Why Truman Dropped the Bomb

[Ani_Ibi]

john doran:

whether or not it’s faulty depends on what i was trying to do with it.

Look at the structure of what you are comparing. It’s a faulty analogy.
john doran:

as it happens, i was simply illustrating that a warning simpliciter is insufficient to absolve one of moral liability for harm done to individuals one has warned.

Which you did not succeed in doing due to the faulty analogy.

 

[Ani_Ibi]

Philip P:

I have no problem with neutralizing the munitions manufacturer. It’s when you reduce human beings to being *only *munitions manufacturers that I have the problem. If the woman who is employed at the munitions factory is not currently working there, she is not currently a munitions manufacturer. She is off limits as far as legitimate targeting goes. You may destroy her work place, and those currently at work there (though you should exert yourself to minimize deaths as much as possible), but you may not claim that simply because she has worked at a munitions plant in the past, she is a legitimate target for the duration of the war.

This is quibbling, Philip. Unless the munitions worker quits her job or dies she is still a munitions worker.

 

[Philip_P]

Ani Ibi:

So if conventional carpet bombing and atomic bombing were not that different in terms of collateral damage…then why was the atomic bomb chosen in 1945?

Because it made a bigger bang. Essentially an attempt at terrorizing the Japanese into surrender. Of course, I can’t prove that right here, so that remains just an unsubtantiated opinion.

Regarding the entire city not being the target, you have a point. I’ll need to amend my position. Instead of claiming that the atomic bomb had the entire city as its target, I’ll say that the atomic bomb’s target included a large area which included many non-combatants. So it’s still wrong, in my formulation, because it targeted non-combatants, but I’ve reduced the target area to be more in line with actuality (otherwise I would have to pretend that a single 1945-era atomic bomb is equally capable of destroying Los Angeles as Manhattan, despite the huge difference in city area).

To rebut this claim, you’ll need to rebut the following:

Syllogism 1
Premise 1: A proximate intention is an intention intrinsic to the nature of the object.
Premise 2: The nature of a nuclear bomb is to destroy everything within its target area
Conclusion: The proximate intention of a nuclear bomb is to destroy everything within its target area.

Syllogism 2
Premise 1: The target area in the two nuclear bombings in question consisted a large part of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, including all non-combatants within this area.
Premise 2: The proximate intention of a nuclear bomb is to destroy everything within its target area (from S1, above).
Conclusion: The proximate intention of the bombings in question was to destroy a large part of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, including all non-combatants within the area.

 

[Philip_P]

Ani Ibi:

This is quibbling, Philip. Unless the munitions worker quits her job or dies she is still a munitions worker.

But you don’t know if she’s going to quit her work or die. The CCC passages which justify lethal force against an agressor refer to agressor in the present tense, not past or future. Yes, it does seem like quibbling, and normally we don’t get anywhere near enough these moral lines for such distinctions to matter. War is a situation that is morally trying precisely because it *does *force us to that line, however. We have to hold the line somewhere. I’m holding it in the present tense, as it’s written in the CCC.

 

[john_doran]

qmvsimp:

I agree that the collateral civilian harm was disproportionate, but that does not mean it was obvious this would be the case when Truman made the decision.

Was it reasonable to presume that the industrial centers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still producing arms and ammunition? I say yes.

Was it reasonable to presume that the population had been turned into mostly combatants prepared to repell an American invasion? Based on Japan’s radio transmissions and our experience in Iwo Jima and Okinawa, I say yes.

Was it reasonable to presume that most of the non-combatants had been warned ahead of time about the bomb? Based on the fliers dropped ahead of time, I say yes.

Did we know exactly where the arms and ammunition factories were in the cities? No.

Did we have precision guidance systems to place bombs? No.

Was time an issue with regard to lives? Yes, both American casualties and Japanese casualties (both military and civilian starvation).

Did we have strong evidence to show that the population had not been militarized? No.

Final conclusion: The bombings were moral at the time.

Was it a mistake in hindsight? Maybe.

you should do a little more research on this, because many of the “facts” you (and others on this thread) present are not uncontroversial.

see here, for instance:

doug-long.com/letter.htm

while i, personally, believe the use of nuclear ordnance to be inherently unjustifiable, the more i read about hiroshima and nagasaki, the more i come to believe that the bombing was also pragmatically unjustifiable…

 

[john_doran]

Ani Ibi:

Look at the structure of what you are comparing. It’s a faulty analogy.

