Why Couldn't the Universe Exist Without a Cause?

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You didn’t make an argument, you made a claim that there “must be a necessarily existing being for which existence is its very nature”, and gave no argument for that claim.


Otherwise you could just have said Anselm claims that ne…cessarily existing is a perfection, and argues that God must have that attribute to be perfect. One sentence, job done. I don’t think that’s at all difficult to understand, but “I’m not going to argue with you about it because it is pointless from experience to do so”. 😉
I never used Anselm’s reasoning as you have described here at all. I merely pointed out a reasoning for a necessarily existing being. Now, one may think the necessarily existing being is the universe or some fundamental element of it. But, the point I am making is that something must necessarily exist or nothing would exist. That is the point I have been trying to make. If the universe does not exist by necessity then it can not be the necessarily existing being.

And if something is a necessarily existing being then it follows that its essence is existence itself. That is, it is part of its very nature or being to exist. It doesn’t receive existence. It is existence.
 
I don’t know how poorly you and Pound Coolish understand the case, because it is both of you who wanted to rely on the darkness of the singularity to propose that “perhaps causality works only in our universe, but not in other “worlds”; then, maybe the singularity had no cause”. As for me, I have openly declared that I don’t know it and, as a consequence, I cannot say, as you seem to be saying, that the Big Bang cosmological model ignores the remainder of the body of knowledge of physics. Nevertheless -and fortunately now you understand it-, causality is nothing that can be represented in a mathematical model and, therefore, the “hypothesis” that Pound Coolish proposed in the OP, and which you supported, is not reasonable.
Cute how you thought you could excuse that fiction by claiming to be ever so humble, but you’ve done it before so it came as no surprise. These are my exact words from six months back: “if you feel the need to do amateur psychoanalysis on other posters then fine, but please don’t try it on with me. As the moderator says when it’s necessary for him to intervene, discuss the subject not each other. Thanks.”
I don’t mind repeating it once more: the principle of causality is not deduced from any set of axioms. How do I know this principle? In a way analogous to the way in which I know the truth of any axiom: by direct apprehension.
And I don’t mind repeating it once more: do you apprehend it a posteriori or a priori?

If we know something a priori, without any experience of this world, then it would seem it must be true in all possible worlds. The law of identity would seem to be such a candidate.

Whereas if we know something a posteriori, by experience of this world, then it is not necessarily true in other possible worlds. The existence of Madrid would seem to be such a candidate.

So, and I think I’ve asked you this before: You say you apprehend causality directly, but would that be self-evident to you without any knowledge of this world? Do you claim you would apprehend causality directly in every possible world, even those without time or any correlate of time? Or is it just your intuition that every possible world, including a singularity, must be much the same as Kansas? How do you respond to someone who doesn’t share your intuitions, how do you decide which of you is correct, where is your secure foundation for knowledge?
Driven by the world? What do you mean?
I said the same thing in three different ways: a posteriori = based on observation = driven by (our experience of) the world.
 
Oh no!, you hadn’t understood… I had said that the change of temperature, the change of pressure and the change of volume were effects of the same cause, which is not represented in the equation; but here you come again, with your idea that the change of temperature causes the change of pressure; and you think that the ideal gas law is telling you that! If you force the equation to say it, of course it will say it! But in that case, it will be your causality which will produce your desired effect on the equation!

At least you accept that the temperature change is caused by another agent! That is an advantage! You might know there are other changes in the gas besides those of volume and pressure, like internal energy, enthalpy, entropy, specific heat, viscosity, etcetera. It is a fortune that the manual of your car doesn’t mention those physical properties; otherwise, I guess that, instead of thinking that all those changes are actually different aspects of the only change that takes place in the gas, you will think that they are effects of the temperature change.

If we put one of those instruments which we call “thermometers” in contact with the gas, we will observe a change in the instrument, and we associate such change with a defined variable which we call “temperature”. In a similar manner, if we put one of those instruments which we call “manometers” in contact with the same gas, we will observe a change in the instrument, and we associate this change with a defined variable which we call “pressure”. From where do you get the idea that the variable we call “temperature” has primacy over the variable we call “pressure” in such a way that one is the cause of the other?

