Why Truman Dropped the Bomb

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john doran:
no, i don’t. and that’s precisely my point.

if you read my posts again, you’ll see that i offer this argument as a reductio ad absurdum of Ani Ibi’s argument: if what he says is true, then this moral identity follows. and that’s absurd. ergo his argument fails.

QED.
Fair enough.
 
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qmvsimp:
If he is prevented from leaving then it would be immoral to shoot him.

If the chair is being used in the war effort to make arms and munitions, and he is capable of leaving the chair, and it’s wartime, and you warn him in his native language, and you give him time to leave, and he has been trained in military tactics on how to resist you; then it would be moral to destroy the chair, without making sure whether he has left the chair or not.
perhaps. but would it be moral to destroy the whole neighbourhood just to get the chair?
 
Philip P:
No. You could aim at the sniper. Suppose you miss and hit the child instead - that’s double effect. Not necessarily morally culpable here.
This is a fine line. In our case, we’re using a bomb that by its very nature will destroy everything around it. I guess you could shoot with a machine gun and know that the chance of the child surviving is virtually zero, but knowing that that is not your intent (to kill the child)
Philip P:
Apply to our case. Suppose you drop conventional bombs on the munitions factories, some go astray and kill civilians. You are not necessarily morally culpable for those deaths. Suppose instead you choose a weapon or method that by its very nature entails the death of all within the city (i.e. firebombing, carpet bombing, atomic bombing). You’ve just murdered thousand of noncombatants. You cannot claim you did not mean to kill the non-combatants any more than the man who first shoots the child before shooting the sniper can claim that he did not mean to shoot the child.
I don’t really agree with the claim that the militarized population were “non-combatants,” since they were specifically trained, children included, on how to combat us during an invasion.

But, regarding the claim of not meaning to kill non-combatants. Be careful here. In any war, the chances of at least some non-combatants being killed is 100%. By what you’re claiming, any wartime actions would be immoral since some non-combatants would be killed.

Our moral culpability ends when our bombing is discriminate (see my earlier post), our primary target is not civilians, and we’ve warned the civilians living among our primary target that we will be bombing it, so please leave.

We do not have the moral obligation of making sure that all the non-combatants heeded our advice. None of them were tied to chairs or prevented by the Japanese military to leave. In fact, I understand that a very small number did leave.
 
john doran:
perhaps. but would it be moral to destroy the whole neighbourhood just to get the chair?
If the neighborhood had chairs interspersed throughout, and they were hidden, so you couldn’t p(name removed by moderator)oint their exact location, and you warned those around that you were going to target the area, then yes.
 
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qmvsimp:
This is a fine line. In our case, we’re using a bomb that by its very nature will destroy everything around it. I guess you could shoot with a machine gun and know that the chance of the child surviving is virtually zero, but knowing that that is not your intent (to kill the child)
Let me add a further clarification here, then. Even in the case when you are intending to hit the sniper, you must actually aim at the sniper. You cannot simply fire a machine gun in the sniper’s general direction and claim to be trying to hit the sniper and avoiding the child. Hitting the child in this case would still cary moral culpability (criminal negligence, perhaps?).

On the other hand, if you had a sniper aiming at the sniper, took careful aim and shot, and at the last second the child jerked his head and got in the way of the bullet, then you are probably not culpable. You were making a good faith effort to respect the line between combatant and non-combatant.
I don’t really agree with the claim that the militarized population were “non-combatants,” since they were specifically trained, children included, on how to combat us during an invasion.
I’ve got a few earlier posts on this. If you have a specific rebuttal please point it out, but I don’t want to simply restate myself in this posting.
But, regarding the claim of not meaning to kill non-combatants. Be careful here. In any war, the chances of at least some non-combatants being killed is 100%. By what you’re claiming, any wartime actions would be immoral since some non-combatants would be killed.

Our moral culpability ends when our bombing is discriminate (see my earlier post), our primary target is not civilians, and we’ve warned the civilians living among our primary target that we will be bombing it, so please leave.

