Why Truman Dropped the Bomb

[john_doran]

Ani Ibi:

The object of an act = the behaviour + the proximate (direct) intention

The circumtantial (indirect) intention may reduce the goodness of the object but, if the object is good in and of itself, then the circumstantial intention cannot change this goodness into evil.

The object: to end the Pacific War

The behaviour: bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic ordinance

Proximate intention: by neutralizing the Japanese military command hub, materiels, and troop concentration.

Circumstantial intention: harming the civilian population.

if by “circumstantial” intention, you mean an actual, positive intent to harm the civilian populace, then that would seem to taint the whole act and make it simply and straightforwardly wrong; it doesn’t matter how “weak” an intent is, if intending is what colors the moral nature of an action.

but even if you just mean something more like “accepting as a side-effect”, the primary (i.e. intended) action can still be made morally unacceptable if the side-effects being accepted are accepted unreasonably. and that’s the argument made by at least some of those who argue that the use of nuclear ordnance is wrong, always and everywhere: that accepting the inevitable, incidental deaths of so great a number of non-combatants is inherently unreasonable.

jospeh boyle, germain grisez, and john finnis make a compelling argument to that effect in their book, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

oat soda:

this says it all i don’t think you can use the excuse that “they didn’t know civilians would die”. so your left with civilans = combatants. which is a ridiculous argument.

Well, if you say so. But it is not the argument I made. It is your false dilemma misreading of the argument I made.
oat soda:

if they are not going to directly use those bombs to kill anyone why would you kill them?

The decision to kill them is contingent on many variables. I believe the optimum objective is to apprehend them, interrogate them, and bring them to justice.

If they resist arrest, then the police may use whatever means is necessary to prevent their escape and to prevent them from perpetrating harm on innocent bystanders, other suspects, or on the police themselves. If there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect is carrying a bomb, the police are empowered to execute a ‘double tap’ head shot, thus killing the suspect instantly.
oat soda:

assuming these people making a bomb are terrorist and not a sovergn country like japan

A sovereign country who perpetrated an unprovoked attack on America who had not at that time declared war: Pearl Harbour. A sovereign country who had been responsible for the butchery – not killing – butchery of 19 million – not 19 thousand – 19 million – Asians in the course of a decades-long undeclared war.

3 million Rwandans put to the sword and we call that genocide. Are you among the people who were in remote material collaboration with those who withheld the means to prevent that genocide? 6 million Jews and 6 million other peoples sent to the death camps and we call that genocide. Are you among the people who would have been in remote material collaboration with those who, instead of bringing the Nazis to justice, would have promoted a “Peace in our Time” position?

The point is not that Japan was a sovereign country. The point is that the Japan military were a murder-machine out of control, aggressors who perpetrated an unprovoked attack on our navy at harbour; aggressors who could not be negotiated with and who were not going to surrender except if we demonstrated our overwhelming military superiority. Why do I presume to say that surrender was unlikely? The Code of Bushido.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

wcknight:

Had the Japanese won the war Truman may have been tried.

And he may have been convicted, but not legitimately.

wcknight:

Not about looking good, but having made a moral decision based on humane principles.

Since several of us, using different approaches, have demonstrated the morality of the decision and the humane principles in operation, then I can only assume that the normal, natural, and legitimate repugnance over the widescale suffering and death -the costs of that decision – is mitigated with a large measure of looking good by ignoring the benefits of that decision. Political correctness.

wcknight:

I think Truman made the best decision given the circumstances, BUT I’m an American and looking back at history with 20-20 hindsight.

I’m Canadian. We had our own demons in that war.

wcknight:

Given the ruthlessness of the Japanese military during the war, you would think “almost” any action could be justified. They rivaled the Nazis as far as atrocities goes.

They far exceeded the Nazis and the Nazis were bad enough. Death rate in camps under the Nazis = 1 in 10. Death rate in camps under the Japanese = 1 in 3.

wcknight:

I don’t know what the percentage of civilians working in war factories was. During a war it could very well have been 90%. The same could probably have been said about Detroit or Boston. During wartime, a huge portion of the population is involved either directly or indirectly with the war effort.