I am not sure that being used to deal with mere generalities you are ready to understand these things
Wow, are you being serious? I was hoping you might be making some refined point about different metaphysical views on causality, Hume vs. Aristotle or something.

And such condescension too, your claim of humility in your previous post didn’t last long did it?

If it wasn’t raining out I’d just give up here. The impression you give me is you have so little aptitude for science that you can’t see the wood for the trees. I expect that’s not the case, but you’re certainly doing a great job complicating and obfuscating everything.

So, one last time. The ideal gas law is one little equation. It doesn’t tell you about entropy, specific heat, viscosity, etc, nor how to raise the temperature or how to measure it, etc., partly because that’s not what Boyle & co. set out to do, but mainly because none of those things are relevant. None of them alter the fact that the law works, that whenever the conditions apply, the phenomenon is seen to occur. Which, again, is how a physical law is defined.

So, again, PV = nRT. Let’s say we want to know what happens to P if we change T. So rearrange the equation to P = nRT/V. R is a constant, and let’s also keep V and n fixed, as with an ideal bottle containing a fix amount of gas.

Substitute T=290 Kelvin, calculate the pressure. Substitute T=310 Kelvin, calculate the pressure again. We see that the math predicts that causing the temperature to increase will have the effect of raising the pressure, and if we do the experiment, the prediction is confirmed. Not to 120 dp or anything because the world is more complicated than one law, but because whatever else is going on, no matter how many complications and obfuscations you dream up, whenever the conditions apply, the phenomenon is seen to occur, which is how a physical law is defined.
 
I never used Anselm’s reasoning as you have described here at all. I merely pointed out a reasoning for a necessarily existing being. Now, one may think the necessarily existing being is the universe or some fundamental element of it. But, the point I am making is that something must necessarily exist or nothing would exist. That is the point I have been trying to make. If the universe does not exist by necessity then it can not be the necessarily existing being.

And if something is a necessarily existing being then it follows that its essence is existence itself. That is, it is part of its very nature or being to exist. It doesn’t receive existence. It is existence.
You didn’t say what your reasoning was, so I made a stab in the dark. I don’t agree with your reasoning though. My issue is that there are a number of logical traps in words like thing, nothing, being, existing.

For instance, nothing is no-thing, the absence of a thing. But only things can exist, so it makes no sense to talk of no-thing having existence. But if no-thing cannot exist, does that mean something must exist, in other words must there be something rather than nothing? Some people do make that argument, but is it really logical or just a play on words?

Then, if a no-thing cannot have existence and only a thing can, does it make sense to talk about non-existing things, aren’t they instead no-things? And so on. To me it seems only to be playing with language.

Even then, if we were to put all that aside and for a moment accept the notion of a necessarily existing being, surely that means that every aspect of that being must also necessarily exist, since otherwise, if it had optional properties, it wouldn’t exist necessarily, it could have been different. But if logic dictates that it couldn’t be different, wouldn’t logic then be more fundamental than God?
 
Logic reflects God in a way, the feeling logic gives us and it’s objective beauty. When you speak of a state of matter have action outside of time, I don’t feel like you are speaking of matter at all. You are just putting ideas together at random. Do you really feel you know nothing of matter from your senses?
 
You didn’t say what your reasoning was, so I made a stab in the dark. I don’t agree with your reasoning though. My issue is that there are a number of logical traps in words like thing, nothing, being, existing.

For instance, nothing is no-thing, the absence of a thing. But only things can exist, so it makes no sense to talk of no-thing having existence. But if no-thing cannot exist, does that mean something must exist, in other words must there be something rather than nothing? Some people do make that argument, but is it really logical or just a play on words?

Then, if a no-thing cannot have existence and only a thing can, does it make sense to talk about non-existing things, aren’t they instead no-things? And so on. To me it seems only to be playing with language.

Even then, if we were to put all that aside and for a moment accept the notion of a necessarily existing being, surely that means that every aspect of that being must also necessarily exist, since otherwise, if it had optional properties, it wouldn’t exist necessarily, it could have been different. But if logic dictates that it couldn’t be different, wouldn’t logic then be more fundamental than God?
Our understanding of God does not affect what God is. All Baptists should already believe this, no? Anyway, our ideas of the supernatural or above-natural are not pictures in our imaginations. Incredible religious art reflects actual thoughts we have about the cause of creation
 
Cute how you thought you could excuse that fiction by claiming to be ever so humble, but you’ve done it before so it came as no surprise. These are my exact words from six months back: “if you feel the need to do amateur psychoanalysis on other posters then fine, but please don’t try it on with me. As the moderator says when it’s necessary for him to intervene, discuss the subject not each other. Thanks.”