Which you did not succeed in doing due to the faulty analogy.

sigh.

here’s qmvsimp’s original post, to which i was responding:

qmvsimp:

What everyone seems to ignore is that we warned the cities ahead of time, about what was going to happen. We gave them time to evacuate. Do you still thinks it’s immoral under these circumstances?

it is difficult to misinterpret this: the obvious implication of the text is that offering (A) a warning, and (B) a chance to evacuate is sufficient to mitigate culpability for civilian casualties.

so, i painted a picture where A and B occur, but without any lessening of moral liability for the agent in question. and that, directly and simply, entails that A and B are not enough, without more, to absolve the US of liability.

QED.

 

[vern_humphrey]

qmvsimp:

No need to go into detail, as it is all covered in earlier posts. Suffice to say I disagree with you.

I will point out one thing though: I think your blanket condemnation of taking out an entire city is wrong. You can make an argument that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were immoral bombings, but cities can be militarized, cities can be military cities where families of soldiers live with the soldiers, where military training takes place, where armaments are made, etc. I think it’s wrong to say that a city, by definition, can never be a legitimate target.

It’s definitely wrong to say that the enemy can gain immunity for his military bases and war factories by putting them in cities.

It’s well understood that the side that places an anti-aircraft battery on the roof of an orphanage is responible for any resulting deaths among the orphans.

 

[Philip_P]

vern humphrey:

It’s well understood that the side that places an anti-aircraft battery on the roof of an orphanage is responible for any resulting deaths among the orphans.

This does not absolve your from all responsibilty, however. As with the example of the sniper holding the child hostage, while you may end up hitting the child despite your best efforts, you may not deliberately kill the child in order to have a better shot at the sniper.

With the anti-aircraft battery in the orphanage, you have a positive duty to minimize the danger to the orphans as much as possible. Can the military objective be accomplished without taking out the anti-aircraft battery? Can the anti-aircraft battery be neutralized in some way short of bombing it? In choosing our weapons and technique, we must seek that which would destroy the battery with the least amount of damage to the orphans themselves.

I suppose there is one way atomic bombing is justified. If the *only *weapons we had were atomic bombs. Then we would not have the option of a better weapon. A rather implausible scenario, though.

 

[vern_humphrey]

Philip P:

With the anti-aircraft battery in the orphanage, you have a positive duty to minimize the danger to the orphans as much as possible. Can the military objective be accomplished without taking out the anti-aircraft battery? Can the anti-aircraft battery be neutralized in some way short of bombing it? In choosing our weapons and technique, we must seek that which would destroy the battery with the least amount of damage to the orphans themselves.

And how do you intend to do that, since the people who control both building and orphans put the anti-aircraft battery there deliberately so you would have to kill orphans to take it out?
Philip P:

I suppose there is one way atomic bombing is justified. If the *only *weapons we had were atomic bombs. Then we would not have the option of a better weapon. A rather implausible scenario, though.

As we have seen, it was the only weapon that would accomplish the aim – to bring Japan to surrender. The use of conventional bombs and incendiaries had already killed more people in a single raid than the atomic bombs - and not brought the Japanese to surrender.

 

[qmvsimp]

john doran:

you should do a little more research on this, because many of the “facts” you (and others on this thread) present are not uncontroversial.

I do understand that many of these issues are in dispute. What is not indispute is that many, if not most, in the military believed what I am claiming. To assert their actions were immoral, you must show that they didn’t believe my claims, or that they should have known that my claims were false.

Given our shoddy intelligence in Iwo Jima and Okinawa, I think it’s a stretch to assert that they should have known better.