IF the Japanese had the 2 nukes, would folks be saying that it was okay to nuke Detroit and Boston in an effort to stop the war ?
Granted Detroit may not be a city worth saving anyway. (sorry Detroiters, nothing personnel) but Boston is at least the home of the world champion Red Sox, and super bowl champion Patriots…

I’m glad nobody had their eyes on Toronto, last year’s Grey Cup champions and this year’s Stanley Cup winners. Tai Domi is staying. Are you proposing nuclear hockey?

 

[vern_humphrey]

oat soda:

there is a huge difference between women and children making bombs and the people who are in the act or of the intent to employ them. this is what seperates combatants and non combatants. chaplains, doctors, and JAGs, in the military are non combatants. because they do not actively go to war. they may indirectly support the war, but they are not active participants.

You’re wrong. While medics and chaplains are by intenational agreement not to be targeted, they are also obliged to render equal service to both sides – we treat and minister to enemy wounded just as we do for our own troops.

JAG, Quartermaster and other branches of service can be killed on the same basis as Infantry and Armor.
oat soda:

the people making these bombs are supporting the war, as are the people feeding the soldiers or growing food which feeds the soldiers. does that make them all guilty? do we kill all of them? by your logic, every one in japan or germany was guilty because they probably supported the war in some way, either voluntarily, or involuntarity.

Those who produce foodstuffs and war material are indeed serving the war effort, and so are legitimate targets.
oat soda:

this is why a chaplian or medic are not supposed to be targeted or taken POW during war according to the geneva convention.

No. Chaplains and medics may be taken prisoner. The only provision is that they are allowed to care for or minister to their fellow prisoners in that case.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

john doran:

how is it false? munitions and food are each a sine qua non of the war effort - if you lack either, then war cannot be waged.

Yes. Both munitions and food are necessary conditions for the furtherance of a military campaign. In this respect they are similar.

However the relationship between the manufacturers of munitions and the military is exclusive. What they are doing with their own hands always produces the means by which the military may wage war. What farmers and cooks are doing with their own hands is circumstantial.

Some farmers and cooks may be providing the means by which the military can continue waging war. **Some **farmers and cooks may not. Whereas **all **munitions manufacturers are providing the means by which the military can continue waging war. Regarding the exclusive and non-exclusive nature (respectively) of the activities of munitions manufacturers and farmers/cooks, these activities are not necessarily similar.

 

[john_doran]

Ani Ibi:

However the relationship between the manufacturers of munitions and the military is exclusive. What they are doing with their own hands always produces the means by which the military may wage war. What farmers and cooks are doing with their own hands is circumstantial.

Some farmers and cooks may be providing the means by which the military can continue waging war. **Some **farmers and cooks may not. Whereas **all **munitions manufacturers are providing the means by which the military can continue waging war. Regarding the exclusive and non-exclusive nature (respectively) of the activities of munitions manufacturers and farmers/cooks, these activities are not necessarily similar.

well that may be true, but keep in mind that the only way to forestall the provision of food to the military is to destroy all the food-producers, since eliminating only the ones currently responsible for direct food-supply would simply cause the government to expropriate the remaining farms to further the war-effort.

i would say that makes farmers and the manufacturers of ordnance morally identical.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

john doran:

if by “circumstantial” intention, you mean an actual, positive intent to harm the civilian populace, then that would seem to taint the whole act and make it simply and straightforwardly wrong; it doesn’t matter how “weak” an intent is, if intending is what colors the moral nature of an action.

No. The proximate or direct intention is intrinsic to and extricable from the object. Neutralizing the Japanese command, materiels, and troop concentration was intrinsic to and inextricable from ending the Pacific War.

The circumstantial or indirect intention is not intrinsic to and inextricable from the object. Harming the civilian population was not intrinsic to and inextricable from ending the War. This is why:

If the Japanese military hub had been way out in the wilderness far away from the civilian population or if Japan had responded to our warnings and evacuated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then the object would be the same – ending the Pacific War – the proximate or direct intention would be the same – neutralizing the Japanese military hub. The object and proximate intention therefore are constants.

However, the harming of the civilian population would not be the same. If the atomic bombs had been dropped on a hypothetical Japanese military hub in the wilderness, no harm would have come to the civilian population. Therefore the harm to the civilian population is a variable.

Given the object, behaviour, and proximate means identified by those who dropped the atomic bombs, the responsibility for harming the civilians lay squarely on the shoulders of the Japanese military who had embedded their war-waging means in the two cities in question.