We do not have the moral obligation of making sure that all the non-combatants heeded our advice. None of them were tied to chairs or prevented by the Japanese military to leave. In fact, I understand that a very small number did leave.
In classical just war theory, what you are saying is similar to discussions on the morality of a siege. I’m not sure the same applies when an entire city is slated to be blotted off the face of the earth. Essentially, what it comes down to is that I refuse to accept an *entire *city as being a legitimate target, which is what an atomic bomb essentially does. I think the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets must be scrupulously maintained.

Also heard that there were no warnings and that, in Nagasaki, the leaflets actually came *after *the bomb was dropped.
 
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qmvsimp:
If the neighborhood had chairs interspersed throughout, and they were hidden, so you couldn’t p(name removed by moderator)oint their exact location, and you warned those around that you were going to target the area, then yes.
how many chairs would be needed to make your calculus of value work out the way you want? and how many civilians? what if there were 3 chairs and 30,000 civilians, would it be ok to kill them all to get the chairs? 2 chairs and 40,000 civilians? 10 and 1,000? how do you do the math?
 
Philip P:
Let me add a further clarification here, then. Even in the case when you are intending to hit the sniper, you must actually aim at the sniper. You cannot simply fire a machine gun in the sniper’s general direction and claim to be trying to hit the sniper and avoiding the child. Hitting the child in this case would still cary moral culpability (criminal negligence, perhaps?).

On the other hand, if you had a sniper aiming at the sniper, took careful aim and shot, and at the last second the child jerked his head and got in the way of the bullet, then you are probably not culpable. You were making a good faith effort to respect the line between combatant and non-combatant.

I’ve got a few earlier posts on this. If you have a specific rebuttal please point it out, but I don’t want to simply restate myself in this posting.

In classical just war theory, what you are saying is similar to discussions on the morality of a siege. I’m not sure the same applies when an entire city is slated to be blotted off the face of the earth. Essentially, what it comes down to is that I refuse to accept an *entire *city as being a legitimate target, which is what an atomic bomb essentially does. I think the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets must be scrupulously maintained.

Also heard that there were no warnings and that, in Nagasaki, the leaflets actually came *after *the bomb was dropped.
No need to go into detail, as it is all covered in earlier posts. Suffice to say I disagree with you.

I will point out one thing though: I think your blanket condemnation of taking out an entire city is wrong. You can make an argument that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were immoral bombings, but cities can be militarized, cities can be military cities where families of soldiers live with the soldiers, where military training takes place, where armaments are made, etc. I think it’s wrong to say that a city, by definition, can never be a legitimate target.
 
john doran:
how many chairs would be needed to make your calculus of value work out the way you want? and how many civilians? what if there were 3 chairs and 30,000 civilians, would it be ok to kill them all to get the chairs? 2 chairs and 40,000 civilians? 10 and 1,000? how do you do the math?
This is a good question. One that I can’t put a number qualifier on. But this is the same issue with having to kill an innocent in order to stop an aggressor from killing you or others. Like the sniper example and the tyrant living in the ranch house example.

Are there other ways of accomplishing the distruction or elimination of a killer or war instrument? Is time important? Can you warn the non-combatants beforehand?

In all of this discussion remember one thing: the result does not determine the morality of the action. It is the intention that does.

Was the targeting of Hiroshima and Nagasaki indiscriminate? Did we intend to purposely target civilians? I think the answer to both is no. I am not so sure, now that I know the results of our actions, that the bombing was not a mistake.
 
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qmvsimp:
I will point out one thing though: I think your blanket condemnation of taking out an entire city is wrong. You can make an argument that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were immoral bombings, but cities can be militarized, cities can be military cities where families of soldiers live with the soldiers, where military training takes place, where armaments are made, etc. I think it’s wrong to say that a city, by definition, can never be a legitimate target.
That’s an interesting position. For instance, would the city of Los Alamos be an example of a “militarized” city? I’m not sure it fits the definition of a city; more like a government installation. Similarly, an air force base is not a city, even though it has housing and non-military personnel attached to it. In contrast, if you were to base an army in Santa Fe, I don’t think that transforms the entire city of Santa Fe into a military target (I’m using American cities because I know more about them than about Japanese cities).

Still, in both the cases of Los Alamos or an air force base, I think you have a duty to target the war machines (planes, storage facilities, non-human objects) over actual people if possible. If it is possible to destroy a target’s military value without killing the humans present, that is alwasy preferrable.
 