 

[john_doran]

vern humphrey:

As we have seen, it was the only weapon that would accomplish the aim – to bring Japan to surrender. The use of conventional bombs and incendiaries had already killed more people in a single raid than the atomic bombs - and not brought the Japanese to surrender.

well, the japanese would have surrendered conditionally without the use of atomic ordnance. what’s more, the entry of russia into the fray would have hastened a non-nuclear end to the conflict.

and why not a demonstration of the power of the bomb in a non-populated area? we had 2 of the bombs and a third on the way, though the japanese didn’t need to know that…

 

[qmvsimp]

john doran:

well, the japanese would have surrendered conditionally without the use of atomic ordnance. what’s more, the entry of russia into the fray would have hastened a non-nuclear end to the conflict.

and why not a demonstration of the power of the bomb in a non-populated area? we had 2 of the bombs and a third on the way, though the japanese didn’t need to know that…

The claim that the Japanese would have surrendered anyway is an interesting claim, but is just an opinion. The consensus among the military brass (confirmed by Japanese radio broadcasts) was that Japan was going to fight to the death, just like at Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

Russia was already in the fray. They had attacked the Japanese in Manchuria and took over the Kurile islands.

The fliers we dropped were very specific about just one bomb destroying everything. It is not our moral responsibility to prove to them we were not lying.

 

[vern_humphrey]

john doran:

well, the japanese would have surrendered conditionally without the use of atomic ordnance. what’s more, the entry of russia into the fray would have hastened a non-nuclear end to the conflict.

You know that for certain, do you?
john doran:

and why not a demonstration of the power of the bomb in a non-populated area? we had 2 of the bombs and a third on the way, though the japanese didn’t need to know that…

First of all, the firebombing of Tokyo was a “demonstration” that killed more people than either atomic bomb. They didn’t surrender.

We bombed Hiroshima. They didn’t surrender. It took a second bomb on Nagasaki to drive the point home.

It’s unlikely they would have surrendered, then based on a “demonstration.” So we’d still have had to bomb them twice – and we would have had only one bomb left after the “demonstration.”

 

[john_doran]

qmvsimp:

I do understand that many of these issues are in dispute. What is not indispute is that many, if not most, in the military believed what I am claiming.

here’s a list of some of those who didn’t believe that the use of the bomb was necessary or justifiable :

• General Dwight D. Eisenhower
• General Douglas MacArthur (the highest ranking officer in the Pacific Theater, who was not actually consulted beforehand)
• Fleet Admiral William Leahy (Chief of Staff to the President)
• General Carl Spaatz (commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific),
• Brigadier General Carter Clarke (the military intelligence officer who prepared intercepted Japanese cables for U.S. officials)
• Major General Curtis LeMay
• Admiral Ernest King, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
• Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet

 

[john_doran]

vern humphrey:

You know that for certain, do you?

no. do you know for certain they wouldn’t?

the primary japanese objection to the potsdam declaration was the allies’ failure to stipulate that hirohito would retain his title as emperor of japan, a condition that was of paramount importance to the japanese, and one on which they continued to insist even after the bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki.
vern humphrey:

First of all, the firebombing of Tokyo was a “demonstration” that killed more people than either atomic bomb. They didn’t surrender.

a firebomb is a conventional weapon, and doesn’t even come close to the radically terrifying impact of a nuclear bomb.
vern humphrey:

We bombed Hiroshima. They didn’t surrender. It took a second bomb on Nagasaki to drive the point home.

hardly anyone in the country even knew what had happened to hiroshima in the 3 days between the two attacks. why would they surrender until they had actually been apprised of the situation?
vern humphrey:

It’s unlikely they would have surrendered, then based on a “demonstration.” So we’d still have had to bomb them twice – and we would have had only one bomb left after the “demonstration.”

well, i disagree - if you focused the attention of the nation on a demonstration and ensured that as many people as possible witnessed the destructive force of a single bomb - especially those in power - i have no doubt the japanese response would have been swift and decisive: we surrender.

 

[qmvsimp]

john doran:

here’s a list of some of those who didn’t believe that the use of the bomb was necessary or justifiable :

• General Dwight D. Eisenhower
• General Douglas MacArthur (the highest ranking officer in the Pacific Theater, who was not actually consulted beforehand)
• Fleet Admiral William Leahy (Chief of Staff to the President)
• General Carl Spaatz (commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific),
• Brigadier General Carter Clarke (the military intelligence officer who prepared intercepted Japanese cables for U.S. officials)
• Major General Curtis LeMay
• Admiral Ernest King, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
• Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet

While I’m not convinced your list is accurate, most on the list expressed their opinion after the fact. That is not a fair poll.