And I don’t mind repeating it once more: do you apprehend it a posteriori or a priori?

If we know something a priori, without any experience of this world, then it would seem it must be true in all possible worlds. The law of identity would seem to be such a candidate.

Whereas if we know something a posteriori, by experience of this world, then it is not necessarily true in other possible worlds. The existence of Madrid would seem to be such a candidate.

So, and I think I’ve asked you this before: You say you apprehend causality directly, but would that be self-evident to you without any knowledge of this world? Do you claim you would apprehend causality directly in every possible world, even those without time or any correlate of time? Or is it just your intuition that every possible world, including a singularity, must be much the same as Kansas? How do you respond to someone who doesn’t share your intuitions, how do you decide which of you is correct, where is your secure foundation for knowledge?
Ok, you are asking several questions here. Let’s see them one by one:

How do you respond to someone who doesn’t share your intuitions, how do you decide which of you is correct, where is your secure foundation for knowledge?

This is a question that we could ask to each other without exclusion. Each one of us could think that a set of given propositions is so evident that we can admit it as a set of axioms. If others agree, and we also coincide on a set of fundamental definitions, a series of demonstrations might follow. If someone does not agree on the axioms, there will be no way to convince him, for no demonstration of the set of axioms will be possible. If the disagreement is on the fundamental definitions I think that the main obstacle is an attitude that the parties involved frequently adopt to reject other possibilities without further discussion.

Now, let’s suppose we agree on the set of axioms and fundamental definitions. From here we could develop some theorems, and some disagreement are possible sometimes, for example, when one believes that his demonstration is rigorous while others are not satisfied with it. In those cases it is necessary to focus on those steps where a gap in the chain of propositions was identified. And here again there will be a moment in which no further demonstration will be possible: either we see the problem or we don’t see it.

However, we could try indirect procedures. In the case of the axioms, we could ask the other party what is it that he considers acceptable and why, until his fundamental principles appear before us. Then, we could see if there really is an early divergence point in which a disagreement is practically inevitable. And it seems to me that, while some individuals can see more than one of the possible divergence paths, others can see just one, or they don’t even see one of them. So, sometimes an agreement, or at least an understanding of the other’s position is possible, though not always.

In the case of the possible “gaps” or errors in a demonstration, if we can’t continue the discussion using direct argumentation, sometimes we could practice the kind of demonstration which is called “reductio ad absurdum”, though some individuals reject it (not because they don’t like it to be applied to them, but because they don’t allow themselves to use it: they state as a principle that “reductio ad absurdum” is not demonstrative).

At any rate, if two individuals A and B are discussing it will be A who will decide if there are enough reasons for him to agree with B; and it will be B who will decide if there are sufficient reasons for him to agree with A.
 
Atheists (like Aron Ra in a video I saw today) and agnostics point to the singularity as the explanation of the universe. Taking the sequence of moments, step by step into the past, leads to instantaneous time, so as to avoid the powerful kalam cosmological argument. It’s like an eternal free fall during which the momentum is reversed, and thus we have entropy. Whether the instantaneous can do an infinity of tasks in a finite time is the core of the dispute. In my mind, the infinity cannot be crossed at all because it goes on forever and forever. Besides, material explanations of the universe are foggy, instead of clear with the thought of Divinity. So the mind calls out the the truth, because the truth rings true 👍
 
Do you claim you would apprehend causality directly in every possible world, even those without time or any correlate of time? Or is it just your intuition that every possible world, including a singularity, must be much the same as Kansas?
All our knowledge is ultimately based on the apprehension of structures. Let’s think for example on a triangle defined in a Euclidean space. Some of its properties do not depend on the peculiarities that an imagined triangle might adopt. It could be an isosceles triangle, or an equilateral, or a right triangle, but its internal angles will be equivalent to two right angles. As we include more and more peculiarities in the apprehended structure, we will require more and more conditions to be satisfied for some of our propositions to be true. So, we could establish some propositions that will be true for all right triangles, but not for isosceles.

