinas believed that Romans 9 had to be interpreted to mean that it is better for there to be a ratio of the glorified and the burning than everyone loving God in Heaven.

Don’t worry, I read your quotations with interest. I interpret them differently from you, that is all .

Now, I read the article over again, but I think it would be misinterpreting Aquinas to say that it is “better” for some men to be damned than for all to be saved, as if a certain ratio needs to be maintained. God can draw good out of people’s condemnation, as He can with any evil, but that doesn’t mean He positively wills that condemnation. He wills the punishment consequent to that condemnation, certainly, but that too is an act of His goodness. (For one thing, He is consenting to the condemned person’s desire to be far away from Him.)

In reality, Aquinas’ point in this article is a different one: that the salvation offered by God is entirely gratuitous. It does not depend on His foreknowledge that we will deserve it. (Indeed, we are completely incapable of deserving it.) Hence, it is not an injustice that some are not saved.

However, none of this contradicts the fact that we, through our acts of the will, are true and proper causes of our salvation or condemnation (secondary causes, but true causes all the same). And this is the important point: God, in His infinite wisdom, has granted us the power or capacity to decide our ultimate destiny. The consequences of that choice (not the foreknowledge of our merits, which we acquire through grace anyhow) then determine whether God’s goodness will be manifested to us as mercy (in salvation) or as justice (in condemnation).

I have seen nothing, in this article, or in any part of Quaestio 23, that contradicts this view. Quite the opposite .

 

[lmelahn]

(3) God knows the future purely by a knowledge of vision .That is, God knows the future by “watching it happen” so to speak. Now, if the future hasn’t happened yet, how can God know it? It seems like the only answer is that the future exists just as the present does. It is only because we are temporal and finite that we percieve an absolute “now” but to God, all of time is equally present and therefore God sees the future from all eternity as it actually exists.

An important clarification is that, for Aquinas (following Augustine and Aristotle), the future and the past do not exist.

Rather, when God decrees the creation of something, He also decrees when it will begin, how long it will endure, and when it will end. (Spiritual creatures, like men and angels, by His decree, have no end.)

So, does the Battle of Waterloo exist now? No, it is over and gone. What about someone who will be born in 2100? No, he does not exist yet.

However, God can see the passage into and out of existence of His creatures from outside history. He can see, so to speak, their whole trajectory in time all at once. That doesn’t mean they don’t really go into being and out of being. There is no need for the future and past to exist simultaneously with the present, just for God (who is outside of time) to see those changes.

So, God sees future beings (whether contingent or not) with His scientia visionis, without any difficulty. They do not, however, exist right now.

 

[thinkandmull]

No, that article is NOT about giving unequal graces to all and yet still desiring the salvation of all MORE than the salvation of some with the damnation of others. “**Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.”
That’s the objection. He is arguing that “foreknowledge is not the cause of predestination”. It nots saying the forknowledge not is the cause of giving grace, for he speaks of predestination AND reprobation. For Aquinas, predestination IS PROVIDENCE. It is up to **God **whether all or some will be saved. Aquinas’s God, who he never says loves us personally, desides that this person (or “stone”) will go in this place of the castle (heaven), and another there (fiery pit). There is no denying this

“God knows what would happen in a given circumstance. God chooses to actualize such a situation.” I think the molinists terminology was affected by Thomists, but I don’t think this is a accurate description. If the will is free to choose one way or another, and not in the Thomistic sense, than how could God know what someone will choose apart from just knowing from simply seeing the future from eternity?

 

[TomD123]

The third option logically entails the first one if God is the creator of everything.
If there are such things as secondary causes, we are stull stuck with a form of determinism.

I think that the 3rd option does not entail determinism. It is man’s choices which determine God’s knowledge not the other way around. God is not the first cause of the choice. But that is off topic

Once we realize that for Aquinas praemotio does not completely determine our actions (because they emanate from the supposit or person—actiones sunt suppositorum, as the saying goes), I think we see that the question of whether predistination is post or ante praevisa merita is moot. (Which would explain why St. Thomas is silent on this issue.)

Ah, I see. Then I think the answer is simple: it can’t. In my opinion, for all of Bañez’ protestations that he believes in the freedom of the will, his theory does not leave a lot of room for that freedom to operate. In his system, especially given his theory of predestination ante praevisa merita, grace certainly seems to have the effect of restricting the will’s freedom of action. That is not (it seems to me) congruous with the fact that God is Love. Receiving grace should increase our freedom, not limit it.

I don’t think much of Luis de Molina’s theory of predestination post praevisa merita, for the reasons I stated, or of scientia media (more on that, if I have time, in answer to your second post), but his idea of “sufficient” grace more or less has it right. God wills all men to be saved (1 Tim 2:4), and so the “sufficient” grace only becomes “efficacious” when we put it into practice.

It seems then, if your interpretation of Aquinas is correct, that he was basically opting for #3. Aquinas wasn’t a molinist. And Aquinas wouldn’t know our choices by causing them, so they must be the cause of God’s knowledge. But for Aquinas, this seems problematic.

The problem is that de Molina, basically, had a slightly anthropomorphic understanding of how God knows things.

We have to keep in mind that God sees all actual beings in an eternal present: whether those be past, present or future beings. He knows them, because He creates them and (in the very same act) maintains them in existence. He also knows them inasmuch as He is their “model” or Divine Idea and inasmuch as He is their ultimate end. (Note that these are the three types of “extrinsic” causes that Aquinas speaks about: efficient, exemplary, and final.)

Hence, there is no distinction, in Thomas’ thought between (1) and (3): He knows His creatures as their Cause, and He sees them as He creates them and maintains them in being. Any creature exists, has existed, or will exist, is known to God by scientia visionis. Whether those future beings are contingent or not is beside the point: God already sees them in act.

In reply, although it is true that future beings don’t exist yet, God sees all of history in His eternal present. “Future” is a category that applies only to creatures, not the Creator. There is no need, therefore, for a scientia media. God sees all future beings with His knowledge of vision.

I agree Aquinas did not think the of the future as existing. However, I think that this is inconsistent. If God sees all of eternity, how can He see the future unless the future exists? The only other answer seems to be that God is the complete cause of the future so He sees the future as its cause, this is the answer many Thomists would give. But if He is not complete cause of the future (e.g. free-choices) then God can only see the future as it is, that is, as a reality.

No, that article is NOT about giving unequal graces to all and yet still desiring the salvation of all MORE than the salvation of some with the damnation of others. “**Therefore God does not *prepare ***unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.”
That’s the objection. He is arguing that “foreknowledge is not the cause of predestination”. It nots saying the forknowledge not is the cause of giving grace, for he speaks of predestination AND reprobation. For Aquinas, predestination IS PROVIDENCE. It is up to **God **whether all or some will be saved. Aquinas’s God, who he never says loves us personally, desides that this person (or “stone”) will go in this place of the castle (heaven), and another there (fiery pit). There is no denying this

“God knows what would happen in a given circumstance. God chooses to actualize such a situation.” I think the molinists terminology was affected by Thomists, but I don’t think this is a accurate description. If the will is free to choose one way or another, and not in the Thomistic sense, than how could God know what someone will choose apart from just knowing from simply seeing the future from eternity?

I think this is a strong argument in favor of God’s predestination being the cause of actions, not His foreknowledge. But if this is the case, can we make room for a loving and merciful God?

 

[thinkandmull]

“can we make room for a loving and merciful God?” That’s exactly what I’m fight for

God can see the future even though it doesn’t exist in a way we can’t understand. Its not contradictory