If the proximate means had been to harm the civilian population and therefore leverage the Japanese military to surrender then that is a different story. That is the ends justifying the means – terror – which is not licit.

If the proximate means had to been to harm the civilian population as a pleasurable indulgence in sadism and gratuitous violence – terror – then that too is a different story and that too is not licit.
john doran:

but even if you just mean something more like “accepting as a side-effect”, the primary (i.e. intended) action can still be made morally unacceptable if the side-effects being accepted are accepted unreasonably.

Presumably you are crunching numbers here, which is fair enough. But it is a different consideration altogether from what happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As I point out below…
john doran:

and that’s the argument made by at least some of those who argue that the use of nuclear ordnance is wrong, always and everywhere: that accepting the inevitable, incidental deaths of so great a number of non-combatants is inherently unreasonable.

How do the number of deaths at H & N compare to the number of deaths at Dresden and the other European firestorm locations? Now we are talking about then – 1945 – with what they knew about nuclear warfare and conventional warfare then. What they knew then is inextricably tied to the morality of their decision.

More recent commentary is based on what is known now about our current nuclear warfare capabilities. Truman could not make a reasonable choice about our current nuclear warfare capabilities in the absence of the knowledge required to make a reasonable choice. Nor was he asked to. He was not engaged in a war effort where current nuclear warfare capabilities were an option. He did not have that particular option.

The projected number of deaths resulting from hypothetical nuclear warfare now – with what we know now – and with the great big stonking 100 megatonners we have now – is a whole other kettle of fish. Partly because more than one nation is in possession of such huge weapons and because of the effects of nuclear deterrance: ie the radically changed nature of nuclear war between then and now.

What is unreasonable now was not necessarily unreasonable then. Why? Because we are not talking about the same thing. Dropping two low-yield atomic bombs on two Japanese cities in 1945 when we were the only ones who had such bombs is different from dropping multiple high-yield fusion bombs on multiple cities when we are not the only ones who have such bombs. Apples and oranges.
john doran:

jospeh boyle, germain grisez, and john finnis make a compelling argument to that effect in their book, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism.

Please synopsize.

 

[vern_humphrey]

john doran:

well that may be true, but keep in mind that the only way to forestall the provision of food to the military is to destroy all the food-producers, since eliminating only the ones currently responsible for direct food-supply would simply cause the government to expropriate the remaining farms to further the war-effort.

i would say that makes farmers and the manufacturers of ordnance morally identical.

You are essentially correct. The difficulty in attacking farms, however has made it a non-starter militarily. On the other hand, attacking the bridges, rail roads and so on that move food, plus the processing and refrigeration plants is legitimate.

Blockade is, of course, simply another way of attacking the food supply. And as I pointed out earlier is counter-indiscriminate. The blockader aims to starve the whole nation. The nation being blockaded resorts to selective starvation – such food as is available is diverted to the military and the “useless mouths” allowed to starve.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

john doran:

well that may be true, but keep in mind that the only way to forestall the provision of food to the military is to destroy all the food-producers, since eliminating only the ones currently responsible for direct food-supply would simply cause the government to expropriate the remaining farms to further the war-effort.

i would say that makes farmers and the manufacturers of ordnance morally identical.

Fair enough. I am not deeply invested in making the distinction in queston. However, I will point out that it may be a question of priority. Which would you take out first? Munitions factories or farms? There are practical reasons and humanitarian reasons for choosing between them.

 

[vern_humphrey]

Ani Ibi:

Fair enough. I am not deeply invested in making the distinction in queston. However, I will point out that it may be a question of priority. Which would you take out first? Munitions factories or farms? There are practical reasons and humanitarian reasons for choosing between them.

Absolutely. Munitions factories are a much higher payoff target in military terms. Farms are difficult to attack, and you get basically the same effect by attacking the transportation system, preventing foodstuffs from being moved to the military. Since you will attack the transportation system for other reasons, this is essentially a freebie.

 

[john_doran]

Ani Ibi:

No. The proximate or direct intention is intrinsic to and extricable from the object. Neutralizing the Japanese command, materiels, and troop concentration was intrinsic to and inextricable from ending the Pacific War.