Philip P:
That’s an interesting position. For instance, would the city of Los Alamos be an example of a “militarized” city? I’m not sure it fits the definition of a city; more like a government installation. Similarly, an air force base is not a city, even though it has housing and non-military personnel attached to it. In contrast, if you were to base an army in Santa Fe, I don’t think that transforms the entire city of Santa Fe into a military target (I’m using American cities because I know more about them than about Japanese cities).

Still, in both the cases of Los Alamos or an air force base, I think you have a duty to target the war machines (planes, storage facilities, non-human objects) over actual people if possible. If it is possible to destroy a target’s military value without killing the humans present, that is alwasy preferrable.
Agreed.

I think after 400+ posts, this horse is dead. No need to beat it anymore.
 
Philip P:
Unfortunately, this attempt to avoid the slippery slope fails. You cannot claim that the a Japanese woman who worked at the munitions factory this afternoon but is now sleeping at home is actually, rather than merely potentially, complicit, while at the same time saying that the farmer is not also complicit.
I didn’t say that.

The farmer is not necessarily complicit.

The munitions manufacturer is necessarily complicit.

We settled this some time ago by bombing the bridges and roads. And I gave a list of options which could be mixed or matched. What happened to that list?

In any case chosing between neutralizing the farmer or the munititions manufacturer is a matter of allocating limited resources toward the the action which produces the greater benefit. And this is not just a practical consideration. I have already explained this. The pragmatics, humanitarian, and moral are knitted together.
 
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qmvsimp:
In all of this discussion remember one thing: the result does not determine the morality of the action. It is the intention that does.
that’s not the only factor, though - any foreseen but unintended side-effects must also be proportionate to the intended end.

and i would say that the collateral civilian harm in this case was disproportionate and so far forth accepted by the US only unreasonably.
 
john doran:
it’s not whether the japanese were warned of the impending bomb-drop - it’s whether or not it was reasonable for the allies to believe that the civilians would actually have managed to evacuate the premises by the time the nuke was released.
What is not reasonable about assuming that those who wanted to escape would find a way?
john doran:
i mean, if you “warn” a guy who’s tied to a chair that you’re going to be shooting a bullet right where he’s sitting in the next 5 minutes, so he should get away, do you really believe that you’re absolved from culpability for killing him with your gun 5 minutes later when he’s still tied to that chair and you pull the trigger?
Faulty analogy. The room contains a soldier and a cook. You warn the cook and the soldier that if the soldier does not surrender in two days, then you will throw a grenade into the room.
 
Philip P:
Apply to our case. Suppose you drop conventional bombs on the munitions factories, some go astray and kill civilians. You are not necessarily morally culpable for those deaths.
The bomb over Nagasaki went astray due to bad weather and low visibility.
Philip P:
Suppose instead you choose a weapon or method that by its very nature entails the death of all within the city (i.e. firebombing, carpet bombing, atomic bombing).
Low-yield atomic bombing does not necessarily mean the destruction of an entire city. Only at ground zero. Firestorms are greater or smaller depending on the size of the bomb, the weather conditions, and the combustibility of the buildings.

If they had guidance systems in 1945, there would be a significant difference between carpet bombing and atomic bombing. Atomic bombing would damage a only specific area. Carpet bombing…well why would you carpet bomb if you had guidance systems?

However they did not have guidance systems in 1945 (other than hawk-eye bombardiers).

Conventional bombs went astray more often than they hit their targets. In Europe, attempts to avoid hitting civilians were not working. Not only that, the bombs were not hitting their targets. That drove the decision to carpet bomb, creating the firestorms.

**If **you had guidance systems in 1945, then yes you could say that bombing with atomic ordinance and bombing with conventional ordinance was significantly different. And that the nature of the atomic bomb posed a high risk of collateral damage. But there was a high risk of collateral damage with all bombing raids.

In 2005, we have guidance systems. We can guide a bomb directly to a mosquito sitting on a lily pad. So in 2005 there is a big difference between guiding a conventional bomb to a mosquito sitting on a lily pad and nuking the mosquito for morbid. The conventional bomb takes the mosquito out of the biting business. The nuke takes the mosquito and a big chunk of the forest and probably Uncle Mikey in his cabin out of business.