The apprehension of causality has to do, among other things, with change. If there is no change, we don’t look for a cause, unless a change was expected (we will ask: “what is preventing the change?”). So, change is part of the structure we call causality. Now, change is associated to our notion of time. If there is no time, there is no change, and -as I said-, we don’t request a cause to explain such lack of change.

Let me assume now a system of equations which includes time as one of its variables and which is defined in the range of real numbers greater than zero. Let’s assume too that there is a singularity for this system in t=0, and that other variables grow without limit as time tends to zero. So, if we assume that this system of equations models something real, it will be evident that there is change as time tends to zero, no matter how close to zero this variable is. Actually, the change in the other variables that grow without limit will be faster and faster as time approaches zero. Then, it makes sense to look for causes in the neighborhood of the singularity.
 
And I don’t mind repeating it once more: do you apprehend it a posteriori or a priori?

If we know something a priori, without any experience of this world, then it would seem it must be true in all possible worlds. The law of identity would seem to be such a candidate.

Whereas if we know something a posteriori, by experience of this world, then it is not necessarily true in other possible worlds. The existence of Madrid would seem to be such a candidate.
We need to discuss your conditionals, for I think that even the law of identity is known by experience of this world. Still, I think you are right when you say that it must be true in all possible worlds. I have visited some countries, but I don’t know every place on the earth, so much the less every place in the world. Most of what I know, I have learned in my country; but I know that wherever I find similar structures, all the propositions that I have judged true here, will be true there.

But perhaps you are intending to use those arguments that David Hume derived from his distinction of “Relations of ideas” and “matters of fact”. If so, I will be able to continue with my response. Please confirm.
 
Wow, are you being serious? I was hoping you might be making some refined point about different metaphysical views on causality, Hume vs. Aristotle or something.

And such condescension too, your claim of humility in your previous post didn’t last long did it?

If it wasn’t raining out I’d just give up here. The impression you give me is you have so little aptitude for science that you can’t see the wood for the trees. I expect that’s not the case, but you’re certainly doing a great job complicating and obfuscating everything.

So, one last time. The ideal gas law is one little equation. It doesn’t tell you about entropy, specific heat, viscosity, etc, nor how to raise the temperature or how to measure it, etc., partly because that’s not what Boyle & co. set out to do, but mainly because none of those things are relevant. None of them alter the fact that the law works, that whenever the conditions apply, the phenomenon is seen to occur. Which, again, is how a physical law is defined.

So, again, PV = nRT. Let’s say we want to know what happens to P if we change T. So rearrange the equation to P = nRT/V. R is a constant, and let’s also keep V and n fixed, as with an ideal bottle containing a fix amount of gas.

Substitute T=290 Kelvin, calculate the pressure. Substitute T=310 Kelvin, calculate the pressure again. We see that the math predicts that causing the temperature to increase will have the effect of raising the pressure, and if we do the experiment, the prediction is confirmed. Not to 120 dp or anything because the world is more complicated than one law, but because whatever else is going on, no matter how many complications and obfuscations you dream up, whenever the conditions apply, the phenomenon is seen to occur, which is how a physical law is defined.
I am serious, and I did not see it necessary to introduce the arguments of any philosopher for this particular part of our discussion.

It is not my intention to complicate things, but to clarify them. To do it I find it necessary to call your attention to related ideas, because repeating many times the same thing will not be successful.

This is another form in which we commonly write the ideal gas law equation:

nR= PV/nT

which applies to a fixed amount of gas. With this expression we want to say that the relation PV/T between the values of the defined variables P, V, and T is a constant, no matter how the state of the gas changes. In this equation we are not interested on what is causing the changes in the gas, but only on how the values of the defined variables are related. This way, if for a given state 1 of the gas we know the values for P1, V1, and T1, we will be able to determine the value of any one of those variables at any different state 2 provided we know the values of the other two, using this equation:

P1V1/T1 = P2V2/T2

Now, P, V and T are not the only variables that have been defined for an ideal gas. And every variable has been defined because it is relevant. Now, its relevance implies that it will appear in an equation; and if such equation involves one of the variables which appear in the ideal gas law, then it will be possible to substitute it in the ideal gas equation by a relation between other variables which appear in the other equation. This way we will have another mathematical model which will include some other defined variables besides P, V and T, which will refer to the same ideal gas, and which will work.