The circumstantial or indirect intention is not intrinsic to and inextricable from the object. Harming the civilian population was not intrinsic to and inextricable from ending the War. This is why:

If the Japanese military hub had been way out in the wilderness far away from the civilian population or if Japan had responded to our warnings and evacuated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then the object would be the same – ending the Pacific War – the proximate or direct intention would be the same – neutralizing the Japanese military hub. The object and proximate intention therefore are constants.

However, the harming of the civilian population would not be the same. If the atomic bombs had been dropped on a hypothetical Japanese military hub in the wilderness, no harm would have come to the civilian population. Therefore the harm to the civilian population is a variable.

i’m not sure what you think all of this means, but if it’s an attempt to provide a justification for some kind of intending that is “less” than what you’re calling “poximate” intention, then i would say you have still failed to make your case: any intention matters in the determination of the moral character of an act.

your appeal to the moral counterfactual certainly doesn’t help: what difference does it make what would have been intended if there were no civilians around if, in fact there were civilians and the intent - however slight or “circumstantial” - was, in fact, to cause them harm?

however, if all you mean to do is say that “circumstantial intent” is synonymous with “accepting”, then fair enough.
Ani Ibi:

How do the number of deaths at H & N compare to the number of deaths at Dresden and the other European firestorm locations? Now we are talking about then – 1945 – with what they knew about nuclear warfare and conventional warfare then. What they knew then is inextricably tied to the morality of their decision.

well, if i’m not mistaken, more people died in dresden than in hiroshima and nagasaki. and i would say that dresden is a proportionately more reprehensible allied action therefor.
Ani Ibi:

More recent commentary is based on what is known now about our current nuclear warfare capabilities. Truman could not make a reasonable choice about our current nuclear warfare capabilities in the absence of the knowledge required to make a reasonable choice. Nor was he asked to. He was not engaged in a war effort where current nuclear warfare capabilities were an option. He did not have that particular option.

sure - if neither truman nor any of the relevant commanders had any idea of the kind of destructive capability of the bomb, then they could not have been culpable for their choice to drop it.

were they really ignorant in this way? i don’t know, and neither do you. neither does anyone save the people in question. which is what makes that question rather uninteresting. it also doesn’t really matter, since what happens in the hearts of men is only for god to judge.
Ani Ibi:

The projected number of deaths resulting from hypothetical nuclear warfare now – with what we know now – and with the great big stonking 100 megatonners we have now – is a whole other kettle of fish. Partly because more than one nation is in possession of such huge weapons and because of the effects of nuclear deterrance: ie the radically changed nature of nuclear war between then and now.

What is unreasonable now was not necessarily unreasonable then. Why? Because we are not talking about the same thing. Dropping two low-yield atomic bombs on two Japanese cities in 1945 when we were the only ones who had such bombs is different from dropping multiple high-yield fusion bombs on multiple cities when we are not the only ones who have such bombs. Apples and oranges.

different, perhaps. but certainly not necessarily any morally different. maybe, but maybe not - your observation of the facts of the evolution of nuclear yields is not dispositive.

but, if the question here is literally “if you were truman, would you have dropped the bombs?”, then the literal answer for everyone is necessarily “yes. because, being truman, i would have done what truman did”.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

vern humphrey:

Absolutely. Munitions factories are a much higher payoff target in military terms. Farms are difficult to attack, and you get basically the same effect by attacking the transportation system, preventing foodstuffs from being moved to the military. Since you will attack the transportation system for other reasons, this is essentially a freebie.

An army guy once explained to me what engineers are. He said they build bridges and then blow them up.

 

[john_doran]

Ani Ibi:

Fair enough. I am not deeply invested in making the distinction in queston. However, I will point out that it may be a question of priority. Which would you take out first? Munitions factories or farms? There are practical reasons and humanitarian reasons for choosing between them.

well, to be fair, i was making neither a practical nor (directly) humanitarian point: i was simply leaning on oat soda’s ***moral ***point, which i took to be that you can’t paint anyone with the moral brush of “material collaboration” without painting too many people with it: once you start looking at non-combatants through the lens of actual complicity in the war-effort, it’s only a short half-step from needing also to include potentially collaborative civilians. which is almost everyone. which, of course, means that everyone is, by your lights, a potentially legitimate target for hostility.