So if conventional carpet bombing and atomic bombing were not that different in terms of collateral damage…then why was the atomic bomb chosen in 1945?
 
john doran:
perhaps. but would it be moral to destroy the whole neighbourhood just to get the chair?
In the absence of guidance systems it was the nature of air attacks – conventional or nuclear – to produce collateral damage in 1945.
 
Philip P:
Essentially, what it comes down to is that I refuse to accept an *entire *city as being a legitimate target, which is what an atomic bomb essentially does.
The entire city was not the target.

The bomb used at Hiroshima was 12.5 kilotons killing 26.5% of its population. The bomb used at Nagasaki was 21 kilotons killing 21.9% of its population.

The percentage of deaths in a given population depends on the size of thepopulation and the proximity of that population to ground zero.

I think you might be thinking of the low-yield atomic bombs used in 1945 in the same light as the big fusion bombs tested in later years.

1945 = H 12.5 kilotons and N 21 kilotons, where kilo = 1000
tests = 1 megaton, where mega = million.
 
Ani Ibi:
Faulty analogy. The room contains a soldier and a cook. You warn the cook and the soldier that if the soldier does not surrender in two days, then you will throw a grenade into the room.
whether or not it’s faulty depends on what i was trying to do with it. as it happens, i was simply illustrating that a warning simpliciter is insufficient to absolve one of moral liability for harm done to individuals one has warned.

and as such, it’s right on the money.
 
john doran:
that’s not the only factor, though - any foreseen but unintended side-effects must also be proportionate to the intended end.

and i would say that the collateral civilian harm in this case was disproportionate and so far forth accepted by the US only unreasonably.
I agree that the collateral civilian harm was disproportionate, but that does not mean it was obvious this would be the case when Truman made the decision.

Was it reasonable to presume that the industrial centers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still producing arms and ammunition? I say yes.

Was it reasonable to presume that the population had been turned into mostly combatants prepared to repell an American invasion? Based on Japan’s radio transmissions and our experience in Iwo Jima and Okinawa, I say yes.

Was it reasonable to presume that most of the non-combatants had been warned ahead of time about the bomb? Based on the fliers dropped ahead of time, I say yes.

Did we know exactly where the arms and ammunition factories were in the cities? No.

Did we have precision guidance systems to place bombs? No.

Was time an issue with regard to lives? Yes, both American casualties and Japanese casualties (both military and civilian starvation).

Did we have strong evidence to show that the population had not been militarized? No.

Final conclusion: The bombings were moral at the time.

Was it a mistake in hindsight? Maybe.
 
Ani Ibi:
We settled this some time ago by bombing the bridges and roads. And I gave a list of options which could be mixed or matched. What happened to that list?

In any case chosing between neutralizing the farmer or the munititions manufacturer is a matter of allocating limited resources toward the the action which produces the greater benefit. And this is not just a practical consideration. I have already explained this. The pragmatics, humanitarian, and moral are knitted together.
I have no problem with neutralizing the munitions manufacturer. It’s when you reduce human beings to being *only *munitions manufacturers that I have the problem. If the woman who is employed at the munitions factory is not currently working there, she is not currently a munitions manufacturer. She is off limits as far as legitimate targeting goes. You may destroy her work place, and those currently at work there (though you should exert yourself to minimize deaths as much as possible), but you may not claim that simply because she has worked at a munitions plant in the past, she is a legitimate target for the duration of the war.
 
john doran:
whether or not it’s faulty depends on what i was trying to do with it. as it happens, i was simply illustrating that a warning simpliciter is insufficient to absolve one of moral liability for harm done to individuals one has warned.
It may or may not be insufficient. If time is of the essence, and you have no way of verifying with 100% accuracy that the warning was received by all and adheared to, then it is not your moral responsibility to hold fire. It is your moral responsibility to be reasonable, not 100% positive.

Similar to the sniper example. No one can be 100% positive that the bullet will not hit the child. But if the sniper is actively still killing people (time is of the essence), you can morally try to hit the sniper even if the child will also likely be hit.
 
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