Even though ideal, our gas is relatively complex. Which means that we associate to it several defined variables. Those variables are aspects or physical properties of the gas (modes in which it can interact with other objects: a thermometer, a manometer…), not parts in which the gas is divided or can be divided. If “temperature” was a part of the gas, and “pressure” another, I could understand why you could think that “temperature” causes a change on “pressure”; but they are not parts in which the gas can be divided; they are variables which we have defined.
 
Our understanding of God does not affect what God is. All Baptists should already believe this, no? Anyway, our ideas of the supernatural or above-natural are not pictures in our imaginations. Incredible religious art reflects actual thoughts we have about the cause of creation
I was questioning the logic of one poster’s argument, can’t see why you’d bring up my denomination, what’s that got to do with anything? :confused:
 
Ok, you are asking several questions here. Let’s see them one by one:

How do you respond to someone who doesn’t share your intuitions, how do you decide which of you is correct, where is your secure foundation for knowledge?

This is a question that we could ask to each other without exclusion. Each one of us could think that a set of given propositions is so evident that we can admit it as a set of axioms. If others agree, and we also coincide on a set of fundamental definitions, a series of demonstrations might follow. If someone does not agree on the axioms, there will be no way to convince him, for no demonstration of the set of axioms will be possible. If the disagreement is on the fundamental definitions I think that the main obstacle is an attitude that the parties involved frequently adopt to reject other possibilities without further discussion.

Now, let’s suppose we agree on the set of axioms and fundamental definitions. From here we could develop some theorems, and some disagreement are possible sometimes, for example, when one believes that his demonstration is rigorous while others are not satisfied with it. In those cases it is necessary to focus on those steps where a gap in the chain of propositions was identified. And here again there will be a moment in which no further demonstration will be possible: either we see the problem or we don’t see it.

However, we could try indirect procedures. In the case of the axioms, we could ask the other party what is it that he considers acceptable and why, until his fundamental principles appear before us. Then, we could see if there really is an early divergence point in which a disagreement is practically inevitable. And it seems to me that, while some individuals can see more than one of the possible divergence paths, others can see just one, or they don’t even see one of them. So, sometimes an agreement, or at least an understanding of the other’s position is possible, though not always.

In the case of the possible “gaps” or errors in a demonstration, if we can’t continue the discussion using direct argumentation, sometimes we could practice the kind of demonstration which is called “reductio ad absurdum”, though some individuals reject it (not because they don’t like it to be applied to them, but because they don’t allow themselves to use it: they state as a principle that “reductio ad absurdum” is not demonstrative).

At any rate, if two individuals A and B are discussing it will be A who will decide if there are enough reasons for him to agree with B; and it will be B who will decide if there are sufficient reasons for him to agree with A.
That might be a neat way to form a tribe or a political party: keep out those who don’t share our intuitions on the grounds that there’s no way to convince them, but do let in those who share our intuitions, and whenever we later find the intuitions don’t match, settle it by gentleman’s agreement or split away and form a new tribe. Surely not a secure foundation for knowledge though.

The laws of nature don’t depend on our intuitions or on what we think is reasonable. They don’t depend on us period. They depend on nature. The secure foundation of knowledge in science is summed up by Fenyman: “It doesn’t matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn’t matter how smart you are. If it doesn’t agree with experiment, it’s wrong.”

And we can’t do experiments in other possible worlds.
 
All our knowledge is ultimately based on the apprehension of structures. Let’s think for example on a triangle defined in a Euclidean space. Some of its properties do not depend on the peculiarities that an imagined triangle might adopt. It could be an isosceles triangle, or an equilateral, or a right triangle, but its internal angles will be equivalent to two right angles. As we include more and more peculiarities in the apprehended structure, we will require more and more conditions to be satisfied for some of our propositions to be true. So, we could establish some propositions that will be true for all right triangles, but not for isosceles.

The apprehension of causality has to do, among other things, with change. If there is no change, we don’t look for a cause, unless a change was expected (we will ask: “what is preventing the change?”). So, change is part of the structure we call causality. Now, change is associated to our notion of time. If there is no time, there is no change, and -as I said-, we don’t request a cause to explain such lack of change.