I can come up with a list of military who thought it was necessary. But this wouldn’t prove it was. It would prove what we already know: that the decision was not an easy one, that there existed evidence and opinions on both sides of all the issues discussed here.

This furthers my point that Truman could not be morally culpable because you can’t say “he should have known.”

 

[john_doran]

qmvsimp:

The fliers we dropped were very specific about just one bomb destroying everything. It is not our moral responsibility to prove to them we were not lying.

not only is it not even clear that leaflets were dropped on hiroshima in particular, but the flyers didn’t name a specific city - they just said “evacuate your cities”.

but even had they named an exact city and a specific date, do you have any idea just how much propaganda circulates during war-time? pamphlets making false claims were regularly dropped in order to confuse, disinform, and demoralize the enemy. why would these pamphlets be any different?

 

[john_doran]

qmvsimp:

While I’m not convinced your list is accurate, most on the list expressed their opinion after the fact.

please provide evidence for the claim that they did not express this opinion prior to the fact.

qmvsimp:

I can come up with a list of military who thought it was necessary. But this wouldn’t prove it was. It would prove what we already know: that the decision was not an easy one, that there existed evidence and opinions on both sides of all the issues discussed here.

sure. but my point is only that you cannot rely on “most of the military thought it was ok, so it was probably ok for them”, which is what you originally posted.

here - this is what you actually said:

qmvsimp:

What is not indispute is that many, if not most, in the military believed what I am claiming. To assert their actions were immoral, you must show that they didn’t believe my claims, or that they should have known that my claims were false.

which is obviously incompatible with “I can come up with a list of military who thought it was necessary. But this wouldn’t prove it was.”. and that’s all i was trying to demonstrate.

qmvsimp:

This furthers my point that Truman could not be morally culpable because you can’t say “he should have known.”

i am not making any claims whatsoever about anyone’s personal culpability - god alone knows the heart of each man.

i am only considering the justifiability of the use of nuclear arms in the abstract.

 

[vern_humphrey]

john doran:

no. do you know for certain they wouldn’t?

You’re the one asserting the positive. By the rules of logic, the burden of proof is on you.
john doran:

the primary japanese objection to the potsdam declaration was the allies’ failure to stipulate that hirohito would retain his title as emperor of japan, a condition that was of paramount importance to the japanese, and one on which they continued to insist even after the bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki.

So why were there plots and attempts to kill pro-surrender politicians?
john doran:

a firebomb is a conventional weapon, and doesn’t even come close to the radically terrifying impact of a nuclear bomb.

Now there’s a nonsensical claim. A single firebomb raid killed more people than either atomic bomb. The raids created fire-storms, which by their nature are uncontrolable and unpredictable.
john doran:

hardly anyone in the country even knew what had happened to hiroshima in the 3 days between the two attacks. why would they surrender until they had actually been apprised of the situation?

This is the flip side of the belief that leaders are telepathically connected to their followers.http://forums.catholic-questions.org/images/icons/icon12.gif

The decision-makers knew it.
john doran:

well, i disagree - if you focused the attention of the nation on a demonstration and ensured that as many people as possible witnessed the destructive force of a single bomb - especially those in power - i have no doubt the japanese response would have been swift and decisive: we surrender.

Your disagreement doesn’t amount to proof, nor even probabilty.

 

[qmvsimp]

john doran:

no. do you know for certain they wouldn’t?

But that is one of the main points here. None of us knows for certain. To claim immoral based on the assertion that they would have surrendered anyway, requires a high burden to show that they would have.
john doran:

the primary japanese objection to the potsdam declaration was the allies’ failure to stipulate that hirohito would retain his title as emperor of japan, a condition that was of paramount importance to the japanese, and one on which they continued to insist even after the bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki.

There was a lot more to it than that. I understood that they wanted more than just a figurehead position for the Emporer.
john doran:

hardly anyone in the country even knew what had happened to hiroshima in the 3 days between the two attacks. why would they surrender until they had actually been apprised of the situation?

What’s important is that the top echelons of the military brass (the decision makers) did know about it, and they still did not surrender.