 

[john_doran]

vern humphrey:

Absolutely. Munitions factories are a much higher payoff target in military terms. Farms are difficult to attack, and you get basically the same effect by attacking the transportation system, preventing foodstuffs from being moved to the military. Since you will attack the transportation system for other reasons, this is essentially a freebie.

but we’re talking about the use of nuclear ordnance here, right? at that point distinctions based on “difficulty” of attack presumably become moot, since it takes as little effort to turn farmland into glass with a nuke as it does a whole city.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

john doran:

i’m not sure what you think all of this means

Fair enough. I having been referencing the principle of double effect which I applied earlier on in this thread.

manualman:

but if it’s an attempt to provide a justification for some kind of intending that is “less” than what you’re calling “poximate” intention, then i would say you have still failed to make your case: any intention matters in the determination of the moral character of an act.

That contradicts what the principle of double effect says which is that circumstantial intention cannot change the species of the object from morally good to morally evil. It can, however, reduce the moral goodness of an object.
john doran:

your appeal to the moral counterfactual certainly doesn’t help: what difference does it make what would have been intended if there were no civilians around if, in fact there were civilians and the intent - however slight or “circumstantial” - was, in fact, to cause them harm?

I am not arguing that the intent to cause the civilians harm was absent. I am arguing that the intent was circumstantial. And that, given the fact that the population was given advanced warning of what would happen, the failure of the population to evacuate falls on the shoulders of the Japanese military who embedded in that civilian population and literally held them hostage.
john doran:

however, if all you mean to do is say that “circumstantial intent” is synonymous with “accepting”, then fair enough.

I don’t know what you mean by ‘accepting.’
john doran:

well, if i’m not mistaken, more people died in dresden than in hiroshima and nagasaki. and i would say that dresden is a proportionately more reprehensible allied action therefor.

Yet a distinction has been made in this discussion between firestorms caused by conventional warfare and firestorms caused by nuclear warfare.
john doran:

sure - if neither truman nor any of the relevant commanders had any idea of the kind of destructive capability of the bomb, then they could not have been culpable for their choice to drop it.

I was not saying that. Truman knew enough about the low-yield atomic bombs he deployed to make a responsible decision.

What I am saying is that the across-the-board condemnation of nuclear warfare we see currently is to a large extent based on what we know now about current nuclear strike capabilities and nuclear deterrance.

What we know now and what Truman knew then are apples and oranges.

What we can do now and what Truman could do then are apples and oranges.
john doran:

but, if the question here is literally “if you were truman, would you have dropped the bombs?”, then the literal answer for everyone is necessarily “yes. because, being truman, i would have done what truman did”.

How disingenuous do you think this statement comes across to people? Do you think you have persuaded me that this statement is made in good faith?

 

[john_doran]

Ani Ibi:

Fair enough. I having been referencing the principle of double effect which I applied earlier on in this thread.

i know.
Ani Ibi:

That contradicts what the principle of double effect says which is that circumstantial intention cannot change the species of the object from morally good to morally evil. It can, however, reduce the moral goodness of an object.

who’s formulation of the principle of double effect are you using? this is the first time i have heard of “circumstantial intent”, at least as meaning something other than the acceptance of side effects.
Ani Ibi:

I am not arguing that the intent to cause the civilians harm was absent. I am arguing that the intent was circumstantial. And that, given the fact that the population was given advanced warning of what would happen, the failure of the population to evacuate falls on the shoulders of the Japanese military who embedded in that civilian population and literally held them hostage.

i don’t think this works as an absolution from responsibility for the deaths of non-combatants in the instant case: the question is not whether warning was given, but whether it was reasonable to believe that the civilians would actually be gone when the bomb dropped. i would say no.
Ani Ibi:

I don’t know what you mean by ‘accepting.’

one “accepts” the side effects of one’s action when one perceives that those effects are likely to follow as an incident to one’s “proximately” intended action, and one executes that action anyway.
Ani Ibi:

Yet a distinction has been made in this discussion between firestorms caused by conventional warfare and firestorms caused by nuclear warfare.

perhaps. but not by me.
Ani Ibi:

How disingenuous do you think this statement comes across to people? Do you think you have persuaded me that this statement is made in good faith?

i’m pretty sure you think i meant something that i did not, in fact, mean. because otherwise i can’t make any sense of this comment. at all.

 

[vern_humphrey]

john doran:

but we’re talking about the use of nuclear ordnance here, right? at that point distinctions based on “difficulty” of attack presumably become moot, since it takes as little effort to turn farmland into glass with a nuke as it does a whole city.