Let me assume now a system of equations which includes time as one of its variables and which is defined in the range of real numbers greater than zero. Let’s assume too that there is a singularity for this system in t=0, and that other variables grow without limit as time tends to zero. So, if we assume that this system of equations models something real, it will be evident that there is change as time tends to zero, no matter how close to zero this variable is. Actually, the change in the other variables that grow without limit will be faster and faster as time approaches zero. Then, it makes sense to look for causes in the neighborhood of the singularity.
Again this seems to be based on your intuition. By only looking for a cause when you expect change, you ignore the causes of stability. A physical law doesn’t just tell us what causes a change, it says what’s involved in preventing or minimizing change.

Your claim that there can be no change without time may also be your intuition, but for example the state change in quantum entanglement is instantaneous. There are also many differing philosophical views on time, presentism or block universe and so on. While interesting, these opinions would not appear to be a good foundation for knowledge. It would seem better to leave the question open and see where the evidence leads, rather than close our minds to all the alternatives.

Re. your last paragraph: At t=0 the math doesn’t just product big numbers, it produces infinities, as in attempting to divide by zero. The biggest number you know - say a googolplex - isn’t even remotely close to infinity, no number can ever be. That’s why the math breaks down in the singularity. That indicates the theory is wrong at t=0, which indicates it starts to go wrong near t=0, so I’d have thought that must be fixed before anything like reliable predictions can be made. And going back to that Fenyman quote, it’s a bit difficult to make observations.
 
We need to discuss your conditionals, for I think that even the law of identity is known by experience of this world. Still, I think you are right when you say that it must be true in all possible worlds. I have visited some countries, but I don’t know every place on the earth, so much the less every place in the world. Most of what I know, I have learned in my country; but I know that wherever I find similar structures, all the propositions that I have judged true here, will be true there.

But perhaps you are intending to use those arguments that David Hume derived from his distinction of “Relations of ideas” and “matters of fact”. If so, I will be able to continue with my response. Please confirm.
Perhaps, but all I’m concerned with is this question: Does logic dictate that there must be cause and effect in all possible worlds?

To answer yes, your proof must obviously exclude any reference to our world, since the proof can’t depend on contingencies but must be true in all logically possible worlds.

If it can’t be proved then logically our world can come into existence without a cause, since we only know of cause and effect within this world.
 
I am serious, and I did not see it necessary to introduce the arguments of any philosopher for this particular part of our discussion.

It is not my intention to complicate things, but to clarify them. To do it I find it necessary to call your attention to related ideas, because repeating many times the same thing will not be successful.

This is another form in which we commonly write the ideal gas law equation:

nR= PV/nT

which applies to a fixed amount of gas. With this expression we want to say that the relation PV/T between the values of the defined variables P, V, and T is a constant, no matter how the state of the gas changes. In this equation we are not interested on what is causing the changes in the gas, but only on how the values of the defined variables are related. This way, if for a given state 1 of the gas we know the values for P1, V1, and T1, we will be able to determine the value of any one of those variables at any different state 2 provided we know the values of the other two, using this equation:

P1V1/T1 = P2V2/T2

Now, P, V and T are not the only variables that have been defined for an ideal gas. And every variable has been defined because it is relevant. Now, its relevance implies that it will appear in an equation; and if such equation involves one of the variables which appear in the ideal gas law, then it will be possible to substitute it in the ideal gas equation by a relation between other variables which appear in the other equation. This way we will have another mathematical model which will include some other defined variables besides P, V and T, which will refer to the same ideal gas, and which will work.

Even though ideal, our gas is relatively complex. Which means that we associate to it several defined variables. Those variables are aspects or physical properties of the gas (modes in which it can interact with other objects: a thermometer, a manometer…), not parts in which the gas is divided or can be divided. If “temperature” was a part of the gas, and “pressure” another, I could understand why you could think that “temperature” causes a change on “pressure”; but they are not parts in which the gas can be divided; they are variables which we have defined.
Nope. The temperature is a measure of the heat, and the heat is just a name for the jiggling of the atoms. Removing heat means reduce the jiggling, until at absolute zero it would stop (theoretically). Adding heat means increase the jiggling, until at some point the dance is so energetic that molecular bonds are broken, etc. Similar story with pressure. And importantly, even before having that explanation of temperature, it was known that whatever it represented is relevant, which is why it’s right there in the law, just as Newton had no backstory for gravity, but could still derive his law from observations.