No, we’re talking about targets.

Earlier I pointed out that conventional weapons had been used in raids that killed more people in a single raid than either the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombs. This shows the fallacy of claiming that Hiroshima and Nagasake were somehow “different” – they were in fact part of a pattern of attacks by both sides.

Now, attacks on farmland with nuclear weapons would be a waste of effort – particularly with the weapons of the day. You couldn’t damage enough land to make it worth the expenditure of such an expensive and rare weapon. To use the British phrase, it would be like “breaking windows with gunieas.”

To attack the enemy’s food supply, you would concentrate on the transportation system (which you’d already be attacking for other reasons) and on processing plants.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

john doran:

well, to be fair, i was making neither a practical nor (directly) humanitarian point: i was simply leaning on oat soda’s ***moral ***point, which i took to be that you can’t paint anyone with the moral brush of “material collaboration” without painting too many people with it:

I don’t understand this sentence. Maybe if you used simple sentence structure instead of complex sentence structure.
john doran:

once you start looking at non-combatants through the lens of actual complicity in the war-effort, it’s only a short half-step from needing also to include potentially collaborative civilians. which is almost everyone. which, of course, means that everyone is, by your lights, a potentially legitimate target for hostility.

This is a slippery slope. The reasons I made the distinction between munitions manufacturers and farmers/cooks were:

1. to draw attention to the necessarily morally compromised position of munitions manufacturers at all times during the time war. End result: the munitions manufacturers themselves are fair game. No supplies = no army.
2. to draw attention to the practical difficulties of scorched earth warfare. End result: take out the bridges and roads and leave the farmers to their farms and the cooks to their noodles. No supplies = no army.

The munitions manufacturers were not potentially complicit. They were complicit. Some of the farmers/cooks may or may not have been complicit also. This reality has no bearing on whether or not to destroy the munitions supply.

One could argue that destroying the munitions supply and not destroying the farmers/cooks is not fair. But I have responded that it is a question of priority: which you take out first; to which you dedicate precious resources, time, and personnel.

In the event of an occupation, which do you think is the better scenario:

1. coming into an urban area full of well-fed people armed with sticks and stones or
2. coming into an urban area full of hungry people armed to the teeth with heavy fire power?

Take out the bridges: The result is that both food and munitions cannot be transported great distances. But munitions and food can still be used by locals.

Take out the farms: The result is whatever food is left will be used by the military and great numbers of civilians will starve.

Take out the munitions factories: The result is that the availability of weapons is reduced to the level of minimum threat.

Take out the munitions manufacturers in them or around the factories: The result is that, when the available weapons and ammo run out, no more will replace them.

And any combination thereof.

The atomic bombs had an additional effect. The Japanese military knew their own intentions. They knew what they would do were they to have developed the atomic bomb first. Perhaps our bomb was a kind of psy-ops against the military. And since the proximate intention was to neutralize the military our bomb was objective-specific.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

john doran:

i’m pretty sure you think i meant something that i did not, in fact, mean. because otherwise i can’t make any sense of this comment. at all.

Well, then take another look at what you said. You reduced the spirit of the discussion into a factitious oversimplication.

As for whose double effect I am referring, the links are where I first posted them. I have been over this so frequently on these three threads that that is all I am willing to say at this point. The links are there. If you want them, then do a search.

 

[john_doran]

vern humphrey:

No, we’re talking about targets.

…of miltary attacks.
vern humphrey:

Earlier I pointed out that conventional weapons had been used in raids that killed more people in a single raid than either the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombs. This shows the fallacy of claiming that Hiroshima and Nagasake were somehow “different” – they were in fact part of a pattern of attacks by both sides.

i agree.
vern humphrey:

Now, attacks on farmland with nuclear weapons would be a waste of effort – particularly with the weapons of the day. You couldn’t damage enough land to make it worth the expenditure of such an expensive and rare weapon. To use the British phrase, it would be like “breaking windows with gunieas.”

To attack the enemy’s food supply, you would concentrate on the transportation system (which you’d already be attacking for other reasons) and on processing plants.

you may well be right. but, again, i am primarily concerned with the moral aspect of armed conflict; not destroying farms just because of certain pragmatic or tactical limitations seems…well, morally questionable.