Consider a flight simulator. You sit there, increase “engine speed”, pull on the “elevators”, “take off”. Your actions cause (name removed by moderator)uts to a program which then outputs effects. The program uses the math of the physical laws (within such programs, that section is known as “the physics”). Even when simulating the world, the math is the handle on cause and effect. Otherwise, if you were correct and causality was so promiscuous it couldn’t be represented in the language of order, than causality would surely be a myth.
 
Perhaps, but all I’m concerned with is this question: Does logic dictate that there must be cause and effect in all possible worlds?

To answer yes, your proof must obviously exclude any reference to our world, since the proof can’t depend on contingencies but must be true in all logically possible worlds.

If it can’t be proved then logically our world can come into existence without a cause, since we only know of cause and effect within this world.
If all possible worlds did exist, they become part of the Universe (Creation), and universal laws would apply. Cause and effect is a universal law known by right logic and confirmed by objective reality. Right logic does dictate that there must be cause and effect in all possible worlds, creation. there is no possible world without being created-for all possible worlds to be possible means it has the capacity to be, but isn’t yet, has no being or existence. If it could exist without cause, it would be, and not be “possible” All possibilities must have a cause to exist, be. Only God, the Uncaused Cause needs no cause to exist. It’s His Nature.
 
According to Aquinas’ five ways, anything nothing can be put in motion or exist without a cause. As he demonstrates, therefore, there must be something outside our universe that caused it.That is true of our own universe. What we are speaking of though, are things apart from our own universe.There must be something, yes, that led to the universe in some way, but not necessarily by causing it. It seems inconceivable to us because we are used to a universe where everything is caused.

But we don’t know what something outside of or before our universe was like. Whatever our universe came out of, the laws of thermodynamics may or may not have applied to it. Science has no claims about such a time and place. Such an existence might function entirely differently from the universe we know. Therefore, perhaps in such an existence, things could exist without being caused.

That is, before the Big Bang, there may have been a different set of rules from those we know. We don’t know what such a time and place would be like, because we have no way of observing it! So, how can we know there must be a First Cause?
“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth” (Genesis 1:1). The Church teaches that by these solemn words of Sacred Scripture whatever exists outside of God has its existence and beginning from God and is caused by Him. God himself through divine revelation has made this fact known to us. Accordingly, without even considering the philosophical arguments of Aquinas’ five proofs for the existence of God, we can be absolutely certain that God is the first cause of whatever exists outside of himself, that is, the universe of creatures which He created. We understand this upon the authority of God revealing, “I am the Lord, and there is no other, besides me there is no God” (Isaiah 45:5). It is an article of our catholic faith that whatever exists outside of God is created and caused by Him. We need to firmly plant in our minds this truth without any doubt and with absolute certainty or we may find ourselves doubting the word of God which would be a sin against the theological virtue of faith. We should firmly believe this truth with more certainty than that 2 + 2=4.

So, the first argument why the universe we live in or some other imaginative universe couldn’t exist without a cause is based on divine revelation which is the word of God. Whatever exists outside of God is caused and created by Him from nothing whether we are considering the world we live in or were to imagine some other possible world that God could create.

Aquinas’ philosophical arguments for the existence of God, the five proofs, proceed from effect to cause. They are founded upon observable facts of the actual existence of the world we live in. That the universe we live in has a first cause can be rationally and reasonably demonstrated from the actual existence of this universe. Philosophically, even if we were to imagine the existence of some kind of world or universe other than the one we live in and observe, the actual existence of this other world being uncertain for it may not exist and may never exist, it does not necessarily follow that this imaginative other world would not need a first cause. For we could ask the same kinds of questions about this imaginative other world that we ask about the actual existence of the world we live in. Where does it come from? Who or what caused it? What is it for? Why does it exist?

Whatever has being or existence in whatever way, mode, or manner has being which comes from and is caused by one first being, who is Being itself, and this is God and there is only one God.
 
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